TMI Blog1972 (4) TMI 96X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her under the Gold Control Act, 1968. The seizure of the goods mentioned above including the currency notes and the Ambassador car was made under Section 115 of the Customs Act. No notice was issued to the petitioner on or before February 23, 1971, on which date the period of six months of the seizure of the goods expired. It is alleged on behalf of the respondents that an order granting extension of time by a further period of two months i.e. up to April 22, 1971, for the issue of show-cause notice in respect of the aforesaid seized goods, was granted by the Collector, Customs and Central Excise Chandigarh, on February 17, 1971 i.e. before the expiry of six months from the date of the seizure of the goods. A similar order was passed extending the time under Section 79 of the gold Control Act, 1968, by the Collector, Customs and Central Excise, Chandigarh on February 19, 1971. On March 9, 1971 the Collector, Central Excise and Customs, issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why the request for the grant of extension of time should not be acceded to. The petitioner was directed to appear before the Collector Central Excise and Customs, on March 18, 1971, for submitting hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... filed to the replication by respondent No.1. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the order of extension passed ex parte on February 17, 1971, under the proviso to Section 110(2) of the customs Act was a nullity in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Charan Das Malhotra's case, AIR 1972 SC 689 (supra) as it had been passed without notice to the petitioner. It is admitted by the respondents that it is so and that is why notice dated March 9, 1971, was issued to the petitioner and others to show cause why the extension of time should not be allowed and the proper order was passed extending the time on March 22, 1971, extending time under the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Customs Act is valid or nor and while determining that question 1971, has to be completely ignored as honest. 3. The principal attack as to the validity and legality of the order of extension passed on March 22, 1971, under the proviso to Section 110(2) of the Customs Act is that it had been passed after the expiry of six months from the date of the seizure of the goods and was, therefore, not valid because immediately after the expiry of six m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s was November 24, 1961, after taking into account the number of days required for obtaining the certified copies. The certified copies were actually sent by the Company to the said Registrars on March 6, 1962, ie. about three months and a half after the expiry of the time allowed by Section 18(1). Under sub-section (4) of Section 18, the Court is empowered to extend the time for filing of documents or for the registration of the alteration by such period as it thinks proper. Section 19(2) of the Companies Act provides:-- If the documents required to be filed with the Registrar under Section 18 are not filed within the time allowed under the section, such alteration and the order of the Court made under sub-section (5) of Section 17 and all proceedings connected therewith shall, at the expiry of such period, become void and inoperative. Provided that the Court may, on sufficient cause shown, revive the order on application made within a further period of one month . 4. The learned judge considered various decisions cited before him in order to find out the meaning of the word extended or extension and held as under:-- One characteristic feature of all these decisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion 18 sub-section (1) for extension of time for filing the document, the order of the Court had become void and inoperative after 21st November, 1961. As I read in Sections 18 and 19, it means that a certified copy the first instance must be filed within three months from the date of the order. If extension of time for filing of the documents is to be sought, then the Court must be moved within three months before the order becomes void and inoperative. Once is so moved within limitations, it may 'at any time' by order, extend the time for the filing of documents. If this has also been not done, then on sufficient cause order if an application has been made within a month. The period of one month in this case commenced from the date of the order becoming void and inoperative. This is a further period' which is added to the three months allowed under Section 18 sub-section (1). The use of the word 'revive' in the proviso to Section 19, sub-section (2) is in contradistinction with the word 'extend' occurring in Section 18, sub-section (4) is significant. 'Revive' brings back to life what has become moribund. It is synonymous to re-enact or to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ir return accrues to the owner of goods, which defeats the right of the Customs authorities to retain possession of those goods after the expiry of six months. Both the rights cannot co-exist for any time. It will amount to the revival of that right of the Customs authorities by extending time retrospectively after the expiry of six months which will be in direct conflict with the right of the owner of the goods to claim their return and has, therefore, to be negatived in view of the specific and mandatory provisions of Section 110(2) of the Act. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that a statute should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested rights, and such a construction should never be adopted, if the words are open to another construction, which will have the effect of defeating that right. It is, therefore, obligatory on the Collector of Customs to pass an order extending the period of six months before its expiry and if once an extension of time is allowed and another extension is required, the order of further extension must also be passed before the expiry of the extended period so that the total period including extensions from the date o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sputed that extension can be made after the expiry of the period in cases where the provision authorising the making of orders extending certain periods uses an expression that such orders could be passed before or after the earlier period. Such an expression only makes it clear that the order of 'extension' can be passed at any time, but cannot give a different meaning to the word 'extension'. The argument therefore, for the petitioner based on the implications of the word 'extension' to the effect that only what exists can be extended is not sufficient for arriving at the conclusion that the orders about extension must be passed prior to the expiry of the earlier period. The provision in clause 16 is in most general terms. It does not limit the power of the Governor to order the extension within the period to be extended, but empowers him to extend the period from time to time. In the absence of any such limitations, we are not prepared to narrow down the interpretations of this provision and to hold that the Governor must exercise his powers of extending the period before its expiry. (10) Such an order of extension merely substitutes the extended perio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... specified submit its award to the State Government.' (11) Clause 16 of the Order says that to adjudicator shall, after recording necessary evidence, make the award within 40 days. It would appear from these provisions of the Act and the order and from the absence of any provision suggesting the return of the reference by the adjudicator in case he could not pronounce the adjudicator is bound to make an award unless the reference to him has been revoked, and that in case he fails to pronounce the award within the time allowed, he should take steps to have the necessary period extended. (12) We, therefore, construe these various provisions to mean that the adjudicator remains seized of the reference till he makes his award or till the reference to him is withdrawn by the Governor, and that so long as he remains seized of the reference, the Governor can make an order extending the period of decision and thus making him competent to make the award. No valid objection, therefore, can be taken to the adjudicator's making the award within any such extended periods. 7. The observations of the learned Judges in Paragraphs 10 and 11 set out above are significant. In clause 16 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... related back to the date on which the previous period of six months expired so as to make it continuous. I regret I cannot agree to this submission. If the proviso to Section 110(2) had provided that only a request for extension of time has to be made within a period of six months and the time can be extended at any time and form time to time for another period not exceeding six months, the submission made by the learned counsel would have had some force. The language of the proviso is not susceptible of that meaning. All that it says is that the Collector of Customs may, on sufficient cause being shown extend the aforesaid period of six months , which clearly means that not only a request for extension of time has to be made but the order has also to be passed within that period after being satisfied of the sufficient cause in support of that order. The interpretation sought for by the learned one. He has, However, relied on the following observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Charan Das Malhotra's case (supra):-- But it may be said that in both those cases there was a civil right involved and that power, therefore, had to be held to be quasi-judicial. Bu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n enactment. 10. After approving the above observations in the Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. The Ajax Products limited AIR 1965 SC 1358, it was further observed- There may be cases in which the language of the statue may be so clear that a proviso may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment . 11. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 110 construed in the manner stated by their Lordships will lead to the only conclusion that the extension of time in order to deprive the owners of the goods of the right to claim their return, can be made only before the expiry of the statutory fixed time so as to make the possession of the Customs authorities continuous. Once the period of six months or any other extended period expires without being extended before its expiry, and a break occurs in the continuity of possession of the Customs authorities, the right of the owner of the seized goods to claim their return at once so accrues which cannot be defeated by extending the time after its expiry. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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