TMI Blog1960 (4) TMI 84X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anagpur Encumbered Estates Act. In the course of such management the Manager of the Estate granted on September 1, 1919, to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area. The present litigation was commenced by the first respondent with a view to recover rents and royalties on the basis of the second lease from the heirs and representatives of the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah and also from the present appellant as Receiver to that estate. As under the terms of the lease the lessor is entitled to the half share of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from January 1, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts. As the suit was brought on August 12, 1941, the period prior to August 12,1935, would prima facie be barred by limitation. According to the plaintiff, limitation was saved by the acknowledgments that had been made from time to time by the then Receiver of the estate. Two defen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he terms of the two leases up to the year 1935 but that there was no material on the record to find out as to what was the amount due up to that year on the basis of that second lease he made an order -in the following terms: The defendant is hereby directed to assess and state the amount due under the lease in suit out of the said sum of ₹ 67,459-3-3 on the basis, of the accounts of his office.... in respect of the plaintiff's dues within two months from this date, failing which a commissioner will be appointed to take accounts and ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff, and the defendant shall be liable for the costs of the same. Against this decree the contesting defendant, the Receiver appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Patna. Before the appeal court two points were raised. The first was that on a proper construction of the 1919 lease it should be found that the minerals specifically excluded in clause 16 of the earlier lease were included in the 1919 lease and consequently, the lessor having granted certain leases to other parties in respect of these minerals in the area the lessee was entitled to suspension of rents. The other point raised. was tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... copper sulphate, coal, chalk, redearth, etc., mati slate stone and all kinds of precious stones such as diamond, ruby, emerald, topaz, crystals, etc., lying on the surface and subsoil of Ghatsila otherwise called pargana Dhalbhum, mentioned in Schedule excluding the 2 mouzas Narsinghgarh and Ghatsila and the Dibkulis mentioned in Schedule below. It will be noticed that this clause does not mention stones, lime-stones, ghuting or ballasts. Clause 6 of the lease however provided that the lessee shall be competent to take stones, lime-stones, ghuting and ballast which may be required for constructing buildings, bungalows and pathways, etc., necessary for the aforesaid mining work free of cost and rent. Clause 16 of the lease contains some further provisions as regards these and is in these words :- That by virtue of the aforesaid patta, you shall not be competent to offer any obstruction either to me or to my any authorised person to raise stones (used) for utensils or stones, lime-stone and ghuting, etc., for buildings which are not covered by this patta and sell the same to me or to tenants, etc., under me to dig bandh, tank, canal and wells, etc., but the terms of the said ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es relating to Mining Leases and shall be subject to the provision of clause 16 of the said principal lease. The lease concluded with the words:---- Provided always and it is hereby agreed that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to show that the Pottah of the tenth day of January one thousand and nine hundred made between Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo, son of Gopinath Deo Dhabal Deo, deceased and the Hon'ble Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah, son of Prince Mohammad Anwar Shah, deceased is not still valid and subsisting. In his attempt to establish that by this later lease the lessor granted a lease even of those minerals which had been excluded specifically by clause 16 of the earlier lease, Mr. Jha has arrayed in his aid several well established principles of construction. The first of these is that the intention of the parties to a document of grant must be ascertained first and foremost from the words used in the disposition clause, understanding the words used in their strict, natural grammatical sense and that once the intention can be clearly understood from the words in the disposition clause thus interpreted it is no business of the courts to examine what the pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mbol Y the intention of the parties in using the words set out above was that this lease should be in respect of X minus Y . We are afraid however that this is an over-simplification of the problem which we must resist. While it is true that strict grammatical sense of the words must be given effect to, words and phrases are not used by people always and invariably in the same sense. As has often been emphasised by eminent judges the intention of persons using certain words cannot be discovered by considering the words in the abstract. When in this lease the grantor used certain words, what we cannot ignore is that when words set out above were used in the present lease both the parties had present in their minds the fact of the principal lease. They were not only well aware of the fact of the earlier lease but actually referred to it as the principal lease and repeatedly emphasised the fact that the terms and conditions of the principal lease in so far as not contradicted by the present lease would remain valid and effective. One of the principal facts of that earlier lease is that while some metals and minerals were specifically granted thereby some were specifically exclude ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssees if so long as under-leases were not given, the lessee himself would not be bound by the provisions of clause 16 of the principal lease and would be competent to obstruct the head lessor in the several matier is mentioned in clause 16 ? It is in our opinion unthinkable that such a clause as this fourth clause would be included in respect of sub-lessees unless it was also the intention of the parties that the lessee himself would be bound by the provisions of cl. 16 of the principal lease. The view that this must have been the intention is strengthened by the concluding words of this lease which provide in substance that notwithstanding anything in the later lease the principal lease would be valid and subsisting. Here also there would be no point in saying that the principal lease would be valid and subsisting as regards merely the minerals which had been specifically 'granted by the principal lease. As regards the principal lease being binding in respect of those minerals, there could be no doubt whatsoever and the concluding clause of the 1919 lease would be unnecessary and meaningless. As regards the metals and minerals which are excluded by cl. 16 there might however b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n included. That the dispute must have been of the nature, as the Trial Court believes' appears probable also from the use of the words other than those specifically mentioned in the preamble. The dispute being on the question of what was mentioned and what was not mentioned in the granting clause, the object of granting the second lease was that what had not so long been mentioned in the granting clause would also be included in such grant by a supplementary lease. The question of what had been excluded was not in the contemplation of the parties at all. It is significant to note that there was no evidence that before the date of the second lease, any dispute had arisen as regards the operation of the exclusion clause, viz., Clause 16. A consideration of the preamble therefore further strengthens the conclusion that this later lease did not grant any mineral rights in respect of what had been excluded by the principal lease in its 16th clause. If we interpret the disposition clause in the second lease in this way, as we think we must, there is no repugnancy between this clause and the later clauses and there is no scope therefore for the applicability of the doctrine ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ja Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo is in these words:- Sir, I have the honour to send herewith two statements of account showing an aggregate sum of ₹ 4,993-6-1 as royalty due to the Dhalbhum Raj by the above estate from 1st January to 31st December, 1930. On your accepting the statements as correct a cheque for the said sum of ₹ 4,993-6-1 will be sent to you. Besides the above, there is lying to the credit of the Dhalbhum Raj the sum of ₹ 31,944-8-3 being the royalty upto the end of December, 1929. I shall be obliged if you will kindly let me know whether you are prepared to accept the same and on hearing from you I shall be glad to forward to you a cheque in payment thereof. According to Mr. Jha the first statement as regards the sum of ₹ 4,993-6-1 due to the Dhalbhum Raj by the above estate from 1 st January to 31 st December, 1930, was not a clear and independent statement of the dues but was made subject to the condition that this was accepted as correct. Similarly he argued that the statement in the next paragraph of the letter as regards the sum of ₹ 31,944-8-3 being the royalty up to the end of December, 1929, was also not a clear and indep ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... apagonda v. Sangadiappa (1) that duly authorised would include (1) (1901) Bom. L.R. 221. (F.B.). duly authorised either by the action of the party indebted or by force of law or order of the Court has been followed in other High Courts also (Vide: Rashbehary v. Anand Ram (1); Ramcharan Das V. Gaya Prasad (2) ; Lakshumanan v. Sadayappa (3 ) and Thankamma v. Kunhamma (4) and in our opinion represents the correct state of law. Mr. Jha has next argued that, in any case, law does not authorise the Receiver of an Estate to make acknowledgments of debt due from the estate. For this proposition he has relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Currimbhai v. Ahmedali (5). In that case it was held that an acknowledgment by an official assignee will not amount to an acknowledgment by an agent of the debtor. Though this case does not deal strictly with the case of a Receiver, Mr. Jha has relied on the reasoning therein as supporting his con- tention. Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Sanyal, on behalf of the respondent to the fact that a contrary view has been taken in Lakshmanan Chetty v. Sadayappa Chetty (6). Mr. Sanyal has argued that in respect of a debt due from the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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