TMI Blog1998 (3) TMI 631X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... - C.A. 1714 OF 1998 - - - Dated:- 23-3-1998 - K. VENKATASWAMI, M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ. For the Appellants : S. Sivasubramaniam, Sr. Adv., and T. Raja For the Respondents : M.A. Krishna Moorthy JUDGMENT The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: M. JAGANNADHA RAO. J. Leave granted This appeal is preferred by the two appellants namely A. G. Varadarajulu and Srimati V. Jayalakshmi who are respectively. husband and wife, against the order passed by the Tamilnadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, Madras in TRP No. 82 of 1994 dated 25th April, 1995. The case arises under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms(Fixation of Ceiling on land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act). The 1st appellant is the declarant. The 1st appellant s plea is that land of an extent o acres 36.74 allotted in favour of his wife, the second appellant Smt. V. Jayalakshmi in a partition Deed dated 25.9.1970 executed between the appellant s son. Balaguruswamy and his wife should be excluded from his (the 1st appellant) holding as being Stridhana land of his wife. Within the meaning of the said expression in Section 3(42) of the Act, to the extent permissible under section 5(4) of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. 15.2.1970 as required by section 3(42) and that it was not sufficient that she had a pre-existing right of maintenance as on 15.2.1970. It was held that it was rightly included in the holding of the first appellant by the Authorised officer. Against the said order of the Land commissioner dated 25.9.86 W.P. No. 11055/86 was filed in the Madras High Court which was transferred to the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms Special Appellate Tribunal, after its Constitution and numbered as TRP No. 82/94. After the TRP was dismissed by the Special Tribunal by its judgment dated 25.4.95, the appellants have preferred this appeal against the said judgment. We have heard learned Senior counsel for the appellants Sri S. Sivasubramaniam and the learned counsel for the respondents Sri M.A. Krishna Moorthy. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that the Tribunals had accepted that the partition Deed dated 24.9.1970 executed between the second appellant and her son Balaguruswamy was a valid document, - as it was executed between 25.2.1970 and 2.1.1970 during which period such partitions were permitted by the section 21A. It was argued that if the said partition deed was to be deemed to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rmediary or in one or more of t hose capacities. " "Section 3(42) : Stridhana land means any land held on the date commencement of this Act by any; female member of a family in her own name." "Section 5 (4) (a): Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), where the stridhana land held by any female member of a family together with the other land held by all the members of that family. is in excess of 15 standard acres the female member concerned may hold. in addition to the extent of land which the family is entitled to hold under sub-section (1), Stridhana land not exceeding 10 standard acres: Provided that where any extent of stridhana land held by a female member is included in the extent of land which the family is entitled to hold under sub-section 91) and in case where the extent so included is -- (i) 10 or more than 10 standard acres, she shall not be entitled to hold any stridhana land in addition to the extent so included: or (ii) less than 10 standard acres. She may hold in addition to t he extent so included an extent of stridhana land. Which together with the extent so included. Shall not exceed 10 standard acres. (b) where the extent of stridhana land held ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any thing in section 3(42). Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Sushila Devi Ammal others vs. State of Madras [1993 Supp. (1) SCC 462]. That case no doubt dealt with section 21A and held that if the case fell within section 21A, then section 23 would not be applicable, relying upon the words in section 21A "in any other provision of this Act". We are here not concerned with section 23 and the above decision cannot, therefore, be of any help to the appellants. Stridhana land under Section 3(42) is not the same thing as known to Hindu law: Appellants want to rely upon the right to maintenance inhering in a female under Hindu Law for the purpose of construing the definition of stridhana land in section 3(42) of the Act. Question arises whether while dealing with definitions under Land Ceiling laws - which are applicable to persons governed by different personal laws - it is permissible to construe the definitions in the light of personal laws. As shown below, unless the definitions in land ceiling laws themselves refer to personal laws, it is not permissible to resort to the personal laws while interpreting defini ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore, manifestly wrong to approach the interpretation of sections of the Act with the preconceived notion that in using the expression family . the Legislature had intended to connote an undivided family as known to Hindu Law and that after partition with minor sons had taken place in a Hindu joint family. there could not be a family consisting of the father and his divided minor sons. The land ceiling law could define a family as consisting of the father and minor sons and such minor sons could also be divided minor sons, thought such a concept was not known to customary Hindu law. We are, therefore, of the view that it is not permissible for the appellants to introduce principles relating to maintenance of a wife or mother into the interpretation of the word stridhana land in section 3(42) of the Act. Can it be said that the second appellant was holding the land on 15.2.1970? Even assuming that the right to maintenance of a wife or mother as known to customary Hindu law could be used to construe the definition of stridhana land in section 3(42), the question would be whether the second appellant could be deemed to be holding this extent of land on 15.2.1970, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g. According to Oxford English Dictionary, it means, to possess, to be owner or holder or tenant of. The meaning indicates that possession must be backed with some right or title." We are, therefore, of the view that the word held in section 3(42) is used in the sense that the female must be in possession of the land as owner or with some element of title on 15.2.1970, the date of commencement of the Act. Whether mere existence of a right to maintenance as 15.2. 1970 is sufficient? In our opinion, it is not sufficient that as on 15.2.1970, the second appellant had a right to maintenance under the customary Hindu law against this property in satisfaction of which this extent of land was allotted to her on 24.9.1970. A right to claim maintenance against certain property of the joint family cannot be equated with holding the land as on 15.2.1970. A point almost similar to the one before us arose under the Maharashtra Agricultural (Ceiling on Holdings) Act. 1961 (as amended in 1975) in Rambhau vs. State of Maharashtra [1995 Supp. (3) SCC 74]. In that case, the tenure holder had two unmarried daughters on the relevant date and he contended that, while calculating the ceiling a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erefore be said to be holding stridhana land as on the date of commencement of the Act, i.e. 15.2.1970, within section 3(42) of the Act. Therefore the fact that she had, as on 15.2.1970, a right to maintenance against this property which later crystalised into the allotment of this property in her favour on 24.9.1970 is not sufficient. Neither under the customary Hindu law, nor under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 nor under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 nor under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is there any provision which gives a share to a wife in the joint family property held her husband nor to a mother in the joint family property allotted to her son in a partition. Learned senior counsel for the appellants placed strong reliance on certain observations in the judgment of S. Murtaza Fazal Ali.J. in V. Tulasamma Others vs. Sesha Reddy (Dead) By Lrs. [1977 (3) SCC 99]. In that case the Court was concerned with section 14(1) and (2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. If the land came to be possessed by the female at the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in lieu of a pre-existing right of maintenance. The land would become her absolute property ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
