TMI Blog1958 (8) TMI 54X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jected. This information was received by him on April 8, 1952. Thereafter on December 8,1952, the appellant filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises, being Suit No. 257 of 1953 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge, Kanpur, impleading the Municipal Board, Kanpur, Shri S. B. Gupta, Municipal Engineer, Shri Brahmanand Misra, the then Chairman of the Municipal Board and the Government of Uttar Pradesh as defendants and challenged the legality of the dismissal order passed against him on the ground that the previous approval of the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Department was not taken as required by the rules, that the appellant was denied an opportunity of being heard in person by the Board, that no show-cause notice for the proposed punishment of dismissal was issued to him by the Board nor were the charges framed by it, that the dismissal order did not specify the charges, that some of the grounds on which he was dismissed did not form the subject-matter of the charges at all, that in any case, the charges framed were false and malicious. The appellant prayed for a declaration that the order of his dismissal was ultra vires, illegal and void and claimed a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ngly came to the conclusion that the appellant s suit was barred by limitation under s. 326 of the Act. In view of the said finding the High Court did not go into any other questions at issue between the parties but dismissed the appeal with costs. An application filed by the appellant for a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court proved infructuous, with the result that the appellant applied for and obtained from this Court special leave to appeal against this judgment of the High Court. The only question that arises for our determination in this appeal is whether the appellant s suit was barred by limitation, because if that is determined against the appellant it will be conclusive of this appeal. Section 326 of the Act runs as under: 326(1) No suit shall be instituted against a Board, or against a member, officer or servant of a board in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of the two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a Board, left at its office, and in the case of a member, officer or servant, delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, explicitly st ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reof to him and in the event of his filing an appeal against the same within the period specified, the resolution was kept in abeyance and did not come into operation until the decision of the appeal by tile State Government. If that was so, lie contended, his wrongful dismissal by the Board became operative as from the date when the decision of the State Government was communicated to him and that was the date on which the cause of action in regard to his wrongful dismissal accrued to him, with the result that the suit filed by him within 8 months of such communication (including the period of 2 months notice) was well within time. He also supported this position by relying upon the provisions of s. 58(2) which empowered the State Government to suspend an employee pending the decision of the appeal, contending that such power vested in the State Government posited that the order of dismissal every though validly passed in accordance with the conditions specified in s. 58(1) was not to become effective until such decision was reached, because only in such event the State Government would be in a position to pass an order of suspension pending the decision of the appeal. If the ord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oard. In any event, that power is given to the State Government for giving relief to the employee who has thus appealed, against the rigour of the order of dismissal passed by the Board against him. The employee may have been dismissed by the Board, in which case on looking at the prima facie aspect of the matter the State Government may as well come to the conclusion that the operation of the order of dismissal may be stayed and he be suspended instead, thus entitling him to subsistence allowance during the pendency of the appeal. If the appeal is eventually dismissed the order of dismmissal by the Board will stand; if the appeal is allowed he will be entitled to continue in the employ and enjoy all the benefits and privileges of such employment, but lie would not have to starve during the period that the appeal was pending before the State Government. The provisions of s. 58(2) have to be read along with those of s. 58(1) and it cannot be urged that the power of suspension vested in the State Government is to be exercised in any other case except that of dismissal or removal of the employee by the Board. In the case of any other punishment an order of suspension passed by the Sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n one month from the date of the communication of the resolution to him, and that the resolution shall not take effect until the period of one month has expired or until the State Government has passed orders on any appeal preferred by him. The absence of any such provision in s. 58 of the Act also goes to show that no such consequence was intended by the legislature. The enactment of s. 58(1) in the manner in which it has been done giving to the employee only a right of appeal to the State Government within 30 days of the communication to him of the order of the Board without anything more is enough to show that neither was the suspension of the order nor the postponement of the effect thereof as a result of the filing of an appeal ever in the contemplation of the legislature. It may be noted in passing that the appellant relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Dist. Board, Shahjahanpur v. Kailashi Nath A I.R. 1948 All. 199which turned on the construction of s. 71 of the U.P. District Boards Act set out above in support of his contention. The provisions of that section, however, are quite distinct from those of s. 58(1) of the Act before us and this case was right ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Board or the accrual of a fresh cause of action which could be ventilated by him within the period of limitation commencing therefrom. The initial difficulty in the way of the appellant, however, is that departmental enquiries even though they culminate in decisions on appeals or revision cannot be equated with proceedings before the regular courts of law. As was observed by this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh [1958] S.C.R. 595: ......... an order of dismissal passed on a departmental enquiry by an officer in the department and an order- passed by another officer next higher in rank dismissing an appeal therefrom and an order rejecting an application for revision by the head of the department (--an hardly be equated with any propriety with decrees made in a civil suit under the Code of Civil Procedure by the court of first instance and the decree dismissing the appeal therefrom by an appeal court and the order- dismissing the revision petition by a yet higher court............. because the departmental tribunals of the first instance or on appeal or revision are not regular courts manned by persons trained in law although they may have the trappings o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4 is an application which must be made to the Court of the first instance whether the decree varied or reversed was passed by that Court or a higher Court. That Court has to determine whether the applicant is entitled to any and what benefits, by way of restitution or otherwise, by reason of the decree of the appellate court varying or reversing a previous decree. We have to determine this case under Art. 181, of the Limitation Act, which directs us, in general language, to find out the date on which the applicant s right accrued. In the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, their right accrued immediately the -District Judge reversed the decision of the trial court, and reduced the amount of the plaintiff s claim. Unless, therefore, we are required by reason of the nature of the matter to ignore the effect of that decision, because it was confirmed on appeal, it seems to me to be wrong to do so. To refuse so to do does not involve the proposition that two decrees for the same thing may be executed simultaneously. Nor does it involve, so far as I can see, the affirmance of any other proposition that can be regarded as inconvenient or absurd. Further, when even if the analogy a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en the remedy is available to the party. The cause of action in the present case accrued to the appellant the moment the resolution of the --Board was communicated to him and that was the date of the commencement of the limitation. The remedy, if any, by way of filing a suit against the Board in respect of his wrongful dismissal was available to him from that date and it was open to him to pursue that remedy within the period of limitation prescribed under s. 326 of the Act. The result is no doubt unfortunate for the appellant, because the trial court found in his favour in regard to his plea of wrongful dismissal. If he had only brought the suit within the period prescribed by s. 326 of the (I) (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 185, 213. Act, he might possibly have got some relief from the Court. He however chose to wait till the decision of the State Government on his appeal and overstepped the limit of time to his own detriment. We are unable to come to any other conclusion than the one reached above and the appeal must, therefore, stand dismissed; but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, we make no order to costs. The appellant was given leave to proceed as a pauper and he pros ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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