TMI Blog1969 (1) TMI 76X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and had thereby incurred the liability to be ejected. On appeal by the defendants the learned Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit on 8-2-1960, by giving the defendants benefit of Section 13 (4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (which for the sake of brevity will be referred to hereinafter as the Act ). 4. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Jaipur the plaintiff landlord filed appeal before this Court which was allowed on 8-4-1965 and the suit for ejectment was decreed only on the ground of default in payment of rent. On 30-4-1965 the defendants applied before the learned single Judge for grant of leave to appeal to the Division Bench from the judgment of the learned single Judge under Section 18 (2) of the Raiasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 but this application was rejected the same day. Thereafter on 3-5-1965 the defendants filed a petition under Article 136(1) of the Constitution of India to the Supreme Court for grant of Special Leave to Appeal from the judgment dated 8-4-1965. While the application for grant of Special Leave to Appeal was pendi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... default; (c) the provisions of Clauses (a) and (b) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals, or applications for revisions, preferred or made after the commencement of the amending Act, against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in Clause (b), for the expression from the date of commencement of the Amending Act , the expression from the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision shall be substituted; (d) if in any proceeding, any decree for eviction on the ground only of non-payment of rent has been passed on or after the 21st March, 1955, but before the date of commencement of the Amending Act, and in which no appeal or application for revision has been preferred or made the court may, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the Amending Act, reopen the proceeding if the tenant deposits ail arrears of rent upto the date of such application as also the amount of interest thereon at six per cent per annum and costs of the suit; and thereafter such proceeding, shall be disposed of as if such deposit of rent constituted a valid payment to landl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4-1965 for grant of leave to appeal to Division Bench nor the petition dated 18-5-1965 for grant of Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution can be treated as an appeal . It is contended that the learned single Judga was in error in holding that the defendants-appellants cannot take advantage of Section 13-A, Clause (d) of the Act, on the ground that they had preferred an appeal from the judgment and decree dated 8-4-1965. He has submitted that the authorities relied upon by the learned single Judge have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, strongly supported the view taken by the learned single Judge by reference to a few more authorities besides those referred to in the judgment under appeal. 9. Before we embark upon the consideration of the various authorities relied upon by, the learned Single Judge and cited at the Bar we consider it proper to examine the provisions of Section 13-A. It is crystal clear from the various Clauses of this section that by inserting Section 13-A, the Legislature wanted that an opportunity be afforded to the tenants w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lst March, 1955. But with respect to the application of this clause a distinction is being drawn by the learned counsel for the respondent between those tenants who did not file appeals or applications for revision from the decrees of eviction passed against them and those who did file appeals or applications for revision. It is argued that those who had filed appeals or applications for revision cannot press into service Clause (d) which can be availed of only by those who had not filed any appeal or revision. We, however, find ourselves unable to accept this interpretation, as in our opinion, acceptance of such an interpretation would involve absurdity and inconsistency. We fail to understand how the legislature could have intended to penalise those tenants who had preferred appeals or applications for revision and benefit those tenants only who had not filed appeals or revisions on account of their own inaction? To us it appears that under this clause the legislature extended protection to all those tenants against whom decrees for eviction had been passed on the ground only of non-payment of rent before the date of commencement of the Amending Act but on or after the 21st ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... document that the apparent grammatical construction cannot be the true one, then that which, upon the whole, is the true meaning shall prevail, in spite of the grammatical construction of a particular part of it. And substantially the same opinion is expressed by Lord Selborne in Caledonian Ry, v. North British Ry. (1881) 6 AC 114 (222):-- The mere literal construction of a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intentions of the legislature as apparent by the statute, and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction by which, that intention can be better effectuated. Again Lord Fitzgerald in Bradlaugh v. Clarke, (1883) 8 AC 354 at p. 384 observed as follows:-- I apprehend it is a rule in the construction of statutes that in the first instance the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any expressed intention or declared purpose of the statutes, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. 11. Maxwell in his book ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has been passed before 9-6-1965 and an appeal against the decree for ejectment is pending that relief has been granted under Clause (c) and that if an appeal is preferred but is rejected then the tenant is not entitled to any relief. In our humble view the benefit of Section 13-A would be available to those tenants also against whom a decree for eviction had been passed on the ground of non-payment of rent on or after 21-3-55 but before the date of commencement of the Amending Act even though an appeal was preferred by them and rejected before the commencement of the Act. It may thus be not necessary for us to determine the question whether the application for grant of leave to appeal must be regarded as an appeal . However since the judgment of the learned single Judge has mainly proceeded on this point and the case has also been argued before us at a considerable length on that basis, we consider it proper to decide this question also. 13. We may state at once that no authority in point has been placed before us whether an application for leave to appeal can be regarded as an appear. The learned single Judge relied upon the following authorities in support of his view: Nag ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, 1908, and the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court held, after referring to the Privy Council case cited above, AIR 1932 PC 165 that an appeal against an order granting review even though it is incompetent would be included in the definition of appeal within the ordinary acceptation of the term. Thus, in this case also, an appeal from an order granting the review had been filed, even though it was incompetent and it was held that it was nevertheless an appeal as contemplated by the Civil Procedure Code. 17. In (1899) ILR 22 Mad 68 the question which arose for decision was whether the power of revision exercised by the High Court under Section 622 of the old Civil Procedure Code was a part of the Court's ap-gellate jurisdiction and in this connection ubramania Ayyar J., referred to the dictionary meaning or the word appeal as contained in the Webster's dictionary. The following passage from the judgment of Subramania Ayyar J., was strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his argument: Now according to Webster's Dictionary the first meaning, in law, of the noun 'appeal' is the removal of the cause or a suit fro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the Letters Patent to be included in the appellate jurisdiction? In this connection, the learned Judges observed, Now the term 'Appeal' is defined in the Oxford Dictionary, Volume 1, page 398, as the transference of a case from an inferior to a higher Court or tribunal in the hope of reversing or modifying the decision of the former.' Reference was also made to the definition of the term appeal contained in the Law Dictionary by Sweet where it was defined as a proceeding taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a Court by submitting the question to a higher Court, or Court of appeal. This case also cannot be of any assistance to us in deciding the point argued before us. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants on the other hand referred us to Ghanashyam Mohapatra v. Suryamani Swain, AIR 1964 Ori 205. It was observed in this case that the word appeal as appearing in Article 182(2) is one confined only to such appeals as are directly taken against a decree, but it does not include all appeals from decrees passed in collateral proceedings such as the one under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil P. C. In support of this observation the learned Judges of the Orissa High Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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