TMI Blog2016 (7) TMI 1522X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 2 applied for housing loan for the purchase of a residential house and its construction with the intention to create an asset and also derive income from the same and repay the loan amount. Respondent No.1 Bank sanctioned housing loan of Rs. 3.63 crores i.e. Rs. 2.43 crores for the purchase of the house and Rs. 1.20 crores for the construction. Accordingly, a loan agreement for housing loan was executed on 24.3.2013, Annexure P.2 between petitioner No.1 alongwith his wife Smt.Seema Sharma and Punjab National Bank, Sector 17, Chandigarh. The monthly instalment of Rs. 2,42,607/- was to be paid by petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 who authorized the Bank to recover the said amount from Account No.1418000107058478 in case of default. Out of the sanctioned amount of loan, an amount of Rs. 2,43,00,000/- only was disbursed on 18.7.2013 in the loan account No.008700NC00721877 in the name of petitioner No.2. The balance amount has not been disbursed by the respondent Bank till date. Petitioner No.2 had provided necessary documents of the property i.e. sale deed for the purpose of mortgaging the same with the bank. According to petitioner No.1, due to business exigencies, the payments due were irregu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rh by filing SA No.83 of 2016 to bring forth the lapses as well as shortcomings which were the mandatory technicalities to be followed by the respondent Bank before the process of sale of property was initiated but the same were not followed. The proceedings after the declaration of the NPA were upheld to be in consonance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act as well as the rules vide order dated 7.6.2016, Annexure P.13. According to the petitioners, the auction process was held by the bank but the Bank was not able to sell the property on the prescribed date of auction i.e. 7.6.2016. Hence the instant writ petition by the petitioners. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners. 4. After perusing the averments made in the writ petition and hearing learned counsel for the petitioners, we find that the petitioners have an alternative efficacious remedy of appeal against the impugned order. Moreover, the disputed questions of fact have been sought to be raised in the writ petition. The Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2013) 357 ITR 357, elaborately considered the question of entertaining writ petition where alternative stat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lusion that there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or procedure required for decision has not been adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar vs. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai vs. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality vs. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T. Muthusami vs. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB vs. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu vs. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha vs. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72). 17. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: "12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) "77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226-or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32-is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.""(See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5; C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272; Sheela Devi v ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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