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2008 (7) TMI 898

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..... t under section 86 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 raising the question of law as to whether the SLSC was justified in reducing the quantum of eligible investment for grant of benefit under the aforesaid incentive scheme to that extent. The learned counsel for the assessee Mr. Ramit Mehta has urged that mere shifting of part of the plant and machinery from Tonk to Bhilwara where both the units of the petitioner-assessee manufacture same product, i.e., ready-made garment was not prohibited either under the aforesaid Incentive Scheme, 1998 or under the provisions of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994. He submits that the fixed capital investment made within the State of Rajasthan continued to remain within the State of Rajasthan and for business expediency, if another unit requires such plant and machinery and it was lying as idle capacity at Tonk, there was no reason why the assessee should be prohibited from shifting its part of plant and machinery from Tonk to Bhilwara. He submits that incentive scheme does not envisage eligible fixed capital investment in any particular area of the State of Rajasthan nor there is any list of prohibited areas where investment so made would be .....

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..... tic and narrow approach and decided to reduce the eligible capital investment merely on the basis of shifting of plant and machinery from one place to another under the same ownership and management on account of business and commercial expediency. The benefit of incentive scheme given to the industrial unit as one assessee and it is not split unit-wise in the scheme. The definition of "new industrial unit" in clause 2(k) of the Incentive Scheme of 1998 is as under: "2(k)(i) 'New industrial unit' means an industrial unit which commences commercial production during the operative period of this Scheme including a unit set up on the site of an existing industrial unit by making separately identifiable capital investment; subject however, that where an industrial unit manufacturing the same product is established on the site of an existing unit, the benefit permissible for a new unit shall be available to it only on the production in excess of 80 per cent of the installed capacity of the existing unit. (ii) 'New industrial unit' shall also include a sick unit,- (a) which has not availed of any benefit of exemption from tax or deferment of tax; (b) which has been a .....

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..... gard to the intention of the Legislature manifest on the statutory language. Indeed, the need to resort to any interpretative process arises only where the meaning is not manifest on the plain words of the statute. If the words are plain and clear and directly convey the meaning, there is no need for any interpretation.   It appears to us the true rule of construction of a provisions as to exemption is the one stated by this court in Union of India v. Wood Papers Ltd. [1991] 83 STC 251; AIR 1991 SC 2049 at page 2051; [1991] 1 JT 151 at page 155: (at page 255 of 83 STC) '. . . Truly, speaking, liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision is to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction . . .'" In Bajaj Tempo Ltd., Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City-III, Bombay [1992] 196 .....

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..... When the law to be applied in a given case prescribes interpretation of statute, the court has to ascertain the facts and then interpret the law to apply to such facts. Interpretation cannot be in a vacuum or in relation to hypothetical facts. It is the function of the Legislature to say what shall be the law and it is only the court to say what the law is. . . . 33.. It is also well-settled that to arrive at the intention of the legislation depending on the objects for which the enactment is made, the court can resort to historical, contextual and purposive interpretation leaving textual interpretation aside. 34.. Francis Bennion: Statutory Interpretation, referred to . . . 35.. More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the courts should keep in mind the objective or purpose for which statute has been enacted . . ." In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [1987] 61 Comp Cas 663 (SC); MANU/SC/0073/1987 the court stated (page 692 of Comp Cas): ". . .If a statute is looked at in the context of its enactment, with the glasses .....

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..... d duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited'. 'It appears to me', said Lord Simonds, 'to be a naked usurpation of legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation'. Lord Morton observed: 'these heroics are out of place'. Lord Tucker said, 'Your Lordships would be acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity if the view put forward by Denning, L.J., were to prevail'. This disapproval of Denning L. J.'s approach was cited with approval by this court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [1990] 3 SCC 682; [1990] 77 FJR 17 (SC); MANU/SC/0479/1990." In both constitutional and statutory interpretation, a judge must sometimes exercise discretion in determining the proper relationship between the subject and objective purposes of the law. Indeed, a theory of interpretation cannot be constructed without interpretive discretion as its foundation. Interpretation without judicial discretion is a myth. Any theory of interpretation- intentionalism, orginalism, purposivism, and so on- must be based on an inherent internal element o .....

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