TMI Blog1974 (6) TMI 58X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... im. In the meantime, on 10th April, 1972, the appellant addressed an appeal to the Government complaining against the order of suspension passed by the High Court and requesting the Governor to cancel the order of suspension on the ground that it was outside the authority of the High Court. The High Court withheld the appeal of the appellant and refused to forward it to the Governor since in its opinion no appeal lay to the Governor, against an order of suspension passed by the High Court. The appellant thereupon forwarded directly to the Governor a representation dated 14th May, 1972 with a copy to the Registrar of the High Court and by this representation the appellant moved the Governor to transfer the disciplinary inquiry against him to the Administrative Tribunal. There were several statements made in this representation which scandalized the High Court and tended to lower its prestige, dignity and authority and thus constituted criminal contempt of court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court, therefore, suo motu issued a notice dated 3rd July, 1972 calling upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itional District Magistrate (Judicial). The appellant was granted personal hearing and after considering the explanation given by him, the High Court again at a Full Court meeting of all the' judges held on 8th December, 1972, found the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him except charge No. 4(a) and reduced him to the rank of Additional District Magistrate (Judicial). The appellant took the view that same of the issues arising in the disciplinary inquiry were the same as those arising in the proceeding for contempt which was pending against him and the decision of those issues by the High Court on the Administrative side in the course of the disciplinary inquiry amounted to pre-judging those issues in the proceeding for contempt which was a judicial proceeding and the Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court, who decided the disciplinary inquiry were, therefore, guilty of criminal contempt of their own High Court. The appellant, therefore, as soon as the proceeding for contempt was decided by the Full Bench on 5th February, 1973, moved the Full Bench for initiating proceeding for contempt against the Chief Justice and other judges in their personal capac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion 19, sub-section (1). It is difficult to imagine, contended the appellant, that the legislature should have conferred a right on the Advocate General,or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General to move the High Court for taking action for contempt, but should have refused to grant a right of appeal to the Advocate General or such other person even if his motion was wrongly rejected by the High Court. These rival contentions raise an interesting question of law depending for its determination on the true interpretation of the language of section 19, sub-section (1). Now, while considering this question, we must bear in mind the true nature of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by the High Court and the law in regard to right of appeal which obtained immediately prior to the enactment of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It has always been regarded as well settled law that so far as criminal contempt is concerned, it is a matter entirely :between the Court and the alleged condemner. No one has a statutory or common law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the alleged condemner is guilty of contempt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... atutory right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because his opponent is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to come to the Court and complain that the authority of the Court has been flouted, and if the Court thinks that it was so, then the Court ill its discretion takes action to vindicate its authority. It is, therefore, difficult to see how an application ?or contempt raises any question between the parties, so that any order made on such an application by which the Court in its discretion refuses to take any action against the party alleged to be in the wrong can be said to raise any question between the parties. It is, therefore, clear that under the law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no appeal lay at he instance of a party moving the High Court for taking action for contempt, if the High Court in the exercise of its discretion refused to take action on the motion of such party. Even if the High Court took action and initiated a proceeding for contempt and in such proceeding, the alleged contemner, being found guilty, was punished for contempt, the order being one made by the High Court in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly to substitute the Supreme Court for the Privy Council. In short, there is only a discretionary right of appeal available at present in cases of criminal contempt. Then in Paragraph 3.1 in Chapter XI of its Report the Sanyal Committee proceeded to state : we accordingly recommend that against 'an order of a single Judge, punishing for contempt, the appeal should lie, in the High Court, to a Bench of Judges and against a similar order of a Bench of Judges of a High Court, the appeal should lie as of right to the Supreme Court. Chapter XII of the Report contained the recommendations of the Sanyal Committee and clause, 25 of the recommendations was in the following terms : Provision may be made for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its. .jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The appeal should lie to a Bench of Judges of the High Court where the order or decision is of a single Judge. Where the order or decision is of a Bench the appeal should lie to the Supreme Court. It was in pursuance of this recommendation made by the Sanyal Committee that the Parliament, while enacting the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General or a reference is made by a subordinate court. Does the Court enter upon the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and act in exercise of it when it considers such motion or reference for the purpose of deciding whether it should initiate a proceeding for contempt ? We do not think so. The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court'. on a consideration of such motion or reference, to decide, in exercise of its discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognizance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt Prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even if there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contemner. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the Court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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