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TMI Blog2007 (12) TMI 525X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it was held that the infancy protection shall not be available to the appellant factory after 22.9.1997. 2. The factual scenario lies into a very narrow compass. Appellant started production on 1.9.1995 and according to it, it was entitled to benefit under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act from that day. From August, 1998 appellant started to comply with the provisions of the Act as the three year fledging period as envisaged under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act came to an end. On 26.3.1999 enquiry under Section 7A of the Act was initiated to secure the compliance of the Act from September, 1995 to July, 1998. By order dated 27.7.2000 the Commissioner recorded a specific finding that the company was a new unit and was eligible for exemption under Section 16(1)(d) of the Act but since it was effaced from the statue from 22.9.1997 the benefit was available till that date and not thereafter. The writ petition filed was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, so was the special appeal. 3. In support of the appeal learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the view of the High Court is untenable and even if retrospective effect was given the same was to not in any way affect the entitlem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ernment and whose employees are entitled to the benefit of contributory provident fund or old age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed by the Central Government or the State Government governing such benefit; or (c) to any other establishment set up under any Central Provincial or State Act and whose employees are entitled to the benefits of contributory provident fund or old age pension in accordance with any scheme or rule framed under that Act governing such benefits; or (d) to any other establishment newly set up, until the expiry of a period of three years from the date on which such establishment is, or has been set up. 9. Thereafter, Section 16 was again amended by Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Act, 1988, omitting Clause (d) with explanation in Sub-section (1) of Section 16 with effect from 22.9.1997. (The said omission was initially carried out by Ordinance No. 17/1997 promulgated on 22.9.1997 followed by Ordinance No. 25/1997 dated 25.12.1997 and Ordinance No. 8 of 1998 dated 23.4.1998 followed by Act 10 of 1998.) 10. According to the appellants, the un-amended provisions as it stood after the amendment in 19 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing the infancy period from 5 years to 3 years, held thus, in Magic Wash Industries (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Panaji and Anr. 1999 L.I.C. 2197: There is no doubt that the vested rights or benefits under the legislation could be retrospectively taken away by legislation, but then the statute taking away such rights or benefits must expressly reflect its intention to that effect. The infancy period prior to the amended provision Section 16(1)(d) was five years in the case of establishments employing 20 to 50 workers and in the event this infancy benefit was to be withdrawn, it was necessary that the intention of the Legislature should have been clearly reflected in the amended provision itself that the rights and benefits which had already accrued stood withdrawn. The amended Clause 16(1)(d) came on the statute book on June 2, 1988, when it was assented by the President of India but the amended Section 16 was put into operation only with effect from August 1, 1988, which empowered the Central Government to appoint different dates for the coming into force of different provisions of the Act. We find it difficult in the circumstances, to conclude that the int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation (See Keshvan Madhavan Memon v. State of Bombay 1951CriLJ680 ). But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the Legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only 'nova Constitution futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis'. In the words of LORD BLANESBURG, "provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment." (See Delhi Cloth Mills & General Co. Ltd. v. CIT, Delhi. "Every statute, it has been said", observed LOPES, L.J., "which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions already past, must be presumed to be intended not to have a retrospective effect.&qu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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