9911796707
TMI Blog1995 (4) TMI 260X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . The applicant is registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. It filed due returns under both these Acts for every assessment year up to the period of four quarters ending June 30, 1993. The requisite returns for the four quarters ending December 31, 1986, were filed on different dates between August 27, 1987 and December 18, 1987. There was no application by the applicant in the High Court at Calcutta under article 226 or under article 227 of the Constitution, restraining the authorities from making assessment of sales tax for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986. The applicant received in the middle of April 1992 a notice dated April 6, 1992, in form VI from the respondent No. 1, requiring it to appear on a specified date mentioned in the notice with necessary books of accounts and documents for the purpose of making assessment under the Act for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986. The applicant was advised that the assessment for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986, was barred by limitation. Without prejudice to its rights and c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the representative of the applicant before the respondent No. 1 on June 10, 1993. On the next day, i.e., on June 11, 1993, the respondent No. 1 made a best judgment assessment of tax and determination of interest for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986. The respondent No. 1 issued notices in form VII and form VII-L, asking the applicant to pay tax to the tune of Rs. 8,83,336 and interest to the tune of Rs. 11,17,960 in pursuance of the order of assessment dated June 11, 1993. By filing the present application under section 8 of the Act of 1987, the applicant has challenged the assessment on June 11, 1993 and the notices in form VII and form VII-L. 3.. The case of the applicant is that the order of assessment and the order of determination of interest, both dated June 11, 1993, are vitiated by malice in law, arbitrariness and denial of the principles of natural justice. It is alleged that the orders were passed vindictively with the intention to teach the applicant a lesson for challenging the earlier order of assessment dated December 14, 1992 in this Tribunal. The applicant contends that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to reject the written objections ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , were barred by the period of limitation of four years. Though the representative of the applicant was ready and willing on June 10, 1993 to produce relevant books and records for the purpose of assessment after the points of objection of the applicant regarding the notice dated May 21, 1993 were decided by the respondent No. 1, the latter passed an ex parte order of assessment on June 11, 1993, without giving the applicant an opportunity to produce the relevant books of accounts and documents. There is, thus, a manifest bias and non-application of mind on the part of the respondent No. 1. The applicant was in possession of declaration forms covering almost all the transactions and was also in possession of other relevant documents, by production of which, as in the previous years, the applicant would be entitled to a concessional rate of tax. The applicant has prayed for quashing the order of assessment and the order of determination of interest both dated June 11, 1993, and the notices of demand issued thereunder for the disputed period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986. 4.. The respondents have filed two affidavits-in-opposition. One of these affidavits-in-opposition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... assessment could be made on any day before December 31, 1992. Hence the assessment for the four quarters ending on December 31, 1986 as originally made on December 14, 1992, was not barred by limitation. The order passed by this Tribunal on March 5, 1993, in case No. RN-29 of 1993 had conferred jurisdiction on the respondent No. 1 to make a fresh assessment, if he was satisfied that the original assessment, which was set aside, had not been hit by limitation. As the original assessment made on December 14, 1992 was within time, the fresh assessment dated June 11, 1993, was lawful and within time in terms of the second Reported in [1990] 78 STC 298 (WBTT). proviso to section 11(2a) of the Act. The averments regarding the notice dated May 21, 1993, for making fresh assessment are denied. It is denied that the notice dated April 6, 1992, had ceased to have any effect with the passing of the order dated March 5, 1993 by this Tribunal. It is asserted that the order of this Tribunal gave liberty to the respondents to make a fresh assessment and it was not the meaning of the order that the applicant would go unassessed for the disputed period of four quarters ending on December 31, 1986. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase No. RN-29 of 1993, the respondent No. 1 passed a reasoned order in course of the order of assessment dated June 11, 1993, dealing with all aspects of the question of limitation and all the objections raised by the applicant in that respect. The assessment made on June 11, 1993, cannot be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice or bias. 6.. An affidavit-in-reply has been filed for the applicant, reiterating mostly the averments made in the main application. It is stated in the affidavit-in-reply that the applicant was not a party to the cases of M/s. Clipper Tea and M/s. Hindusthan Sheet Metal Limited and was not in a position to know the exact terms of the orders of injunction passed by the High Court, Calcutta. It is alleged that the respondents knew that the order of injunction obtained by M/s. Clipper Tea on June 8, 1987, had restrained them from making assessment of the applicant in respect of transactions already made. It is alleged that the last transaction of M/s. Clipper Tea with the applicant was in the year 1982. 7.. When the case was first heard by the Division Bench, written notes of arguments were submitted by Mr. Jatin Gh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of June; and (ii) after the 31st day of December next following the expiry of four years from the end of the year in respect of which or part of which the assessment is made, where such four years end on any date from the 1st day of July to the 30th day of December. (c) No assessment under sub-section (2) shall be made- (1)....................... (ii)....................... Provided that where any proceedings for assessment under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are pending at the commencement of Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) West Bengal Amendment Act, 1950 (W.B. Act XLVIII of 1950), such assessment may be made at any time within four years or six years respectively of the date of such commencement: Provided further that when a fresh assessment is required to be made in pursuance of an order under section 20 or under section 21 or in pursuance of any other order of any court, such fresh assessment may be made at any time within four years from the date of such order: Provided also that- (a) any assessment under sub-section (1) in respect of any year or part of a year where such year ends on any date between the 1st day of January, 1986 and the 30th day of June, 1986 (both d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h Court. It was further stated in that order dated December 14, 1992 that the order of injunction of the honourable High Court had been vacated by an order of this Tribunal and hence the assessment case was taken up for completion. The contention for the applicant before this Tribunal at the time of hearing of that Case No. RN-29 of 1993 was that the impugned order of assessment dated December 14, 1992, did not actually give any reason for considering that the Commercial Tax Officer had the jurisdiction to make the assessment beyond the period of four years. In the absence of details it was not possible for the applicant to apprehend, as it was argued in that case for the applicant, whether there was any saving of limitation or not. It was in this context that this Tribunal observed as follows: "It, therefore, appears to us that the order passed by the Commercial Tax Officer in making the impugned assessment was vague, unspecific and nonspeaking with regard to the question of limitation. If the assessment is actually barred by limitation, the Commercial Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to make it. If, however, the limitation was saved by orders of injunction as claimed, he had of c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dvantage of the second proviso to section 11(2a) of the Act under which when any fresh assessment was required to be made in pursuance of any order of any court, such fresh assessment could be made at any time within four years from the date of such order. Mr. Ghosh referred, in this connection, to the case of Rajinder Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi [1979] 120 ITR 14 (SC); AIR 1979 SC 1933, wherein the distinction between "finding" and "direction" was explained. Direction means express direction necessary for disposal of a case given by competent court or authority or Tribunal. Direction is in the nature of an order requiring positive compliance. The order dated March 5, 1993, passed by this Tribunal in Case No. RN-29 of 1993, giving liberty to the Commercial Tax Officer to make fresh assessment for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986 was a "direction" or authoritative instruction or guidance and not "any other order of any court" as mentioned in the second proviso to section 11(2a) of the Act. The contention of the respondents that the order of assessment dated June 11, 1993, is not barred by limitation on the ground that the fresh assessment was made w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is that the notice dated April 6, 1992, ceased to have any effect and had been annulled by the order of this Tribunal dated March 5, 1993 and the Commercial Tax Officer could not proceed to assume jurisdiction on the ground that he was entitled to make fresh assessments of tax and determination of interest in continuation of the process initiated on April 6, 1992, on the basis of the order of this Tribunal dated March 5, 1993. The words "set aside" mean "to reverse, vacate, cancel, annul or revoke a judgment, order, etc." (see Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 1230). Ordinarily, where a High Court exercises "certiorari" jurisdiction, it merely quashes the offending order and the consequential legal effect is that but for the offending order the remaining part of the proceeding stands automatically revived before the inferior court or Tribunal with the need for fresh consideration and disposal by a fresh order. Though, ordinarily, the High Court does not substitute its own order for the order quashed by it, it has power none the less to pass such further orders as the justice of the case requires (Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Incometax Officer, Calcutta AIR 1980 SC 656; [19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Insurance Corporation authorities could not sit in appeal upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by holding that the termination of service already effected by the letter dated April 28, 1993, held good. The L.I.C. authorities were given liberty by that judgment to pass a new order upon consideration of all relevant facts after giving an opportunity of hearing to the applicant. As this Tribunal's order dated March 5, 1993, did not decide the question of limitation in respect of the assessment for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986, the order of honourable Mr. Justice Susanta Chatterjee in Matter No. 1912 of 1993 has no manner of application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 10.. Reliance has been placed for the Revenue on the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Bal Kishun Halwai [1974] 34 STC 354 for the purpose of showing that there was no irregularity in the wording of the notice dated May 21, 1993, as being in continuation of the earlier notice dated April 6, 1992 in form VI. Mr. Jatin Ghosh, learned counsel for the applicant, contended that this decision of the Patna High Court did n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tions in the affidavitsin-opposition for showing that the assessment for the disputed period ending December 31, 1986 on June 11, 1983, is not barred by limitation. These contentions are (a) on the basis of the second proviso to section 11(2a); (b) on the basis of section 11(2b) and (c) section 11(2a)(b)(ii) of the Act. In course of hearing Mr. T.N. De, learned State Representative, has made reference to the substitution of the third proviso to section 11(2a) of the Act for saving limitation. I have already dealt with the second proviso to section 11(2a) of the Act. I have shown that limitation for the disputed period cannot be saved by resorting to this second proviso as the order of this Tribunal dated March 5, 1993, was in the nature of a direction, giving liberty to the Commercial Tax Officer to make assessment for the disputed period, if permitted by law and not a final order of the Tribunal in the matter of assessment for the disputed period. As for section 11(2b) of the Act, the contention of the respondents is that on the basis of an order of injunction passed by the High Court, Calcutta, on June 8, 1987, in Matter No. 2644 of 1987 relating to M/s. Clipper Tea and another ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Clipper Tea had already made transaction. This interim order dated June 8, 1987, ceased to have any effect and stood vacated on May 22, 1989, in terms of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act of 1987, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: "Provided that interlocutory order granted on an application by the High Court till the disposal of any rule shall continue for a period not exceeding twelve weeks from commencement of sub-section (1) of section 6 unless the Tribunal by an order varies or modifies the same earlier or extends the same." It is beyond controversy that the aforesaid period of twelve weeks expired on May 2, 1989. The interim order in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea was, thus, in force for a period of one year ten months and fourteen days from June 8, 1987 to May 22, 1989. When excluded from the normal period of limitation of 4 years, which was to expire on December 31, 1990, for assessment for the disputed period ending December 31, 1986, the period of limitation ultimately expired on December 14, 1992, i.e., on the date the first assessment was made by the Commercial Tax Officer, which was set aside by the order of this Tribunal on March 5, 1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ght of the period during which the interim orders in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea and Hindusthan Sheet Metal Limited were in force, the period of four years ended on December 14, 1992 (for the interim order in M/s. Clipper Tea) and on July 13, 1992 (for the interim order in Hindusthan Sheet Metal). Both the said dates fell between the first day of July, and 30th day of December. In that situation, the period of limitation of four years ended on December 31, 1992. 13.. Mr. Jatin Ghosh, the learned counsel for the applicant, has contended that section 11(2a)(b)(ii) has no application in the instant case. According to him, the provisions of section 11(2a)(b)(ii) of the Act can come into operation only when the year of assessment of any assessee ends on any date between 1st January and 30th December excepting 30th June and 31st December. It is contended that the provisions contained in both the clauses of section 11(2a)(b) are in the nature of deeming provisions which amount to extension of the period of limitation when the year of assessment ends of any date other than the 30th of June or the 31st December. Mr. Ghosh contends that as the period of assessment in the present case ended ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion in the case of Hindusthan Sheet Metal. The substituted third proviso to section 11(2a) of the Act is that if the provisions of section 11E(1) of the Act do not apply to any assessment in respect of any of the periods ending on or before December 31, 1992, such assessment shall, notwithstanding the provisions in section 11(2a) of the Act, be made on or before the 31st day of December, 1994. Though statute of limitation is considered as a statute of repose, an exception is made in the case of taxing statutes in some cases. In the case of S.C. Prashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas AIR 1963 SC 1356; [1963] 49 ITR 1 (SC) a notice under section 34(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, was issued on April 30, 1954, in a case of escaped income of less than Rs. 1,00,000 in respect of assessment year 1942-43, as a result of the direction mentioned in the second proviso to section 34(3) of that Act, as amended in 1953. It was held by majority of three to two in that case that even though the notice was invalid for the reason that it was issued after the expiry of eight years prescribed for it under the amendment of the Income-tax Act in 1948, it was validated by section 4 of the Income-tax (Amendm ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... " Mr. T.N. De, learned State Representative contended that the applicantcompany itself relied on the interim order passed by the High Court in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea for postponing assessment for the year 1983, which was a period subsequent to the year 1982. The contention is that the stand taken for the applicant that the interim order in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea did not apply to assessment for any period subsequent to the year 1982, because the applicantcompany had no transaction with M/s. Clipper Tea after 1982, is contradictory with this letter written by the applicant itself. Mr. T.N. De, contended that the applicant was barred by estoppel from submitting that the interim order passed in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea was not applicable to the impugned assessment for the disputed period of four quarters ending December 31, 1986. This contention cannot be accepted. The applicant's objection as to jurisdiction of the Commercial Tax Officer to make the assessment on June 11, 1993, cannot be taken to be waived by the applicant by writing this letter dated September 15, 1983. Consent cannot give any court jurisdiction where there is none (Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Cha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 94". It is contended that in view of these provisions in the third proviso, the proviso is to be taken to have been introduced to save assessments for four quarters ending in 1989 and 1990. The contention is that the outer-limit for completing assessment for four quarters ending 1989 was December 31, 1993, before the amendment. It will be December 31, 1991, after the amendment. Unless there is any saving clause even the assessment for 1989 will become time-barred by virtue of the amendment from April 15, 1993. Hence, the proviso is nothing but a saving clause for saving assessments for 1989 and 1990. The proviso cannot authorise the Commercial Tax Officer to reopen the assessment which had already become time-barred. This contention cannot be accepted. As the English year was divided into two parts, namely, (1) from 1st January to 29th June and (ii) from 1st July to 30th December, assessment for the disputed period could have been made by December 31, 1992, as the limitation for making assessment for the four quarters ending December 31, 1986 ended on December 14, 1992 (on the basis of the injunction in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea) and on July 13, 1992 (on the basis of the injunc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on Tribunal order dated March 5, 1993, the instant assessment proceeding is well within the time prescribed by the law. Hence I propose to allow the dealer another opportunity to produce relevant books of accounts and records before me but the dealer refused the said proposal on the ground stated in the written submission. As such the question of further opportunity to produce the books of accounts does not arise. Mr. P. Mukhopadhyay is informed. Order reserved." 19.. After passing of this order on June 10, 1993, assessment was made on June 11, 1993. Mr. Jatin Ghosh contended that the order dated June 10, 1993 was not a reasoned order as directed by this Tribunal. The contention is that the Tribunal had directed in the judgment/order dated March 5, 1993 that the respondent No. 1 must pass a reasoned order on the preliminary objection on the question of limitation, after giving an opportunity to the applicant of being heard, in case he decided to make a fresh assessment. It is argued that this Tribunal by the order dated March 5, 1993, placed a mandate on the Commercial Tax Officer to first decide on the preliminary objection raised by the applicant and only thereafter to proceed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Tribunal. 20.. The contention of Mr. Jatin Ghosh that the order of assessment dated June 11, 1993, was without jurisdiction on misreading and misconstruing jurisdictional fact cannot be accepted. Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raza Textiles Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Raipur AIR 1973 SC 1362; [1973] 87 ITR 539 and contended that no authority, much less a quasi-judicial authority, could confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding a jurisdictional fact wrongly. It is contended that the respondent No. 1 could have assumed jurisdiction to make or complete the order of assessment for the disputed period only if it could be shown, on a true and proper construction of the orders of injunction in the case of M/s. Clipper Tea and Hindusthan Sheet Metal, that the same were applicable in the present case and had, in fact, restrained the respondent No. 1 from making or completing the assessment within the period of four years normally allowed by statute. It is further contended that the respondent No. 1 could not and should not assume jurisdiction by deciding the jurisdictional fact wrongly. I have already shown that the orders of injunction passed in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... epresentative. As such, there is no question of violation of principles of natural justice by the respondent No. 1 by allegedly not allowing the applicant to produce books of accounts and records before making the assessment on June 11, 1993 or by allegedly not allowing the applicant's representative to make any submission in the matter before the respondent No. 1 on June 10, 1993. Merely because in his order dated June 11, 1993, the respondent No. 1 had observed that to his mind the assessee was bent upon not producing books of accounts and documents in the fear of higher tax liability it could not be said that there was manifest bias. 22.. Mr. Jatin Ghosh, the learned counsel for the applicant, drew our attention to the case of Choudhury v. Union of India AIR 1956 Cal 662 and contended that a person dealing with enquiry at any stage should not have prejudged the issue, as done by the Commercial Tax Officer in the present case. In the absence of any allegation of personal bias it cannot at all be stated that the respondent No. 1 prejudged any issue merely because he made the assessment on June 11, 1993. Under the law it was the respondent No. 1 who was to make the assessment and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... previous assessment dated December 14, 1992, was within time. Thus, once the assessing officer held that assessment dated December 14, 1992 was within time, he was required to make a fresh assessment and for that purpose a period of four years was available from the date of order, i.e., March 5, 1993. The liberty could not be understood to be one for scuttling a fresh assessment, which it was his duty to make. The expression--"any other order of any court"--is sufficiently comprehensive to include an order of this nature, which was in every sense an "order" finally disposing of the previous application. 27. I am unable to agree with the honourable Chairman (see paragraph 15) that applicant's letter dated September 15, 1983, requesting postponement of assessment for the period of four quarters ending December 31, 1983, did not amount to waiver. The principle that consent does not confer jurisdiction is not germane in this context. Nor is it a question of waiver. The same party who relied on High Court's order of injunction in the case of Clipper Tea for postponing assessment must be held to be estopped by his conduct from subsequently submitting that there was no order of injunct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n section 11(2b) and also by operation of law as enjoined in section 11(2a) together with its provisos, the impugned assessment orders would be seen to have been passed within time. The applicants have denied that the court injunctions barred the Commercial Tax Officer from proceeding with the assessment and contended that the assessment orders dated December 14, 1992 and June 11, 1993, were barred by limitation. They have also challenged the applicability of section 11(2a)(b) of the 41 Act as also the provisos to extend the period of limitation beyond December 31, 1990, as relied on by the respondents. 32.. The issues which, therefore, arise for determination for settling the question of limitation are: (1) Whether the order of injunction granted by the Calcutta High Court on June 8, 1987, in Matter No. 2644 of 1987 in the case of Jagadish Prasad Sharma, the proprietor of Messrs Clippers Tea v. Commercial Tax Officer can be said to have barred the respondents from proceeding with the assessment of the applicant for the year ended December 31, 1986 and, if so, for what period; (ii) Whether the order of injunction granted by the Calcutta High Court on May 10, 1988, in the case of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... already made. Further, from the list of transactions filed by Shri Jagadish Prasad Sharma, the proprietor, in the writ petition before the High Court, Calcutta, the last transaction of the applicant with Messrs. Clippers Tea was shown as having taken place on August 16, 1982, vide bill No. Ex/1443 for a sum of Rs. 3,773.61. Therefore, there can be no question of the respondent having been restrained from proceeding with the assessment for the impugned period within the period of limitation of four years. 36.. A careful reading of the order of the Calcutta High Court as quoted above would indicate that there was no blanket bar on the respondents from proceeding with pending assessments. There is no reason to infer that the order directed that all assessments in respect of the dealers to whom declaration forms were to be furnished by the petitioner should not be completed and/or concluded until further orders of the court. Had it been the intention, there was no need for the words "in respect of transaction already made" occurring after the words "the assessments in respect of the dealers to whom the declaration forms are to be furnished by the petitioner". Read as a whole, it seem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1 to 3......... 4.. Tea Brokers Private Limited 5 to 7........." It has been contended on behalf of the applicant that the subject-matter of the writ application in the High Court was under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, but the respondents submitted that the disputed sales were exigible to tax under the 41 Act. Be that as it may, here the order of the court is unambiguous and there cannot be any manner of doubt that the assessment of Messrs Tea Brokers Private Ltd., the applicant in the present case, was not to be proceeded with until further orders of the court. This order of injunction was vacated by this Tribunal on November 22, 1989, with the final disposal of the writ petition of Messrs Hindusthan Sheet Metal Ltd., which was dismissed on merit. It would, therefore, appear that for the period from May 10, 1988 to November 22, 1989 amounting to a period of one year, six months and thirteen days, the respondents were restrained from proceeding with the assessment and hence, this period will have to be excluded while computing the limitation for assessment under section 11(2b) of the 41 Act. Since the original period for completion of assessment was December 31, 1990, addi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2), the period during which the Commissioner is restrained from commencing or continuing any proceeding for such assessment by an order of the Board of Revenue or any court shall be excluded." 41.. A careful reading of the provisions in section 11(2a)(b) makes it clear that these are in the nature of deeming provisions which have the effect of extending the period of limitation when the year or period of assessment ends on any date other than the 30th of June or the 31st of December. In other words, assessments in cases where the accounting year or period of an assessee fall between 1st January and 29th June, or between 1st July and 30th December of any year can be completed by the 30th June or 31st December respectively. Where the assessment period in a given case already ends on 30th June or 31st December of any year, section 11(2a)(b) can have no application at all. Since, in the instant case, the applicant's assessment period ended on December 31, 1986, the assessment had to be completed by December 31, 1990 which after allowing for the court's injunction becomes extended up to July 13, 1992. This cannot, therefore, be said to be a case falling under section 11(2a)(b) of the 4 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f section 11(2a) has no manner of application since the order of the Tribunal dated March 5, 1993, giving liberty to the Commercial Tax Officer to make fresh assessment if permitted by law was not a direction or order for making a fresh assessment requiring positive compliance as to come within the meaning of the words "any other order of any court " used in the second proviso. 44.. The respondents also referred to the third proviso to section 11(2a) which has been introduced with effect from April 15, 1993, which reads as follows: "Provided also that if the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 11E do not apply to any assessment in respect of any of the periods ending on or before the 31st day of December, 1992, such assessment shall, notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this sub-section, be made on or before the 31st day of December, 1994." It was, therefore, sought to be contended that both the assessment orders of December 14, 1992 and June 11, 1993, were passed within time. However, this argument also becomes meaningless considering that the assessment proceedings became void on and from July 14, 1992, after the expiry of limitation on July 13, 1992. There was, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
