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TMI Blog2005 (8) TMI 681X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... took up the construction of Solan-Jawanji-Dharja Road. After the re-organisation of the States on 1.11.1966 the PWD Department of H.P. took over the construction. The road was finally commissioned in the year 1968. Possession of the land owned by the appellants comprising of Khasra No. 102/1 situated in Village Bagur, Tehsil and District Solan, along with the lands of large number of villages that came under the said road construction plan was taken over in the year 1968. Though the possession of the land was taken over from the Land-owners in December, 1968 no steps were taken to formally acquire the land by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"]. Having failed to secure justice to get any compensation or even step being taken by the Government for acquiring the land of nearly 17 years, a public interest writ petition No. 510 of 1985 titled Chander Kant Sharma and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, was filed. The State of Himachal Pradesh failed to justify any valid reasons for not taking steps to get the land acquired and for not paying any compensation to the Land-owners. Finding grievance of the writ petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the statutory rate which will be paid to the petitioners under the law, whether awarded by the Collector of enhanced by the Court, and such interest will not be taken into consideration in any proceeding under the Act, while awarding the statutory compensation. 4. The tabular statement appended to the affidavits of the Superintending Engineer and the Land Acquisition Collector gives the requisite information relating to the land situate in other eleven villages which has been taken possession of for the purposes of the construction of the road in question. The land-owners, whose land in those villages has been taken possession of, will also be entitled to similar treatment. Under the circumstances, in order to ensure similar treatment being accorded to persons identically situate as the petitioners and in order to avoid proliferation of limitation, it appears to be just and proper to direct that the land- owners, whose land situate in those eleven villages has also been taken possession of for the purposes of the construction of the road in question, will also be entitled to the payment of interim compensation and equitable compensation on the same basis as the petitioners herein ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 9% per annum on the enhanced compensation from the date of possession, that is, 18.12.68 till the date of expiry of one year thereafter, that is, 17.12.1969; (e) Interest at the rate of 15% per annum of the enhanced amount with effect from 18.12.1969 till the date of payment of the amount in Court." The Respondents being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said award preferred a First Appeal under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court which was marked as Regular First Appeal No. 104 of 1993. By reason of the impugned judgment, a Division Bench of the High Court while upholding the amount of compensation payable to the Appellant herein for acquisition of the land set aside that part of the award, purported to be relying on or on the basis of the decision of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors v. Dharam Das, AIR (1996) SC 127, complying the payment of interest only with effect from 7.5.1989 or with effect from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and not from 18.12.1968. In Dharam Das, (supra) the State of Himachal Pradesh had filed an appeal against the judgment rendered in C.W.P. No.125 of 1986, [State of Himachal Pradesh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e an application for referring the dispute for determination of the court inter alia as regard the amount of compensation. The State could have filed such an application under Section 18. It did not choose to do so. Only the Appellant herein took recourse to the said provision culminating in passing of the impugned judgment of the High Court. Thus, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer directing payment of additional interest has also attained finality. In the Reference Court or for that matter the High Court exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 54 of the Act could not have dealt with the said question. The principle of res judicata is species of the principle of estoppel. When a proceeding based on a particular cause of action has attained finality, the principle of res judicata shall fully apply. Reference in this regard may be made to Wade and Forsyth on Administrative Law, 9th Ed., pg. 243, wherein it is stated: "One special variety of estoppel is res judicata. This results from the rule which prevents the parties to a judicial determination from litigating the same question over again even though the determination is demonstrably wrong. Except in procee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o that the other side may not be put to harassment. The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create a bar as regards a plea, between the same parties in some other matter in another court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh the very point that was determined in the earlier judgment." It was further noticed: "In Ishwardas v. the State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors., AIR (1979) SC 551, this Court held: "...In order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim..." Yet again in Arnold v. National Westminster Bank Plc., [1991] 3 ALL ER 41, the House of Lords noticed the distinction between cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter having been between the same parties or their privies and having involved the same subject-matter. In such a case, the bar is abs ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al and Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and Anr., AIR (1960) SC 941 and Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh, [1987] 1 SCC 727]. In Y.B. Patil (supra) it was held: "4... It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent state of that proceeding..." It was further observed: "In a case of this nature, however, the doctrine of `issue estoppel' as also `cause of action estoppel' may arise. In Thoday (supra) Lord Diplock held : "...cause of action estoppel" is that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist, i.e., judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged in the judgment....If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te that the question raised by the learned Judges of the High Court was not raised by the Respondents although having regard to the decision of this Court in Dharam Das (supra) it was available. The High Court, in our opinion, although has a wide power in terms of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it could not have gone outside the pleadings and make out a new case. In Siddu Venkappa Devadiga v. Smt. Rangu S. Devadiga and Ors., [1977] 3 SCC 532, it was held: "8...As has been stated, the defendant traversed that claim in his written statement and pleaded that the business always belonged to him as owner. There was thus no plea that the business was "benami" for Shivanna. We also find that the parties did not join issue on the question that the business was "benami". On the other hand, the point at issue was whether Shivanna was the owner of the business and the tenancy rights of the premises where it was being carried on. It is well-settled, having been laid down by this Court in Trojan and Co. Ltd. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar and Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the plea of the parties, and that it is the ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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