TMI Blog1973 (11) TMI 89X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ely : (i) non-payment of rent in arrears for a period of more than one year, (ii) bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlords for their own use and occupation. The rate of contractual rent was ₹ 151- per month. On 23-9-1964 the parties arrived at a compromise, the terms of which, as incorpora- ted in the decree, were as under : (i) The defendant do hand over possession of the suit premises by 30-9-1968 without any objection. The tenant to pay ₹ 532 50 P as arrears of rent and mesne profits upto 30-9- 1964. The plaintiff is to receive ₹ 380/- deposited by the defendant in court and the remaining amount is to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs on or about 31-12- 1964. The defendant is to pay ₹ 151- p.m. as mesne profits from 1-10-1964. (ii) The relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties has come to an end and no such relationship is to be created by the compromise. The defendant has been given time to vacate the suit. premises by way of grace. If the defendant fails to comply with the aforesaid terms of the decree, the plaintiffs would be entitled to execute the decree both for the decretal amount' as wel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... executing court to be dealt with in accordance with law . Aggrieved by that order of the Extra Assistant Judge, the tenant preferred a revision petition in the High Court of Gujarat,. The revision was dismissed in limine by an order dated 26-10- 1972, against which this appeal by special leave has been filed. Mr. Dholakia, learned Counsel for the appellant, contends that in view of public policy which underlies all Rent Control Acts, including the Bombay Rent Act, no decree or order of eviction can be passed unless the Rent Court or Tribunal is satisfied, on the oasis of extrinsic material as to the existence of all the essential facts constituting a statutory ground for eviction. It is stressed that in the instant case the material, if any, preceding the decree or even the so-called admission of the rent being in arrears in the compromise itself, was far too insufficient to make out a ground for eviction under s. 12(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. Clause (a) of s. 12(3), proceeds the argument, could not cover the case because the tenant had deposited the rent due upto the date of the suit and had also made an application for fixation of standard rent; and clause (b) of the same sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by virtue of Rule 8 of the Bombay Rent Act Rules, the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, including 0.23, Rule 3, which gives a mandate to the court to pass a decree in terms of a compromise, are applicable to suits under the Bombay Rent Act, but the application of the Code to proceedings before the Rent Controller Tribunal under the Delhi Rent Act or Madras Rent Act has been expressly excluded' In support of this contention reliance has been placed on Chandan Baj v. Surjan (1). (iii) Even if the ratio of the said Supreme Court decisions applies to decrees under the Bombay Rent Act, then also both the statutory grounds for eviction pleaded in the plaint, had been expressly or impliedly admitted by the defendant in the compromise, and it will be presumed that in passing the eviction decree the court was satisfied about the existence of those grounds. In this view, according to the Counsel, the instant case will fall within the ratio of Seshadri's case (supra). At the stage of the final hearing of the appeal, especially after the learned Counsel for the appellant had addressed us on merits, we do not propose to go into the preliminary ground urged by Mr. Parekh. If the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e neologism statutory tenant has come into existence because of this protective policy which is common to all enactments of this kind. Further, all the three Acts create Courts/Tribunals of special and exclusive jurisdiction for the enforcement of their provisions. Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act which begins with a non- obstante clause, specifies Courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant inter alia relating to (a) recovery of rent of any premises;(b) recovery of possession of any premises to which the provisions of Part II apply. The words to which the provisions of Part II apply are significant. They indicate that the exclusive jurisdiction for recovery of possession is to be exercised when the provisions of Part II, which include ss. 12 and 13, apply. All these three Acts lay down specific grounds more or less similar, on which a decree or order of eviction can be passed by the Rent Court or the Tribunal exercising exclusive jurisdiction. In the Delhi Rent Act, such grounds are specified in a consolidated form under s. 13, while the same thing has been split up into two and provided in two ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der these provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do. In the view we take, we are fortified by the ratio of the decision in Barton v. Fincham(1). Therein the Court of Appeal was considering the scheme of the Rent Restrictions Act, 1920, the language of S. 5 of which was similar to s. 13 of the Delhi Rent Act. In that context, Atkin L. J. stated the law on the point thus : The section appears to me to limit definitely the jurisdiction of the Courts in making ejectment orders in the case of premises to which the Act applies. Parties cannot by agreement give the Courts jurisdiction which the Legislature has enacted they are not to have. If the parties before the Court admit that one of the events has happened which give the Court jurisdiction, and there is no reason to doubt the bona fides of the admission, the Court is under no obligation to make further inquiry as to the question of fact; but apart from such an admission the Court cannot give effect to- an agreement, whether by way of compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the provisions of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted Chari's claim At the commencement of the enquiry, Chari was examined before the Court. He particularly testified how he had purchased the house for his own occupation. He also filed a number of documents to establish that the requirement of premises for his own occupation was true. Seshadri did not prefer to cross- examine Chari, About 11/2 months thereafter, both the parties entered into a compromise in these terms : (1) The respondent hereby withdraws his defence in the aforesaid petition and submits to a decree for eviction unconditionally. (2) The respondent prays that time for vacating upto June 5, 1969, might please be given and the petitioner agrees to the same. (3) The respondent agrees to vacate the petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to the petitioner on or before the said date viz. June 5, 1969, without fail under any circumstances and undertakes not to apply for extension of time. (4) It is agreed by both the parties that this memo of compromise-is executable as a Decree of Court. The Court, after referring to the petition of the landlord being under s. 10 (3)(a)(i), of the Act on the ground of his own occupation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the. foundation of the rights of the parties On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong. We do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in s. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act, merely because the tenant had made an application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at the time of passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of ₹ 15/- per month, the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the compromise was thus an admission of the material facts which constituted a ground for eviction under s. 12 (3) (a). Rent was admittedly payable by the month; since the application for fixation of fair rent stood ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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