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TMI Blog1968 (9) TMI 115X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der dated December 28, 1963. The Appellant-company filed an appeal against the said order which was disposed of by the Chief Labour Commissioner in April 1964. On April 25, 1965 the respondent union made a further application for modifications. The Regional Labour Commissioner by his order dated September 2, 1965 allowed certain modifications but rejected the rest. The union thereupon appealed against the said order. After hearing the parties the Chief Labour Commissioner passed his impugned order dated October 27, 1967 ordering certification of certain modifications. Though the Appellant-company objected at first to all the modifications, counsel pressed the appeal in respect of four modifications only. The first modification challenged is in Standing Order 9, clause (a)which, as unamended, read as follows: "The railway under the terms of employment has the right to terminate the services of a permanent Workman on giving him one month's notice in writing or one month's pay may be paid in lieu of notice." The union claimed that the management should give reasons even when they terminated the services ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dings of the enquiry committee as soon as possible after the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings in his case and be allowed to defend his case through union's representative." The modification allowed was as follows: "In case the management propose to remove the workman from service they shall serve on the workmen separate show cause notice to that effect." Counsel for the company challenged the impugned order in its two facets: the scope of the power of modification under s. 10(2), and on merits on the ground that the modifications did not stand the test of reasonableness and fairness. On the first question his contention was that the jurisdiction and powers of the authorities under the Act to certify modifications of the existing standing orders are limited to cases where a change of circumstances is established. In the course of his argument, counsel, however, qualified the contention by conceding that if at the time of the last certification certain circumstances were, for one reason or the other, omitted from consideration they would constitute a Valid reason for modification and the modifi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 10, whose interpretation is in question, provides by sub-s. 1 as follows: "Standing orders finally certified under this Act shall not, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, be liable to modification until the expiry of 6 months from the date on which the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation." Sub-s. 2 runs as follows: "Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1), an employer or workman may apply to the certifying officer to have the standing orders modified ..... Sub-s. 3 provides that the foregoing provisions of the Act shall apply in respect of an application for modification as they apply to the certification of the first standing orders. Section 11 empowers the certifying officer and the appellate authority to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in an order passed by them or errors arising from any accidental slip or omission. Lastly, s. 12 provides that no oral evidence having the effect of adding to or otherwise varying or contradicting standing orders as finally certified under the Act shall be admitted in any court. Counsel conce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid, instead of reading into an Act what ought to have been said. So too, in Latham v. Lafone ([1867] L.R. 2 Ex. 115,121), Martin B. said: "I think the proper rule for construing this statute is to adhere to its words strictly; and it is my strong belief that, by reasoning on long-drawn inferences and remote consequences, the courts have pronounced many judgments affecting debts and actions in a manner that the persons who originated and prepared the Act never dreamed of." In the light of these principles we ought, therefore, to give a literal meaning to the language used by Parliament unless the language is ambiguous or its literal sense gives rise to an anomaly or results in something which would defeat the purpose of the Act. The Act was passed because the legislature thought that in many industrial establishments the conditions of service were not uniform and sometimes were not even reduced to writing. This led to conflicts resulting in unnecessary industrial disputes. The object of passing the Act was thus to require employers to define with certainty the conditions of service in their establishments and to require them to reduce them to writing and to get them compulsorily ce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . His only function was to see that the draft made provisions for all matters contained in the Schedule and that it D was otherwise certifiable under the Act. Therefore though the workmen through the union or otherwise were served with the copy of the draft and had the right to raise objections, the objections could be of a limited character, namely, that the draft did not provide for all matters in the Schedule or that it was not otherwise certifiable under the Act. Even in an appeal under s. 6, the E only objections they could raise were limited to the two aforesaid questions. The workmen thus could not object that the draft standing orders were not reasonable or fair. Under s. 10, the right to apply for modification was conferred on the employer alone and in view of sub-s. 3 the only consideration which the certifying authority could apply to such modification was the one which he F could apply under ss. 4 and 6. Therefore, no question whether the modification was fair or reasonable could be raised. It is thus clear that the workman had very little say in the matter even if he felt that the standing orders or their modifications were either not reasonable or fair. They could, of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Boveri Ltd. v. The Workmen. It will be pertinent, while examining the question whether there is a restriction, as suggested by counsel, to the right to apply for modifications, to bear in mind the change in the legislative policy reflected in the amendments of ss. 4 and 10. It will be noticed that s. 10 does not state that once a standing order is modified and the modification is certified, no further modification is permissible except upon proof that new circumstances have arisen since the last modification. As a matter of fact the legislature has not incorporated any words in the sub-sec. restricting the right to apply for modification except of course the time limit of six months in sub-s. 1. Section 6 no doubt lays down that the order of the appellate authority in an appeal against the order of the certifying officer under s. 5 is final but that finality is itself subject to the right to apply for modification under s. 10(2). Even so, it was urged that the finality of the order under s. 6 was indicative of a condition precedent to the jurisdiction under sec. 10(2) to entertain an application for modification on a new set circumstances having arisen in the meantime. The quest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nding orders provide 10 festival holidays, if counsel were right, the workmen can never apply for an addition in their number as they would be faced with the contention that the festivals existed at the time of the last certification and there was therefore no change of circumstances. The Act is a beneficent piece of legislation and therefore unless compelled by any words in it we would not be justified in importing in s. 10 through inference only a restriction to the right conferred by. it on account of a supposed danger of multiplicity for the purpose of ensuring that conditions of service, which the employer laid down, became known to the workmen and the liberty of the employer in prescribing the conditions of service was only limited to the extent that the Standing Orders had to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act and, as far as practicable, in conformity with Model Standing Orders. The Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority were debarred from adjudicating upon the fairness or the reasonableness of the provisions of the Standing Orders. Then, as noticed in the case of Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd.( [1966] 2 S.C.R, 863), the Legislature ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rom the date when the standing orders or the last modifications thereof came into operation. The object of providing the time limit was that the standing orders .or their modifications should be allowed to work for sufficiently long time to see whether they work properly or not. Even that time limit is not rigid because a modification even before six months is permissible if there is an agreement between the parties. The ground for urging that a restriction should be read in s. 10 was the apprehension that since workmen individually have the right to apply for modifications there would be multiple applications which an employer would have to face. Secondly, that an application without a change of circumstances would be tantamount to a review by the same authority of his previous order of certification. It was said that if no restriction is read in s. 10 it would mean that the same authority. who. on satisfaction of the fairness and reasonableness of a standing order or its last modification had certified it would be called upon to review his previous decision on reasonableness and fairness. Such a review, it was argued, is permissible only on well-recognised grounds, namely, disco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pply to industry matters, sound policy dictates that principles analogous to res judicata must be applied and it must be held that unless circumstances have changed an application for modification would be ,barred. For this, counsel relied on Burn & Co. v. Their Employees(S.C.R.781, 789). There the demand was for wage scales fixed in an award by the Mercantile Tribunal instead of the scales in accordance with the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. In a dispute previously raised by labour an award was made in 1950 which accepted the wage scales according to the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and rejected the demand for the scales according to those awarded by the Mercantile Tribunal which were more favourable. It was in these circumstances that this Court expressed the view that an award fixing wage scales should have fairly long range operation and should not be unsettled unless a change of circumstances has occurred justifying fresh adjudication. But with the constant spiralling of prices the principle would appear to have lost much of its efficacy. The trend in recent decisions is that application of technical rules such as res judicata. acquiescence, estoppel et ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... scharge simpliciter, (2) insertion of lime limit of 60 days in the disposal of appeals, (3) insertion in standing order 11 of a clause that where a workman is re. moved on the ground of inefficiency due to physical unfitness, the management should offer to such a workman alternative employment on reasonable emoluments and (4) insertion of the clause requiring a_ second show cause notice at time stage when the decision of suitable punishment is to be made. So far as modifications (2), and (3) are concerned, clearly no principle is involved and there would be no justification for us to interfere with the conclusion of the appellate authority on the question of their being fair and reasonable. As regards the first modification, the contention was that an employer has under the law of master and servant the right to terminate the services of his: employee by a discharge simpliciter after giving a month's notice or a month's wages in. lieu thereof, and is not required to give reasons for such an order. The Industrial Disputes Act also does not lay down any fetter to that right by requiring him to give reasons to the employee concerned and industrial adjudication has so far recog ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation, Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should therefore be set aside. The appeal, therefore, is partly allowed to the extent aforesaid and the impugned order to that extent is set aside. There will be Bhargava, J. The management of the Shahdara (Delhi) Saharnpur Light Railway Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Company") has riffled this appeal, by special leave, against an order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) under section 6 ,of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as an appellate authority, granting partially an application made under section 10 of the Act presented on behalf of the respondent, Shahdara- Saharanpur Railway Workers' Union. The first draft Standing Orders submitted by the Company to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder s. 6 of the Act. Reliance was, however, placed on the decision of this Court in Burn & Co., Calcutta v.. Their Employees ([1956]S.C.R 781), where this Court was dealing with the applicability of the principle analogous to the rule of res judicata to proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal dealing with a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. In that case, an earlier award had been given in an industrial dispute and the question arose whether, in the subsequent dispute for adjudication, the decisions given in the earlier award should be held as binding, unless it was shown that there had been a change of circumstances. In the appeal before this Court, it was urged that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in brushing aside the earlier award and in deciding the matter afresh as if it arose for the first time for determination; and it was argued that, when once a dispute is referred to a Tribunal and that results in an adjudication, that must be taken as binding on the parties thereto, unless there was a change of circumstances, and, as none such had been alleged or proved, the earlier award should have been accepted, as indeed it was accepted by the Adjudicator. This Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions of Industrial Tribunals also. Legislation regulating the relation between Capital and Labour has two objects in view. It seeks to ensure to the workmen, who have not the capacity to treat with capital on equal terms, fair returns for their labour. It also seeks to prevent disputes between employer and employees, so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the society might not suffer. Now, if we are to hold that an adjudication loses its force when it is repudiated under section 19(6) and that the whole controversy is at large, then the result would be that far from reconciling themselves to the award and settling down to work it, either party will treat it as a mere stage in the prosecution of a prolonged struggle, and far from bringing industrial peace, the awards would turn out to be but truces giving the parties breathing time before resuming hostile action with renewed vigour. On the other hand, if we are, to regard them as intended to have long term operation and at the same time hold that they are liable to be modified by change in the circumstances on which they were based, both the purposes of the legislature would be served. That is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpany and. Others. The judgment in this case was given only about a month after the judgment in the case of Workmen of Balmer Lawrie & Co. ([1964] 5 S.C.R. 344) by the same Bench of this Court which held: "It is true that too frequent alterations of conditions of service by industrial adjudication have been generally deprecated by this Court for the reason that it is likely to disturb industrial peace and equilibrium. At the same time, the Court has more than once pointed out the importance of remembering the dynamic nature , of industrial relations. That is why the Court has, specially in the more recent decisions, refused to apply to industrial adjudications principles of res judicata that are meant and suited for ordinary civil litigations. Even where conditions of service have been changed only a few years before, industrial adjudication has allowed fresh changes if convinced of the necessity and justification of these by the existing conditions and circumstances. Where, as in the present case, in a previous reference the tribunal has refused the demand for change., there is even less reason for saying that that refusal should have any such binding effect. It is important to re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... will thus be seen that the Act came into force before either the Central Act or the U.P. Act was passed. The scheme of the Act originally was to require employers in industrial establishment to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them. The Legislature thought that, in many industrial establishments, the conditions of employment were not always uniform, and sometimes, were not even reduced to writing, and that led to considerable confusion which ultimately resulted in industrial disputes. That is why the Legislature passed the Act making it compulsory for the establishments, to which the Act applied, to reduce to writing conditions of employment and get them certified as provided by the Act. The matters in respect of which conditions of employment had to be certified were specified 'in the schedule appended to the Act. This Schedule contains 11 matters in respect of which Standing orders had to be made. In fact, the words "Standing orders" are defined by s. 2(g) as meaning rules relating to matters set out in the Schedule. The "Certifying officer" appointed under the Act is defi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ircumstances the Certifying Officer or the Appellate Authority should grant modifications when an application under s. 10(2) of the Act is validly made after the expiry of the period of six months laid down in s. 10 (1 ) of the Act. The purpose of the Act, as it was originally passed in 1946, was merely to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to the workmen employed by them. To. give effect to this purpose, s. 3 of the Act gave the power exclusively to the employers to submit draft Standing Orders for certification. The Certifying Officer had to certify the Standing Orders, if provision was made in them for every matter set out in the Schedule and the Standing Orders were otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act. In addition, sub-s. (2) of section 3 also laid down that the provision to be made was to. be, as far as practicable, in conformity with Model Standing Orders prescribed by the appropriate State Government. Thus, the Act, in its original form, was designed only for the purpose of ensuring that conditions (A service, which the employer la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erring on the, Certifying Officer the function of judging the reasonableness and fairness of the proposed Standing Orders. These amendments cannot, however, affect the alternative remedy which the workmen had of seeking redress under the Industrial Disputes Act if they had grievance against any of the Standing Orders certified by the Certifying Officer [See Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Another, and the Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen. It is, therefore, clear that, after the amendment in 1956, the workmen have now two alternative remedies for seeking alterations in the Standing Orders proposed or ,already certified. They can object to the proposed Standing Orders at the time of first certification, or can ask for modification of the certified Standing Orders under s. 10(2) on the limited ground of fairness or reasonableness. But, for the same purpose, they also have the alternative remedy of seeking redress under the Industrial Disputes Act, in which case the scope of their demand would be much wider. If the proceedings go for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, the workmen can claim alterations of the Stand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... material which was originally before the Certifying Officer and the Appellate Authority, the Certifying Officer may, on the same material, come to a conclusion different from the conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Authority at the first stage under s. 6 of the Act. In that case, the Certifying Officer may allow the modification which was previously rejected by the Appellate Authority. The wide interpretation, urged by learned counsel for the workmen in this appeal that the power of a Certifying Officer on an application for modification is not limited at all, can thus result in orders being made which completely negative the finality of the decision given by an Appellate Authority under section 6 at an earlier stage. In fact, if tins interpretation is accepted and it is held that an order of modification can be made on the identical material which was available to the Appellate Authority at the time of its earlier order, it would mean that merely because a period of six months has elapsed,, a Certifying Officer would be competent to re- appraise the same facts and circumstances, take a different view and set aside the order passed by his superior authority and, thus, in effect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the workman or the employer desires to have modification without any fresh grounds, material or circumstances. The validity of the order of the Appellate Authority in the present appeal has to be judged on this basis. I have already mentioned earlier the various Standing Orders in respect of which modifications allowed by the Appellate Authority were sought to be challenged in this appeal. The objections in respect of some of these modifications, which were originally challenged, were not pressed by counsel during the hearing of the appeal and, consequently, those modifications need not be interfered with. At the stage of final hearing, learned counsel only pressed for setting aside four modifications mentioned by the Chief Labour Commissioner in his. appellate order as items Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 6 relating to modifications .of Standing. Orders 9(a), 12(A) and 11(vn). It may be mentioned that items 5 and 6 are both modifications in Standing Order 11 (vii). In each of these cases, the order passed by the Chief Labour Commissioner now impugned shows that he did not rely on any fresh facts, material or circumstances which were not available at the earlier stage when the Standing Orders w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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