TMI Blog2014 (6) TMI 1022X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Collector, subsequently, the same were withdrawn. So, it is clear that there was no order made by AGOT Court, which is the court of competent jurisdiction to permit AGOT to hand over the possession of the land in its control to the Government, for resumption. The said judicial procedure has been overlooked by the Government in resuming the land, even of its own. This act of the Government, bypassing an act under which the entrustment has been made, would amount to violation of the basic structure of the Constitution of India and the power of separation which has been demarcated could not be usurped by one organ on its own. Judicial discipline binds us and the constitutional wisdom underlined under Article 141 of the Constitution is to be followed - while upholding the rule of law that there shall be a proper procedure to approach the AGOT Court and also the competent court of civil jurisdiction where the scheme decree has been formulated for control and management of the property for obtaining an order before resumption of the land under the Official Trustees Act, these appeals are to be dismissed. Thus, though there is a violation of Rule of Law by the authorities in resump ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... short CMRL), for implementing the project, which action, according to the appellants, was illegal and unjustified. 3. According to the appellant in W.A. No. 2510 of 2013, namely, S.V.R. Ramprasad, he was appointed as a co-trustee of Rajah Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar Choultry by an order of this Court in O.S.A. Nos. 66 67 of 2000, dated 05.06.2000; Rajah Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar had submitted a proposal to construct a choultry in Chennai at the cost of about ₹ 30,000/- before the Government on 10.03.1888 and sought a piece of land for that purpose and in consideration of that laudable objective and upon taking into account the various charitable activities of Rajah Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar rendered to the society, the Government had come forward to allot a piece of land measuring an extent of 1.33 acres, now comprised in T.S. No. 41, Vepery Village, Fort-Tondiarpet Taluk, valued at ₹ 3,638/- at free of cost for the purpose of construction of the choultry in that piece of land with a condition that the said piece of land shall be used for construction of choultry and on failure of fulfillment of the conditions and that the said grant of land would be liable for resumption; the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich granted leave and after recording the undertaking given by the learned Solicitor General, directed that all the affected parties should be given notices and an opportunity to respond and, accordingly, disposed of the Petitions, by an order dated 25.07.2013. Thereafter, the District Collector, Chennai, issued individual notices to the affected parties and received their response. The District Collector, after examining the objections, submitted a report to the Government with a recommendation to resume the land in T.S. No. 41. The Government has examined the proposal in the light of the earlier proceedings and the objections raised by the affected parties and resolved to resume the land by an order, dated 28.09.2013, in G.O.Ms. No. 380, Revenue (LD1(1)) Department. The District Collector, pursuant to the said order dated 28.09.2013, issued notices, dated 30.09.2013, directing the petitioners to vacate and hand over the premises to the Tahsildar, Fort Tondiarpet Taluk, Chennai, on 15.10.2013. The Government Order in G.O.Ms. No. 380, dated 28.09.2013, and the consequential eviction notices, dated 30.09.2013, were under challenge in the Writ Petitions before the learned single Jud ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ishan Das and others vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1570: (11) We consider that both these contentions are unsound and the petitioners have made out a clear case of the violation of their fundamental rights. There has been some argument before us as to the true legal effect of the sanction granted in 1909 to Ramji Das subject to the conditions adverted to earlier: whether it was a lease in favour of the firm Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das; whether it was a licence coupled with a grant or an irrevocable licence within the meaning of s. 60(b) of the Easements Act, 1882. These are disputed questions which we do not think that we are called upon to decide in the present proceeding. The admitted position, so far as the present proceeding is concerned, is that the land belonged to the State; with the permission of the State Ramji Das, on behalf of the joint family firm of Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das, built the dharmasala, temple and shops and managed the same during his life time. After his death the petitioners, other members of the joint family, continued the management. On this admitted position the petitioners cannot be held to be trespassers in respect of the dhar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cree of a Civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated. In these circumstances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossessing the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. The State of Bihar this Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon the others. We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erty can be transferred by the Official Trustee. (iii) K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2011 SC 3430: 115. Principles of eminent domain, as such, is not seen incorporated in Article 300A, as we see, in Article 30(1A), as well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) though we can infer those principles in Article 300A. Provision for payment of compensation has been specifically incorporated in Article 30(1A) as well as in the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) for achieving specific objectives. Constitution's 44th Amendment Act, 1978 while omitting Article 31 brought in a substantive provision Clause (1A) to Article 30. Resultantly, though no individual or even educational institution belonging to majority community shall have any fundamental right to compensation in case of compulsory acquisition of his property by the State, an educational institution belonging to a minority community shall have such fundamental right to claim compensation in case State enacts a law providing for compulsory acquisition of any property of an educational institution established and administered by a minority community. Further, the second proviso to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... imarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Article 300A, however, does not prohibit the payment of just compensation when a person is deprived of his property, but the question is whether a person is entitled to get compensation, as a matter of right, in the absence of any stipulation in the statute, depriving him of his property. 121. We find no apparent conflict with the words used in Entry 42, List III so as to infer that the payment of compensation is inbuilt or inherent either in the words acquisition and requisitioning under Entry 42, List III. Right to claim compensation is, therefore, cannot be read into the legislative Entry 42 List III. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under Article 300-A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the State on judicially justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words, the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lants before initiating the impugned action, as directed by the Supreme Court. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior Counsel has relied upon a decision in the case of Azim Ahmed Kazmi and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 278, wherein it is held as under: 17. The questions which requires consideration are (i) whether the order passed by the State Government on 15th December, 2000 for cancellation of lease and resumption of possession is legally valid and (i) whether the State Government can dispossess the lessee in accordance with the Government Grants Act, 1895 without resorting to other procedure established by any other law. 18. There is clear recital in the lease deed executed in favour of the appellants by the Government of U.P. on 19th March, 1996 that the same is being done under the Government Grants Act, 1895. Clause 3(C) of the deed reads as follows: 3(C) That if the demised premises are at any time required by the lessor for his or for any public purpose he shall have the right to give one month's clear notice in writing to the lessees to remove any building standing at the time of the demised premises and wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nts from their possession. He has relied on the following decisions: (i) Virendra Singh and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in AIR 1954 SC 447: 29. Now what effect did the Constitution have on that? In our opinion, the Constitution, by reason of the authority derived from, and conferred by, the peoples of this land, blotted out in one magnificent sweep all vestiges of arbitrary and despotic power in the territories of India and over its citizens and lands and prohibited just such acts of arbitrary power as the State now seeks to uphold. Let it be conceded (without admitting or deciding the point) that the Dominion of India once had the powers for which the Union Government now contends. The self-same authorities which appear to concede that power also admit that it can be waived or relinquished. What then was the attitude of the Dominion towards those States which it sought to draw into the Republic of India which was yet to be free, sovereign, democratic, as its Constitution later proclaimed it to be? We quote from the mouthpiece of that Government as disclosed in the White Paper on Indian States published by official authority. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel' ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ance: devotion, loyalty, ideality, to the Sovereign Democratic Republic that is India. At one stroke all other territorial allegiances were wiped out and the past was obliterated except where expressly preserved; at one moment of time the new order was born with its new allegiance springing from the same source for all, grounded on the same basis: the sovereign will of the, peoples of India with no class, no caste, no race, no creed, no distinction, no reservation. (ii) State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, reported in AIR 1961 SC 221: It was urged that the Subordinate Judge by his order directed the State not to issue any notification for taking possession -and as the notification under s. 3(1) does not proprio vigore affect or interfere with the possession of the proprietor or tenure-holder, the issue of such a notification was not within the prohibition. The same argument was addressed to the High Court and was repelled by the learned Judges and in our opinion correctly. In the first place, the only notification contemplated by the provisions of the Act immediately relevant to the suit, was a notification under s. 3(1). Such a notification has the statutory effect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The Land Acquisition Officer appears to have valued the rights of the respondents in the lands acquired. Whether the valuation made by him is correct or not cannot be gone into these proceedings. The appellants is bound by the valuation made by the Land Acquisition Officer. The view taken by the Land Acquisition Officer that the respondents are not entitled to any compensation in respect of the lands acquired cannot be sustained in view of this Court's decision in Seshagiri Rao's case (supra). (iv) The State of U.P. And Zahoor Ahmad and another, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 547: 16. Section 3 of the Government Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The meaning of sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants is that the scope of that Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations, or restrictions in its grants, and the right, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated accordin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on as it was rendered 'without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority'. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur, [1989] 1 SCC 101. The Bench held that, 'precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment'. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio Decidendi. In Shama Rao v. State of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1680 it was observed, 'it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... above makes it very clear that an enquiry as to the age of the juvenile has to be made only when he is brought or appears before the competent authority. A Police Officer or a Magistrate who is not empowered to act or cannot act as a competent authority has to merely form an opinion guided by the apparent age of the person and in the event of forming an opinion that he is a juvenile, he has to forward him to the competent authority at the earliest subject to arrangements for keeping in custody and safety of the person having been made for the duration of time elapsing in between. The competent authority shall proceed to hold enquiry as to the age of that person for determining the same by reference to the date of the appearance of the person before it or by reference to the date when person was brought before it under any of the provisions of the Act. It is irrelevant what was the age of the person on the date of commission of the offence. Any other interpretation would not fit in the scheme and phraseology employed by the Parliament in drafting the Act. (ix) M/s. A-One Granites vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in AIR 2001 SC 1203: 10. The first question which falls for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y Article 141 of the Constitution of India and observed thus: A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. In the case of Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar, 2000(5) SCC 488, while examining the binding effect of such a decision, this Court observed thus:- A decision not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. That which has escaped in the judgment is not the ratio decidendi. This is the rule of sub silentio, in the technical sense when a particular point of law was not consciously determined. 12. Thus we have no difficulty in holding that as the question regarding applicability of rule 72 of the Rules having not been even referred to, much less considered by this Court in the earlier appeals, it cannot be said that the point is concluded by the same and no longer res integra and accordingly this Court is called upon to decide the same. (x) Achaldas Durgaji Oswal (d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f be sold, and the proceeds thereof be paid into Court and applied in payment of what is found due to the defendant, and the balance, if any, be paid to the plaintiff or other persons entitled to receive the same. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 shows that only a mortgagor can apply to the Court to pass a final decree on payment of the amount found or declared due under the preliminary decree on making this deposit and upon filing the application as provided for in sub-rule (1) of Rule 8 the mortgagor can request the Court to order the mortgagee to put him in possession of the properties which were the subject matter of the mortgage. The amount determined by the Court which the mortgagor is liable to pay to the mortgagee can be deposited before the right of redeem is lost. It may be noticed that even sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of Order XXXIV does not apply to the usufructuary mortgage. It may be noticed that by reason of the amendment introduced in 1929 the right conferred earlier on a usufructuary mortgage to bring the property to sale in case of the mortgagor not making the payment within the time fixed in the decree was taken away; As sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 is applicable only in a case of mo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nal condition can be imposed depriving the recipients of the benefits of their legitimate right to get compensation in case of taking over of the benefit even for a valid public purpose. The recipients cannot be at the mercy of the State forever. 108. Be it noted, the land by way of assignment is let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, for personal occupation and cultivation by the agricultural labourers and others belonging to weaker sections of the society. It may be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit but not without providing for compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof. The acquisition of such land even for a public purpose without payment of compensation shall be in the teeth of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. 110. In the result, we hold that 'no compensation' clause, restricting the right of the assignees to claim full compensation in respect of the land resumed equivalent to the market value of the land, is unconstitutional. The 'no compensation clause' infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 31-A of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and which has been accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation to ownership or possession of any property for which the expression vest is generally used. What we can understand from the claim of a vested right set up by the respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the Court for its consideration, it had a legitimate or settled expectation to obtain the sanction. In our considered opinion, such settled expectation, if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is, that the respondent Company which can have no control over the manner of processing of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rule-making power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G.T. Road and other wards, such settled expectation has been rendered impossible of fulfillment due to change in law. The claim based on the alleged vested right or settled expectation c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce to take possession thereof on the expiry of that period subject to the condition that if the lessor is willing to purchase the property on the demises premises, the lessees shall be paid for such building such amount as may be determined by the Secretary to the Government of U.P. In the Nagar Awas Department. 12. Mr. R. Natarajan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A. No. 2510 of 2013, would submit that the appellant is one of the descendants in the family of Rajah Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar and was appointed as a co-Trustee by this Hon'ble Court vide order dated 05.06.2000 in O.S.A. Nos. 66 and 67 of 2000. The Government, vide G.O.Ms. No. 534 dated 06.08.1888, had allotted a piece of land measuring an extent of 1.33 acres, comprised in T.S. No. 41, Vepery Village, Fort-Tondiarpet Taluk valued at ₹ 3,638/- at free of cost solely for the purpose of construction of choultry, failing which, the said grant of land would be liable for resumption. The choultry building so constructed has been classified as a historical and heritage building by the High Power Heritage Committee under orders of this Court and subsequently, a direction was issued by this Court to th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ect that, it has its own authority and power to resume the Trust property of Rajah Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar without reference to this Court. Hence, the only course available to the State is to either move this Court under Section 25 of the Official Trustees Act or under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, that the Government has no power to intrude or invade the right of the founder Trustee and that the encumbrance existing in T.S. No. 41 cannot be ignored by the State. Thus, it is prayed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned order passed in W.P. No. 28461 of 2013 is liable to be set aside in view of the reason that encumbrance exists in the subject property, which debars the 1st respondent from adopting the measure of resumption and the legal encumbrance confers possessory rights and title upon Rajah Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar Choultry, which has to be addressed and redressed in the manner specified under the scheme of Land Acquisition Act. 14. In support of his case, Mr. R. Natarajan, learned counsel, has relied on the following decisions: (i) Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab etc Batch, reported in (1982) 3 SCC 24: 18. It will thus be seen that the r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dings before quasi-judicial and executive authorities. (iii) Saraswati Devi (Dead) By Lr. vs. Delhi Development Authority and others, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 571: 34. What is the effect of provisional possession which was given to the appellants husband in 1960 on approval of his highest bid? Does it amount to creation of an encumbrance in the property? If the provisional possession given to the appellant's husband amounted to creation of an encumbrance, whether the said property could have been acquired under the LA Act although the ownership vested in the central government? The fate of the appeal significantly will depend upon answer to these questions. 39. In M. Ratanchand Chordia Ors. v. Kasim Khaleeli, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of the word encumbrances with reference to the 1954 Act and the LA Act in the context of the easementary right of way. The Division Bench considered the word encumbrances thus: (AIR p. 215, para 18) 18. The word Encumbrances in regard to a person or an estate denotes a burden which ordinarily consists of debts, obligations and responsibilities. In the sphere of law it connotes ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... power of acquisition under the LA Act but if some private rights have been created in such property or the property has encumbrance(s), the acquisition of such land is not beyond the pale of the LA Act. 43. Madan Lal Nangia has been relied upon by the Division Bench in the impugned order in upsetting the decision of the Single Judge. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish this judgment. He submitted that Madan Lal Nangia was a case where this Court was concerned with the properties which vested in the custodian and having regard to this aspect, this Court said that merely because the properties vest in the custodian as an evacuee property it does not mean that the same cannot be acquired for some other purpose. 44. It is true that facts in Madan Lal Nangia were little different but, in our view, the legal position highlighted therein does not become inapplicable to the present case on that ground. In paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the Report (Pgs. 334-335), this Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 334-35) 16. A property is a composite property because a private party has an interest in that property. The scheme of separation, to be fr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rvenes therein, such land even if owned by the government can be acquired under the LA Act. This is in congruity and consonance with Sharda Devi as well. (iv) K. Guruprasad Rao vs. State of Karnataka and others, reported in (2013) 8 SCC 418: 94. In our view, the detailed reasons recorded by the Committee, which have been extracted hereinabove, for not accepting the recommendations of the expert bodies about the distance up to which mining should not be allowed are correct and those recommendations cannot be relied upon for accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the State and the private respondents that the recommendations made by the Committee should be rejected. We may hasten to add that the Committee's recommendations are not in conflict with the provisions of the 1957 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The 1959 Rules and the Karnataka Rules provide for grant of permission/licence for mining in the prohibited/regulated/protected area but the documents produced before this Court do not show that the competent authority had granted permission/licence to any of the private respondents for undertaking mining operations which have the effect of damaging the tem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Beneficiation plant subject to the condition that it shall procure raw material only through E-auction mode. 101. With a view to ensure that other protected monuments in the State do not suffer the fate of Jambunatheswara temple, we direct that the Committee appointed by this Court vide order dated 26.4.2011 shall undertake similar exercise in respect of other protected monuments in the State in whose vicinity mining operations are being undertaken and submit report to the State Government within a maximum period of nine months. The State Government shall release a sum of ₹ 30 lacs in favour of the Committee to meet the expenses of survey, investigation etc. The report submitted by the Committee shall be considered by the Government within next two months and appropriate order be passed. 102. We hope and trust that the Government of India will also appoint an expert committee/group to examine the impact of mining on the monuments declared as protected monuments under the 1958 Act and take necessary remedial measures. 15. Mr. Anirudh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A. Nos. 2513 to 2517 of 2013, would vehemently contend that resumption wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... writ petitions has resulted in a jeopardy to the right of appellants to livelihood, which needs interference by this Court in entirety. The learned counsel has cited following judgments: (i) Lancaster Motor Company Limited vs. Bremith Limited, reported in 1941 1 K.B. 675: I should have thought, as I have said, that the appeal could not succeed, but Mr. Mitchell refers us to the decision of this Court in Gerard vs. Worth of Paris Ltd. There a Company went into voluntary liquidation, the liquidator discharged the manageress, and she sued the company for wrongful dismissal and obtained judgment in default of defence. She then applied for a garnishee order on a bank account in the name of the liquidator. There was no evidence of any other claims on the company. The Master refused to make the order absolute, but the judge in chambers reversed his decision. There were several points argued in the case, but the point on which the parties appeared to be anxious to have a decision was the question to the priority of the claimant's debt. So far as the report shows, no argument was addressed to the Court on the question whether or not, in view of the fact that the account was in th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o answer the judgment against these matters. The crucial matter to be observed is what is the relationship of the alleged debtor. That relationship must be one of debtor and creditor and unless it falls within that description the rule does not apply. That aspect of the matter was fully gone into by Slesser L.J., and Mackinnnon L.J. Did not dissent from that view. In fact, he took the same view himself. In those circumstances, I feel that I am justified in the course which I propose to take and that is of saying that, in my opinion, this appeal must be dismissed. (ii) Anamallai Club vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and others, reported in AIR 1997 SCC 3650: 5. The question is; whether the resumption of possession unilaterally, after determination of the grant in the manner provided under the grant itself, is valid in law as was held by the High Court? We think that the view taken by the High Court is not correct in law. In Bishan Das Ors. vs. State of Punjab Ors. [(1962 2 SCR 69], a Constitution Bench of this Court had considered the question whether the Government would unilaterally take possession of the land after termination of the lease. One Ramjidas had built a dhara ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry of earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression 're-entry' in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and Governmental authorities should have a 'legal' pedigree'. In Bishan Das vs. State of Punjab [ (1962) 2 SCR 69] this Court said: We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order... Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is des ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise and to have the right determination of the controversy by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of fact or liability be conclusively proved or presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course of law in a comprehensive sense. It is thus clear that the course have viewed with askance any process other than strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing a person in occupation of immovable property against his consent. The reason is obvious that it aims to preserve the efficacy of law and peace and order in the society relegating the jurisprudential perspectives to a suit under Section 6 of the Act and restitute possession to the person dispossessed, irrespective of the fact whether he has any title to possession or not. (iii) The Collector of Bombay vs. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri and others, reported in (1955) 1 SCR 1311: 20. Then there remains the question whether the sale deed, Exhibit A, imposes any limitation on the right of the Crown to asses ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be construed in the light of the preamble, and so construed, it cannot, for the reasons already given, have any bearing on the rights of the parties. Moreover, that section only enacts that all provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over shall take effect according to their tenor, and what is relied on is not any provision, restriction, condition or limitation over, in Exhibit A which according to its tenor entitles the respondents to hold the lands rent-free, but the absolute character of the interest conveyed under Exhibit A. Therefore, Section 3 does not in terms apply. (iv) Raje Anandrao vs. Shamrao and others, reported AIR 1961 SC 1206: 23. The last provision has been made to make it clear that the management will not take away the money but immediately give it to the representative of the pujaris for distribution among them. The provisions of the Public Trusts Act will be satisfied in that the management will be in a position to know how much has gone to the pujaris including the amount spent on dhoop, deep and neivedya. This provision will also take away any objection about there being interference with the private rights of the pujaris under the agreem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ficiaries of the Trust. In such a suit, though all the beneficiaries may not be expressly impleaded, the action is instituted on their behalf and relief is claimed in a representative character. This position immediately attracts the provisions of explanation VI to s. 11 of the Code. Explanation VI provides that where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right 'or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. It is clear that s. 11 read with its explanation VI leads to the result that a decree passed in a suit instituted by persons to which explanation VI applies will bar further claims by persons interested in the same right in respect of which the prior suit had been instituted. Explanation VI thus illustrates one aspect of constructive res judicata. Where a representative suit is brought under s. 92 and a decree is passed in such a suit, law assumes that all persons who have the same interest as the plaintiffs in the representative suit were represented by the said plaintiffs and, therefore, are constructively barred ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erfere with it unless the Commissioners have acted ultra vires, or the scheme contains something wrong in principle or in law, or by reason of changed circumstances, the continuance of the charity under the constitution established by the scheme has become impracticable. This principle was laid down as early as 1851 in the case of the Attorney-General v. The' Bishop of Worcester, where it was held that schemes which have been settled under the directions of the Court are not to be disturbed upon merely speculative view or in matters of discretion or regulation upon which judges or Attorneys-General may differ in opinion, or except upon substantial grounds and clear evidence, not only that the scheme does not operate beneficially, but that it can by alteration be made to do so consistently with the object of the foundation. The same principle was reiterated in 1872 in the case of Attorney-General v. Stewart (1872) L.R. 14. (vi) Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (1982) 1 SCC 39: 46. The first and second contentions may conveniently be dealt with together. In order to appreciate these contentions, it is necessary to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntals is an important step taken by the State Government to obviate hoarding and black-marketing in wheat which is in short supply. It is hardly necessary to emphasise the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby. Perhaps fixation of the minimum limit of wheat permitted to be possessed by a wholesale dealer at 250 quintals, at a time, is too low, but the restriction so imposed cannot be treated to be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the national interest. It is a matter of common knowledge that wholesale dealers of foodgrains mainly operate in large cities and towns and have the means and capacity to manipulate the market by withholding stocks of a commodity. There was need to check such speculative tendencies in the trade. It was therefore felt expedient to re-fix the stock limit of wheat for wholesale dealers at 250 quintals at a time, as in the case of a commission agent. The underlying idea is that the wholesale dealers should be allowed to continue their trading activities within reasonable limits. The fixation of stock limit at 250 quintals implies that wholesale dealers can have at any time, in stock, a wagon-load of wheat. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... teleprinter message amounts to an 'intrusion' on the fundamental right to carry on trade or business under Art. 19(1)(g) or on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse under Art. 301 of the Constitution appears to be wholly misconceived. As already stated the instructions conveyed by the State Government by the impugned teleprinter message imposing the requirement for the making of an endorsement by the Deputy Marketing Officer or the Senior Marketing Officer or the physical verification of stocks of wheat during the course of transit, are not a 'restriction' on the fundamental right to carry on trade or business guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) or on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse under Art. 301. These are nothing but regulatory measures to ensure that the excess stock of wheat held by a wholesale dealer, commission agent or a retailer is not transported to a place outside the State or from one district to another. Even if these requirements are considered to be a 'restriction' on inter-State or intra-State trade, that is, across the State or from one part of the State to another, the limitation so imposed on the enjoyment of the right c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the court. In such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not an authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio. (viii) R. Venugopala Naidu and others vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities and others, reported in AIR 1990 SC 444: 7. Mr. S. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that though the appellants were not shown as parties in suit-title but the suit under Section 92 of Civil Procedure Code being a representative suit the scheme-decree binds not only the parties thereto but all those who are interested in the trust. According to him parties in clause 14 of the scheme decree would include appellants and all those who are interested in the trust. He has relied on Raje Anandrao v. Shamrao and Others, [1961] 3 SCR 930 wherein this Court held as under: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. It is clear that s. 11 read with its explanation VI leads to the result that a decree passed in a suit instituted by persons to which explanation VI applies will bar further claims by persons interested in the same right in respect of which the prior suit had been instituted. Explanation VI thus illustrates one aspect of constructive res judicata. Where a representative suit is brought under s. 92 and a decree is passed in such a suit, law assumes that all persons who have the same interest as the plaintiffs in the representative suit were represented by the said plaintiffs and, therefore, are constructively barred by res judicata from reagitating the matters directly and substantially in issue in the said earlier suit. A similar result follows if a suit is either brought or defended under 0.1., r. 8. In that case persons either suing or defending an action are doing so in a representative character, and so the decree passed in such a suit binds all those whose interests were represented e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rned, would be ₹ 50 crores a year. This is based on the assumption that there are 79,000 surviving P.F. retirees. Apart from the fact that this number of 79,000 was based on calculations made in 1988, and would be greatly reduced by this time, the petitioners submit that the actual number of survivors would only be about 38,000. Thus, the actual burden would be less than half. Further, even assuming that the figure of 79,000 put forth by the Government is correct, the average annual expenditure per retiree for pension calculated by the Government is incorrect as the calculation includes the non-recurring arrear payments for the year 1987-88. Taking the correct figures of total pension outlay and total number of beneficiaries the per capita pension expenditure per annum works out to ₹ 4521. Multiplying this by 79,000 (assuming the figures of the Railways to be correct) the annual expenditure comes to ₹ 35.71 crores. This compared to the current budget of pensions of ₹ 900 crores, is quite insignificant and can be easily awarded by this Court as was done in Nakara, it is urged. 61. It is submitted in the alternative that if this Court feels that a positive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority'. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur, [1989] 1 SCC 101. The Bench held that, 'precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment'. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In Shama Rao v. State of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1680 it was observed, 'it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein'. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent cannot unilaterally determine the lease and call upon the lessee to deliver the possession. Therefore, the Government is required to exercise the power of eminent domain by invoking the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act for getting such land. The Collector shall have to determine the compensation towards the leasehold interest held by the lessee, if assessable separately and determine the compensation. The lessee being the owner of the superstructure and the Government being the owner of the land, if compensation is determined for both the components, then the same has to be apportioned between them. At what proportion the lessor and the lessee are entitled to receive the compensation has to be determined. In the absence of any covenant in the lease for payment and in the absence of any specific data available to him, the Collector has to determine the respective shares at which the compensation is to be apportioned between the Government and the lessee, the course open to the Land Acquisition Collector is to determine the total compensation, make an award and make a reference to the civil court under Section 30 for decision on appointment. Exactly that is the situation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cie, we feel that the view which we have taken would create no difficulty even in assigning meaning to the term juvenile as occurring in Chapter VI (Sections 41 to 45) of the Act because a juvenile covered by any of these provisions is likely to fall within the definition of neglected juvenile as defined in clause (l) of Section 2 who shall also have to be dealt with by a Juvenile Board under Chapter III of the Act and the view taken by us would hold the field there as well. However, we express no opinion on the scope of Chapter VI of the Act and leave that aspect to be taken care of in a suitable case. At any rate in the present context we need not vex our mind on that aspect. Section 2 which defines juvenile and neglected juvenile itself begins by saying that the words defined therein would have the assigned meaning unless the context otherwise requires. So far as the present context is concerned we are clear in our mind that the crucial date for determining the question whether a person is juvenile is the date when he is brought before the competent authority. 24. So far as the finding regarding the age of the appellant is concerned it is based on appreciation of evidence and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ling with a prayer for review of the earlier decision of the Division Bench in M. Varadaraja Pillai's case and for setting it aside. Had it been so, a different question would have arisen, namely, whether another Division Bench or a Full Bench had jurisdiction or competence to review an earlier Division Bench decision of that particular Court and whether it could be treated as affirmed, for whatsoever reasons, by the Supreme Court on a plea that in view of the decision having been dealt with by the Supreme Court the decision of the High Court was no longer available to be reviewed. We need not here go into the question, whether it was a case of review, or whether the review application should have been filed in the High Court or Supreme Court. Such a question is not arising before us. 19. Under Article 141 of the Constitution, it is the law declared by the Supreme Court, which is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Inasmuch as no law was declared by this Court, the Full Bench was not precluded from going into the question of law arising for decision before it and in that context entering into and examining the correctness or otherwise of the law stated by th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A decision, it is trite, should not be read as a statute. A decision is an authority for the questions of law determined by it. Such a question is determined having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. While applying the ratio, the court may not pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. A judgment, as is well-known, must be read in its entirety and the observations made therein should receive consideration in the light of the questions raised before it. (xiv) Tika Ram vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2009 10 SCC 689: 59. It was reiterated by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel, as also, Shri Qamar Ahmed, Learned Counsel that the question of constitutional validity of the Act was not considered by the High Court as the Act was held to be valid in GDA's case (cited supra) and in MDA's case (cited supra). It was, however, urged that the question of Constitutional validity was never considered in these cases. Reliance was placed on judgments reported as Arnit Das v. State of Bihar reported in 2000(5) SCC 488, State of UP Anr. v. Synthetics Chemicals Ltd. Anr. re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se 6 of registered sub-lease dated 17.7.1968, Plaintiffs were obliged to surrender the superstructures to the Trust without claiming any compensation after the expiry of the initial period of 18 years from 01.4.1968 to 31.3.1986 or atleast the period of extended term of 22 years viz., 31.3.2008. Viewed from any angle, possession of Appellants are not lawful one beyond 30.4.1985. 118. Considering all the aspects and observing that document dated 12.10.1973 is vitiated, learned Judge held that Appellants are not entitled to any compensation for the superstructures. When sublease dated 12.10.1973 is vitiated, and when the term of lease itself come to an end on 30.4.1985, Appellants cannot claim any right beyond that and therefore, in our considered view, Appellants are not entitled to claim any compensation. 119. Whether Plaintiffs are entitled to equitable relief of interim injunction:- Learned Senior Counsel for Appellants contended that in an application for grant of temporary injunction, Court is concerned only with prima facie case and balance of convenience and while so, learned Judge has gone beyond the scope of the application and dealt with the matter as if Court is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing the best possible for the Appellants, possession of the Appellants cannot be said to be lawful possession beyond 30.04.1985 entitling them to obtain interim injunction from the Court as against the true owner Chennai Corporation. The object of interlocutory Application is to protect the Plaintiff against the injury by violation of his right for which he could not adequately be compensated for damages. Beyond 30.4.1985 when the possession of the Appellants is not lawful possession, Appellants cannot be said to have established prima facie case to obtain an injunction against the lawful owner. A person in wrongful possession will not be entitled to protection by an injunction against the lawful owner. By the grant of interim injunction, 1st Defendant-Corporation would not be in a position to take possession and maintain the VP Hall and the surrounding land. 123. Subsequent development is also relevant to be noted. Enormous amount of traffic congestion in and around the Chennai City has led both Central as well as State Government to contemplate viable solution to reduce the congestion in the traffic and to help the general public which paved the way for Chennai Metro Rail. Che ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gration for the public which will substantially reduce the traffic congestion in the City. The subsequent events and the predominant public purpose is an important factor to be taken into consideration. If any injunction is granted in favour of Appellants that would also stall the Chennai Metro Rail Project which is aimed at developing the infrastructure of the City of Chennai. 125. Upon consideration of all materials in issue, the learned Judge rightly dismissed the applications declining temporary injunction. Exercise of discretion by the trial Court should not be lightly interfered with by the Appellate Court. Only if the trial Court erroneously exercised its discretion and has acted perversely without taking into consideration the entire material on record, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to interfere with the order of the trial Court. In the instant case, Appellants are in occupation of the large extent of prime property on a meagre rent of ₹ 4000/- per month. Upon consideration of the facts and materials, the learned Judge has rightly held that Appellants are not entitled to get injunction and there is no improper exercise of discretion warranting interference. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gued was on the question of priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the court granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When, therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal in Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M.R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did; nevertheless, since it was decided without argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of authority, it was not binding and would not be followed. Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment. This rule has ever since been followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a matter that has once been fully argued and decide ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry it was observed, it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law. 49) In the case of Arnit Das Vs. State of Bihar - (2000) 5 SCC 488, this Court held: A decision not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a bindin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er passed by the Government. The learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon the following authorities: (i) State of U.P. vs. Zahoor Ahmad, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 547: 16. Section 3 of the Government Grants Act declares the unfettered discretion of the Government to impose such conditions and limitations as it thinks fit, no matter what the general law of the land be. The meaning of sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants is that the scope of that Act is not limited to affecting the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act only. The Government has unfettered discretion to impose any conditions, limitations, or restrictions in its grants, and the right, privileges and obligations of the grantee would be regulated according to the terms of the grant, notwithstanding any provisions of any statutory or common law. (ii) Hajee S.V.M. Mohamed Jamaludeen Bros. Co. vs. Govt. of TN, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 466: 9. Section 2 of the Grants Act insulates all grants and all transfers of land or any interest therein made by the government from the checks of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Section 3 of the Grants act protects the terms of such grant from th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rasad's clients have on facts lost in all Courts below. Notice to produce documents, given belatedly in some other case, is of no relevance so far as these Appeals are concerned. The practice of annexing irrelevant documents and trying to rely on them for the first time in the Appeal or in Review Petitions in the High Court should be deprecated. 33. In Civil Appeal Nos. 917-918 of 1998 it is clear that, at all stages, the case has progressed on the basis that it was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms. Of course, in the Plaint, in Para. 4(b) it had been averred that the land was not on old grant terms. However, except for making such an averment that point has clearly not been pressed at any stage. In evidence given by the plaintiff and/or on his behalf, there is no statement that the land was of plaintiff ownership and/or that the land did not belong to the Government. During trial the documents, now sought to be relied upon by Mr. Andhyarujina were neither produced nor tendered nor got marked as Exhibits. Were they produced Respondents would have had an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and show that the averments in the documents were not correct an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as thus confirmed that at the time the Second Appeal was argued it was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms. This Court has to go by what has been recorded in the Judgment. What is recorded in the Judgment is supported by the conduct of the parties inasmuch as no evidence was led to dispute the fact, no documents were tendered or marked as Exhibits and no submissions were made on this aspect. That it was not disputed that the land was on old grant terms is also supported by what has been recorded in the Judgments of the trial court and the First Appellate Court. There is no evidence that the written admissions were taken forcibly and/or that they were not binding or not correct. Admissions are relevant evidence if not explained away. Thus these cases have been fought over the last 17 years on an admitted position. Mr. Rohtagi is right that it would be a travesty of justice and would amount to permitting parties to misuse laws delays if at this stage they are permitted to change their stand and take contentions which are contrary to what has been the admitted position all these years. 36. In Civil Appeals (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22436-22437 of 1997) all the Cour ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of or 'acquired' in Art. 31(2) have to be read along with the word 'deprived' in clause (1). Taking possession or acquisition amounts to deprivation within the meaning of clause (1). No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case must depend on its own facts. The word law used in Art. 300A must be an Act of Parliament or of State Legislature, a rule or statutory order having force of law. The deprivation of the property shall be only by authority of law, be it an Act of Parliament or State Legislature, but not by executive fiat or an order. Deprivation of property is by acquisition or requisition or taking possession of for a public purpose. 33. It is true as contended by Sri Javery that clause (2) of Art. 31 was not suitably incorporated in Art. 300A but the obligation to pay compensation to the deprived owner of his property was enjoined as an inherent incident of acquisition under law is equally untenable for the following reasons. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon' Reprint Edition 1987, p. 385, defined 'eminent domain ' thus: The right of the State or the sovereign to its or his own property is absolute while that of the subject o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inherent in every sovereign State to expropriate private property for public purpose without its owner's consent which inheres in Art. 300A and it would be exercised by the authority of law and not by executive fiat or order. (v) Union of India and others vs. Harish Chand Anand (Dead) Through Lrs., reported in (2010) 15 SCC 591: 12. We have carefully considered the contention. We are not persuaded to accept this contention raised by the appellant. As noted earlier the High Court accepted the contention raised by the respondent relying on the Division Bench decision in Bhagwati Devi. Subsequently, the Himachal Pradesh High Court took the same views as the Allahabad High Court, in Durga Dass Sud v. Union of India. We are of the view that the decision of the Delhi High Court in Raj Singh vs. Union of India is acceptable. Therein in para 4 the learned Single Judge held that the determination of compensation was not a condition precedent to the resumption. The Division Bench concurred with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench in para 21 of the judgment in Raj Singh case observed: The question of compensation would have to be considered in an indepe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has been followed and any delay in completing the project would result in heavy financial implications and, as such, CMRL, being the requisitioning body, its interests should be protected. The learned Senior Counsel has relied on the following rulings: (i) Gaya Prasad vs. Secretary of State, reported in AIR 1939 Allahabad 263: ...No limit of time applies to Government in its resumption of a grant. In the present case, the suit has been brought for resumption and there is no reason whatever why it should not be granted. It may be noted that the grant has been violated by the transfer by sale of 22nd July 1928 and any sanction of the Municipal Board would not make that transfer valid. Secondly, the grant was violated by the appellant digging foundations with the intention of making a building. The grant is not for the purpose of making a building but for the purpose of planting a garden or grove. Thirdly, the grant was violated by Gaya Prasad, the present occupant, setting up title in himself which was in issue before the Assistant Collector and was the subject of a reference to the Munsif and was again the subject of a claim apparently before the lower Appellate Court where t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ke effect according to their tenor. Reading the enactment as a whole, the scope of Section 3 is that it saves provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over which would be bad under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, such as conditions in restraint of alienations or enjoyment repugnant to the nature of the estate, limitations offending the rule against perpetuities and the like. But no question arises here as to the validity of any provision, restriction, condition, or limitation over, contained in Exhibit A on the ground that it is in contravention of any of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and there is accordingly nothing on which Section 3 could take effect. 16. It is argued by the learned Attorney-General that this limitation on the scope of the Act applies in terms only to Section 2, and that Section 3 goes much further, and is general and unqualified in its operation. The scope of Section 3 came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces. After setting out that section, Lord Wright observed: These general words cannot be read in their apparent generality. The whole Act wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them. 20. The question of the ownership of the structure built upon Government land by the Trust may be looked at from another point of view. We have already held that the Trust was in the position of a statutory agent of Government and had erected the structure with money belonging to Government but advanced at interest to the Trust. In such a situation the structure also would be the property of Government, though for the time being it may be at the disposal of the Trust for the purpose of managing it efficiently as a statutory body. Simply because the Trust erected the structure in question and later on paid up the amount advanced by Government for the purpose would not necessarily lead to the, legal inference that the structure was the property o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... en come those penal provisions which impose fines, like the present case, and the question is whether in such a case also the State must be deemed by necessary implication to be exempt from the penal provision. Generally speaking fines when inflicted by courts are realised by the State and go to the coffers of the State. In effect, therefore if the State as such is to be prosecuted under a penal statute imposing fine the result is that the Court will sentence the State to fine which will go to the State itself. It is obvious that if such is the result of a prosecution, namely that the accused gets the fine, the intention could never be that such a prosecution should be launched. Therefore where the penalty is fine and the fine goes to the State, it must be held that by necessary implication the law does not intend the State to be prosecuted for such an offence. In the present case I find that under s. 81 of the Act of 1923 (or the corresponding s. 115 of the Act of 1951) the fines imposed by the Magistrate will not go to the Corporation but in the usual way to the State. Under the circumstances whatever other methods may be possible for enforcing the provisions of s. 386 (or s. 437 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der Art. 226 was not limited in the manner in which the jurisdiction of civil courts is limited under S. 9. The High Court then expressed itself somewhat strongly against the intention of the appellant to recover possession from the ex-Zamindars merely be resuming the grants without taking recourse to a court of law and so, it held that the ex-Zamindars who had moved it under Art. 226 were entitled to an appropriate writ under the said Article. The appellant then moved the High Court for a certificate and it is with the certificate issued by the High Court that it has come to this Court in the present two appeals. 11. As we have already observed, the High Court did not embark upon the enquiry as to title in the present proceedings, because that is a question which may be appropriately tried in a regular suit. In proceeding to issue a writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court, however, appears to have assumed that the appellant was not entitled to seek to recover possession of the properties after resuming the grants in question. Whether or not the grants in question are resumable, and if they are, whether or not the appellant can recover possession without filing a suit, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d have been incompetent against the appellant, a similar relief can be claimed by the respondents against the appellant under Article 226. Even on that assumption, no right can be claimed by the respondents merely on the ground of their possession, unless their right to remain in possession is established against the appellant, and this can be done if the grant is held to be not resumable. (vi) State of Andhra vs. Gathala Abhishekam and others, reported in AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 450: 24. It is profitable to refer to the Government Grants Act, XV of 1895 in this connection. That Act was enacted to remove certain doubts which had arisen as to the extent and operation of the Transfer of Property Act and as to the power of the Government to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers of land made by it or under its authority. Section 2 of the said Act categorically states that nothing in the Transfer of Property Act contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or transfer of land or of interest therein and made by or on behalf of the Government to or in favour of any person whosoever, but every grant and transfer shall be construed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... der Chand v. Sukhi,. (e) Namdeo Lokman v. Narmadabai,. (f) Haji Fasihuddin v. Mohd. Habib,. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case we experience no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the tenure of the grant clearly indicates that the land was assigned on condition that the plaintiffs should pay the land revenue on the prescribed dates. When they have failed to pay, it follows that the Government has the right to resume and re-enter and take 'possession of the land without paying any compensation. No notice therefore is contemplated under the tenor of the grant. Reference in this regard is specifically made to cited-above. That was a case in which the principal question which arose for decision was whether notice as contemplated by Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary for the determination of a lease for non-payment of rent even where such lease was executed before the corning into force of the Transfer of Property Act. Discussing elaborately the law and authorities their Lordships came to the conclusion that no such notice was necessary and that the defaulting lessee cannot claim the benefit of a notice in writing to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Madras Cultivating tenant the Act should apply, he could not be evicted from his holding. The State was undoubtedly the landlord and but for the claim to immunity by reason of the Government Grants Act, Section 3 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection act would afford protection to the tenant against eviction. The learned Judge examined the provisions of the Government Grants Act. He referred to the decisions already cited by us earlier in this judgment He cited the observation to the Privy Council in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces (1946) F.C.R. in: (1946) F.L.J. 88 : L.R. 73 I.A. 123 : (1946) 2 M.L.J. 29 that the generality and the observations of the Supreme Court in Collector of Bombay v. Nasserwanji. The learned Judge construed the observation that the general words in Section 3 cannot be read in their apparent generality to mean that the scope of Section 3 of that Act was limited. It seems to us that the observations both of the they were made. In the Privy Council decision the validity of the Provinces which Tenancy Act, as enacted by the Provincial Legislature. United Provinces as it affected the rights conferred upon a grantee under a Sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of any other statute. We are unable to agree in the view taken by our learned brother that the earlier decisions of this Court in Murugesa Gramani v. Province of Madras (1946) 2 M.L.J. 171, Ullattuthedi Chovi v. Secretary of State for India (1921) 41 M.L.J. 494 and Kallingal Moosa Kutty v. The Secretary of Stale for India (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 65: 37 M.L.J. 332, may not be good law after the decisions of the Judicial Committee and the Supreme Court cited above. Neither expressly nor by necessary implication does the Government Grants Act either stand repealed or has fallen into obsolescence. We hold that it is open to the State to put forward successfully the contention that the express stipulation found in the terms of the grant, such as that of the lessee should surrender possession after the expiry of the term of demise etc. can take effect, notwithstanding the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. It is also our view that it is not necessary for the Madras City Tenants Protection Act to contain any provision excluding the State from its operation, for such an exclusion from the operation of any particular enactment may be found in a different enactment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rchase tax on it in exercise of power under Entry 54 of List II. But it struck down the levy as it would disturb price structure regulated by Central Government. It was held that control of alcohol industry having been taken over by the Parliament, for purpose of regulation and development the State stood denuded of its taxing power under Entry 54 of List II to the extent the field of price fixation was covered by the price control order issued by the Government. And the purchase price being component of price fixation which squarely fell within the power of Central Government the imposition of purchase tax amounted to intrusion into the forbidden area of price fixation by Central Government. Support for this was drawn, principally, from the two Constitution Bench decision in Indian Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1990] 1 SCC 12 and Synthetic and Chemicals v. State of U.P., [1990] 1 SCC 1091. The first was relied for the principle that even a taxing legislation by the State could be invalid to the extent it trenched on Central legislation on the same subject. And the latter for the conclusion that, 'however, sales tax cannot be charged on industrial alcohol in the present ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he learned Single Judge was also not right in holding that the appellant has no locus standi in the matter. Apart from being a tenant on the ground floor of the building adjacent to the vacant plot of land the appellant trust, is also the residuary legatee under the will and has a beneficial interest in the trust property sought to be leased. The appellant was, therefore, entitled to raise objections regarding grant of lease in favour of Respondent 2 on the ground that the said lease was not in the interest of the trust property and the said objections could not be brushed aside on the view that the appellant had no locus standi. (xii) The Government Grants Act, 1895: Statement of Objects and Reasons: The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sections 10-12 invalidate with certain exceptions all conditions for the forfeiture of the transferred property on alienation by the transferree and all limitations over consequent upon any such alienation or any insolvency of or attempted alienation by him. The Crown is not specifically mentioned in the Act, and it may be assumed that it was not designed to impose fetters of this description upon the discretion of the Crown, especially as to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the possession without recourse to law. The Eviction Act contemplates such a procedure. Premises defined under Section 3(d) of the Act means and land or any building or a part of a building or but and enclosed etc. Section 4 prescribes procedure of issuance of a notice of show cause before eviction giving an opportunity and thereafter taking action under Section 5 of the Act. Unfortunately, on the facts of the case on hand, the respondent, has not adopted the procedure prescribed under Sections 4 and 5 of the Eviction Act after determination of the licence granted under the Government Grants Act. The High Court, therefore, was not right in its conclusion that the procedure prescribed under PPE Act is not applicable to the grants made under the Government Grants Act since the appellants remained in settled possession since a long time pursuant to the grant. After determination of the grant, though they have no right to remain in possession, the State cannot take unilateral possession without taking recourse to the procedure, provided under the Act. It is, therefore, clear that it would have been open to the respondent to have a notice issued to the appellant and give time to vacat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... clause 7 of the agreement is valid and enforceable in view of the provisions in the grants act and hence appellant is not entitled to claim damages for the action resorted to by a government. 8. If clause 7 of the agreement is valid it is binding on both the parties to the contract and the corollary is that government had the power to revoke it unilaterally and hence termination of the contract is not liable to be questioned by the other party. As the division bench upheld the validity of clause 7 only on account of its protection as per the Grants Act we are mainly called upon to decide whether the impugned clause in the agreement has the said protection. 9. Section 2 of the Grants Act insulates all grants and all transfers of land or any interest therein made by the government from the checks of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. Section 3 of the Grants act protects the terms of such grant from the provisions of any other law. we extract the above two provision hereunder: 2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government grants. - Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or ot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Act. (xv) Suganthi Suresh Kumar vs. Jagdeeshan, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 420: 11. When this Court pronounced in Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, (supra) that a court may enforce an order to pay compensation by imposing a sentence in default it is open to all courts in India to follow the said course. The said legal position would continue to hold good until it is overruled by larger Bench of this court. Hence learned single judge of High Court of Kerala has committed an impropriety by expressing that the said legal direction of this Court should not be followed by the subordinate courts in Kerala. We express our disapproval of the course adopted by the said judge in Rajendran v. Jose, (2001) 3 Kerala Law Times 431. It is unfortunate that when the Sessions judge has correctly done a course in accordance with the discipline the Single judge of the High Court has incorrectly reversed it. (xvi) Union of India and others vs. Kannadapara Sanghatanegala Okkuta Kannadigara and others, reported in : (2002) 10 SCC 226: 5. We do not find any basis for the High Court coming to the conclusion that the decision of the Union Cabinet was vitiated on account of legal malafides. Merel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... utes which can be referred to Civil Court for determination. They are the disputes: (i) as to the measurement of the land, (ii) as to the amount of the compensation, (iii) as to the persons to whom the compensation is payable, or (d) as to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Under Section 30 the only disputes which are referable are: (i) any dispute as to the apportionment of the amount of compensation or any part thereof, or (ii) a dispute as to the persons to whom the amount of compensation or any part thereof is payable. A dispute as to the measurement of the land or as to the quantum of compensation or a dispute of a nature not falling within Section 30, can neither be referred by the Collector under Section 30 of the Act nor would the Civil Court acquire jurisdiction to enter into and determine the same. By reference to nature of power Under Section 18 of the Act the Collector does not have power to withhold the reference. Once a written application has been made satisfying the requirements of Section 18, the Collector shall make a reference. The Collector has no discretion in the matter; whether the dispute has any merit or not is to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Union of India, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 289: 18. Even if we assume that there is force in the material placed by the petitioners that by forming new railway zones efficiency in the railway administration would not enhance, the reasons given by the Government and material placed by them in support of forming new railway zones is no less or even more forceful. Further, when technical questions arise and experts in the field have expressed various views and all those aspects have been taken into consideration by the Government, in deciding the matter, could it still be said that this Court should reexamine to interfere with the same. The wholesome rule in regard to judicial interference in administrative decisions is that if the Government takes into consideration all relevant factors, eschew from considering irrelevant factors and act reasonably within the parameters of the law, courts would keep off the same. Even on the test suggested by Dr. Pal we cannot travel outside this principle to sit in appeal on the decision of the Government. 19. The decision in B.S. Muddappa's case is distinguishable both on principle and on facts from the present case. The question in that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arm, submission of statement and declaration by the Farm culminating in the orders passed by the prescribed authority and the appellate authority were void and infructuous because the Govt. Grantee, as holder of the land, was not at all a party before the ceiling authority. (xx) Bajaj Hindustan Limited vs. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises Limited and another, reported in (2011) 1 SCC 640: The lands were released to the ruler for its development and for making it cultivable within the prescribed period. The terms of the Govt. Grant are contained in letter dated 26.1.1950 of the Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of UP addressed to the Director of Colonization, Lucknow, U.P. Consequent to the release of the lands in favour of the ruler, no formal lease containing the terms and conditions of the Govt. Grant came to be executed between the erstwhile ruler and the Government of U.P. but it is not in dispute that the possession of the lands under the grant was taken on the basis of the proposal of the government, contained in the letter dated 29.8.1950. The rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the said Govt. Grant. (xxi) Pradeep Oil Corporation vs. Municipal Co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... view, the case at hand is totally different. The HUDCO judgment dealt with the case where vacant land belonging to the lessor/Government and in regard whereto no lease deed had been executed and no construction had been made by the lessee/HUDCO. The land belonging to the central government was sought to be taxed under Section 120(1) of the DMC Act which fastens liability on the lessor. Since land belonged to UOI the same was exempted from payment of tax until the lease deed was executed and construction made thereon by HUDCO-under Section 120(2). 48. Incidence to pay tax under section 120(2) DMC Act is with regard to a composite assessment of land and buildings as section 120(2) talks of a composite assessment only. In the present case vacant land or property of Railways is not sought to be taxed as was in the case of HUDCO Vs. MCD under section 120(1) DMC Act, but property tax/Composite Assessment is sought to be made on the installations/ storage depots having been constructed by the appellant-by virtue of Section 120(2) DMC Act. It is important to notice that w.e.f. the date of execution of lease deed and construction made thereon by HUDCO, HUDCO has been paying the property ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uired becomes. the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession. The legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word vest has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly ss. 45 to 49 and 54 and 54A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them. (xxiii) Azim Ahmad Kazmi and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 278: 27. For taking possession, the State Government is required to follow the law, if any, prescribed. In the absence of any specific law, the State Government may take possession by filing a suit. 28. Under the provision ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nai Metro Rail Project, chaired by the Chief Secretary, in the meeting held on 09.12.2009, identified the lands assigned to Sir Ramasamy Mudaliar Choultry, namely, the subject lands, and directed the Chennai Metro Rail Limited and the Revenue Department to take appropriate action for allocation of the lands well before the construction of Metro Station is taken up. Thereafter, the District Collector, Chennai, and the Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration sent reports to Government, on non-functioning of choultry and the commercial exploitation of land/buildings such as hotels and travel agencies, which was a violation of the conditions imposed by the Government at the time of granting of lands to the choultry. Based on the said reports of the District Collector and the Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration and also considering the requirement of the land for implementation of Chennai Metro Rail Project, orders were issued by the Government vide G.O.Ms. No. 168, Revenue, dated 21.05.2012, for resumption of lands in Block No. 7 of T.S. Nos. 41 and 43/2, for violation of conditions of grant and alienation to Chennai Metro Rail Limited. Chall ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o be adversely affected, a well reasoned speaking order was directed to be passed, taking into consideration all the issues canvassed in response to the show cause notices. Likewise, the appellants were given liberty to obtain the final orders passed in the matter on or after 30.09.2013 from the office of the concerned District Collector, Chennai. 24. As per the directions of the Supreme Court of India, notices were issued to AGOT, Co-Trustee and 44 lessees/tenants/occupants by the District Collector, Chennai, on 01.08.2013 and the AGOT, Co-Trustee and 17 lessees/tenants/occupants have furnished their replies before the due date i.e., 16.08.2013. The District Collector, Chennai, has complied with all the directions of the Supreme Court viz., issuing notice, getting replies, examining with reference to legal position and sent her compliance report to the Government through the Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration with a request to pass orders for resumption of land in T.S. No. 41. The Principal Secretary and Commissioner of Land Administration has endorsed the report of the District Collector, Chennai. 25. Based on the records available, legal position, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... icial Trustee and shall be held by him upon the same Trusts as the same was held previously to such order, and the same Trusts as the same was held previously to such order, and the previous Trustee or Trustees (if any) shall be exempt from the liability as Trustees of such property save in respect of acts done before the date of such order. (3) Nothing in this section shall, be deemed to affect the provisions of the Indian Trust Act, 1882 (2 of 1882). Section 25: 25. Power of High Court to make orders in respect of property vested in Official Trustee. The High Court may make such orders as it thinks fit respecting any Trust property vested in the Official Trustee, or the income or produce thereof. Section 29: 29. Transfer of Trust property by Official Trustee to original Trustee or any other Trustee. (1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent the transfer by the Official Trustee of any property vested in him to (a) the original Trustee (if any); or (b) any other lawfully appointed Trustee; or (c) any other person if the Court so directs. (2) Upon such transfer such property shall vest in such Trustee, and shall be held by him upon the same Trusts ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rson of his property and any violation of it is amenable to judicial review. Payment of compensation amount is a constitutional requirement under Article 30(1A) and under the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1), unlike Article 300A. After the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the constitutional obligation to pay compensation to a person who is deprived of his property primarily depends upon the terms of the statute and the legislative policy. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation of a person of his property under Article 300-A, is a pre-condition, but no compensation or nil compensation or its illusiveness has to be justified by the State on judicially justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words, the right to claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, it can be inferred in that Article and it is for the State to justify its stand on justifiable grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy, object and purpose of the statute and a host of other factors ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... may not be proper for this Court to examine this position, as the ratio of that case in a given circumstance could be the law laid down under Article 141 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is for the parties to raise the same before the appropriate forum, as the ratio laid down under Article 141 of the Constitution has binding effect and will be the force of law. 34. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in a recent decision in the case of K.T. Plantation Private Limited v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1, while dealing with the power of Government to withdraw exemption granted in certain lands, has extensively discussed the scope of Article 300-A and to what extent, it could be applied to the said property. In the said case, the Apex Court, while asserting the importance of the law providing for deprivation of property and where such law is unjust on account of payment of nil compensation, had authoritatively held that Article 300-A enables the State to put restriction on the right to property by a law that law, so as to be sustainable, must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e birth to it. The Constitution of India is one such document which is the longest of its kind representing the political, economic and social ideals and aspirations of the vast majority of Indian people. The ideals intended to be achieved by the provisions of the Constitution were preceded by immense sacrifices and the Constitution could not be a source for the destruction of these ideals. It is a constituted document keeping with modern constitutional practice, and fundamental to the governance of the country. The people of India have provided a constitutional polity consisting of certain primary organs, institutions and functionaries to exercise the powers provided in the Constitution. All powers belong to the people are entrusted by them to specified institutions and functionaries. This is enshrined in our Preamble with a statement of the Constitution. 40. Except the Indian Constitution, no other Constitution in the world combines under its wings such diverse peoples with different nations, religious, culture and in different stages of economic development into one nation and no other nation is faced with such vast socio-economic problems. It is a noble and grand vision carr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the beginning to the end. While the end may expand, or alter, the point of commencement can never change. It is the Preamble wherefrom the Constitution commences. Hence, the significance of the Preamble. 44. It is no exaggeration to say that the Preamble to the Constitution of India is its spirit and backbone. The Preamble pervades through and inspires all the provisions of the Constitution. It is also the quintessence of the Constitution. Ever since the day it was adopted by the Constituent Assembly, it has enabled the Constitution to stand erect neither bending nor breaking. 45. The significance of the Preamble is that it contains the fundamentals of our Constitution. The people of India resolved to constitute their country into a sovereign democratic republic. No one can suggest that the words and expressions in the Preamble are ambiguous in any manner. By their true import and connotation, it is well known that no question of any ambiguity is involved. 46. The objectives specified in the Preamble contain the basic structure of our Constitution, which cannot be amended in exercise of the power under Article 368 of the Constitution. The concept relating to separation o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to meet the situations. A power has also been conferred on the President of India under Articles 372 and 372-A to adopt any law in the country by making such adaptations and modifications whether by way of repeal or amendment as may be necessary or expedient and to provide that the law so adapted or modified shall have effect subject to adaptation and modifications so made and the adaptation and modifications shall not be questioned. 52. The President of India also exercises judicial function, as Article 103 of the Constitution empowers the President to decide cases of disqualification of membership of the Houses of Parliament. According to this Article, if any question arises as to whether a member of either House of Parliament has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) of Article 102, the question shall be referred for the decision of the President and his decision shall be final. Article 50 lays emphasis to separate judiciary from executive. But, in practice, we find that the executive also exercises the powers of judicial function as in appointment of Judges (Articles 124, 126 and 127). The legislature (either House of Parliament) also exerci ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nches of the Government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially belong to another. 55.3. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538, the then Hon'ble Chief Justice S.R. Das opined that in the absence of specific provision for separation of powers in our Constitution, such as there is under the American Constitution, some such division of powers legislative, executive and judicial, is nevertheless implicit in our Constitution. Same view was expressed in Jayanti Lal Amrit Lal v. S.N. Rana, AIR 1964 SC 648. 55.4. Judiciary is independent and a separate wing of the Government. Executive or Legislature has no concern with the day to day functioning of the Judiciary. In Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987, Supreme Court held: The Indian Constitution, though it does not accept the strict doctrine of separation of powers, provides for an independent judiciary in the States.... But, at the time the Constitution was made in most of the States the magistracy was under the direct control of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s proved the fact that if there is a complete separation of powers, the Government cannot run smoothly and effectively. Smooth running of Government is possible only by co-operation and mutual adjustment of all the three organs of the Government. The aim behind the principle is to protect the people against capricious, tyrannical and whimsical powers of the State. 58. Virtually, absolute separation of powers is not possible in any form of Government. In view of the variety of situations, the legislature cannot foresee or anticipate all the circumstances to which a legislative measure should be extended and applied. Therefore, legislature is empowered to delegate some of its functions to administrative authority (executive). But, one thing is notable that legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative power. 59. With the widening of the horizons of 'Judicial Activism', criticism emanated from a few percent of the people that the judiciary is overstepping its bounds and taking over the Government functions, but, this is not a justifiable thought. The Supreme Court and the High Courts act as watchman to keep Executive and Legislature within the bounds of law. Toda ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stitutional practice, and fundamental to the governance of the country. The people of India have provided a constitutional polity consisting of certain primary organs, institutions and functionaries to exercise the powers provided in the Constitution. No other Constitution combines under its wings such diverse people, numbering now more than one billion, with different languages and religions and in different stages of economic development, into one nation, and no other nation is faced with such vast socio-economic problems. The Constitution cannot be interpreted like an ordinary statute, but as a Constitution, which, apart from setting up a machinery for the Government, has a noble and grand vision, which was put in words in the Preamble and carried out in part by conferring fundamental rights on the people and by the application of Directive Principles. 64. The Preamble of the Constitution of India, the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles, constituting a 'Trinity', assure to every person in a welfare State, social and economic democracy, with equality of status and dignity of persons. Political democracy without social and economic democracy would always re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ds were subjected to civil jurisdiction and the competent Civil Court, namely, the High Court of Judicature at Madras, framed a Scheme Decree in C.S. No. 90 of 1963. Accordingly, properties held by Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar's Choultry were vested with the Administrator General and Official Trustee (hereinafter referred to as AG OT) of Tamil Nadu from 18.08.1970. From then onwards, the management of the Trust and the properties attached to it were under the control of the AG OT. As per the Scheme Decree, the AG OT of Tamil Nadu leased out the lands in T.S. No. 41 to various tenants and collected rent. 69. While that being so, having regard to the unprecedented growth of population in general with particular reference to the Metropolitan City of Chennai, there was an imminent need to provide better transportation facilities to the commuters as also office goers and business people, which persuaded the State to expand the rail transport facility in the City of Chennai and for such avowed object, CMRL had planned a project called Chennai Metro Rail Project which aimed for construction of two corridors under Phase-I. Corridor I starts from Washermenpet and ends at Airport at a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fter framing of the said Scheme, the subject property has been entrusted to a Trustee under the control of judiciary, namely, AG OT. Therefore, it is more important that in a public project, for immediate execution of the same, the law of the land has to be followed in vesting and divesting the property from the authorities concerned before resumption of the land. It is true that the State Government is empowered to invoke appropriate jurisdiction under the authority of law to resume the land and vacate persons, who later on came to the picture in possession of the property, lawfully. 73. If that could be the position, the question, which arises for consideration is, as to, whether the State, by invoking eminent domain, can resume the land under the authority of law, namely, Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, notwithstanding any law for the time-being in force. Here again, another question arises to the effect that when the subject matter is concerned with two authorities, namely, Union of India and State of Tamil Nadu, and the property in question has already been vested with the judicial organ, viz., AG OT, which comes under the purview of Official Trustees Act, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... property. It has not only provided that no person can be deprived of property by the executive without legislative sanction but it has further provided that even the legislature cannot deprive a person of his property unless there is a public purpose and then only on payment of compensation. Article 31, in this regard, provides as follows: 31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. (2) No property, movable or immovable, including any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession of or acquired for public purposes under any law authorising the taking of such possession or such acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given. (3) No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. (4) If any Bill pending at the commenceme ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efore, within the constitutional protection, denotes group of rights inhering citizen's relation to physical thing, as right to possess, use and dispose of it in accordance with law. 77. Article 31, which was deleted by the Constitution 44th Amendment Act, 1978 with effect from 20.06.1979, provided for compulsory acquisition of property. Clause (3) of that Article provided that, no law referred to in clause (2), made by the legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent. Article 31-A confers protection upon laws falling within clauses (a) to (e) of that Article, provided that such laws, if made by a State Legislature, have received the assent of the President. Clause (a) of Article 31-A comprehends laws of agrarian reform. Right to property is a human right as also a Constitutional right. But, it is not a fundamental right. At the same time, each and every claim to property would not be a property right. 78. In Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon, Reprint Edn., 1987, at p. 1031, it is stated that the property is the most comprehensive of all terms which can be used, inasmuch ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e can acquire the property for a public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory acquisition of the property which is under occupation of an individual is a serious matter and has grave repercussions on his constitutional right of not being deprived of his property without the sanction of law viz., Article 300-A and the legal rights. Therefore, the State must exercise this power with great care and circumspection. At times, compulsory acquisition of land is likely to make the owner/occupant landless. The degree of care required to be taken by the State is greater when the power of compulsory acquisition of land is exercised, because that results in depriving the individual of his property. 81. In this case, though the State, through the District Collector of Chennai and also AG OT concerned, made applications before the AG OT Court under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras for taking suitable orders, such applications have subsequently been withdrawn by them for reasons best known to them. In the matter in question, when the subject land is governed by an authority of law being controlled and maintained by the judiciary, then involvement of judiciary could not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... power to resume its own property, which has been entrusted to the other organ of the democracy, namely, Judiciary. The Executive should act only under the authority of law by invoking appropriate jurisdiction, when the subject property is already under the control of the judiciary. Such an act of the State, in our considered opinion, bypassed the procedures to be followed and is not the appropriate method to be adopted by them for resumption of the land, though the said land is required for a public purpose. Rule of law is supreme beginning with the fundamental to special features of Constitution and no authority under them can waive such jurisdictional limits contemplated under law. This Court has already taken a view in one way or the other in interpreting Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 and the basic structure of the Constitution is the fundament of the Constitution. Therefore, the three organs should always be within the Rule of law. 84. In this regard, the crucial question that arises for consideration in this case is, when one organ of democracy, namely, the executive/Government has been empowered to entrust its own property to another organ viz., judiciary u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... building services, drop-off and pick-up facilities, airport check-in facilities, ventilation shafts, subway, feeder bus stand, multi-model facilities, pick-up and drop-off bay, MTC Bus bay, fireman staircase, entry and exit points and that if the taking over of the lands by the Chennai Metro is not allowed, the same would seriously prejudice and cause unnecessary hurdles in proceeding with the project. Holding so, the Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment of this Court and allowed W.A. Nos. 68, 69, 89 and 90 of 2013, filed by State and CMRL, thereby paving way for resumption of land for Chennai Metro Rail Project. Allowing the appeals, the Supreme Court, however, directed the appellants therein, who were State and CMRL, to value the buildings belonging to the first respondent therein, who is not a party to the proceedings in these appeals, standing in T.S. No. 43/2, determine the compensation and pay the same to the first respondent within three months. By the said judgment, the first respondent therein was directed to surrender possession of the lands through AGOT within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the said judgment. The relevant portions of the j ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e details placed before the Court which according to learned Additional Solicitor General was made available before the Division Bench also, we have no reason to reject the said submission in order to sustain the conclusion of the Division Bench. In other words, the conclusion of the Division Bench having been reached without properly examining the relevant documents relating to the Chennai Metro Project, namely, the plans, the project schedule and the other averments placed before the Division Bench, the impugned order of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. 19. Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the First Respondent in support of his submission that the lands situated in Survey No. 43/2 were not required at all for the purpose of carrying out the Metro Project and referred to an affidavit filed before the Division Bench by the Managing Director of Chennai Metro Rail Limited. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the said affidavit the reference to the Metro Rail Station planned along the Poonamallee High Road has been stated and while referring to the same, a specific reference was made to the private buildings located opposite to Picnic Hote ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion to be examined is as to whether the lease granted in favour of the First Respondent by the AG OT based on the directions of the High Court can have any implication in preventing the Appellant from taking over the lands. As noted earlier, indisputably the lands in Survey No. 43/2 belong to the State. At the time when the lands were granted and assigned in favour of Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar Trust vide GO Ms. Nos. 763 and 253 dated 09.12.1898 and 17.01.1899 respectively, conditions were imposed to the effect that the lands would revert back to the Government when it ceases to be used for the purpose for which it was granted and that should the property at any time resumed by Government, the compensation payable should in no case exceed the cost or the then present value whichever shall be less of any building erected or other works executed in the land. Though, learned Additional Solicitor General sought to contend as was also contended before the High Court that by leasing out the lands to different parties the condition No. 1 was violated, namely, that the land was put to different use than for what it was granted, we do not find any good grounds to accept the same. On the othe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ustained, having regard to the condition contained in the initial GO Ms. Nos. 763 and 253 dated 09.12.1898 and 17.01.1899 since based on valid orders of the High Court and the AG OT the First Respondent developed its Hotel business in the lands in question, while resuming the lands, the State Government along with the Chennai Metro is bound to compensate the First Respondent for the buildings which were erected in the said land in Survey No. 43/2 based on the valuation to be made by the appropriate Authorities. 24. Therefore, while allowing the Appeals of the State Government as well as the Chennai Metro and while setting aside the Judgment of the Division Bench, Writ Appeal Nos. 68, 69, 89 and 90 of 2013 are allowed. We, however, direct the Appellants to value the buildings belonging to the First Respondent standing in Survey No. 43/2 and determine the compensation and pay the same to the First Respondent. The said exercise of valuation and payment of compensation shall be effected within three months from this date. 25. In the light of our above orders, the First Respondent is directed to surrender possession of the lands in Survey No. 43/2 in an extent of 5644 sq. ft. th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... doctrine and not Article 31(2), which had embodied the doctrine of Eminent Domain . Article 300-A enables the State to put restrictions on the right to property by law. That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other provisions of the Constitution. The limitation or restriction should not be arbitrary or excessive. The legislation providing for deprivation of property under Article 300-A must be just, fair and reasonable, as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 26(b), 301, etc. Thus, in each case, courts will have to examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object, purpose as also the question whether payment of nil compensation or nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the Constitution, as indicated above. 92. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that though there is a violation of Rule of Law by the authorities in resumption of lands in question, with heavy heart, by giving due respect to the ratio decidendi of the Supreme Court with regard to the very same subject lands, we are left with no other choice but to follow the same under Article 141 of the Constitution. 93. However, w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
