TMI Blog1994 (7) TMI 344X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , will not dispute the declaration of compensation awarded . Entering into this agreement as it will be for his own benefit and he stands to gain by the implementation of the said agreement. The second party (Land Acquisition Collector) is empowered to make an award at the rate of Rs II 00 (Rupees eleven hundred only) per cent inclusive of solatium and value for all structures and 'improvements in and upon the said land . Pursuant thereto notification under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (Act 21 of 1962 for short the Act ) was published in the State Gazette acquiring 2.69.11 hectares in Survey Nos. 1759 part and 1127 parts in Trivandrum for the housing scheme envisaged by the appellants. Possession of the land was taken on 1-2-1978 but since declaration under Section 6 was not published within two years from the date of publication of Section 3(1) notification, on 12-6-1979 fresh notification under Section 3(1) was published. The respondents questioned the notification by filing a writ petition on 10-8-1979 which was disposed of on 13-10-1980 upholding the fresh notification. A declaration under Section 6 was published on 18-1-1981 and a notice und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uld begin to run from the date of the second notification and the award having been made within four years from that date, the Collector was within his power to make the award under Section 16 and the finding of the High Court that the award became void after the expiry of four years from the date of the agreement is clearly erroneous. In view of the agreement, no reference under Section 18 can be made to the civil court. Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents resisted the contentions. 3. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the phrase all persons interested agree in Section 16(1) required that each and every party having an interest in the compensation should necessarily be a party to the agreement. To appreciate whether this broad construction could alone subserve the legislative intent, should be considered in the light of the language in Section 16 and purpose it seeks to serve and its effects, require consideration. Section 16(1) reads thus: 16. (1) If the Collector and all the persons interested agree, whether before or after the date of publication of the notification under subsection (1) of Section 3, as to the amount ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated that the question whether, when the legislature has used general words in a statute, not following particular or specific words, those words are to receive any (and, if so, what) limitation is one which may sometimes be answered by considering whether the intention of the legislature on this point can be gathered from other parts of the statute. At p. 184, it is stated that sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of making the Act, sometimes by comparing one part of the Act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances, so that they have ever been guided by the intent of the legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to, reason and good discretion. The statute has to be construed according to the intent of the legislature. In Maharashtra State Financial Corpn. V. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. (1991) 2 SCC 637, 651 (para 16), this Court held that it is settled rule of interpretation that statutory provisions should be construed in a manner which subserves the purpose of the enactment and does not defeat it and that no part thereof is rendered surplus or otiose. The obj ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... award binds the non- party when it was entered into in an individual capacity by the contracting party. The finding of the High Court that no award could have been made in respect of respondent- company, therefore, is clearly erroneous and unsustainable. It is accordingly set aside. We are informed that the Indian Bank was paid of its debt and its request for reference under Section 18 was negatived by the Collector, which became final. 5.The crucial question whether a period of 4 years envisaged in proviso to Section 16(1) should be reckoned from the date when the agreement was executed or from the date the publication of the notification, under Section 3(1) after the agreement was executed and what would be the meaning of the words from such date ? Before considering these questions, it is necessary to note few material facts and the preexisting law. Unmended Section 16(1) gave power to the Collector and all persons interested in the compensation, to agree for fixation of the amount of compensation by an award by consent. It is otherwise known as statutory agreement. There was no limitation prescribed for making the award by the Collector. Sub-section (2) makes the award con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate of the publication of the notification. In the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 it was further reduced to one year. Equally Section 11-A was made by 1984 Amendment Act prescribing 2 years' limitation from the date of publication of the declaration to make the award in respect of the proceedings taken under the Act and the proviso thereto gives further three years to make the award in the pending proceedings from the date of the commencement of 1984 Amendment Act. On expiry thereof, proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse . It is thus clear from the legislative mandate that the completion of passing of the award after the initiation of the acquisition proceedings are being unduly delayed and now it is enjoined to be done within 2 years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6. The Kerala Legislature recognising the same situation prevailing under the Act the Kerala Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1980, suitably amended Sections 3 and 6 of that Act, Section 16(1) was also amended. Preceding thereto a Division Bench of that court in Kalyankutti Ammal V. State of Kerala(ILR (1981) 2 Ker 53)interpreted the agreement and Section 16(1) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... falls within its express terms. The scope of the proviso, therefore, is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and it excludes something which otherwise would have been within the rule. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear, the proviso cannot be torn apart from the main enactment nor can it be used to nullify by implication what the enactment clearly says, nor set at naught the real object of the main enactment, unless the words of the proviso are such that it is its necessary effect. In that case it Was held that by reading the proviso consistent with the provisions of Section 88 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Act, the object of the main provision was sustained. In A.N. Sehgal V. Raje Ram Sheoran (1992 Supp (1) SCC 304: 1993 SCC (L S) 675 :(1993) 24 ATC) another Bench interpreting proviso in the Haryana Service of Engineers Rules, 1960 held that the proviso to Rule 5(2)(a) cannot be applied to confer the benefit of regular appointment on every promotee appointed in excess of 50% quota. This Court harmoniously read the main provision and the proviso and gave effect to the rule. 7. It would, thus, be clear that S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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