TMI Blog1970 (9) TMI 105X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ore for ejectment and damages. A compromise took place between the patties but the defendant did not vacate the premises in terms of the compromise and continued to remain in occupation of the same. The property was requisitioned under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules and Government took its possession on February 2, 1944. It was derequisitioned on November 21, 1945. For the period from February 2, 1944 to November 21, 1945 the plaintiffs received monthly compensation from the Government at the rate of ₹ 350/-. For the period of the defendant's alleged wrongful occupation the plaintiffs filed two suits against the defendant. The first was for and recovery of damages upto February 1, 1944 and the second was for damages from November 22, 1945 upto November 21, 1948. The plaintiffs also claimed future damages till recovery of possession although the suit was not one for possession The suits were decreed by the learned Subordinate Judge in December 1951 at the rate of ₹ 300/- per month for the entire period of claim. In other words the claim for future mesne profits was also a]-lowed. On appeal the High Court disallowed the claim for future mesne profits and redu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1948 and a decree had been passed by !he trial court in favour of the plaintiffs for the entire claim including the claim for future damages. The plaintiffs were only required to pay additional court fee as provided by the Indian Court Fee Act for the claim relating to future damages and the plaintiffs had in fact paid the required amount of additional court fee. The High Court, in the judgment mentioned before and in the portion extracted therefrom, had negatived the claim for future damages on the sole ground that no decree could be granted for recovery of compensation after the date of the suit or after the date of the decree in a pure money suit. In other words it was held that under the law the court was not competent to decree such a suit. Section 14 in so far as it is material for our purpose runs as follows:- S. 14(1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of Appeal, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good fa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... merits of the case they would be defects of a like nature . The cases which were decided on the principle that if 'a plaintiff or a petitioner failed to establish a cause of action in himself no deduction of time could be allowed under s. 14 were noticed and it was accepted that they proceeded on a correct view. Illustration of the facts which would be covered by the words or other cause of a like nature as given in the decided cases were : (i) if a suit had failed because it was brought without proper leave; (ii) if it had failed because no notice under s. 80, Civil Procedure Code, had been given; (iii) where it would fail for non-production of the Collector's certificate required by S. 7 of the Pensions Act. In each one of these cases the court did not lack jurisdiction in its inception but the suit could not be proceeded with and disposed of until the statutory conditions laid down had been satisfied or fulfilled. Mention may be made of two cases which are apposite out of the, numerous decisions relating to, the point under consideration. In Shrimati Nrityamoni Dassi Others v. Lakhan Chandra Sen(I.L.R. [1916] 43 Cal. 660.) the plaintiffs were defendants in a suit b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sence of diligence or good faith on his part. He was found entitled to the benefit of s. 14 of the Act. It is welt settled that although all questions of limitation must be decided by the provisions of the Act and the courts cannot travel beyond them the words or other cause, of a like nature must be construed liberally. Some clue is furnished with regard to the intention of the legislature by the Explanation III in s. 14(2). Before the enactment of the Act in 1908 there was a conflict amongst the High Courts on the question whether misjoinder and non-joinder were defects which were covered by the words or other cause of a like nature . It was to set at rest this conflict that Explanation III was added. An extended meaning was thus given to these words. Strictly speaking misjoinder or non- joinder of parties could hardly be regarded as a defect of jurisdiction or something similar or analogous to it. In our judgment the present case is very similar to the one decided by the Privy Council in Shrimati Nrityamoni Dassi Ors. v. Lakhan Chandra Sen(1). There an effective decree had been made by Henderson J., of the Calcutta High Court which enured to the benefit of the defenda ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y Council and which is stated to be one of general application has been invoked on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents. Rangnekar, J., in delivering the judgment of the Division Bench in Narayan Jivaji Patil Another v. Curunsthgouda Khandappagouda Patil Another(I. L. R. [1939] Bom. 173.) discussed at length the various pronouncements of the Privy Council and deduced the principle that where a claim was satisfied either by agreement of parties or by decree of the court and it the satisfaction or decree was set aside subsequently in a judicial proceeding. a fresh cause of action would accrue in favour of the claimant. In the present case it could be said that the cause of action for future mesne profits was satisfied by the decree which had been granted by the trial court in the money suit of 1948. The High Court, however, in the appeals decided by it by means of the judgment in India Electric, Works Ltd. v. Mrs. B. S. Mantosh Ors.( A. I. R. 1956 Cal. 148 at p. 155.) delivered on June 30, 1955 had set aside that decree. A new cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiffs from the date of that judgment. It is, however, unnecessary to rest our decision on the principle reli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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