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TMI Blog2003 (8) TMI 559X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r, 2002. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. Ashoke Banerjee, the learned counsel for the respondents, that this appeal is not maintainable on two-fold grounds. First, that the meeting has already been held on 28th September, 2002, and nothing remains to be decided. In support, he refers to the order dated 30th April, 2003 passed in this appeal refusing stay of operation of this order appealed against on the self-same ground that the order has lost its force. The second ground is that the order that was granted is not an order within the meaning of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, appealable under Order 43. Since no injunction was granted against the appellant restraining him from holding the meeting, it was only a chance to participate was allowed to the plaintiff. 3. This contention has since been opposed on behalf of the appellant on various grounds. One of the grounds is that an application under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC has since been filed by the plaintiff alleging the breach of the interim order by preventing the plaintiff from participating in the meeting held on 28th September, 2002, which is in the nature of execution and not a contempt and as such, if the order remains ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e from the bar in course of hearing. This contention, however, may not be gone into at this stage since the interim order is already granted and its purpose appears to have been over. 8. Now, we may turn our attention to the question as to whether the order has lost its force rendering the appeal infructuous. In fact, Mr. Mukherjee had sought to strike at the very root. According to him, (i) this order was passed on the basis of the averments made in the plaintiff, which does not disclose any cause of action; (ii) the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which is otherwise barred in law. Mr. Banerjee, however, opposes these contentions on the ground that two applications have since been filed by the appellant. One is under Order 7 Rule 10 and the other under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. These applications have since been directed by this Court to be disposed of at the earliest in its order dated 30th April, 2003, while disposing of the application for stay in this appeal. According to him, any observation made by this Court would affect the merit of the application under Order 7 Rule 10 and that under Order 7 Rule 11. Therefore, this Court should refrain from deciding this que ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ellant. According to him, any damage that might have been caused by virtue of an interim order can be corrected at the hearing. But this is a settled proposition of law for which no decision would be necessary. Inasmuch as, the order is interim in nature, which survives only during the pendency of the proceedings. When a final order is passed, all interim orders merge in the final order. It is the final order that becomes operative. All interim orders stand superseded. Therefore, the order dated 30th April, 2003 would not stand in the way of disposing of the appeal nor the observation made in the order dated 27th September 2002 would affect the defendant in the ultimate decision in the suit. But if any damage is caused during the pendency of the suit by reason of the said order, it is open to challenge the same before a higher forum and get it corrected through appeal or otherwise. Therefore, there is no scope for holding that the appeal is not maintainable. 12. In the plaint Annexure-H (at page 37 supplementary affidavit) in paragraph 14, it has been pleaded that on 12th September, 2002, the plaintiff all of a sudden received an intimation from a member of the club at the plainti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s defined in Section 2(3) to mean the area comprised within the local limits for the time being of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court. In Section 2(4), High Court has been defined to mean the High Court at Calcutta. The Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court does not stretch beyond the Circular Road beyond which the 58/2, Ballygunge Circular Road, is situated. The Raja Raj Ballav Street is definitely within the Original Side jurisdiction of the High Court and is within the jurisdiction of City Civil Court. But it could not give jurisdiction to the City Civil Court simply on the basis of the receipt of the intimation/information as pleaded in paragraph 14 of the plaint. 14. That apart, Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the City Civil Courts Act prescribes that subject to Sub-sections (3) and (4), the City Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of proceedings of the value mentioned therein. Sub-section (4) of Section 5 prescribes that the City Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction to try suits or proceedings specified in the First Schedule. The First Schedule in item No. 10 (i) precludes suits and proceedings under the Indian Companies ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gislature incorporated in item 10 of the First Schedule? Therefore, it appears that this was the real interpretation of the said provision as was held in the said decision. In Renuka Pachal v. Champa Guha Neogi and Ors., AIR1978Cal457 (FB), this Court had held that if there is an amendment in the legislation after an interpretation of a particular provision by Court and no expression is used in the legislation, while amending, differing from the interpretation given in the decision, in that event, it is to be presumed that the legislature had intended to adopt or accept the interpretation so given in the decision and approve that the intention of the legislature was correctly interpreted. 17. In the cause title of the plaint, the appellant has been described as a company registered under the Companies Act, 1913. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is pointed out the appellant-defendant No. 1 is a limited liability Company incorporated under the provision of the Companies Act, 1956. It is also not disputed by Mr. Banerjee that the appellant is a Company. Admittedly, the relief that was sought for in the plaint is related to the holding of the AGM and EGM, which are necessarily related ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , that the disposal of the application without notice to the other respondents is impermissible. In this case, in fact, notices were not issued in the other respondents. Only upon hearing the caveator/appellant, the application was disposed of finally. The Court cannot decide the rights of the parties without notice to interested parties. There was no finding that the other respondents are not interested. However, the Court can do so by way of interim measure. It cannot dispose of the application finally without notice to the other respondents, unless it dispenses with notice upon the other respondents or finds that the other respondents would not suffer any prejudice or would not at all be affected or that they are not interested in it. In Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund (supra), the Apex Court had taken such a view in paragraphs 40, 41, 42 and 47 of the decision. In order to avoid prolixity, we refrain from reproducing the said paragraphs. 21. Mr. Mukherjee next contended that the application under Order 39 Rule 2A is in the nature of execution. He relied on the decision in State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1961 SC 211 V-23. It is not necessary to go into this question at th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the defendant/petitioner for stay of operation of the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 54 of 2002 for hearing on 2nd August, 2002 without granting any ad interim order of stay. Evidently, the plaintiff/opposite party was dismissed from the membership of the defendant-club. Such order of dismissal was challenged by the plaintiff/opposite party in the above suit. In the said suit, the prayer for an interim order of injunction restraining the respondent-club from giving effect to the said order of dismissal of the membership of the plaintiff/opposite party called up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, it became evident that the dismissal of the plaintiff/opposite party from the membership of the defendant-club had been given effect to during a period of about last two years. However, the suit having been decreed ex parte, Title Appeal No. 233 of 2002 has been filed by the defendant-club and in that appeal, the prayer for stay of operation of the judgment and decree passed ex parte in the said suit was made. Having regard to the fact that the order of dismissal of the petitioner from the membership of the defendant-club had continued to be in force for a period of abo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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