TMI Blog2014 (10) TMI 947X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above. - Civil Appeal No. 9849 of 2014 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 18639 of 2012) - - - Dated:- 17-10-2014 - J. Chelameswar And A. K. Sikri, JJ. JUDGMENT A.K. SIKRI, J. Leave granted. 2) This appeal, preferred by the State of Uttar Pradesh and its functionaries, assails the order of the High Court whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants has been dismissed and the order of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (for short, 'the Tribunal') passed in favour of the respondents herein, is affirmed. 3) To mention at the outset, the Tribunal as well as the High Court has given the respondents herein benefit of the order passed by the Court in earlier round of litigation filed by similarly situated persons. The appellants contend that as far as these respondents are concerned, they never approached the Court seeking such a relief and were only fen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated June 22, 1987 cancelling their appointments by the new Chief Medical Officer. This suit was registered as Suit No. 695/1987. It appears that this suit could not be taken to its logical conclusion as same was dismissed for non-prosecution because of non appearance of the advocate of the respondents. The respondents herein did not take any further steps in the said suit either by filing application for restoration of the suit or challenging the said order in appeal. In fact, there was a complete quietus on the part of these respondents. 7) It so happened that a few other candidates who were also affected by the same orders dated June 22, 1987, whereby their appointments were cancelled, approached the Tribunal challenging the legality, validity and proprietary of the said order on several grounds. One of the grounds taken was that before cancellation of their appointments, no showcause notice was given to them. The Tribunal decided the case filed by them in their favour vide judgment dated August 16, 1991 holding the impugned order dated June 22, 1987 as illegal and void and quashed the same. Against the order of the Tribunal, the State filed the writ petition in the High Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... would amount to invidious discrimination which is anathema to the right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10) It is of interest to note that both the sides, in support of their respective submissions, have referred to certain judgments and the reading whereof would demonstrate that in certain cases benefit of a particular judicial pronouncement is extended to those who are identically situated on the principle of equality. On the other hand, there is a line of judgments denying such a benefit to the second group which approaches the Court afterwards, even when the said second group is similarly situated as the persons belonging to the first group. However, there is no conflict between the two sets of cases. In order to find out the principles laid down on the basis of which benefit of the earlier judgment is extended to those coming subsequently and the situations where such benefit is denied, we will have to undertake a journey into these details and lay down clear parameters. 11) Let us first take note of those judgments, which are referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents, wherein this Court has applied the ratio of the earli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hile accepting the scheme framed by the Railway Administration, modified the date from January 01, 1984 to January 01, 1981. While doing so, following reasons were given: 5...There is another area where discrimination is likely to rear its ugly head. These workmen come from the lowest grade of railway service. They can ill afford to rush to court. Their federations have hardly been of any assistance. They had individually to collect money and rush to court which in case of some may be beyond their reach. Therefore, some of the retrenched workmen failed to know at the door of justice because these doors do not open unless hudge expenses are incurred. Choice in such a situation, even without crystal gazing is between incurring expenses for a litigation with uncertain outcome and hunger from day to day. It is a Hobson's choice. Therefore, those who could not come to the Court need not be at comparative disadvantage to those who rushed in here. If they are otherwise similarly situated, they are entitled to similar treatment if not by anyone else at the hands of this Court. We would like to point out at this stage itself that the writ petitions were filed by the concerned ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fusal to extend the benefit, they filed Application in the Central Administrative Tribunal in April 1994. This Application was dismissed by the Tribunal as time barred and against the judgment of the Tribunal these appellants had approached this Court. The Court, in a brief order which runs into six paragraphs, held that delay in filing the Application should have been condoned and the appellants should have been given relief by the Tribunal on the same terms as were granted to others by the Full Bench judgment of the Tribunal . After stating the aforesaid facts in the earlier paragraphs of the order, the reasons for extending the benefit are contained in para 6 thereof, which reads as under: 6. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this was a fit case in which the Tribunal should have condoned the delay in the filing of the application and the appellants should have been given relief in the same terms as was granted by the Full Bench of the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside, the delay in filing of OA No. 774 of 1994 is condoned and the said application is allowed. The app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judgment, this Court had declared that the revised reservation policy was not applicable to the selections initiated prior thereto. It resulted in the consequential direction to the State Government to appoint N.T. Devin Katti (appellant in that case) on the post of Tehsildar with retrospective effect. At the same time, it was also made clear that for the purposes of seniority such persons would have to be placed below the last candidates appointed in the year 1976 and they would also be not entitled to any back wages. Insofar as, respondent C. Lalitha is concerned, on the basis of revised reservation policy, she was appointed as Tehsildar. After the rendition of the aforesaid judgment in N.T. Devin Katti's case (supra), she approached the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal by filing an OA claiming appointment as Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal dismissed the OA. However, her appeal against the order of the Tribunal was allowed by this Court vide orders dated March 15, 1994, taking note of the fact that she was selected and shown in the first list, which was upheld by the Court in the case of N.T. Devin Katti (supra). Since she had already been promoted to Class I Po ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the judgments are not to be read as a statute. It is in the aforesaid context that observations are made in para 29, on which heavy reliance has been placed by the respondent. When we understand the impact of the observations contextually, we find that again the issue at hand is totally different. 15) Next case in the line, on which the respondents rely, is Maharaj Krishna Bhatt Anr. v. State of Jammu Kashmir (2008) 9 SCC 24. In that case, the appellants and some other Constables approached the Chief Minister of the respondent State for relaxation of rules relating to 50% direct recruitment quota for appointment as Sub-Inspectors of Police (PSI). The Chief Minister's office in turn called for the Director General's recommendations, who recommended the name of one person only, namely, Hamidullah Dar. Hamidullah Dar was accordingly appointed as PSI with effect from April 01, 1987. Thereupon, other persons also approached the Court. In the case of one Abdul Rashid Rather, the Single Judge of the High Court allowed his writ petition. The respondent State filed LPA which was dismissed, and subsequently, special leave petition was also dismissed by this Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... learned Single Judge was legal, proper and in furtherance of justice, equity and fairness in action. The said order, therefore, deserves to be restored. 16) No doubt, the Court extended the benefit of the decision in Abdul Rashid Rather's case to the appellants. However, what needs to be kept in mind is that these appellants had not taken out legal proceedings after the judgment in Abdul Rashid Rather's case. They had approached the Court well in time when Abdul Rashid Rather had also filed the petition. 17) The submission of learned counsel for the appellants, on the other hand, is that the respondents did not approach the Court earlier and acquiesced into the termination orders. Approaching the Court at such a belated stage, after the judgment in some other case, was clearly impermissible and such a petition should have been dismissed on the ground of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. It was submitted that in such circumstances this Court has taken consistent view to the effect that benefit of judgment in the other case should not be extended even if the persons in the two sets of cases were similarly situated. Mr. P.N. Misra, learned senior counsel appe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs, they have discharged their export obligation and, therefore, in terms of para 185(4) of the Import Export policy, they were entitled to the facility for the import of OGL items. However, they sought revalidation four years after discharge of export obligation and five years after the expiry of the licence. This claim was rejected by the authorities on the ground of delay. Writ petition was filed in this Court one year after such rejection. In these circumstances, the Court dismissed the writ petition for approaching the Court belatedly and refused to follow the orders passed in another petitions by this Court, which was sought to be extended on the ground that the petitions were exactly similar to those petitions which were preferred in another case. No doubt, writ petition was dismissed on the ground of unexplained inordinate delay, but it would be necessary to observe that it was not a service matter. However, the principle of delay and laches would have some relevance for our purposes as well. 19) State of Karnataka Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 267 is, on the other hand, a service matter. Here, the respondents, while working as teachers in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to the persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and challenged their retirement. In para 7, the Court quoted from M/s. Rup Diamonds Ors. (supra). In para 8, S.M. Kotrayya (supra) was taken note of. Some other judgments on the same principle of laches and delays are taken note of in paras 9 to 11 which are as follows: 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538, this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (195) 6 SCC 684. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage. 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta, (1997) 3 SCC 395, it was ob ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. 22) Holding that the respondents had also acquiesced in accepting the retirements, the appeal of U.P. Jal Nigam was allowed with the following reasons: 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. (3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. 24) Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the ye ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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