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1973 (11) TMI 88

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..... ntence. On April 2, 1956, the appellant received a communication from the Divisional Personnel Officer, Northern Railway that he had been dismissed by the Divisional Superintendent from service w.e.f. March 31, 1956. In Appeal by special leave, this Court, set aside the conviction ,of the appellant and acquitted him by its judgment dated March 7, 1957. Thereafter, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the order The High Court by its judgment, dated of his dismissal. September 2, 1958, issued the, writ directing the respondents to treat the dismissal of the appellant wholly void and ineffective. Pursuant to that direction, on December 26, 1958 the appellant received a letter from the Divisional Personnel Officer that he had been reinstated to the post of Guard 'C' Grade and that the matter of his back wages for the period between the date of his. dismissal and the date of reinstatement would be decided later on. By another letter of February 13, 1959, the same officer informed the appellant that the period from the date, of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement would be treated as leave- .....

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..... s of the Railway employees, and consequently, the direction of the Authority requiring the Union of India to make payment to the claimant was illegal. In the result, the Appellate Authority allowed the respondent's appeal and dismissed the appellant's claim. The appellant's writ petition impugning this order of the Appellate Authority was, as already stated, dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal. The first question that falls to be considered is, whether the claim application filed by the appellant under s. 15(2) of the Act was time barred? Mr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for the appellant contends that the case falls under the first part of the proviso (1) to s. 15(2) which relates to deduction of wages and limitation would start from March 11, 1959 when the wages for the period of the appellant's inactive service were actually deducted and he was paid ₹ 81.51 only for the entire period ending March 7, 1959., Even on a stricter view, according to the learned Counsel, limitation would not start earlier than the date, February 13, 1959, when constructive deduction took place and it was decided to treat the period of his inactive service as lea .....

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..... er that any application may be admitted after the said period of twelve months when die applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. 15(3) When any application under sub-section (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3, or give them an opportunity of being heard, and, after such further inquiry' (if any) as may be necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding twenty-five rupees in the latter, and even if the amount deducted or the delayed wages are paid before the disposal of the application direct the payment of such compensation, as the authority, may think fit, not exceeding twenty-five rupees :...... The question of limitation turns on an interpretation of the first provi .....

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..... is akin to this category covering the entire deficiency for the period of absence, the only difference being that here, the appellant absence from duty was involuntary. Such absence in official parlance is euphemistically called in active service', if the employee is later on reinstated. The point to be considered further is when did such deduction ofwages take place ? Ordinarily in a case like the present where the employee was dismissed on one date and reinstated on a later date, the deduction of wages may synchronise with the act of reinstatement. But on the peculiar and admitted facts of this case, the deduction did not take place on the date of reinstatement (26-12-1958) because the order of reinstatement expressly stated that decision with regard to his wages to be paid for that period will be taken later on . In the case in hand, therefore, the deduction' will coincide with the decision impliedly or expressly deducting the wages. Such a decision was taken and put in the course of a communication to the appellant on February 18, 1959 whereby he was informed that the period from 3-1-1956 to 17-3-1959, would be treated as 'leave due' Which, it is conceded, me .....

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..... efund of the deducted amount. Both the learned Counsel before us are agreed that in view of the pronouncement of this Court in Devendra Pratap Narain 'Rai; Sharma v. State of U.P.(4), this ground is not sustainable. In Sharma's case (supra), this Court was construing rule 54 of the U.P. Government Fundamental Rules, the language of which is substantially the same as that of rule 2044 of the Railway Establishment Code. It was held therein, that r. 54 enables the State Government to fix the pay of a public servant when his dismissal is set aside in departmental appeal. But that rule has no application to cases in which dismissal is declared invalid by a decree of civil court and he is, in consequence, reinstated. Mr. Bishan Narain next contends that the prescribed Authority had wrongly disallowed the claim of the appellant to Running Allowance' which he had mis-described as Traveling Allowance in his claim application. The point pressed into argument is, that once the Authority had allowed the appellant to amend his application for converting the claim of Traveling Allowance into Running Allowance , it had no discretion left thereafter to prevent him from carryin .....

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..... that Running Allowance was due to the appellant as part of his wages for the entire period of his inactive service. Traveling allowance or running allowance is eligible if the officer has traveled or run, not otherwise. We therefore negative this contention. For the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and restore that of the Prescribed Authority. The appellant shall have his costs throughout. KRISHNA IYER, J.-The judgment just delivered has my full concurrence but I feel impelled to make a few observations not on the merits but on governmental disposition to litigation, the present case being symptomatic of a serious deficiency. In this country the State is the largest litigant to-day and the huge expenditure involved makes a big draft on the public exchequer. In the context of expanding dimensions of State activity and responsibility, is it unfair to expect finer sense and sensibility in its litigation policy, the absence of which, in the present case, he led the Railway callously and cantankerously to resist an action by its own employee, a small man, by urging a mere technical plea which has been pursued right up to the .....

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