TMI Blog1983 (10) TMI 289X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rew from the society of the respondent-husband without any reasonable cause and despite repeated requests and entreaties of the respondent-husband arid the members of his family she declined to return and live with him. Ultimately, a panchayat along with the family members of the respondent-husband had approached and requested for the return of the appellant-wife to the matrimonial home but she flatly refused to return and stay with him at Bhatinda. The respondent-husband was then compelled to resort to the service of a registered legal notice to the wife in February 1974. reiterating his request to come and reside with him. Pursuant thereto the appellant-wife made a show of returning to the husbands house at Bhatinda for a few days and then again went away to her Parents house an the l6th of May. 1974. Persistent. attempts thereafter to persuade the appellant-wife to return to the matrimonial home having failed the petition for restitution of conjugal rights was hence presented on the 27th of July. 1974. 3. In contesting the petition. the appellant-wife admitted the marriage but pleaded that she was serving as a teacher in another State in Rajasthan, where she was posted at dif ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s not raised before the Full Bench and consequently not considered by it. On this premise he declined to follow the same and opined that the Full Bench decision in Smt. Kailash Wati's case (supra) needs reconsideration by a still larger Bench and the reference was made accordingly. 6. Before us it was indeed the common and admitted position of the parties that on the facts of the present case the ratio of the Full Bench in Smt Kailash Watis case (1977-79 Pun LR 216) (supra) directly and squarely covers the legal issues involved. Now once it is so held as it inevitable must be, then a fortiori its ratio was binding on the learned single Judge. What is the precise import of this binding nature, seems now to need no exhaustive dissertation More than two centuries ago Blackstone in his celebrated Commentaries elaborated the rule of the binding nature of the precedent in the following terms :-- It is an established rule to abide by former precedents when the same points come again into litigation as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady and not likely to waver with every Judges new opinion, as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determine ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... about to pronounce is right. On the contrary, if I were free to follow my own opinion, my own powers of reasoning such as they are, I should say that it is wrong. gut I am bound by authority--which, of course it is my duty to follow-- and following authority. I feel bound to pronounce the judgment which I am about to deliver. Similarly Lord Cozens-Hardy. M. R. in Velazquez Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commrs. (1914) 3 KB. 458 had occasion to observe as follows :-- But there is one rule by which of course, we are bound to abide that when there has been a decision of this Court upon a question of principle it is not right for this court, whatever its own views may be to depart from that decision. There would otherwise be no finality in the law. If it is contended that the decision is wrong then the proper course is to go to the ultimate tribunal the House of Lords who have power to settle the law and hold that the decision which is binding upon as is not good law. 8. As in England so in India, the legal position is identical and indeed Article 141 gives a constitutional status to the theory of precedents in respect of the law declared by the Supreme Court. In Tribhavandas Pursh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ven more firmly in the way of Division Benches disagreeing with a previous decision of the Full Bench of the same Court. 11 Now apart from Full benches and the precedents of the superior Court, it would appear that even judgments of the Benches of the same High Court in a limited way are binding in the sense that a judgment cannot be rendered contrary to the earlier decision of a co-equal Bench. At the highest an equivalent bench can seek reconsideration of the same by a larger bench. It is unnecessary to multiply the precedents on the point and reference may instructively be made to the following observations in Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator General of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 936 (Para 19):-- ..........Judicial decorum no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure. If one thing is more necessary in law that any other thing, it is the quality of certainty. That quality would totally disappear if judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a High Court start overruling one another's decisions. If one Division Bench of High Court is unable to distinguish a previous decision of another Division Bench, and holding the view that the earlier decisio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ever, it is equally apt to elaborate what cannot be a valid ground for questioning or reconsidering the law settled by a larger Bench. The very use of the word 'binding' would indicate that it would hold the field despite the fact that the Bench obliged to follow the same may not itself be in agreement at all with the view. It is a necessary discipline of the law that the judgments of the superior Courts and of larger Benches have to be followed unhesitatingly whatever doubts one may individually entertain about their correctness. The rationale for this is plain because to seek a universal intellectual inanimate is an ideal too Utopian to achieve. Consequently the logic and the rationale upon which the ratio of a larger bench is rested, are not matters open for reconsideration. Negatively put, therefore the challenge to the rationale and reasoning of larger Bench is not a valid ground for unsettling it and seeking a re-opening and re-examination of the same this putting the question in a flux afresh. 15. It remains to advert to the solitary ground which was originally pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of this reference. It was sought to be argue ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ically decided in the three decisions referred to above. Yet again in T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1973 SC 974 the Bench was invited to ignore the earlier decisions about the constitutionality of the Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, on the ground that a fresh argument under Art. 19(1)(f) sought to be raised was not earlier considered and adjudicated upon Repelling the contention and reiterating the aforequoted passage from Smt. Somawati's case (AIR 1963 SC 151) (supra), it was observed as under:-- It is common ground in the present cases that the validity Chapter IV-A of the Act has been upheld on all previous occasions and merely because of the aspect now presented based on the guarantee contained in Art. 19(1)(f) was not expressly considered or decision given thereon will not take away the binding effect of those decisions on us. Following the above identical views have been expressed in Ramanlal Keshavlal Son v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1977 Guj 76 (para 50 of the report) and Chikkamuddu v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1980 Kant 169 (para 10). The solitary stand in support of the reference, therefore merits rejection. 17. It deserves poin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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