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TMI Blog1952 (10) TMI 32X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oceeding under article 32 would lie after an application under article 226 for the same relief the same facts had been rejected after due enquiry by a High Court. We express no opinion that point. The facts leading to this proceeding are not in dispute and may be briefly stated. The first petitioner is an Advocate of this Court and his name is also the roll of Advocates of the High Court of Calcutta. As an Advocate of the latter Court he is entitled, under the relevant rules there in force, both to act and to plead the Appellate Side but not to act or to appear, unless instructed by an Attorney, the Original Side. 18th July, 1951, he filed in the Registry the Original Side a warrant of authority executed in his favour by the second petitioner to defend the latter in a pending suit. The warrant was returned 27th July, 195 1, with the endorsement that it "must be filed by an Attorney of this Court under the High Court Rules and Orders, Original Side, and not by an Advocate". The return was made by an Assistant in charge of Suit Registry Department, who is called as the first respondent to this petition. The second respondent is the Registrar, Original Side, who is alleged to have re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d in the Supreme Courts, rules were made empowering Advocates only to appear and plead and not to act, while Attorneys were enrolled and authorised to act and not to plead. In the Sudder Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto, pleaders who obtained a certificate from those Courts were allowed both to act and plead. When the Supreme Courts and the Sudder Courts were abolished and their jurisdictions were transferred to High Courts under the statute of 1861, this differentiation in the functions of legal practitioners was continued in the High Courts under the notion, apparently, that the High Court, in the exercise of its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction, was the successor of the Supreme Court, and that, the Appellate Side, it inherited the jurisdiction and powers of the Sudder Courts, with the result that Advocates were allowed only to appear and plead instructed by Attorneys empowered to act the Original Side as in the Supreme Court, while the Appellate Side, they were allowed both to act and plead as in the Sudder Courts. There was also another class of practitioners known as Vakils who were neither allowed to act nor to plead the Original Side, but were allowed both to act and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s, the Vakils and the Pleaders, by merging them in the class of Advocates who, were "entitled as of right to practise" in the High Courts in which they were enrolled and in any other court in British India, subject to certain exceptions. It also provided for the constitution of Bar Councils for the High Courts with power to regulate the admission of Advocates, to prescribe their qualifications and to inquire into any case of miscouduct that may be referred to them. But the right to practise and the power to make rules were not to limit or in any way affect the unlimited powers of the High Courts at Calcutta and Bombay to make rules allowing or disallowing Advocates to practise their Original Side: (vide section 9 (4) and section 14). While such was the position of Advocates in the courts in what -used to be known as British India, it is not a matter of dispute that Advocates practising in the courts of what were known as Indian States were allowed to appear, plead and act behalf of suitors. It will thus be seen that legal practitioners, by whatever name called, practising in all the High Courts in India, except the Original Side of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, and in the i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... High Court as the respondents seek to do. the other hand, the respondents contend that the non obstante clause in the first part of the section furnishes the key to the proper interpretation of its scope, and inasmuch as that clause supersedes only those pro-visions of the Bar Councils Act, and of any other law which exclude persons not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court from the right to practise in that Court, the enacting clause must be construed as conferring only a right co-extensive with the disability removed by the opening clause; that is to say, the section is designed only to enable Advocates of the Supreme Court who are not enrolled as Advocates of any High Court to practise nevertheless in that High Court. The petitioner, who is already an Advocate of the Calcutta High Court, could derive no additional right from the section in relation to that Court, as he does not fall within the purview of the section. Alternatively, even if the provision is read as conferring Advocates of the Supreme Court the right to practise in relation to all the High Courts in India, including the High Courts in which they are already enrolled, the section does no more than entitl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t case the right of counsel to sue for and recover a quantum meruit in respect of professional services rendered by him, the Judicial Committee remarked:"Their Lordships entertain serious doubts whether in an English Colony where the common law of England is in force, they (i.e., general considerations of public policy) could have any application to the case of a lawyer who is not a more advocate or pleader and who combines in his own person various functions which are exercised by legal practitioners of every class in England all of whom, the Bar alone excepted, can recover their fees by an action at law." It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that the practice of law in this country generally involves the exercise of both the functions of acting and pleading, behalf of a litigant party; in other words, the Bar in India, generally speaking, is organised as a single agency. Accordingly, when the Legislature confers upon an Advocate "the right to practise" in a Court, it is legitimate to understand that expression as authorising him to appear and plead as well as to act behalf of suitors in that Court. It is true that the word "practice" used in relation to a given profession me ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... difficult situation. It was said that a, local Advocate could be engaged to instruct him, acting for the client. Even if it were permissible to substitute a local Advocate for an "Agent" to overcome the disability imposed by Order IV, Rule 11, of the Supreme Court Rules which prohibits an Advocate from appearing "unless he is instructed by an Agent", it would be tantamount to introducing a new type of dual agency where it does not exist at present, an innovation which, we think, could hardly have been contemplated. Such an interpretation would also render the right conferred by the new Act largely illusory in practice. The construction adopted by the learned Judges of the High Court, which relates the word "practise" in section 2 to the High Court in which the Supreme Court Advocate seeks to exercise his right, seems to us to be equally open to objections. In their view, that word as applied to the same Advocate should be understood in a wider or narrower sense in relation to different High Courts, and indeed, to different jurisdictions of the same High Court, according to the rules there in force. They say:-- "Since the section applies to a number of different High Courts where- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upreme Court in all the cases referred to above seeks to practise only one profession, namely, the profession of an Advocate. As such he would be bound to observe the rules of practice of each Court, that is, the prescribed procedure for conducting legal proceedings in the Court concerned; but a rule which denies to him the right to exercise an essential part of his function by insisting a dual agency the Original Side is much more than a rule of practice and the power of making such a rule, unless expressly reserved by the new Act, as it was reserved in section 9 (4) and section 14(3) of the Bar Councils Act, would be repugnant to the right conferred by section 2. In this connection, it may be pertinent to point out that the power of the High Courts to make rules of practice regulating the procedure to be followed in the conduct of proceedings before them and the power to frame rules regulating the admission and conduct of legal practitioners were always derived from distinct sources originally under different clauses of the Letters Patent establishing them and later from the Civil Procedure Code and the Bar Councils Act. The learned Judges have also overlooked an important disti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isdiction." It is to be noted that by virtue of the last two provisions to which the right of local Advocates is made expressly subject, the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay have the power to "grant or refuse as they think fit" the application of any person applying to practise in the Original Side of those Courts, and the power to make rules laying down who shall plead and who shall act that side. It is in exercise of these powers that the High Courts have framed the rules, to which reference has been made, cutting down the right of the Advocates of those Courts to practise the Original Side to appearing and pleading only and otherwise imposing restrictions that right, such as, that they shall not appear unless instructed by an Attorney. That is to say, the Advocates of those Courts are not entitled to practise as of right the Original Side. As the powers thus reserved are exercisable only in regard to the Original Side, the Advocates of these Courts are under section 14(1) (a) entitled as of right to practise in the appellate and other jurisdictions exercised by those Courts. Similarly, under section 2 of the new Act every Advocate of the Supreme Court is entitled as of right t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and we entirely agree with that decision. The learned Judges below attempted to distinguish that case, as Mr. Chatterjee for the respondents did before us, by observing that because the Bar Councils Act made no distinction between the different jurisdictions of the Madras High Court and the rules of that Court allowed the Advocates to act and plead the Original as well as the Appellate jurisdiction thereof, the learned Judges construed the word "practise" in section 14 to mean both acting and pleading. That is not a correct view of the reasoning employed by the Full Bench. The learned Judges failed to see that such reasoning would indeed lead to the opposite conclusion. As a matter of, fact, there was a rule under which the local Advocates were prevented from acting and they had accordingly not acted in the insolvency jurisdiction of that Court, so that if "practise" in section 14(1) (a) were to be construed in the light of what the Advocates bad been doing in the past under the rules of that Court, the Court would have had to hold that the Advocates acquired no new right by virtue of section 14(1) (a) But the Full Bench held that they did and the gist of their reasoning was thus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ar right under the new -Act the Supreme Court Advocates, did not reserve any such overriding power. In the absence of such reservation, the statutory right of a Supreme Court Advocate to plead as well as to act in the High Courts of Calcutta, and Bombay in the exercise of their original jurisdiction cannot be taken away or curtailed by those Courts, and any rules which they may have made in the past purporting to. exclude any Advocate from acting their Original Side, or from appearing and pleading unless he is instructed by an Attorney cannot affect such right. Turning now to the non obstante clause in section 2 of the new Act, which appears, to have furnished the whole basis for the reasoning of the Court belowand the argument before us closely, followed 'that reasoning-we find the learned Judges begin by inquiring what are the provisions which that clause seek-, to supersede and then place upon the enacting clause such Construction as would make the right conferred by-it co-extensive with the disability imposed by the superseded provisions. The meaning of the section will become clear", they, obser, "if we examine a little more closely what the, section in fact supersedes or rep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... " Indian Bar Councils Act " which are separated by the comma and that, therefore, the whole of that Act is superseded, while'learned counsel for the respondents insisted that in construing a statute punctuation marks should be left out of consideration. Nothing much we think, turns the comma, as it seems I grammatically more correct to take the adjectival clause as qualifying " law ". Having 'regard to the words anything contained" and the preposition "in" used after the disjunctive "or", the qualifying clause cannot reach back to the words " Bar Councils Act ". But, whichever way we take it, it must be admitted that, in framing the non obstante clause, the draftsman had primarily in, mind those Provisions which stood in the way of an Advocate not enrolled in any particular High Court practising in that Court. It does not, however, necessarily follow that section 2 is concerned only with the right of Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise in the High Courts in which they are not enrolled. The true scope of the enacting clause must, as we have observed, be determined a fair reading of the words used in their natural and ordinary meaning, and in the present case, there is not muc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ouncils, Act, and we have already indicated our view that; the word "Practise as applied to a legal practitioner in,,, India includes, in the absence of any limiting or restrictive; context, both the functions of acting and pleading. The phrase " entitled as of right to practise " is an emphatic affirmation of a right to plead, and to act independently,of the will or discretion of any other person. Could it be said that sections 9 (4)and 14 (3) of the Bar Councils Act are consistent with the existence of such a right ? As we have seen already, section 9 (4) preserves the powers of the High Courts at Calcutta and Bombay, among other things, " to grant or refuse, as they think fit " the applications of persons to practise in those High Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction How could a person be said to be entitled as of right to practise in a High Court if that Court has unfettered power to reject his application to practise an important side of its jurisdiction ? Similarly, bow Could a person be said to be entitled as of right to pleadin a High Court if that Court has the power to frame a rule which precludes him from pleading in the original jurisdiction of ;that Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Comprises the exercise of his two-fold function' of acting and pleading without the intervention of anybody else. Any rule or condition that prevents him from exercising one of those functions is plainly a cutting down of his right to practise and, affecting as it does the substance of his right, is in its operation, quite unlike the rules and conditions of practice under which all Advocates normally carry their business in courts. No one suggests that a Supreme Court Advocate is, by becoming entitled to practise in the High Courts, freed from all. obligation to conform to the ruler, of practice and regulations as, to costume and Such other matters, according to which the profession of law must be exercised in the various High Courts. There is a vital distinction between such rules and regulations and the rules which seek to out down the substance of an Advocate's right to act and to plead by excluding him from the exercise of the one or the other of those two functions. The Bar Councils Act recognises this distinction by expressly reserving the power of the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay to exclude or impose restrictions upon the right of Advocates to plead and to act the Ori ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eof. As regards the speeches made by the members of the House in the course of the debate, this Court has recently held that they are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of statutory provisions: The State of Travancore-Cochin & Another v. The Bombay Co. Ltd. etc.( [1952] S,C.R. 1112 ). As regards the propriety of the reference to the statement of objects and reasons, it must be remembered that it seeks only to explain what reasons induced the mover to introduce the Bill in the House and what objects he sought to achieve. But those objects and reasons may or may not correspond to the objective which the majority of members had in view when they passed it into law. The Bill may have undergone radical changes during its passage through the House or Houses, and there is no guarantee that the reasons which led to its introduction and the objects thereby sought to be achieved have remained the same throughout till the Bill emerges from the House as an Act of the Legislature for they do not form part,of the Bill and are not voted upon by the members. We, therefore, consider that the statement of objectsand reasons appended to the Bill should be, ruled out as an aid to t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Advocate of the Calcutta High Court entitled to practise both its Original and Appellate Sides. This means, that he can both plead and act the Appellate Side of the Court and plead only its Original Side. Mr. Ghosh later got himself enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court and after the passing of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Act, 1951, he asserted his right, the strength of the provision of that enactment, to " or act" also the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court. He actually filed "a warrant of power and appearance" behalf of the petitioner No. 2 in a suit pending in the Original Side of that Court in which the latter figures 'as thedefendant. The warrant was returned to him by the Suit Registrar, Original Side, with an endorsement it, that it must be filed by an Attorney of the Court under the rules and orders of the Original Side of the High Court, and not by an Advocate. Being aggrieved by this refusal, the petitioners presented an application before the Calcutta High Court under article 226 of the Constitution, complaining of infraction of the right conferred upon the first petitioner by Act XVIII of 1951 and praying for an appropriate writ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which runs thus "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (XXXVIII of 1926) or in any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court, may be permitted to practise in that High Court every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right to' practise in any High Court whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court". Upon this,aproviso is engrafted to the following effect that"nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle any person merely by reason of his being an Advocate of the Supreme Court to practise in a High Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking not to practise therein after ceasing to hold office as such Judge". Then follows a short explanation which simply lays down that the expression "High Court" in the section includes the Court of a Judicial Commissioner and the statute ends there. It may be mentioned at the outset that the Supreme Court was established in the year 1950 and article 145(1) of the Constitution empowered the Court to make rules "for regulating generally the practice and procedure of the court" includ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . It is further argued that the words "whether or not he is an Advocate of that High Court" occurring in section 2 unmistakably indicate that the -legislature had not in mind the removal of disabilities attaching to outside Advocates merely, but that it intended to confer certain privileges domestic Advocates as well who happened to be enrolled as Advocates of the Supreme Court. All these matters require to be examined carefully. The word "practise" when used with reference to a profession means "to follow, pursue, work at, or exercise such profession". The profession Of an Advocate may contemplate both acting and pleading; under certain circumstances it may mean pleading alone without acting, but it can never mean acting simply, for those who are entitled to act only and have no right to plead do not come within the description of Advocates at all. There are other classes of nonAdvocate lawyers who like Solicitors and Agents can act only but cannot plead, and to the carrying of their profession also the same expression practise" is applied. What is to be remembered in this connection is that the profession of an Advocate can be carried only in a court of law and within the framew ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on 14 (1) of the Bar Councils Act have not been repeated there. Mr. Ghosh has in this connection drawn our attention to two reported cases, one of which is a pronouncement of the Patna High Court and the other of the Madras High Court. In the Patna case the question &rose as to whether an Advocate or Vakil whose name appeared the roll of any High Court could "act" behalf of his client by presenting an application for review of a judgment in a case which was tried by a court subordinate to the High Court. The question was answered in the affirmative and reliance was placed upon section 4 of the Legal Practitioners Act which lays down that "an Advocate or Vakil enrolled any High Court'shall be entitled to practise in all courts subordinate to the court the roll of which he is entered". This case, it is to be noted, deals with Advocates' right to practise in subordinate courts where no distinction at all exists between pleading and acting. Consequently, the word "practise" in this context does include both pleading and acting. In the Madras case(In re the Powers of the Advocates, [1928] I.L.R.52 Mad. 92,) the point for consideration was, whether an Advocate enrolled in the High Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in any High Court he chooses, irrespective of the rules of practice which obtain in such court. The first view does not appear to me to be tenable. 'I If it is held, that what the section contemplates is that a Supreme Court Advocate in exercising his right of practice in any High Court should be governed by the Supreme Court Rules, the Act itself would be altogether unworkable. It is laid down in Order IV, Rule 12, of the Supreme Court Rules that "no person shall appear as Advocate in any case unless he is instructed by an Agent. By "Agent" is meant an Agent of the Supreme Court and under no provision of law is such Agent entitled to act in any High Court in India. The result, therefore, is that if the Supreme Court Rules are applied, no Advocate would be entitled to appear in any High Court at all. It cannot be argued that even though the rules of the Supreme Court may not be strictly applicable, the intention of the legislature is that a Supreme Court Advocate in appearing before a High Court either the Original or the Appellate Side shall have only the right of pleading and he has to be instructed by an Attorney or a local Advocate who is competent to act. Whatever the merits ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitioner, cannot certainly be supported. So long as the rules relating to pleading and acting in particular jurisdictions of specified High Courts are allowed to remain valid and binding, no intention can be imputed to the legislature, without clear words to that effect, of abrogating these rules with regard to the few persons who happen to be enrolled as Advocatess of the Supreme Court. Far from achieving uniformity in any sense of the word, such step would lead to serious anomaly and practical difficulties of an enormous character. In. the original jurisdictions of the Calcutta and the Bombay High Courts, where the dual system subsists, there are elaborate rules regarding the functions of the Solicitors who alone are competent to act that side, both in 'relation to the courts and to the litigants. The whole procedure is of a different type, dissimilar in many respects to that which is laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for an Advocate of the Supreme Court, who chooses to act the Original Side of the Calcutta or the Bombay High Court, to fit himself within the framework of these rules. He cannot possibly carry unless a fresh set ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ause purports to remove all those provisions of the Bar Councils Act or of any other law which imposed restrictions upon persons not enrolled as Advocates of a particular court in the matter of practising in that court. The exclusion is to this extent and no further; and consequently all the other provisions contained in the Bar Councils Act or other statutes which lay down the conditions 'under which an Advocate enrolled in a High Court is entitled to practise in the Original Side of that Court, stand unaffected by that clause. If these provisions remain valid and effective, it is quite reasonable to hold that the word "practise " in the section must mean " practise " in accordance with these rules and not in supersession of them. The contention of Mr. Ghosh is that a proper construction of the language of the claue the whole of the Bar Councils Act and not merely those provisions in it, which relate to disabilities attaching to Advocates of other High Courts, must be deemed to be eliminated, so that the right of practising that is conferred by the section is to be exercised without the restrictions or limitations flowing from any of the provisions of the Bar Councils Act. In sup ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sition. The Bar Councils Act itself does not make any provision relating to the rights of pleading and acting in the Original Side of any High Court. Sections 9(4) and 14(3) of the Act save only the rights of the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay to make rules in relation thereto ; and these rules are made by these courts in the exercise -of their powers under the Letters Patent. Section 19(2) of the Bar Councils Act lays down as follows:- " When sections 8 to 16 come into force in respect of any High Court of Judicature established by Letters Patent, this Act shall have effect in respect of such Court notwithstanding anything contained in such Letters Patent, and such Letters Patent shall, in so far as they are inconsistent with this Act or any rules made there under, be deemed to have been repealed." If the entire Bar Councils Act is excluded for purposes of section 2 of Act XVIII of 1951, the rules framed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay under-the Letters Patent would remain valid -and effective of their own force even without the saving provision contained in the abovementioned section of the Bar Councils Act, and section 19(2) of the Act being out of the picture, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rolled as Advocates of the particular High Court as well. Section 9 (4) of the Bar Councils Act lays down:- "Nothing in this section or in any other provision of this Act shall be deemed to limit or, in any way affect the powers of the High Courts of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal and at Bombay to prescribe the qualifications to be possessed by persons applying to practise in those High Courts respectively in the exercise of their original jurisdiction or the powers of those High Courts to grant or refuse, as they think fit, any such application (or to prescribe the conditions under which such persons shall be entitled to practise or plead)." Provisions of this type are to be found in the Rules of both the Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts. Under Rule 1, Chapter I, of the Calcutta, Original Side Rules, even an Advocate of that court has to make an application for being entitled to appear and plead the Original Side and he can exercise that right only after that permission is granted. Such rules would have no effect after the passing of Act XVIII of 1951 and an Advocate of the Supreme Court will be entitled to plead in the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court as a matt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ins (1802] A.C. 492 at 5o2. (2)Vida Krishna Ayyangar v. Nellaperumal[1920] 47 I.A33; Assam. Railway & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1935] A.C, 443; Administrator General of Bengal v. Premlal [1895] 12 I.A. 107 (3) Vida Debendra v. Jogendru, A.I.R. 1936 Cal. 593. judicial opinion this point is certainly not quite uniform and there are American decisions to the effect that the general history of a statute, and the various steps leading up to an enactment including amendments or modifications -of the original bill and reports of Legislative Committees can be, looked at for ascertaining the intention, of the legislature where it is in doubt; but they hold definitely that the legislative history is inadmissible when there is no obscurity in the meaning of the statute(1). Even assuming that the latter view is correct, it does not appear to me that the first and the second contentions of the petitioner indicated above are really of any assistance to him. It is true that in the statement of, objects and reasons which was circulated' along with the original bill, the word "practise" was said to include both Pleading and acting; but at the same time the original bill did ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of a nonexistent provision. We do not know the reasons -why the legislature deleted this clause and it is not permissible for us to speculate these matters. A reference to the legislative debates or the speeches that were actually delivered in the floor of the House is, in my opinion, inadmissible to ascertain the meaning of the words used in the enactment. The use of the word "practise" in the, proviso to section 2, as it now stands, is also a matter of no importance. Section 2 confers certain additional rights upon the Supreme Court Advocates and they have the right of practising in all the High Courts in India subject, as I have said, to the rules and regulations binding the Advocates in each one of them. The proviso makes an exception to this rule, and in case an Advocate of an particular High Court, who became a Judge of that court, gave an undertaking at the time when he assumed his office that he would not practise in that court after he ceased to be a Judge, the provision in the section could not be availed of by him in the face of his undertaking. This is the plain meaning of the proviso. Apparently the legislature was not in the least concerned when it enacted this provi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... advocate for the petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee'filed the warrant with the Assistant in charge -of the Suit Registry Department of the Original Side. This was, clearly done in purported compliance with the provisions of Chapter 8, rule 15, of the Original Side Rules. That rule, however, requires the defendant to enter his appearance to a writ of summons by filing a memorandum in writing containing the name and place of business of the defendant's attorney or stating that the defendant defends in person and containing his name and place of business. That rule does not in terms contemplate an advocate acting for a defendant. It is, therefore, not surprising at all that July 27,'1951, the "warrant of appearance" was returned by the respondent Arabinda Bose, the Assistant in the Suit Registry ]Department of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court, with the endorsament that "the warrant must be filed by an attorney of this Court under High Court Rules and Orders, Original Side, and not by an Advocate". The petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee thereupon entered appearance in person July 30, 1951, and has been defending the suit in person. The two petitioners, however, moved ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al leave to appeal against the judgment and order of, the Special, Bench of the Calcutta High Court dismissing the petitioners' application, under article 226 of the Constitution and for condonation of the delay in presenting the present petition. At the hearing before us it has not been seriously suggested that the rights of the petitioner Jnanendra Nath Chatterjee, fundamental or otherwise, have in any way been infringed. Nor was the petition presented before us as one for the enforcement of any fundamental right of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh -guaranteed by article 19 of the Constitution. What Was pressed before us by the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh, who appeared in, person, was the right said to have been conferredhim as an advocate of this Court by section 2 of the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in the High Courts) Act (Act XVII of 1951) hereinafter in this judgment referred to as "the Act". In the circumstances the petition has not seriously been presented before us as one under article 32 of the Constitution and it is not necessary for me to express any opinion as to whether a petitioner whose application for enforcement of an alleged fundamental right under artic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tories within Her Majesty's dominions in India, not included within the limits of the local jurisdiction of another High Court. Pursuant to this authority High Courts were established by Letters Patent at Fort William in Bengal, Madras and Bombay. Clause 9 of the Letters Patent of each of the three Presidency High Courts authorised and empowered each of the said High Courts: "to approve, admit, and enrol such and so many Advocates, Vakils, and Attorneys as to the said High Court shall seem meet; and such Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys shall be and are here by authorised to appear for the suitors of the said High Court, and to plead or to act, or to plead and act, for the said suitors, according as the said High Court may by its rules and directions determine, and subject to such rules and directions. Subsequently other, High Courts -were established from time to time by Letters Patent at different places, e.g. Allahabad, Patna,, Lahore and Nagpur, and similar power was, by clause 7 of the respective Letters Patent, conferred each of the said High Courts to make similar,rules. It is well known that each of the High Courts actually framed rules for the admission of advocates, vaki ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prescribed certain conditions subject to which alone an advocate who was not their rolls could "appear and plead" in such High Courts. Chapter I, rule 38, of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court provides as follows:"An Advocate of any other High Court or Chief Court may with the permission of the Chief Justice appear and plead for parties in matters arising in or out of the original jurisdiction, or in or out of appeals therefrom, provided he is a member of the Bar of England or of Northern Ireland, or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, or a person entitled to appear and plead the Original Side of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, and that he is properly instructed by an Attorney-" There is also a rule framed under section 15 (b) of the Indian Bar Councils Act which applies to the Appellate Side of the Calcutta High Court prescribing that an advocate of another High Court can "appear and-plead" the Appellate Side of the Calcutta High Court in a particular case or cases only with the previous permission of the Chief Justice. Reference may in this connection be made to Chapter I, rule 6, of the Bombay Rules applicable to the Original Side and the rule fr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is Act and, therefore, the provisions of the Act have to be considered in the light of these prevailing circumstances which undoubtedly form the background' of this enactment and which cannot be-overlooked or ignored. Turning now to the text of the Act, one cannot but be impressed at once with 'the wording of the full title of the Act. Although there are observations in earlier English cases that the title is not a part of the statute and is, therefore, to be excluded from consideration in construing the statute, it is now settled law that the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light its construction, although it cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment. (See Maxwell the Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edn.P. 44 and the cases cited therein). The full title 'of the Act now under consideration runs thus: "An Act to authorise Advocates of the Supreme Court to practise as of right in any High Court." One cannot fail to note the words " as of right and the words " in any High Court " which follow immediately. Those two sets of words at once convey to my mind that the act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urt " and ending with the words " of that High Court." To clear the ground it will be useful, at the outset, to ascertain the 'scope and ambit of the nonobstante clause. The controversy this clause has raged round the question whether the adjectival clause, namely, "regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court may be permitted. to practise in that High Court " governs the words " the Indian Bar Councils Act " as well as the words "any other law" which immediately precede that clause. If that clause also attaches to and qualifies the words "the Indian Bar Councils Act" then there can remain no manner of doubt that the ambit, scope and purpose of the non-obstante clause are to supersede, not the whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act but, only that part of it which regulates the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of Advocates of a High Court may be permitted to practise in that High Court, that is to say, that the supersession of the Indian Bar Councils. Act is only to the same extent to which that adjectival clause supersedes "any other law". Conscious that such a construction will run counter to hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Councils Act, then the use of the word "other" was wholly inapposite and unnecessary. The use of that word 'unmistakably leads to the conclusion that the adjectival clause also qualifles something other than "other law". If the intention were that the Indian Bar Councils Act should remain unaffected by the qualifying phrase and should be superseded in toto for the purposes of this Act the legislature would have said "or in any law regulating the conditions etc." It would have been yet simpler not to refer to the Indian Bar Councils Act at all and to drop the adjectival clause and to simply say "Not withstanding anything contained in any law". In the light of the true meaning of the title of the Act as I have explained above and having regard to the use of the word " other " I have, no hesitation in holding, in agreement with the High Court, that what the non-obstante clause intended to exclude or supersede was not the whole of the Indian Bar, Councils Act but to exclude or supersede that Act and any other law only in so far as -they or either of them purported to regulate the conditions subject to which a person not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court might be permitt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o it.It is said that the rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts do prescribe the qualifications to be possessed by persona applying to practise in those Courts and the conditions under which such persons will be entitled to practise and reserve to those Courts the right to grant.'or refuse any application for enrolment. It is also pointed out that the rules of the Original Sides of' those two High Courts do determine the persons who shall respectively plead and act in those High Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdictions. It is next pointed out that sections 9 (4) and 14 (3) of the Indian Bar Councils Act preserve these rules and it is contended that a supersession of the Indian Bar Councils Act in its entirety will do away with sections 9(4) and 14(3) and the protection of those sections having been withdrawn, those rules will consequently stand abrogated, so as to facilitate the operation of the provisions of section 2 of the Act under review. I am unable to accept, this argument as sound. Sections 9(4) and 14(3) do not purport to give any fresh validity to the rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts. All that those sections do is to declare that nothing in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... permitted "to appear and plead." There was no question of the foreign advocate "acting" in a High Court of which he was not an advocate. The purpose of the nonobstante clause is to supersede only the provisions of the Indian Bar Councils Act and the rules which regulated those, identical conditions. It is not seriously disputed that the legislature in passing the non-obstante clause had only those conditions in mind. There can be no manner of doubt, therefore, that the words "to practise" in the non-obstante clause mean, in the context, "to appear and plead". The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh then falls back on a-second line of reasoning. He urges that whatever may be the meaning, scope and effect of the non-obstante clause, it cannot possibly cut down the meaning of the positive words in the operative part of the section. His contention is that the High Court war, wrong in holding that the nonobstante clause was coextensive with the operative part. While it may be true that the non-obstante clause need not necessarily be coextensive with the operative part, there can be no doubtand the petitioner and Dr. N. C. Sen Gupta appearing for the Calcutta Bar Association and supporting th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... yers, some of whom, e.g., attorneys of the Original Sides of Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and agents of this Court, only "act", some others of whom, e.g., the Original Side advocates of those two High Courts and of this Court, only "plead" and all the remaining advocates of all the High Courts both "act and plead". The scope of the professional activities of the different categories of lawyers thus varies but, nevertheless, they are all said "to practise". These words, therefore, connote the general idea of exercising the legal profession, which is their dictionary meaning, and in that general sense apply to all lawyers as a class or genus but at the same time they are capable, in their application to particular species or categories of lawyers, to connote the different professional attributes of those different categories or species. Turning to the Indian Bar Councils Act we find that the expression "to practise" has been used in various sections in the generic sense I have mentioned. Let me illustrate my meaning by reference to a few sections. Section 4 of that Act deals with the composition of Bar Councils. Sub-section (1) provides that every Bar Council shall consist of 15 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he different-species who are within the sub-, sections they mean different professional attributes. Thus, in subsection (3) which applies to Original Side advocates only they must mean "to plead" whereas in sub-section (2) which applies to all categories of advocates the words have different meanings, that is to say, in relation to advocates other than Original Side advocates they mean "to act and plead" and in relation to the Original Side advocates they mean only "to plead". Same remarks apply to section 5 (1). It will be futile to refer to the principle that the same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs in the Act, for the context excludes the application of that principle. Take section 8 (2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act which provides: "8. (1)........................ (2) The High Court shall prepare and maintain a roll of advocates of the High Court in which shall be entered the names of-' (a) all persons who were, as advocates, vakils or pleaders, entitled as of right to practise in the High Court immediately before the date which this section comes into force in respect thereof;........... It we do not give to the words "to practise' in clause (a) the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Side advocates, then we must read the words "to practise" in their ordinary dictionary meaning, namely "to exercise his profession". It is thus clearthat the words "to practise" have been used throughout the Indian Bar Councils Act in their general dictionary meaning mentioned above except at the end of section 9 (4). In the same way the word "practising" has been used in Order IV, rule 31, of the Supreme Court Rules in the same generic sense and being used in relation to advocates of this Court it must mean appearing and pleading". In the next following rule the same word has been used in its dictionary meaning although having been used in relation to agents of this Court it must mean "acting". The same' generic meaning given to the words to practise" will make, section 4 of the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 easily intelligible and workable The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh, the other hand, relies article 220 of the Constitution and points out that while the words used in the body of the article forbid judges "to plead or act" the marginal note to the article describes the subject-matter of the article as "prohibition of practising" and concludes that " to practise " means "to a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty for the proposition that the words "to practise" have a fixed and invariable meaning comprising acting and pleading in all cases. The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh then referred us to the case of In re Powers of Advocates((1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 92)., In Madras the High Court in exercise of its powers under clause 9 of the Letters Patent framed a rule empowering advocates to appear, act and plead the Original Side. That rule was held to have been validly made in two earlier decisions. But Rules 128 and 129 of the Insolvency Rules permitted an advocate only to " appear and plead" in'the Insolvency Jurisdiction and the attorney to act there. In these circumstances the question arose in the Madras case whether advocates enrolled under the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926, were entitled to "act" in the Insolvency jurisdiction of the Madras High Court,notwithstanding that under the rules framed by the High Court they were only entitled to "plead" and the Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. The reasoning underlying this decision, as I understand it, was that the general ambit and scope of the profession of a Madras High Court advocate being, according to its rule, "to app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e who act only, those who only plead and those who do both act and plead such a definition will be wholly inaccurate. It is necessary, therefore, to give to those words their generic meaning I have mentioned. In this view of the matter, I agree with the High Court that the ,petitioner can derive no support for his contention from either of these two decisions. My attention has also been drawn to the case of The Queen Doutre((1883) 9 App. Cas. 745) where it was held that in Canada ,where.-the functions of Barristers, and Solicitors are united in the same person, the rules of English law which precludes a Barrister to sue for his fees do not apply and that a Quebec advocate could sue for his remuneration a quantum meruit basis. I do not see how that case throws any light the problem before us. In Queen all advocates "act and plead" and as regards Quebec advocates the critical words may cover both acting and pleading, but how can that circumstance assist us in ascertaining the meaning of those words in enactments of our country where we bave a clear division, of the legal practitioners into three categories I have, mentioned ? The result of the foregoing discussion as to the meaning ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for a moment doubt that in 'the non-obstante clause the Legislature had in mind the provisions of the Indian Bar Councils Act and the rules of the High Courts regulating the conditions subject to which a foreign advocate was permitted "to appear and plead" in a High Court of which he was not an advocate. If that be so, it is legitimate to infer that the Legislature in the operative part of the section gave expression and effect to what it had in its mind when enacting the non-obstante clause. If the intention of the legislature were otherwise, why did not the Legislature say openly and in a straightforward way that it gave the Supreme Court advocate the right "to act and plead" in any High Court ? Why did it use the dubious words "to practise" ? It is not correct to say that those words have been used in the -Indian Bar Councils Act only in the sense of "acting and pleading". As already explained, those words have been used in their ordinary dictionary meaning, namely, "to exercise his or their profession" so as to cover the entire genus or class of Advocates, although in their application to different categories or species they have different connotations as explained above. Seein ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t. NO-, thing can, therefore, be founded the absence of a saving clause the lines of that Act. The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh argues that the text of the original Bill, the statement of objects and reasons over the signature of the Law Minister attached thereto and the debates in the Legislature resulting in the deletion of what was clause (a) of the proviso as it existed in the original Bill will clearly show what the intention of the Legislature was. In the original Bill as introduced in the Legislature there was a proviso to section 2 which ran thus: "Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle any person, merely by reason of his being an Advocate of the Supreme Court-- (a) to plead or to act in any High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction ; or (b) to practise in a High Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking not to practise therein after ceasing to hold office as such Judge." The argument is that the objects and reasons clearly show that the intention was that section 2 should not affect the Original Sides of the two High Courts, and clause (a) was inserted in the proviso in order to achieve that purpo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ouncil decision referred to above rejected any reference to the debates or the objects and reasons. So did M. N. Mukherji J. in Debendra Narain Roy v. Jogendra Narain Deb ((1936) A.I. R. 1936 Cal. 593 at p. 619). Reference may also be made to Craies Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Edn., at p. 123, regarding the memoranda attached to the Bill. In my opinion it is safer to follow the orthodox English view and leave the objects and reasons out of consideration. The petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh points out that in Gopalan's case (supra) this Court did look at the original draft of what eventually became article 21 of the Constitution as throwing some light the construction of that article and urges that we should look at the original Bill and draw appropriate inferences from the fact of the omission of clause (a) of the proviso from the Act. What was looked at in that case was the Report of the Drafting Committee appointed by the Constituent Assembly. That Report was akin to a Report of a Select Committee made after consideration of a Bill referred to it by the Legislature for-consideration. In that Report the Drafting Committee recommended the substitution of the expression "except a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... question by permitting a reference to the original Bill. Assuming that the reasoning of the decision in Gopalan's case(1) regarding admissibility of the Report as an aid to construction may, in certain circumstances, be applicable to the original Bill, we have yet to consider whether in the case now before us the original Bill should be referred to. In Gopalan's case [1950] S.C.R. 88 Kania C. J. said at p. 110:- " The report may be read not to control the meaning of the articles, but may be seen in case of ambiguity." Again at p. 111 the learned Chief Justice stated:"Resort may be had to these sources with great cautiou and only when latent ambiguities are to be resolved." In point of fact the learned Chief Justice did not find the words of article 21 to be ambiguous so as to require recourse to the Report of the Drafting Committee to ascertain the intention of the Constituent Assembly. My Lord the present Chief Justice and Fazl Ali J. and Mukherjea J. did refer to the Report. In the view taken by Mahajan J. it was not necessary for him to express any opinion this instant problem. I did not refer to the debates or to the Report of the Drafting Committee and stated at p. 297 and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the construction put upon the section by the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh must be correct. There is no reason to assume that the legislators read the words"to Practise" as meaning "to appear,act and plead" If they read the words to mean " to appear and plead only, which is the ambit and scope of the profession of Supreme Court advocates under the rules of this Court and of the Original Side advocates of those two High Courts then, in so far as the proviso purported not to extend the application of the section -to "'acting" the Original Side it was wholly unnecessary and may have accordingly been deleted as not being necessary. Further, if the intention was to give the Supreme Court advocates a right to appear and plead only in any High Court in any of its jurisdictions, then the proviso, in so far as it purported not to extend the section to pleading the Original Side of those two High Courts, could not be retained. If, therefore, the intention of the operative part of the section was that the Supreme Court advocate would have the right only "to appear and plead", which is consonant with the functions of a Supreme Court advocate and also co-extensive with the rights of the Origi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e could do all that he could do in the High Court, namely, "appear, act and plead". The words "to practise" were held to cover all these activities not because those words had that invariable ,meaning but because those words had that meaning only in relation to advocates who -by the rule of the High Courts were entitled "to appear, act and plead In short, the content of those words varies with the ambit and scope of the profession of the advocate with regard-to whom they are use a parity of reasoning, the Supreme Court advocate being entitled only "to appear and plead", when section 2 authorised him "to practise" in any High Court, it must be taken to have meant that he was authorised to do in the High Courts all that he was entitled to do in the Supreme Court, namely, "to appear and plead" only. This construction appears to me to be quite logical and calculated to give effect to the object of the Act. It brings about a close approximation between the non-obstante clause and the operative part of the section which should be the aim of every well drawn statute. It is asked: bow can a Supreme Court advocate who can only "appear and plead" when he is instructed by an agent, "appear a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s next pointed out that the result of this construction will be to make the new right illusory in that a Supreme Court advocate will not be entitled to "act" even the Appellate Side of a High Court where he is not enrolled and such a resuIt will militate against the principle of the unification of the Indian Bar. This objection is obviously based the assumption that the object of this Act is to bring about such a drastic and far reaching result. There is no warrant which I can see for any such assumption. I have already mentioned that the point of controversy this subject was that an advocate the roll of one High Court could not as of right "appear and plead" in other High Courts but had to depend the good graces of the Chief Justices of such other High Courts who frequently. withheld the requisite permission even to very. eminent advocates. There was hardly ever any claim made by an advocate of one High Court "to act" as an advocate of another High Court of which he was not an advocate. The limited object of this Act appearing from its full title and the non-obstante clause as explained above was to remedy only this particular defect by providing that an advocate of the Supreme Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itioner the strength of the words "whether or not etc." Take the case of an advocate of the Madras High Court. Under the rules of the Madras High Court be is entitled "to appear, act and plead" in all its jurisdictions. When such an advocate is enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme Court, section 2 of the Act, as construed by the petitioner, really gives him no additional right in relation to his own High Court, for already -he is entitled "to appear, act and plead" there. That is the position also with regard to the advocates of all High Courts, other than the High Courts of Calcutta and Bombay in the matter of their right to practise in their respective High Courts. Seeing that the advocates of 18 High Courts did not in fact get any new right in their respective High Courts, it cannot reasonably be said that the object of the Act was to give any right to an advocate of a particular High Court in respect of his own High Court. It is pointed out that an advocate enrolled the Appellate Sides of the Bombay and Calcutta High Courts is not, as of right, entitled to appear, act and plead the Original Side and the object of the Act was to give those Appellate Side advocates of the Calcu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssion of an advocate in a High Court must involve the observance of the rules of practice of 'that High Court. It is urged that this construction amounts, in reality, to adding words to the section, namely, as an advocate of that Court" or "according to the rules of that Court." This contention is founded a clear misaprehension, for I am really not adding anything at all but I am only stating what is implicit in the section as it stands., In other words, I am construing the words of the section and ascertaining its true meaning and import. The necessary implication of the fact that the Supreme Court advocate is to exercise his profession in any High Court may well be that he becomes entitled to do whatever an advocate (if that particular High Court can do under the, rules of practice of that High Court. Thus when the Supreme Court advocate goes to practise in the, Appellate Side be will be entitled to act and plead as an Appellate Side advocate does and when he goes to practise in the Original Side he will only plead as an Original Side advocate does and in either case be must abide by the relevant rules, for he must practise. as an advocate of the particular High Court does, namel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te party will not be bound to accept service from the Supreme Court advocate who is not so authorised. According to the Calcutta Original Side rules an attorney is personally responsible for the requisition fees, deposition fees etc., but a Supreme Court advocate acting in the Original Side will not be so responsible at all. Nor will the High Court be able to get at the Supreme Court advocate to realise the fees if he is not to be governed by the rules governing the conduct of persons who act the Original Side.' The attorneys acting in the Original Side cannot charge the client with a pice over and above the fees prescribed in the rules of taxation as between attorney and client but a Supreme Court advocate acting in the Original Side, not being in terms bound by the taxation rules, will be free to fleece the client to any extent he can. The attorneys being officers of the Court are under the rules and the Letters Patent amenable to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the High Court but a Supreme Court advocate may with impunity snap his fingers at the High Court, for under no provision of law as it exists except section 2 of the Act can the High Court exercise disciplinary jurisdicti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t we are considering does not confer any power the High Courts to frame rules subject to which the Supreme Court advocates shall exercise in the High Court their newly acquired statutory right under this Act. The Bar Councils' rule-making power under section 15 is limited only to High Court advocates, clause (b) having been superseded by, section 2 of this Act. There is, therefore, no provision of law except section 2 itself which will enable the High Courts to prescribe any rules of conduct 'for the Supreme Court advocates or to oblige them to conform to any rule of practice when they go to practise in any High Court. Therefore, if we accept either of the two constructions suggested by me it will prevent this absurd and undesirable result, for then the Supreme Court advocates when they go 'to practise in any High Court will appear and plead or, alternatively, do what an. advocate of the High Court can do, and in either case be subject to the relevant rules by which the advocates of the particular High Court are bound. If that were not the meaning of section 2, then the Supreme Court advocates will be untrammelled by any rule of practice at all. Further, the petitioners' constructi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ates to do so as of right and without the necessity of their obtaining the sanction of the Chief Justices of the High Courts concerned. The Act permits -a well defined body of professional men, namely, the Supreme Court advocates, to exercise the profession of an advocate in any High Court. That this certainly was a forward step in achieving uniformity cannot possibly be denied. Nothing more was within the purview of the Act as expressed in its full title and the non-obstante clause. Finally, reference is made to the proviso as it now appears in section 2 and it is claimed that the word "practise" in the operative part of the section must mean "appear, act and plead" because that word as appearing in the proviso obviously has that meaning, and reliance is placed the rule of construction that the same word should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs in the Act. All that this proviso says is that nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle a post-Constitution Judge who might be -an advocate of the Supreme Court to practise in a High Court of which he was at any time a Judge, if he had given an undertaking not to practise there after ceasing to hold office as such Judge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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