TMI Blog1960 (11) TMI 123X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cquisition of Immoveable Property Act (XI of 1953) for the construction of houses by members of the Thapar Industries Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Yamuna Nagar. Possession of the land was taken on November 5, 1954. The appellants, at once, instituted a suit on November 14, 1954, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Jagadhari, challenging the requisition proceedings. The suit was ultimately decreed by the Court on June 21, 1955, and the possession of the property in question was restored to the petitioners. On May 27, 1955, the first respondent, i. e., the State of Punjab, through the Secretary, Labour Department, issued a notification under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894) (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act). The notification, under s. 4 is in these terms. No. 4850-S-LP-55/14144. Whereas it appears to the Governor of Punjab that land in the locality hereunder specified is likely to be needed by the Government for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of a Labour Colony under the Government sponsored Housing Scheme for the Industrial Workers of the Thapar Industrial Workers' Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Jamna Nagar (District ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Ambala, who dismissed their appeal, upholding the decision of the trial Court that the notice was a condition precedent to the institution of the suit. Their second appeal was dismissed by the Punjab High Court on February 6,1957. During the pendency of the civil litigation aforesaid, in spite of the fact that the second respondent had obtained delivery of possession through Government agency, by an Order of Injunction issued by the Court, construction had been stayed. As soon as the High Court decided the suit in favour of the respondents, the second respondent started making huge constructions on the land in dispute in a very speedy manner , as alleged by the appellants in their petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, which they filed on February 13, 1957. From the High Court also, they obtained similar Stay Orders whereby building operations were stopped. In their Writ Petition, the appellants, as petitioners in the High Court, challenged the acquisition proceedings on a number of grounds, of which it is only necessary to notice the one which has formed the subject matter of decision in the High Court, namely, that the proceedings were void for want of compliance with the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... art lays down that the cattle (other than cows and calves) must be over 20 years of age and must also be unfit for work or breeding; and in the second part it says, or has become permanently incapacitated from work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or an incurable disease. It is a little difficult to understand why the two parts are juxtaposed in the section. In any view the restriction that the animal must be over 20 years of age and also unfit for work or breeding is an excessive or unreasonable restriction as we have pointed out with regard to a similar provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act. The second part of the clause would not be open to any objection, if it stood by it- self. If, however, it has to be combined with the age- limit mentioned in the first part of the clause, it will again be open to the same objection; if the animal is to be over 20 years of age and also permanently in- capacitated from work or breeding etc.,then the age- limit is really meaningless. Then, the expression 'due to age' in the second part of the clause also loses its meaning. It seems to us that cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4 of the Act as drafted is bad because it imposes a dis- pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the meaning of cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. Section 6 standing by itself, we think, is not open to any serious objection. It is ancillary in nature and tries to give effect to the provision of the Act prohibiting slaughter of cattle in contravention of the Act. Section 7 relates to the prohibition of sale, purchase etc., of cows and calves and inasmuch as a total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves is valid, no ob- jection can be taken to s. 7 of the Act. It merely seeks to effectuate the total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves (both of cows and she-buffaloes). Sec- tion 8 is also ancillary in character and if the other provisions are valid no objection can be taken to the provisions of s. 8. Sections 10 and 11 impose penal- e subsidised by the Government out of public funds; that Part VII of the Act had no application to the present proceedings, and that, therefore, the noti- fication under s. 6 was not invalid. The appellants preferred an appeal, under the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent Bench dismissed the appeal, but for different reasons. After an examination of the precedents of the different High Courts, bearing on the controversy in this case, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t Bench of the High Court was misled in its conclusions, because all the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution had not been brought to their notice. It is not correct to say that Part VII of the Act had become redundant or null and void, as suggested by the High Court, because that Part provided for acquisition for a private purpose. As held by this Court in a recent decision, in the case of Babu Barkaya Thakur v. The State of Bombay ([1961] 1 S.C.R. 128.), the Act deals with two kinds of acquisitions: (1) for a public purpose, at the cost of the Government, and (2) for a purpose akin to such a purpose, at the cost of a Company, and to the latter class of acquisition, the provisions of Part VII are attracted. It was further held in that case that acquisition of a site for building residential houses for industrial labour was a public purpose, and that the Land Acquisition Act was immune from attack based on the provisions of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, in view of the provisions of cl. 5(a) of that Article, which saved an existing law of the nature of the Act in question. As will presently appear, the conclusion of the High Court is entirely correct, but the process of reaso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd conditions of the Government Housing Scheme, that 25% to 50% of the cost of land and structures to be built upon the land was to be advanced by Government out of public funds, in the shape of subsidy and loan. It would, thus, appear that the High Court was not right in the assumption made as aforesaid. It is clear from the statement of facts on record that the respondent No. 2 is a 'Company', within the meaning of the Act; that the land is acquired for the. benefit of the Company, and at its instance, and that a large proportion of the compensation money was to come out of public funds, the other portion being supplied by the Company or its members. There is also no doubt that the structures to be made on the land would benefit the members of the Co-operative Society. But, the private benefit of a large number of industrial workers becomes public benefit within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act. In this connection, it may be mentioned that s. 17 of the Act was amended by the Land Acquisition (Punjab Amendment) Act (11 of 1954) in these terms- 17(2)(b). Whenever in the opinion of the Collector it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rtly out of Public Revenues, or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. On the other hand, in the case of an acquisition for a Company, the compensation has to be paid by the Company. But, in such a case, there has to be an agreement, under s. 41, for the transfer of the land acquired by the Government to the Company on payment of the cost of acquisition, as also other matters not material to our present purpose. The agreement contemplated by s. 41 is to be entered into between the Company and the Appropriate Government only after the latter is satisfied about the purpose of the proposed acquisition, and subject to the condition precedent that the previous consent of the Appropriate Government has been given to the acquisition. The ` previous consent' itself of the Appropriate Government is made to depend upon the satisfaction of that Government that the purpose of the acquisition was as laid down in s. 40. It is, thus, clear that the provisions of ss. 39-41 lay down conditions precedent to the application of the machinery of the Land Acquisition Act, if the acquisition is meant for a Company. Now, s. 6 itself contains the prohibition to the making of the necessar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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