TMI Blog1988 (2) TMI 464X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... listed for consideration by a Bench of three Judges of the very same question in order to see whether there is any conflict between the views taken in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) and a later decision of this Court in Shyamaraju Hedge v. G. Venkatesha Bhat Ors., [1987] 3 J.T. 663 and whether the view taken in the earlier case requires reconsideration. Even at the threshold of the judgment it has to be mentioned that Aundal Ammal's case arose under the Kerala Act whereas Shyamaraju Hedge's case (supra) pertained to the Karnataka Rent Control Act. Since there are essential differences between the two Acts, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the two Acts and the circumstances in which the decision pertaining to each Act came to be rendered by this Court. As per section 20(5) of the Kerala Act a Rent Control Court means a Court constituted under Section 3. Under Section 3(1) the Government may, by Notification in the Gazette appoint a person who is or is qualified to be appointed, a Munsif to be the Rent Control Court for such local areas as may be specified therein. Section 11 of the Act provides that a landlord can seek eviction of his tenan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ona designata, the ordinary incidence of the procedure of that Court including any right of appeal or revision will be inhered to the decision rendered by the District Court. In that view of the matter the Full Bench held that a decision of a District Court under Section 20 of the Kerala Act is undoubtedly amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court especially when there is no provision in the Act providing for an appeal against an order of the District Court under Section 20 or in the alternative any express provision declaring the finality of the said order. The decision of the Full Bench held the field for a number of years in the State of Kerala and in all subsequent cases where the competence of the High Court to entertain a revision under Section 115 C.P.C. against an order of a District Court passed under Section 20(1) of the Kerala Act was challenged the contention was repelled by reference to the judgment of the Full Bench. One such case in point is Balagangadhara Menon v. T.V. Peter, [1984]KLT 845. The question decided by the Full Bench, however, came to be raised before this Court, in Aundal Ammal's case (supra). A Bench consisting of E.S. Venkataram ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... question no. 1 is concerned, as follows: ........ In determining whether the Legislature intended a further revision petition to the High Court, regard must be had to the principle that the construction given to a statute should be such as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it. It seems to us that to recognise a revisional power in the High Court over a revisional order passed by the District Judge would plainly defeat the object of the legislative scheme. The intent behind the bifurcation of jurisdiction- to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court-would be frustrated. The scheme would, in large measure, lose its meaning. If a revision petition is permitted to the High Court against the revisional order of the District Court arising out of a suit of a value less than ₹ 20,000, a fundamental contradiction would be allowed to invade and destroy the division of revisional power between the High Court and the District Court, for the High Court would then enjoy jurisdictional power in respect of an order arising out of a suit of a valuation below ₹ 20,000. That was never intended at all. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gislative intention behind the amendment was to relieve the High Court of the burden of exercising revisional jurisdiction in respect of cases decided under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. We are of firm opinion that the central principle continues to hold, notwithstanding the amendment effected in s. 25, that the hierarchy of remedies enacted in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act represents a complete and final order of remedies, and it is not possible to proceed outside the Act to avail of a superior remedy provided by another statute. Taking the same view of the Kerala Act, which is also a selfcontained Act it was held in Aundal Ammal's case (supra) that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court was in error and the High Court in the instant case had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under Section 115 CPC. Coming now to the Karnataka Act and the decisions of the High Court and of this Court pertaining to Section 50 read with Section 48(6) of the said Act, it is first necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act as they stood before and after the amendments effected by the Amendment Act 31 of 1975. The relevant portions of Section 48 and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt of Civil Judge under this Act decision given or proceedingsor any order passed by the Con- taken by the District Judge.troller under sections 14,15 16,or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself (ii) any order passed or proceed-as to the legality or correctness of ing taken by the Court under thissuch order or proceeding and may Act or any order passed by thepass such order in reference Controller under section 14,thereto as it thinks fit. section 15 or section 16. for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such decision, order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as it think fit; 2. The costs of, and incidental2. The District Judge may, at any all proceedings before the Hightime, call for and examine any order Court shall be in its distretion.passed or proceeding taken by the Court of Munsiff referred to in sub-clause(iii)of clause (d) of section(3)for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or correctness of such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. the order of the District Judge shall be final. 3. The costs of and incidental to all proceedings before the High Court or the District Judge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll not be liable to be called in question in any court of law, whether in a suit or other proceeding or by way of appeal or revision. In the background of the changes made by the legislature, a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court went into the question in Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar Others, ILR 1978 Karnataka 1585 whether by reason of Section 48(6) a further revision against a revisional order passed by the District Judge under Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act would lie or not to the High Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Full Bench held that in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, AIR 1977 SC 1555 and Krishnadass Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP (Civil) No. 913 of 1978 decided on 13th February 1978 the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. to revise an order of the District Judge passed under Section 50(2) will stand unaffected. The correctness of this view was questioned before another Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in M.M. Yaragatti v. Vasant Others, AIR 1987 Karnataka 186. The Full Be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to any modification or revision by an Appellate Authority; and in so far as an Appellate Authority is concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided in section 20. As regards Section 20, a division of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been made between the High Court and the District Court. In all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section 18, the District Judge has been constituted the revisional authority. It is only in other cases i.e. where the decision sought to be revised is that of a judicial officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge, the High Court has been constituted the Revisional authority. The revisional powers conferred under Section 20, whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be are of greater amplitude than the powers of revision exercisable by a High Court under Section 115 C.P.C. Under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or propriety of the orders sought to be revised. Not only tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority and an order of an Appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20. When the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final at their respective states unless the order is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority as the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under Section 20(1) by the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of finality. The third aspect is that the Legislature has not merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided for in Section 20. These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 C.P.C. to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court under Section 20 of the Act ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lso speaks of the finality of the order of the Rent Control Court, subject to the decision of the Revisional Court under Section 50 in more or less the same terms as in Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act, the force underlying the words shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question etc. has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions present distinctly different perspections. It is in that situation it was found in Shyamaraju's case that the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Act warranted the application of the ratio in Chhaganlal's case and Krishnadas Bhatija's case rather than the ratio in Vishesh Kumar's case and Aundal Ammal's case. In fact, it is worthy of notice that Venkataramiah, J. who spoke for the Full Bench in Krishnaji's case was a party to the judgment in Aundal Ammal's case and the learned judge, while concurring with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who spoke for the Bench, has not deemed it necessary to make any reference to the Full Bench decision in Krishnaji's case. There is, therefore, no conflict between the decision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d v. Mary, (supra) as the decision suffered from misconstruction of the relevant Sections in the Act and the weakness in the reasoning became manifest in the light of the subsequent decision of this Court such as in Vishesh Kumar (supra). In the light of our conclusion all the appeals must succeed in so far as the challenge to the right of the High Court to entertain revision petitions under Section 115 C.P.C. is concerned. In Civil Appeal Nos. 626 of 1981 and 624 of 1985, the High Court allowed the revision petition under Section 115 C.P.C. and ordered the eviction of the tenant. In Civil Appeal No. 2079 of 1981 the District Judge set aside the order of eviction but the High Court restored the order of eviction. In Civil Appeal No. 1619 of 1986 the District Court allowed the Revision and restored the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller and the High Court has confirmed the said order in the revision preferred to it. In Civil Appeal No. 7505 of 1983 the District Court reversed the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and ordered eviction and order of the District Court has been confirmed by the High Court. In Special Leave Petition No. 4311 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... District Judge. This question has been answered in the negative in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai, [1987] 3 SCC 83 (a decision under the Kerala Act) but in the affirmative in Shyamaraju Hegde v. Venkatesha Bhat, [1987] 3 J.T. 663 (a decision under the Karnataka Act) and hence this reference to a larger Bench. My learned brothers are of the view that there is no conflict between the above two decisions as the two enactments are not in pari materia and that, so far as the Kerala Act is concerned, Aundal Ammal should be followed. With respect, I am unable to agree. 3. Normally, a revision lies to the High Court under section 115 of the C.P.C. against any order of the District Judge/Court. The fact that the order may have been passed under a special statute or that the statute contains expressions purporting to confer finality on the order of the District Judge/Court or a subordinate authority or Court have been held insufficient to take away this jurisdiction. This is the effect of the decisions in Chhaganlal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, [1977] 2 SCR 871, a case under the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act and in Krishandas Bhatija v. Venkatachala Shetty, SLP No. 9 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of the High Court under S. 115, as has been held in the two cases referred to above, it is difficult to see the justification for reading any such exclusion into the Kerala Act. 5. This poses then the question of a choice between the two views of this court: the one in Shyamaraju and the one in Aundal Ammal. As has already been pointed out, Shyamaraju follows the earlier decisions of this Court in Chhagan Lal and Krishnadas Bhatija. The only other decision of this Court, which has relevance in the present context, is Vihesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, [1980] 3 SCR 32 which has been relied upon in Aundal Ammal. I am in agreement with the view expressed in Shyamaraju that Vishesh Kumar was rendered in a totally different statutory context. That decision turned largely on the legislative history of S. 115 of the C.P.C. and s. 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act in their application to the State of Uttar Pradesh. I am therefore inclined to lean in favour of the view that has commended itself to this Court as to the interpretation of the Karnataka Act and to hold that the High Court has a power of revision over the order of the the District Judge under the Kerala Act as well. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... court of the land. In this view of the matter, sections 18 and 20 have a vital part to play but their effect is not to eliminate the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115. 8. One more circumstance which I think has a bearing on the interpretation to be placed on this procedural problem is this. In the State of Kerala, as early as in Vareed v. Mary, AIR 1969 Ker. 101, a view was taken that the High Court can entertain a second revision and, though Shri Potti suggested that this view has been often challenged, the above Full Bench decision hold the field till Aundal Ammal was decided. In Karnataka, the maintainability of a second revision appears to have been taken for granted untill a doubt was raised in view of certain observations made in a decision under the Cooperative Societies Act. This doubt was dispelled and it was held in Krishnaji's case (ILR 1978 Kar. 1585) that the High Court could maintain a second revision. This view was sought to be reversed by the subsequent Full Bench in Yaragatti's case, in the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal, but that attempt was overruled in Shyamaraju's case. In the result, the position has been that, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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