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TMI Blog1968 (12) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dras Central, in respect of the fourth assessment year before the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, charging the appellant with having committed offences under section 52 of the 1922 Act and under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code in the first three complaints and under section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, hereinafter called " the 1961 Act ", and under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code in the fourth complaint petition. In substance, the allegation of the first respondent was that the appellant had made a statement in the verification under the Income-tax Act which was false knowing it to be false, and he had wilfully omitted and deliberately suppressed the inclusion of certain sums of money in his income-tax returns with a view to evade lawful taxes due to the Government. The appellant filed four applications before the Chief Presidency Magistrate praying that the legality of the trial for both the offences should be tried as the preliminary issue. This application was dismissed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate by a common order dated May 22, 1967, holding that the points of law raised by the appellant were such that they could be agitated in the course of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion and not under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code which was a general provision. It was said that in respect of the matters covered by section 52 of the 1922 Act, the provisions of section 177 of the Indian Penal Code should be taken to have been repealed by implication and, therefore, the prosecution of the appellant under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code was illegal. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by implication, the court must be satisfied that the two enactments are so inconsistent or repugnant that they cannot stand together and the repeal of the express prior enactment must flow from necessary implication of the language of the later enactment. It is, therefore, necessary in this connection to scrutinise the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the two enactments. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that there was inconsistency between the provisions of section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and of section 52 of the 1922 Act. It was said that the differences between the two enactments were as follows : (1) section 177 of the Indian Penal Code is noncompoundable whereas. the off ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ate to impose a penalty of not more than 40s. for an offence, and by another section (section 77) empowered him, if the penalty was not paid, to commit the offender to prison for a month, and a later statute [Metropolitan Police Act, 1864 (c. 55), section 1] repealed section 57 and substituted for it one empowering the magistrate to impose the same penalty or to commit to prison for not more than three days, it was held by the Queen's Bench that this did not impliedly repeal section 77, but that it was competent for the magistrate to sentence an offender to pay a penalty of 40s. and in default of payment to be imprisoned for a month. The principle of these decisions applies to the present case and having regard to the terms and language of the two enactments, we are of opinion that there is no repugnancy or inconsistency and the the two enactments can stand together and they must, therefore, be treated as cumulative in effect. We are of the opinion that the doctrine of implied repeal cannot be applied in the circumstances of this case and that the argument of the appellant on this point must be rejected. We pass on to consider the next question argued on behalf of the appellant ; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears in the repealing statute. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject the court would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The question is not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act therefore will be applicable unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the provisions of the section. Such incompatibility would have to be ascertained from a consideration of all the relevant provisions of the new statute and the mere absence of a saving clause is by itself not material. In other words, the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act will apply to a case of repeal even if there is simultaneous re-enactment unless a contrary intention can be gathered from the new statute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t question arising in this case, viz., whether the appellant can be prosecuted both under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and section 52 of the 1922 Act at the same time. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that, in view of the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), the appellant can be prosecuted either under section 52 of the 1922 Act or under section 177 of the Indian Penal Code and not under both the sections at the same time. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act states : " 26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.--Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. " A plain reading of the section shows that there is no bar to the trial or conviction of the offender under both enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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