TMI Blog1977 (4) TMI 179X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the purpose of this appeal are: Three lands which are the subject-matter of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal are situate in Vijanapur village, which was an In am Village of which the late B. M. Muniswarnappa - father of respondents 1 and 2 was the Inamdar. Personal and Miscellaneous Inams in the erstwhile State of Mysore were abolished under the Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954, hereinafter called the Inams Abolition Act . The Inams Abolition Act provided for vesting of Inams in the State and grant of occupancy rights to the former Inamdars and certain classes of tenants described as (a) Kadim tenant, (b) Permanent tenant and (c) 5Quasi-permanent tenant, and also for recognition of the rights of 'other tenants'. 3. The Notification vesting the In am Village of Vijanapura is said to have been Issued in the year 1956. Late Muniswamappa, as also the appellant, made separate applications for registration of occupancy rights in respect of the aforesaid lands before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition. The application of late Muniswamappa was made under S. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act for grant of occupancy; the applic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts I and 2. In the said proceedings the Land Tribunal made an order on 20-2-1976 holding that the appellant is a 'deemed tenant' of the aforesaid three lands and is entitled to be registered as the occupant under S. 45. The said order was challenged by respondents I and 2 in W. P. 3288 of 1976 on the ground that the writ petitioners were denied fair hearing by the 4th respondent Tribunal. Earlier, they had filed W P. 2167 of 1976 for a writ in the nature of prohibition against the 4th respondent Tribunal to forbear from proceeding with the enquiry. After the disposal of the appellant's application for registration of occupancy by the order made on 20-2-1976, the Tribunal, when it had become functus officio, made an order of injunction on 9-3-1976 restraining respondents 1 and 2 from interfering with the appellant's alleged Possession of the disputed lands. The said order was challenged in W. P. 5844 of 1976. 6. The said Writ Petitions were clubbed together, heard and disposed of by Bhimiah, J., by a common order made on 15-10-1976, by which W. P. 2167 of 1976 was also allowed. The said order was however modified by an order dated 21-10-1976 holding that W. P 2167 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d 227 of the Constitution, to sit as a Court of Appeal or Revision. This submission of Sri Narayana Rao was supported by Sri Chandrakantraju, Senior High Court Government Advocate, appearing for the third respondent State of Karnataka. Sri B. P. Holla, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2 -contended that on the basis of the very applications filed by the appellant before the Tribunal, he cannot be held to be a tenant or a 'deemed tenant'. 10. It is a fundamental requirement of our system of law that all Tribunals or Authorities vested with the power to adjudicate upon the rights of parties affecting their rights to life or property, shall comply with the Rules of Natural Justice. This basic requirement is not an empty formality. Violation of the Rules of Natural Justice renders the decision void even where the law provides for an, appeal. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40 the House of Lords held that a decision given without regard to the principles of Natural Justice is void. In General Medical Council v. Spackman (1943) AC 627 Lord Wright said. If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision, it is indeed, immaterial whether the same ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d have been rendered in the proceedings under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution is correct. Sri Narayana Rao further urged that the view of the learned single Judge that there was nothing left for the appellant to agitate before the Land Tribunal after his claims under Ss. 4 to 9-A were examined by the Special Deputy Commissioner, and Muniswamappa was registered as the occupant of the lands, is erroneous. 15. Sri B. P. Holla, learned counsel for respondents 1 and 2, contended that his clients had not only challenged the decision of the Tribunal by seeking relief in the nature of certiorari but had also filed W. P. 2167 of 1976 for a writ in the nature of prohibition against the Tribunal to forbear from proceeding with the enquiry on the two applications of the appellant on the ground that the Tribunal is seeking to reopen, indirectly, the order granting occupancy to Muniswamappa. Under S. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act which is barred under S. 141 of the Act. Sri Holla submitted that it is not the case of the appellant before the Tribunal that his tenancy right originated subsequent to the grant of occupancy to Muniswamappa by the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner for I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , we considered it necessary that the appellant should state precisely what his case is and, by our order made on Feb. 3, 1977, directed him to state his case with reference to the following points:- (1) In the enquiry held by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition under S. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act, whether the appellant had claimed that he was a tenant coming within the scope of S. 9-A of the said Act and/or whether his claim to tenancy, if any, under S. 9-A was recognised by the Special Deputy Commissioner? If so, the particulars of the Order of the Special Deputy Commissioner. (2) If the claim of tenancy under Section 9-A was not made or allowed in the enquiry under S. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act, is it the appellant's case in the proceedings before the Land Tribunal that after the grant of occupancy right to Muniswamappa, father of respondents 1 and 2, by the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner dated 19-4-1958, the appellant was granted any lease by the said Muniswamappa or by his successors? (3) If it is not the case of the appellant that there was any grant of lease by Muniswamappa or his successors in favour of the appellant subsequ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed under the Land Reforms Act, 1961. That is the basis of the present claim. In view of the extended definition of 'tenant' in the Land Reforms Act, 1961, the appellant claims to be a tenant for the last 40 years. The Position of such a tenant who is a 'tenant' only within the meaning of Land Reforms Act but not otherwise, is analogous to Section 9-A tenant or that of a tenant inducted by Inamdar after 19-4-1958. Now, the case of the appellant has been made clear. He was not recognised as a 'tenant' within the scope of S. 9-A of the Inams Abolition Act; late Muniswamappa, father of respondents 1 and 2, was registered as an occupant by the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner made on 19-4-1958 and the application of the appellant for registration of occupancy under the Inams Abolition Act was rejected. His further case is that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been cultivating the lands under late Muniswamappa on half crop-share basis both before and after the date of vesting of the lands under the Inams Abolition Act, and that after Muniswamappa's death, he has been cultivating the lands on crop-share basis under respondents 1 and 2. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... able to tenants continued under S. 9-A. Section 10, inter alia, provides that The Deputy Commissioner shall examine the nature and history of all lands xx xx xx in respect of which any Person claims to be continued as tenant under S. 9-A**** and decide in respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. Sub-section (2) of S. 10 states that a tenant found to be in possession of any land on the first day of July, 1948, shall be presumed to be a quasi-permanent tenant as defined in Clause (14) of sub-s. (1) of S. 2. Section 10-A provides for entries Los De Made in the Record of Rights after determination- of the claims under S. 10. 21. The lands vest absolutely in the State and all rights of the Inamdar and the tenants under him are extinguished and the only right of the Inamdar and his tenants, whether Kadim tenant, permanent tenant or quasi-permanent tenant, is to make applications for grant of occupancy. The State there-after, when it grants occupancy, whether under S. 4, 5, 6 or 9, confers fresh title on the grantees of occupancy; all prior rights are extinguished except as provided in S. 9-A where under in the case of 'other tenants' they shall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Inams Abolition Act and re-opening the issue of tenancy which 'has been rejected. Sri Narayana Rau, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that the Inams Abolition Act was concerned with Kadim tenants, Permanent tenants. Quasi permanent tenants and 'other tenants' of the Inamdar, but not with 'deemed tenants' as defined in S. 4 of the Act and the Tribunal is not Precluded from considering the evidence of 'deemed tenancy' prior to the date of vesting under the Inams Abolition Act. 24. The purpose and scope of the two Acts are distinct. The Inams Abolition Act as stated earlier, was enacted for the purpose of abolition of In am tenures and conversion of such tenures into Ryotwari tenure and in that Process, grant occupancy rights to the Inamdars and the three classes of tenants. The purpose of the Land Reforms Act, however, is different. It is a legislation enacted to effectuate radical agrarian reforms by imposing ceiling of land-holdings and termination of landlord and tenant relationship in respect of tenanted lands and further conferment of occupancy rights on tenants personally cultivating the lands. Chapter III of the Act contains provisions fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t or tenants for registration of occupancy under the Act has to be decided with reference to the date of vesting under S. 44, viz., 1st March 1974. Under the Inams Abolition Act, the rights of the Inamdars and tenants were decided with reference to the date of vesting under the said Act. The lands in question vested in the State Government under the Inams Abolition Act in about 1956. The material dates under the two Acts and the scope and purpose of the two Acts being different, the termination of the proceedings under the Inams Abolition Act in regard to grant of occupancy cannot bar an investigation of the claim under S. 45 of the Act by the Land Tribunal. What the Tribunal, under the Act, has to enquire into is whether the lands claimed by the applicant before it, have vested in the State Government under S. 44. For that purpose it has to decide whether the lands were held by or in the Possession of any tenant immediately prior to 1st March 1974. The next question the Tribunal has to decide is: Who is the person that has been cultivating such lands personally immediately prior to 1st March 1974? The two questions being closely related have to be dealt with and disposed of togeth ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at such person is not a tenant and its decision is not reversed on appeal, or 1977 the Karnataka Protection from permanent tenant protected from Karnataka/10 IX G-27; (ii) the Tribunal refuses to make such declaration but its decision is reversed on appeal, such person shall not be deemed to be a tenant. A person who unlawfully enters on the land of another and cultivates the same cannot claim the status of a 'deemed tenant' under S. 4. Ordinarily, the concept of tenancy requires proof of grant of a lease by a landlord to the person claiming to be tenant; in such a case the tenant is put in possession of the land leased in consideration of payment o rent. Section 4, by fiction of law, extends the meaning of 'tenant' to a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person. Section 4 of the Act is in pari materia with S. 4 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. Section 4 of the Bombay Act came Up for interpretation before Courts. In Jasvantrai Tricumlal Vyas v. Bai Jiwi, AIR1957Bom195 (FB) the object of S. 4 of the Bombay Act was explained thus by Chagla, C. J.: The one idea that runs through the Tenancy Act is that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nging to others, but it cannot be assumed there form that they are the only persons who are covered by the section. The Act affords protection to all persons who hold agricultural land as contractual tenants and subject to the exceptions specified all persons law fully cultivating lands belonging to others, and it would be unduly restricting the in tent ion of the Legislature to limit the benefit of its provisions to persons who derive their authority from the owner, either under a contract of tenancy, or otherwise. In our view, all persons other than those mentioned in Cls. (a), (b) and (c) of S. 4 who lawfully cultivate lands belonging to other persons whether or not their authority is derived directly from the owner of the land must be deemed tenants of the lands. (Underlining is ours.) In M. C. Chockalingam v. V. Manick vasagam , [1974]2SCR143 the Supreme Court explained, though in a different context, the import of the idea of 'lawful possession' thus: Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stated that his claim is not based on any grant made by the land lord subsequent to 1958 and since licence can only be the result of a grant by one person to another, there cannot be a licence without any grant. Vide S. 52 of the Easements Act. 30. When the appellant had made clear before this Court that he does not claim the status of a contractual tenant or any grant made by the landlord subsequent to 19-4-1958, he cannot come within the definition of 'tenant' under the Act even assuming that he was personally cultivating the lands immediately prior to 1-3-1974. In order to hold that the lands were held by the appellant as a tenant immediately prior to 1st March 1974, it has to be pleaded and shown that he was in possession of the lands either under a contract of lease or at least that he was originally inducted under a contract of lease or licence granted by the landlord and that his possession continued thereafter undisturbed. In the instant case, there- is no such plea pleaded by the appellant. Therefore, in our Judgment, there is no case to go before the Tribunal for adjudication. If the appellant has been unauthorized cultivating the lands and has perfected his ti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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