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TMI Blog2005 (7) TMI 678X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e to end on 31st March of the concerned year. The age of retirement in each case is 55 years, but benefit of continuance in service is granted till the end of the academic year. In each case, the concerned teachers were to superannuate on attaining the age of 55 on various dates between July, 1996 and March, 1997. i.e. during the course of academic year 1996-97. Irrespective of their due date of superannuation, they were allowed to continue in service by virtue of Rule 62 of the Chapter XIV(A) of KER. They retired from service on 31.3.1997. The Government of Kerala (Finance Department) by G.O. No. 3000/98/Fin dated 25.11.1998 had issued orders on acceptance of the recommendations of the Pay Revision Committee 1997 that the existing scales of Pay will be revised and the revised scales will come into force with effect from 1.3.1997. Writ petitions were filed by the concerned teachers claiming benefit of the pay revision and for fixation of pensionary benefits on the basis of the revised pay. The Writ Petitions were allowed by several judgments passed by learned Single Judges. The State preferred Writ Appeals before the Division Bench. When the matter was placed before a Division Benc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of an academic year shall continue in service till the last day of the month in which the academic year ends. They shall be entitled to the benefits of increments and promotion, which fall due, before the last day of the month in which they attain the age of 55 years. But they shall not be eligible for increment or promotion during the period of their service beyond such date. If they are on leave on the day they attain the age of 55 years and if there is no prospect of their returning to duty before the closing day of the academic year, they shall be retired from service on the day of superannuation or on the date of suspension whichever is later. If, however, the day on which the teaching staff (including Principals of Colleges) attains, the age of 55 years falls within the period of one month beginning with the day of re-opening of the institutions they shall cease to be on duty with effect from the date of such re-opening and they shall be granted additional leave from the date of re-opening to the last day of the month in which they attain the age of 55 years. They shall be entitled to the benefit of increment if it falls due before the actual date on which they attain the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (Tiptan) Ltd., (1978) 1 All ER 948 HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act or Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR (1962) SC 847. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said, "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR (1990) SC 981. In D.R. Venkatachalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc., AIR (1977) SC 842, it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or sch ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton, (1858) XI Moore, P.C. 347). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute-Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart, 1 T.R. 52, "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws." The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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