TMI Blog1962 (4) TMI 118X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ication under challenge are valid and constitutional. The appellant then applied for a certificate from the High Court, both under Art. 132 and Art. 133 of the Constitution. The High Court granted him certificate under Art. 133, but refused to certify the case under Art. 132. There after the appellant applied to this Court for liberty to raise a question about the interpretation of the Constitution and permission has been accorded to the appellant accordingly. That is how the present appeal has come to this Court. The appellant owns 6 acres and 30 ghuntas of garden land in village Mulbagilu in Taluka Thirthahalli in the district of Shimoga. Respondent No. 3, Ramappa, Gowda, is his tenant in respect of this land. A registered lease deed was executed in favour of respondent No. 3 by the appellant on March 11, 1943; under this document respondent No. 3 undertook to pay 82-1/2 maunds of areca in addition to ₹ 17/12-in cash as rent per year. In 1955 respondent No. 3 filed an application before respondent No. 2, the Tehsildar of Thirthahalli, under section 12 of the Act and claimed that the standard rent payable by him to the appellant should be fixed (Tenancy case 85 of 1955-56 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich has been recovered in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Section 12 then deals with enquiries with regard to reasonable rent. Sub-section (3) of s. 12 lays down five factors which have to be borne in mind by the authority dealing with an application for the fixation of reasonable rent. Section 13 is a corollary of s. 12 and authorises the reduction of rent after reasonable rent has been determined under s. 12. Section 14 deals with suspensions or remission of rent. Section 15 provides for termination of tenancy. Under s. 18 a statutory bar is created against the eviction of a tenant from a dwelling house and under s. 19 the tenant has the first option of purchasing the site on which he has built a from a dwelling house. Similarly, under s. 22 the tenant is given an option of purchasing the land leased out to him. Section 24 deals with some cases where relief can be granted against termination of tenancy and s. 25 with relief against termination of tenancy for non-payment of rent. Section 30 provides for the procedure to recover rent and s. 31 protects the tenants' rights under any other law. Chapter III deals with the procedure and jurisdiction of Amildar and provi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ay Act was sought to be sustained cannot be invoked in dealing with the present appeal. We are no impressed by this argument. It is true that the preamble to the Act merely says that the Act was passed because it was though necessary to regulate the law which governs the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands and it does not refer to the requirement of social justice or does not specifically mention the object of ensuring the full and efficient use of land for agriculture. But in dealing with a law which has been passed for the purpose of effecting an agrarian reform it would be pedantic to ignore the essential basis of its material provisions merely on the ground that the concept of social justice on which the said provisions are based has not been expressly stated to be one of the objects of the Act in the preamble. We have already examined briefly the broad scheme of the Act and it is obvious that the important provisions of the Act are intended to improve the economic and social conditions of the agricultural tenants and so the policy of social justice can be safely said to be writ large on the face of the Act. Therefore, we do not think that the argument base ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... impugned provision. We are, therefore, satisfied that the case of the impugned section is substantially similar to the case of s. 6 of the Bombay Act with which this Court was concerned in the case of Sanjanwala [1874] L.R. 2 SC. App. 352 and the challenge to the validity of section in the present appeal must, therefore, be held to be covered by the said decision. That takes us to the question as to whether the impugned notification is invalid. This notification has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred on the State Government by s. 6(2) and is provides that the rate of maximum rent payable by the tenants of lands situated in the areas specified in Schedule I and Schedule II to the notification shall be one-third and one-fourth respectively of the crop or crops raised on such lands with effect from the year commencing on April 1, 1955. Schedule I deals with Maidan areas in which the maximum rent or rents shall be one-third of the crop or crops and Schedule II deals with Malanad areas in which the maximum rate of rent shall be one-fourth of the crop or crops raised. It appears that the classification of lands between Maidan an Malanad lands is well known in Mysore. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e schedule such other hours, not being earlier than six or later than eight o'clock in the morning for opening, or earlier than nine o'clock or later than eleven o'clock in the evening for closing the same as they shall think fit. It is in pursuance of the authority conferred on them by the said proviso that the Magistrates of Rothesay passed an order embracing every public-house in the burge by which a deviation from the statutorily fixed hour was effected. In dealing with the validity of the order issued by the Magistrates Lord chancellor Lord Cairns expressed his opinion that if the exception is to swallow up the rule it ceases, of course, to be an exception at all and that which might fairly have been an exercise of discretion becomes no exercise of the kind of discretion mentioned in the Act of Parliament. It was for this reason that the order issued by the Magistrates was declared to be ultra vires. It was conceded that the Magistrates had a discretion, but the Lord Chancellor observed that the words conferring discretion expressly bear with reference to a particular locality and not with the whole burgh. What should be true about the whole burgh had been tre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rgh, it cannot be said that it has been passed after exercising due discretion in respect of the requirements of each particular locality. With respect, if the discretion is given to the Magistrates to provide of a departure from the rule prescribed by the general provision by reference to particular localities, it is not easy to see why the said discretion cannot be exercised more than once. Indeed, situations may arise when the Magistrates may have to consider the matter from time to time in respect of different localities and if it appears to the Magistrates considering the cases of different localities that in regard to each one of them a departure from the general rule should be made, it is not easy to follow why the proviso does not justify different orders being passed by the Magistrates in respect of different but particular localities. On the other hand, if the main provision is construed to mean that the time prescribed by it was to apply generally only with certain exceptions contemplated by the proviso, that would be a different matter. However, it is not necessary for us to pursue this point further and to express a definite opinion on the general proposition that an e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... reas. The Government has also been authorised to fix the payment of rent on any other suitable basis as it thinks fit. In other words, the authority conferred on the Government is either to fix a lower rate or to fix any other basis on which the rent could be fixed. The provision is an independent provision and so the two sub-sections must be read as different, independent, though co-ordinate, provisions of the Statute. It would, we think, we think, be erroneous to treat sub-s. (2) as a proviso or exception to sub-s. (1). Whereas sub-s. (1) deals with and applies to all leases individually and prescribes a ceiling in that behalf, sub-s. (2) is intend to prescribe a maximum by reference to different areas in the State. The object of both the provisions is no doubt similar but is not the same and the relation between them cannot legitimately be treated as the relation between the general rule and the proviso or exception to it. The argument that by issuing the notification the Government has purported to amend s. 6(1) is, in our opinion, not well-founded. As we have already seen, s. 6(1) is intended to apply to all the agricultural leases until a notification is issued under s. 6( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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