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2001 (10) TMI 1136

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..... dibility and reputation of the Firm, as a whole, do not seem to have engaged the attention of the High Court in passing the orders under challenge. The feasibility or otherwise of appointing Party Receiver and allowing them to carry on the day-to-day activities of the business subject to strict and effective control and accountability to the Court of the realizing of the business does not seem to have been considered at all before going out for the appointment of a third party Receiver and prohibiting any sales, completely. As long as the Arbitration clause exists, having recourse to Civil Court for adjudication of disputes envisaged to be resolved through arbitral process or getting any orders of the nature from Civil Court for appointment of Receiver or prohibitory orders without evincing any intention to have recourse to arbitration in terms of the agreement, may not arise. For all the reasons stated supra, the orders of the High Court as also that of the Trial Court set aised and remit the proceedings to the Trial Court which shall consider the matter afresh. - C.A. 7404 OF 2001 - - - Dated:- 31-10-2001 - S. Rajendra Babu and Doraiswamy Raju, JJ. JUDGMENT Spe .....

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..... the Firm M/s Sumeru Enterprises on 3.3.89. The building plans were said to have been got approved from the Jaipur Development Authority in July 1991 and thereafter on 5.10.91, all the partners of M/s Sumeru Enterprises seem to have entered into an agreement with M/s Parasnath Builders Pvt. Ltd., as per the terms of which, among other things, the builders were appointed as Agent and Manager, not only to execute the constructions but also to enter into negotiations for sale of the apartments (shops, offices, etc.) on such terms and conditions and at such rate or prices as prevalent in the market with the intending purchasers. All the partners also were said to have executed a Power of Attorney dated 2.11.91 duly registered in favour of M/s Parasnath Builders Pvt. Ltd. While matters stood thus, Shri Vijay Krishna Yadav also expired on 23.12.91 leaving behind a Will dated 16.12.91 as to the mode of succession and an order of Letters of Administration dated 13.9.93 was said to have been obtained from the District Judge, Jaipur City, on the basis of the Will dated 16.12.91. A sum of Rs.2.50 lakhs each was to be and has been given to each one of the daughters, Preeti Yadav and Mamta Y .....

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..... suit in September 1995, staking a claim for the entire property left behind by late Shri Laxmi Narian Yadav, as his own. It is stated that in this suit Smt. Yadav has been made a party defendant as she had made Prashant Yadav as party defendant also in her suit. Smt. Yadav, in her suit, has filed an application for the appointment of a Receiver as also an application for injunction. M/s Parasnath Builders Pvt. Ltd. as well as Smt. Kalpana Kothari filed applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, in the Trial Court, relying upon the arbitration clauses contained in the Partnership Deed dated 31.1.87 and the agreement dated 5.10.1991 entered into by the Firm with the Builders. The applications filed for appointment of Receiver and also the one for injunction also were opposed by these defendants in the suit. On a consideration of the materials on record and also the respective contentions of parties, by an order dated 6.2.96, the applications for injunction as also for the appointment of Receiver were rejected by the Trial Court. Similarly, the suit was also stayed by allowing the applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Aggrieved, Smt. Su .....

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..... ing to legal issues and relevant facts. On a careful consideration for the same and the reasons assigned by the learned Judge in the High Court, we find it difficult to affix our approval to the order under challenge. The first respondent herein has filed the civil suit for dissolution of the partnership and for accounts and also filed applications for the appointment of Receiver and for injunction. The defendants have initially filed applications in the suit before the Trial Court invoking the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not only the applications filed by the first respondent before the Trial Court were rejected but the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act by the appellants came to be allowed and further proceedings in the suit filed by the first respondent came to be stayed. No doubt, at the appellate stage, after filing a written application for dismissal of the applications filed by the appellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as not pressed in view of the repeal of the 1940 Act and coming into force of the 1996 Act and getting orders thereon, the appellants herein have once again moved the High Court u .....

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..... uthority or the making of an application under Section 8 (1) of the 1996 Act, the arbitration proceedings are enabled, under Section 8 (3) of the 1996 Act to be commenced or continued and an arbitral award also made unhampered by such pendency. We have to test the order under appeal on this basis. On the ground of estoppel and the conduct of the appellants in getting their earlier application made under Section 34 of the 1940 Act dismissed as not pressed that the applications under Section 8 of the 1996 Act were not countenanced by the High Court. The fact that the earlier application under the 1940 Act was got dismissed as not pressed in the teeth of the repeal of the said Act cannot, in our view, constitute any legal impediment for having recourse to and avail of the avenues thrown open to parties under the 1996 Act. Similarly, having regard to the distinct purposes, scope and object of the respective provisions of law in these two Acts, the plea of estoppel can have no application to deprive the appellants of the legitimate right to invoke an all comprehensive provision of mandatory character like Section 8 of the 1996 Act to have the matter relating to the disputes referred .....

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