TMI Blog1996 (7) TMI 563X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aside their conviction and sentence for the said offence while confirming their conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Both the convicts unsuccessfully invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. This appeal by special leave filed by the appellant is directed against the order of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 16.10.1990 dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the convicts. The brother of the appellant filed SLP (Crl.) 2336 of 1990 against the revisional order of the High Court but that S.L.P. was dismissed by this Court on 15.2.1991. The prosecution case is as follows : The appellant (hereinafter the first accused) is the younger brother of the petitioner (hereinafter the second accused) in S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2336 of 1990, which as already noticed was dismissed on 15.2.1991 by this Court. The first accused had been selected for Indian Police Service and was undergoing training in the year 1985 and on completion of the training was posted as an Assistant Superintendent of Police in Jammu Kashmir Police force. His brother, the second accused, was at the relevant time working with the Osmania University at Hyderabad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... also insisted that the said amount should be paid before marriage. The 'dowry' talks between the second accused and PW1, however, remained inconclusive. Lateron the date of marriage was fixed as 2.11.1985. On 1.10.1985, the first accused allegedly wrote a letter, exhibit P6, to Ms.Vani asking her to cancel the date of marriage or to fulfil the demands made by his elders. The first accused came to Hyderabad on 20.10.1985 when P.W.1 told him about the demand of additional payment of ₹ 50,000/- made by the second accused for the purchase of car. The first accused told P.W.1 that he would consult his brother and inform him about it and left for his native place. lt is alleged that on his return from the village, the first accused asked P.W.1 to give ₹ 75,000/- instead of ₹ 50,000/- as agreed upon earlier instead of ₹ 1 lakh as demanded by the second accused. According to the prosecution case this talk took place in the presence of Shri Narasinga Rao (not examined) The first accused suggested that P.W.1 should give ₹ 50,000/- immediately towards the purchase of the car and the balance of ₹ 25,000/- should be paid within one year after the marr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction 4 of the Act and convicted and sentenced as noticed above. Mr. P.P.Rao the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the courts below had committed an error in not correctly interpreting the ambit and scope of section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 read with the definition of `dowry' under section 2 of the said Act. According to the learned counsel, for demand of dowry to become an offence under Section 4 of the Act, it must be made at the time of marriage and not during the negotiations for marriage. Reliance in this behalf is placed on the use of the expressions `bride' and `bridegroom' in Section 4 to emphasise that at the stage of pre-marriage negotiations, the boy and the girl are not `bridegroom' and `bride' and therefore the `demand' made at that stage cannot be construed as a `demand' of dowry punishable under Section 4 of the Act. On merits, counsel argued that reliance placed by the trial court as well as the appellate and the revisional court on various letters purporting to have been written by the first accused was erroneous since the appellant had denied their authorship and there was no satisfactory ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de Section 8 of the Act. Keeping in view the object which is sought to be achieved by the Act and the evil it attempts to stamp out, a three Judges Bench of this court in L.V. Jadhav vs. Shankar Rao Abasaheb Pawar Others (1983 4 SCC 231) opined that the expression Dowry wherever used in the Act must be liberally construed. Before proceeding further, we consider it desirable to notice some of the relevant provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act,1961. Section 2- `dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in case of person to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat) applies. Section 3-Penalty for giving or taking dowry- If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lue of such dowry whichever is more. The definition of the expression 'dowry' contained in Section 2 of the Act cannot be confined merely to the 'demand' of money, property or valuable security 'made at or after the performance of marriage' as is urged by Mr. Rao. The legislature has in its wisdom while providing for the definition of 'dowry' emphasised that any money, property or valuable security given, as a consideration for marriage, 'before, at or after the marriage would be covered by the expression 'dowry' and this definition as contained in Section 2 has to be read wherever the expression 'dowry' occurs in the Act. Meaning of the expression 'dowry'as commonly used and understood is different than the peculiar definition thereof under the Act. Under Section 4 of the Act, mere demand of 'dowry' is sufficient to bring home the offence to an accused. Thus, any demand of money, property or valuable security made from the bride or her parents or other relatives by the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives or vice-versa would fall within the mischief of 'dowry' under the Act where such demand i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ng the same within the definition of 'dowry' punishable under the Act, as such an interpretation would be defeating the very object for which the Act was enacted. Keeping in view the object of the Act, demand of dowry as a consideration for a proposed marriage would also come within the meaning of the expression dowry under the Act. If we were to agree with Mr. Rao that it is only the demand made at or after marriage which is punishable under Section 4 of the Act, Some serious consequences, which the legislature wanted to avoid, are bound to follow. Take for example a case where the bridegroom or his parents or other relatives make a 'demand' of dowry during marriage negotiations and lateron after bringing the bridal party to the bride's house find that the bride or her parents or relative have not met the earlier 'demand' and call off the marriage and leave the bride house should they escape the punishment under the Act. The answer has to be an emphatic 'no'. It would be adding insult to injury if we were to countenance that their action would not attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Such an interpretation would frustrate the very o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... draftsmen have note, provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly Leave the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give 'force and life' to the intention of the legislature A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do so as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. (emphasis supplied) An argument, similar to the one As raised by Mr. Rao regarding the use of the expressions 'bride'and 'bridegroom' occurri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aths of young innocent brides has always sent stock waves to the civilized society but unfortunately the evil has continued unabated. Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day. Change of heart and attitude is needed. A wider social movement not only of educating women of their rights but all of the men folk to respect and recognise the basic human values is essentially needed to bury this pernicious social evil. The role of the courts, under the circumstances, assumes a great importance. The courts are expected to deal with such cases in a realistic manner so as to further the object of the legislation. However, the courts must not lose right of the fact that the Act, though a piece of social legislation, is a penal statute. One of the cardinal rules of interpretation in such cases is that a penal statute must be strictly construed. The courts have, thus, to be watchful to see that emotions or sentiments are not allowed to influence their judgment, one way or the other and that they do not ignore the golden thread passing through criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent till proved guilty and that the guilt of an accused must be estab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to give ₹ 75,000/- for purchase of car. The High Court further observed : Thus the demand for dowry either initially or at later emanated only from the second petitioner, the elder brother for the first petitioner. From the evidence it would appear that the petitioners come from a lower middle class family and fortunately the first petitioner was selected for I.P.S. and from the tone of letters written by the first petitioner to Kum. Vani particularly from Ex. P-6 letter it would appear that he was more interested in acting according to the wishes respondent who he probably felt was responsible for his coming up in life. The recitals in Ex.P-6 would show that he did not like to hurt the feelings of the second petitioner and probably for that reason he could not say anything when his elder brother demanded for more dowry. We cannot say how the first petitioner would have acted if only he had freedom to act according to his wishes. But the first petitioner was obliged to act according to the wishes of his elder brother in asking for more dowry. However, I feel that this cannot be a circumstances to exonerate him from his liability from demand of dowry under Section 4 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lakh for purchase of car and that I said that what was the agreed for purchase of car was only ₹ 50,000/- and not ₹ 75,000/- . This story, therefore, appears to be an after thought, made with a view to implicate the appellant with the commission af an offence under Section 4 of the Act. Had this been the state of affairs, we see no reason as to why the fact would not have found mention at least in the complaints made to 'the Director of the Academy where the appellant was under-going training. PW1, being a lawyer, must be presumed to be aware of the importance and relevance of the statement attributed to the appellant to incorporate it in the complaints and the FIR. We find this part of the evidence of PW1 rather difficult to accept without any independent corroboration. There is no corroboration available on the record as even Shri Narsingh Rao has not been examined. According to PW1, the demand of dowry was repeated by the appellant at the time of Varapuja which was performed on 31.10.1985 at the house of the second accused also. PW1 stated that he handed over the documents pertaining to the house, rupees fifty thousand in cash and pass book showing the depo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... remony has not been produced. Reliance instead has been placed by the prosecution on letter Ex P-6 allegedly written by the appellant to Ms.Vani cancelling the date of marriage. We shall refer to the documentary evidence in the latter part of the judgment. The failure of PW1 to produce the letter allegedly received by him from the first accused invites an adverse presumption against him that had he produced the letter, the same would have belied his evidence. The evidence of PW1, who is the sole witness, suffers from serious inconsistencies and exaggerations. He admittedly is the most interested person to establish his case. He is the complainant an the case. It was he who had made two complaints to the Director of National Police Academy against the appellant before lodging the FIR, Ex.P20. He is a lawyer by profession. He would be presumed to know the importance of the 'demand made by the appellant on the two occasions. He, however, has offered no explanation as to why those facts are conspicuous by their absence from the FIR and the two complaints made to the Director of the Academy. PW1, does not appear to us to be a wholly reliable witness. He has made conscious improvemen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n expert is rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not generally consider it as offering 'conclusive' proof and therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking, independent and reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1977 SC 1091), while dealing with evidence of a handwriting expert, this Court opined: We think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with mare caution than the opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted upon and it has almost become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1957 SC 381 that it is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence. This Court again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion as to the handwriting. There are some other modes of proof of documents also as by comparison of the handwriting as envisaged under Section 73 of the Evidence Act or through the evidence of a handwriting expert under Section 45 of the Act, besides by the admission of the person against whom the document is intended to be used. The receiver of the document, on establishing his acquaintance with the handwriting of the person and competence to identify the writing with which he is familiar, may also prove a document. These modes are legitimate methods of proving documents but before they can be accepted they must bear sufficient strength to carry conviction. Keeping in view the in-conclusive and indefinite nature of the evidence of the handwriting expert PW3 and the lack of competence on the part of PW1 to be familiar with the handwriting of the appellant, the approach adopted by the courts below to arrive at the conclusion that the disputed letters were written by the appellant to Ms.Vani on the basis of the evidence of PW1 and PW3 was not proper. The doubtful evidence of PW1 could neither offer any corroboration to the inconclusive and indefinite opinion of the handwriting exper ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
