TMI Blog1969 (3) TMI 82X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t April, 1955 and 31st December, 1957, and for work done on weekly off-days for the period between 1st April, 1955 and 31st December, 1960. The amount claimed by each workman was separately indicated in the application under each head. The total claim of all the workmen was computed at ₹ 62,420/82P according to the workmen themselves. The second application (LCH) No. 138 of 1965 was presented by 50 workmen on 23rd July, 1965, putting forward a claim for washing allowance at ₹ 36 each from 1st January, 1964 to 30th June, 1965, and cost of uniform at ₹ 40 each from 1st January 1964 to 30th June, 1965 in respect of 18 of those 50 workmen. The third application (LCH) No. 101 of 1965 was filed by one workman alone on 19th April, 1965, claiming a sum of ₹ 8,910/72P in respect of his over-time work and compensation for work done on weekly off days. The fourth application (LCH ) No. 140 of 1965 was filed on 26th July 1965 by 14 workmen making a total claim of ₹ 17,302/60P, for work done on weekly off-days during the period from 1st December, 1960 to 30th June, 1965. 13 of the workmen claimed that they were entitled to payment at Rs, 1190 each, while one workma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nder s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. In the course of the arguments, however, learned counsel conceded that he could not press this point in Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1968 arising out of Writ Petition No. 973 of 1966 which was directed against the order of the Labour Court in Application (LCH) No. 138 of 1965, because the claim in that application before the Labour Court was confined to washing allowance and cost of uniform which are items not governed by the Minimum Wages Act at all. His submissions have, therefore, been confined before us to the other three appeals in which the claim of the workmen was for computation of their benefit in respect of overtime work and work done on weekly off-days. It may be mentioned that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was raised on behalf of the appellant not only in the writ petitions before the High Court, but even before the Labour Court itself when that Court took up the hearing of the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act. However, the ground for challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was confined to the point mentioned by us above. It was not contended either before the Labour Court or in the writ petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as sought to be raised by the appellant. A question of limitation raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and, in these cases, this question could be decided on the basis of the facts on the record, being a pure question of law. It is in this background that we have permitted this question also to be raised in these appeals, though it was not put forward either in the High Court or before the Labour Court. Thus, we are concerned in these appeals with the two aspects relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to, entertain applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, and the plea that the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act were time-barred Dr at least part of the claims under the applications were ame- barred in view of article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. On the first question, both the Labour Court and the High Court held that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was excluded because of s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act has no force, on the assumption that the claims made in these applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act could have be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er of seeking the remedy in section 20 which is as follows : 20. (1) The 'appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions; as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14, to employees employed or paid in that area. (2) Where an employee has any claim of the, nature referred to in sub-section (1), the employee himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under sub-section (1) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uction of documents, and every such Authority shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to the clear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with fixing of rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment for work on a day of rest-and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision is made in other laws, such as the Payment of Wages Act No. 4 of 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. In s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates, of wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14. This language used in s. 20(1) shows that the Authority appointed under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pose of enforcement of payment of amounts and not for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with the various rates fixed under that Act. This interpretation, in our opinion, also harmonises the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act which was already in existence when the Minimum Wages Act was passed. In the present appeals, therefore, we have to see whether the claims which were made by the workmen in the various applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act were of such a nature that they could have been brought before the Authority under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act inasmuch as they raised disputes relating to the rates for payment of overtime and for work done on weekly off days. We have examined the applications which were presented before the Labour Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act in these appeals and have also taken into account the pleadings which were put forward on behalf of the appellant in contesting those applications and we are unable to find that there was any dispute relating to the rates. It is true that, in their applications, the workmen did plead the rates at, which their claims had to be computed; but ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Limitation Act and, thereafter, took notice of the fact that that article had, in a long series of decisions of most, if not all, of the High Courts, been held to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court also dealt with the argument advanced that the reason for holding that article 181 was confined to applications under the Code was that the article should be construed ejusdem generis and that, as all the articles in the third division of the schedule to the Limitation Act related to applications under the' Code, article 181, which was the residuary article, must be limited to applications under the Code. That reasoning, it was pointed out, was no longer applicable because of the amendment of the Limitation Act by the introduction of articles 158 and 178 which governed applications under the Arbitration Act and not thus under the Code. The Court then considered the views expressed by the various High Courts in a number of cases and held :- It does not appear to us quite convincing, without further argument, that the mere amendment of articles 158 and 178 can ipso facto alter the meaning which, as a result of a long series of judicial decisio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid to have, as it were, added the words u nder the Code in the first column of that Article'. Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by art. 181 can be invoked in dealing with applications, under s. 33C(2) of the Act. It appears to us that the view expressed by this Court in those cases must be held to be applicable, even when considering the scope and applicability of article 137 in the new Limitation Act of 1963. The language of article 137 is only slightly different from that of the earlier article 181 inasmuch as, when prescribing the three years period of limitation, the first column giving the description of the application reads as any other application -for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division. In fact, the addition of the word other between the words any and application would indicate that the legislature wanted to make it clear that the principle of interpretation of article 181 on the basis of ejusdem generis should be -applied when interpreting the new article 137. This word other implies a reference to earlier articles and, consequently, in interpreting this article, reg ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with applications or references under the Act are not courts and they are in no way governed either by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. We cannot, therefore, accept the submission made that this article will apply even to applications made to an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. The alterations made in the article and in the new Act cannot, in our opinion, justify the interpretation that even applications presented to bodies, other than courts, are now to be governed for purposes of limitation by -article 137. Reliance in this connection was placed by learned counsel for the appellant primarily on the decision of the Bombay High Court in The Manager, Mls. P. K. Porwal v. The Labour Court at Nagpur(70 B. L. R. 104.). We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in that case. The High Court ignored the circumstance that the provisions of article 137 were sought to be applied to an application which was presented not to a court but to a Labour Court dealing with an application under s. 3 3C (2) of the Act and that such a Labour Court is not governed by any procedural code relating to civil or criminal proceedings. That C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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