TMI Blog1968 (11) TMI 104X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the petitioner that this order passed against him was not communicated, while the case of the opponents 1 and 2 is that as per the outward register, the order was intimated on November 7, 1959. The Revenue Tribunal has not gone 'into this question as to the date of communication. The notice dated August 14, 1962, was issued thereafter under Section 32P to the petitioner and was served on him on August 30, 1962. The petitioner having learnt that the Lands Tribunal had passed the order against him under Section 32G, he applied for review by the application, dated May 10, 1962, as no such order was communicated to him declaring the purchase ineffective. This review application does not appear to have been entertained and no order has been passed thereon. The Mamlatdar, acting as the delegate of the Collector, from time to time adjourned the inquiry started by him under Section 32P. It was on the last occasion on January 7, 1963, that when the petitioner was absent, the statement of the landlord was recorded and the Mamlatdar passed the order, dated January 8, 1963, for delivery of possession to the landlord as they required the same for bonafide personal cultivation. The petit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tive: Provided that if such order is passed in default of the appearance of any party, the Tribunal shall communicate such order to the parties and any party on whose default the order was passed may within 60 days from the date on which the order was communicated to him apply for the review of the same: Thereafter Section 32P provides as under: (1) Where the purchase of any land by tenant under Section 32 becomes ineffective under Section 32G or where a tenant fails to exercise the right to purchase the land held by him within the specified period under Sections 32P or 32G, the Tribunal may suo motu or on an application made in this behalf and in cases other than those in which the purchase has become ineffective by reason of Section 32G or 32N, after holding a formal inquiry direct that the land shall be disposed of in the manner provided in Sub-section (2). (2) such direction shall provide-- (a) that...the former tenant be summarily evicted; (b) that the land shall, subject to the provisions of Section 15, be surrendered to the former landlord; (c) that if the entire land or any portion thereof cannot be surrendered in accordance with the provisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be relied upon was only some-entry in the outward register showing same intimation of copies on November 7, 1959. This must be a mandatory requirement, as the non-compliance thereof would result in the party losing the important right of review. Therefore, there would be an effective order until the same was duly communicated and, the purchase could not become ineffective until this mandatory procedure was complied with. The Prant Officer and the Revenue Tribunal were, therefore, obviously wrong in disposing of this revision application without going into this essential question whether the purchase had actually become ineffective by due compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 32G(3) read with the proviso. In the present case, even the review application filed by the petitioner on September 10, 1962, has never been disposed of by any effective order. Therefore, the order under Section 32P of further disposal by surrender to the landlord was clearly ultra vires as the mandatory requirement of the purchase becoming ineffective was not as yet complied with. This order under Section 32P should have been therefore completely quashed by the Revenue Tribunal. Mr. Solanki is r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ibunal could not refuse to determine the price on the ground that no material had been placed before it by the parties or that neither the landlord nor the tenant appeared or led evidence relating to the factors set out by the Legislature. In Abdul v. State 6 G.L.R. 730, the Division Bench, consisting of Shelat C.J. (as he then was) and Shah J., also explained the scheme of Section 32G by pointing out at page 740 that Section 32G did not contemplate only one order of determining the purchase price, but several orders before the final stage of determining the purchase price was reached. From this scheme which has been explained by both these decisions, it is obvious that a very important duty is cast by the Legislature on the Lands Tribunal to hold this inquisitorial inquiry. When the notice is issued under Section 32G the Tribunal has to call upon the tenant or landlord and other persons to appear on the date specified. Under Sub-section (3), the Tribunal is required to record a statement of the tenant in the prescribed manner whether he was or was not willing to purchase the land held by him as tenant. It is in this context that we have to interpret Sub-section (3) of Section 32 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nish evidence of his unwillingness to purchase. In the present case, the facts clearly disclose that in accordance with the notice under Section 32G(1) the tenant straightway appeared on July 14, 1959, but his statement could not be recorded on that date and the matter was adjourned to August 31, 1959. The Rojnama of that adjourned date does not mention how the adjournment was given but it is obvious that the parties were intimated at the very time and not by a postal intimation and, therefore, the tenant must have been present. It is only on the last date, October 6, 1959 that the tenant was absent and so was the landlord, and the Lands Tribunal recorded the fact of non-appearance of the parties by examining the peon and straightway proceeded to pass this mechanical order on October 15, 1959 to the effect that the tenant was not willing to purchase the land and that, therefore, the purchase was declared ineffective. Thus, the Lands Tribunal has merely mechanically passed the order without applying its mind to this statutory function and duty which had to be performed in a judicial manner. Both Mr. Barot and Mr. Nanavati argued that for the procedure an analogy had to be drawn from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... could arise in the present case for the simple reason that the Legislature had provided that such orders under Section 32G(3) for default of appearance in this sense must be communicated to the tenant so that he could apply for review within 60 days. In the present case the tenant made a statement on oath that the order was not communicated to him and no attempt was made to rebut this evidence of the tenant, except by showing some entry of the outward register that the copy of the order was despatched without examining any person in this connection. In fact the Collector cursorily went into this question without considering the effect of the proviso and the Revenue Tribunal even refused to go into this question. There is also further evidence on the record that the petitioner tenant in this case not only contended that no order was communicated to him, but he had filed the review application which was not disposed of by any effective order. Therefore, unless the order under Section 32G was proved to have been communicated and unless an effective order was passed on this review application as provided by the proviso to Section 32G(3) there could not be any question of limitation. T ..... 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