TMI Blog1999 (1) TMI 525X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct on behalf of his family unit consisting of himself, his wife and two minor unmarried daughters. The Land Reforms Tribunal, Kakinada, by its order dated 12.7.1976 held that the holding of the respondent's unit was 1.6798 Standard Holdings, ter excluding certain lands alleged to have been sold by the respondent and his wife under four registered sale Deeds, namely, Ex.A-1 dated 14.10.1971, Ex.A-2 dated 1.10,1971, Ex.A-8 dated 29.9.1971 and Ex.A-14 dated 29.9.1971. As these four transactions prima facie attracted the provisions of Section 7(1) of the Act, an enquiry had to be held as to whether these transactions were required to be disregarded for the purpose of computa-tion of ceiling area of the respondent as per Section 7(1) of the Act. Section 7(1) of the Act reads as under : 7. Special provision in respect of certain transfers, etc. already made :- Where on or after the 24th January, 1971 but before the notified date, any person has transferred whether by way of sale, gift, usufructuary mortgage, exchange, settlement, surrender or in any other matter whatsoever, any land held by him or created a trust of any land held by him, then the burden of proving that such trans ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pellate Tribunal, Rajahmundry. The Appellate Tribunal after hearing the parties, came to a different conclusion on facts. By its judgment and order dated 19.8.1977 it allowed the appellant's appeal holding that Ex.A-8 and Ex.A-14 were true transactions and though Ex. A-l and Ex.A-2 were nominal ones, still all of them ought not to be considered as they were all effected by the respon- dent and his wife in anticipation of and with a view to avoiding the provisions of the Act. This decision of the Land Reforms Tribunal was carried in revision under Section 21 of the Act by the respondent before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by the impugned judgment in revision disagreeing with the view of the Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the two transactions i.e. Ex. A-l and Ex. A-2 were genuine and that Ex.A-1 Ex. A-2 were not nominal and the learned Judge thus disagreed with the finding of the Appellant Tribunal. So far as the other two transactions are concerned, agreeing with the view of the Appellate Tribunal that they were genuine it was held that all these transactions, even if they might have been entered into in anticipatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the transactions were entered into with a view to utilise the sale consideration raised from them for constructing a house at Kakinada. Hence, subsequent oral evidence to that effect was not believed by the final court of facts. That once the appellate court had not accepted that theory, the High Court could not have allowed the revision application by upsetting such a pure finding of fact, exercising jurisdiction under section 21 of the Act. It was next contended that even on merits, the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained for the simple reason that even if the transactions might be sustained as genuine, as held by the High Court that was not sufficient to avoid the operation of Section 7(1) of the Act as three Judge Benches of this Court in case of Merla Venkata Rao v. State of A.P. Ors. reported in [1995] Supp. 1 SCC 245 and in the case of State of A.P. v. S.B.P.V. Chalapathi Rao Ors. reported in [1995] 1 SCC 725 have taken the view that under Section 7(1) of the Act, a declarant is not only to show that the transactions were genuine, but that they were entered into on account of some compelling necessity and that there was no such evidence in the present case es ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Appellate Tribunal in connection with the genuineness and the necessity for entering into the four impugned sale transactions ? (ii) Even assuming that it was open to the High Court to examine the correctness of the finding of the Appellate Tribunal regarding these transactions, whether the decision rendered by the High Court can be sustained on merits? (iii) Whether this is a fit case for our interference under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India ? We shall deal these points seriatim. Point No. (i) So far as this point is concerned, it will be necessary to note the nature of the jurisdiction conferred by the Legislature on the High Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Section 21 of the Act reads as under : 21. Revision :- An application for revision from any party aggrieved, including the Government, shall lie to the High Court, within the prescribed period, from any order passed on appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on any of the following grounds, namely :- (a) that it exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) that it failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) that it acted in the exercise of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ough Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C. had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may not be in accordance with law, but one thing is clear that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case that the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. The aforesaid decisions of this Court clearly clinch the issue in favour of the appellant. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, it has to be held that while exercising pari materia jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act, the High Court could not have interfered with pure findings of fact reached by the Appellate Tribunal. It cannot be said that the Appellate Tribunal had no ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t by such procedural rules, the scope and ambit of Section 21 as enacted by the Legislature cannot either be extended nor can be curtailed. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of K. Rama Rao v. The Authorised Officer, Gudivada, reported in (1978) 2 A.P.L.J. 27 (Short Notes) on which reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondent. In that case a learned Single Judge of the High Court took the view that once a revision petition was admitted, the petitioner was entitled to urge all the grounds against the order appealed against and the scope of the revision petition cannot be restricted to part of the subject matter or only to certain grounds. In that connection reference was made to Rule 17 of the Rules above referred to. It is difficult to appreciate as to how the said decision can be of any help to learned counsel for the respondent in the facts of the present case. The reasoning adopted in that case by learned Single Judge in overruling the contention about partial admission of revision application rested on the Appellate Side Rules which stated that once the appeal is admitted, it is to be posted for final hear ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s wife in favour of witness No.3 and Ex. A-14 is another registered sale deed dated 29.9.1971 executed by the respondent's wife in favour of P.W. 4 in connection with wet lands of Ac.10.88 cents for a consideration of ₹ 20,000. It is pertinent to note that out of all these four transactions three pertained to very highly valued potentially rich wet lands and one was regarding a large chunk of dry land. They were all effected in a span of 15 days spread over between 29.9.1971 and 14.10.1971. The first transaction by the respondent was in favour of his own father. The recital in this transaction shows that the vendee under Ex. A-1 stated that four days prior to this sale he sold his land situated in Chinasankarlapudi village and as this land is contiguous to his own he purchased that from his son. All these transactions were scrutinised by the Appellate Tribunal and it came to the conclusion that the first two transactions entered into by the respondent were nominal in nature and the last two transactions which were entered into by respondent's wife though were genuine were not backed up by any real necessity and therefore, they could be said to have been entered into w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the discharge Of debts or that the alienations were in fact made for discharge of or meeting any binding debts or for meeting the marriage or educational expenses of any member of the family. On the the basis of this finding the High Court held that the transactions in question were made in anticipation of the Act. It has to be shown that during the relevant period when the transactions in questions were effected, they were supported by any real necessity or pressure on the estate for the discharge of the debts or that the alienation were in fact made for discharge of or meeting any binding debts. Same view was reiterated with approval by a later decision of this Court in S.B.P.V. Chalapathi Rao (Supra). Interpreting Section 7(1) of this Act, the following pertinent observations were made by Kuldip Singh, J speaking for the three Judge Bench. The provisions of the Act and the U.P. Act are not pari materia. under the U.P. Act where it is proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority that the transfer of land in a given case is in good faith, and satisfies other conditions laid down in clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 5, the transfer is valid and c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... trate the legal position which was holding the field in those days. In that case, Alladi Kuppuswami, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench in paragraph 5 of the report observed as follows : 5. From a perusal of Section 7(1) of the Act which has been extracted above, it is clear that in the case of alienations effected between 24th January 1971 and the date of notification the burden is upon the declarant to satisfy the Tribunal that they were not effected in anticipation or with a view to avoid or defeat the objects of any law relating to a reduction in the ceiling on agricultural holdings. There is in other words an initial presumption that such alienations were made with a view to avoid or defeat the provisions of the Act. But the Section itself contemplates that such a presump-tion is rebutable and the burden is placed on the declarant to rebut that presumption. It is open to the declarant by satisfactory evidence to prove that such alienations were made not with a view to avoid or defeat the provisions of the ceiling law, but in the ordinary course. For example, a declarant may, by cogent evidence satisfy the Tribunal that the alienations were effected by the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... meant to subserve the common good, cannot be countenanced and by refusing to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India we cannot put imprimatur on such an illegal act. As held by this Court in the case of Government of Union Territory of Pondicherry v. Mohammed Hus-sain (Dead) by Lrs. reported in [1994] 5 SCC 121 the Ceiling Act is a piece of legislation enacted with a view to achieve more equitable distribution of land for common good so as to subserve the Directive Principles contained in Article 39 of the Constitution of India. The provisions of such a legisla-tion have to be so interpreted as to further the object of the legislation and not defeat the same. Any request on the part of the respondent for our non- interference in the present proceedings would clearly amount to defeating the object of such a beneficial legislation. Point No. (iii) is accordingly answered against the respondent and in favour of the appel-lant. No question of granting any relief to the respondent under Article 142 of the Constitution of India would survive in this view of the matter. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Single ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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