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TMI Blog1971 (11) TMI 16X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... O.P. No. 297 of 1957. The official liquidator, thereafter, had to carry on the necessary administration connected with the winding-up of the company, one amongst which was to prosecute further the petitions or appeals by then filed by the company before the appellate or revisional authorities in the matter of assessments on the quondam company for tax. It is not in dispute that it was only on April 19, 1962, when the official liquidator came up to this court with a request for a reference on the alleged questions of law arising on the orders of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which was ultimately refused by this court, that a quietus was given to the tax liability of the quondam company for the years in question. It can only then be fairly assumed that the total income of the company which was finally to be subject to levy in accordance with law was reckoned in a manner ordinarily known to the taxing statute. As already stated, the Income-tax Officer, who completed the assessments for the respective years, levied penal interest under section 18A(8). The official liquidator applied to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax by a petition dated September 13, 1963, for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ade to the authorities without awaiting such finalisation of the income is not proper. His second contention is that there was not any unreasonable delay, in the peculiar circumstances of the case, and that the Commissioner of Income-tax failed to exercise his jurisdiction, though of a discretionary nature, by not dealing with the merits but dismissing the revision petitions as incompetent and delayed. On the other question that during the pendency of an appeal against the order of assessment, no application for revision of the assessment order made by the Income-tax Officer which relates to the payment of penal interest is maintainable, the learned counsel submits that such reasoning no longer survives in view of the pronouncements of this court. I shall-now take up the last contention. Though the Commissioner of Income-tax referred to the aspect that no revision would lie as against an order of the assessing authority charging penal interest under section 18A(8) of the Act, yet he did not base his conclusion solely on this, as is seen from the later part of the order. In order to make this decision complete the learned counsel brought to my notice the decision of this court in S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prescribed under the sub-section, provided that the Income-tax Officer finds that no payment of tax has been made in accordance with the other preceding sub-sections of section 18A. In the instant case no such payment has been made. The Income-tax Officer was, therefore, not in error in having levied what is loosely termed as penal interest. At one time it was not clear whether the fields of activity of sub-section (8) of section 18A and sub-section (6) of the same section were similar. At any rate, the Bombay and Madras views prior to Chockalingam and Meyyappan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, was different. In Lata Mangeshkar v. Union of India a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court took the view that, where no payment of advance tax had been made by the assessee in accordance with section 18A, the addition of interest in the regular assessment calculated in the manner laid down in sub-section (6) was mandatory under sub-section (8), that the Income-tax Officer had no discretion in the matter of reducing or waiving interest under sub-section (8) and that the fifth proviso to sub-section (6), which invested the Income-tax Officer with such discretion, was not applicable to cases ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the revenue, as a matter of policy, was inclined to be more liberal in view of the circular issued, but on record it does not appear to be so. The circular was not brought to the notice of either the Bombay High Court or this court, when they decided the above two cases. The result was that even the revenue, in spite of the circular, was of the view that rule 48 was applicable only to cases where part of the advance tax had been paid or to cases of assessment followed up by such payment and not to cases where the assessment proceedings were completed and no advance tax has been paid. The controversy, however, has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in Chockalingam and Meyyappan v. Commissioner of Income-tax. In very strong words, the Supreme Court observed : "Sub-section (6) of section 18A, without reserve, is expressly made applicable mutatis mutandis to sub-section (8). There is nothing to show that in applying sub-section (6) any of its provisos is to be left out. Sub-section (8), no doubt, uses the word 'shall', but in the context of sub-section (6) and the fifth proviso the word can only be read as mandatory, if relief under the proviso is not given. The circumstances whi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de and that he was prosecuting the assessment process further so as to obtain relief in a manner known to law. If, therefore, April 19, 1962, is to be taken as the date when the assessee could be said to have had reasonable notice of the finality of the assessment proceedings, then the question is whether he deliberately delayed the presentation of the petitions for waiver of the penal interest thereafter. I have already referred to the fact that between April 19, 1962, and October 12, 1962, the law was not clear as to whether such an application under rule 48 could be made in a situation where the assessment proceedings were completed and whether sub-section (8) of section 18A was a bar. According to the decision of this court in Panchavarnathammal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, the writ-petitioner could not have filed such a revision petition ; he could do so only after October 12, 1962. Therefore, we have to see whether between October 12, 1962, and September 13, 1963, there was such an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner which would disentitle him to the relief of waiver or remission of interest on the advance tax payable by the company in liquidation. I do not thi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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