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TMI Blog1963 (11) TMI 101X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... earlier enactment which we shall call the Rent Reduction Act was, as the name itself indicates, inter alia for reducing the rent payable by ryots in the "estates" to which it applied, while the later which for shortness may be referred to as the Abolition Act, was for abolishing the "estates" of intermediaries who were proprietors of the type of estates defined in the Act and for the creation of direct relationship between the ryots in these estates and the Government. 3. The Government of Madras purporting to act under the powers conferred by the Rent Reduction Act appointed a Special Officer to conduct an enquiry as to the precise reduction to be effected in the rent payable to the appellant by persons in cultivation of the lands in the Appellant's Shrotriem and after considering his report directed a reduction of rents by notification dated May 2, 1950. Almost simultaneously proceedings were taken by the Settlement Officer appointed under the Abolition Act for determining whether or not the Shrotriem should be taken over by Government and the officer gave his decision against the appellant. The appellant filed an appeal to the Tribunal constituted under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... same could not be agitated in a Civil Court. This would be the third question which we have to deal with. 7. It would be convenient to take up first the question whether the Shrotriem is an 'estate' within the scope of the Rent Reduction Act and this would turn upon the provisions of that enactment. The preamble to the Rent Reduction Act specifies, inter alia, that it was an Act to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the Madras Estates, Land Act, 1908, approximately to the level of the assessments levied on lands in ryotwari areas in the neighbourhood and for the collection of such rents exclusively by the State Government. In line with it Section 1 (2) of the Act makes provision for the application of the enactment to all "estate" as defined in Section 3, Clause (2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Its second section empowers the State Government to appoint a special officer for any estate or estates for the purpose of recommending fair and equitable rates of rent for the ryoti lands in such estate or "estates". After the Special Officer completes the enquiry he determines in accordance with the prescribed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... types of tenures under which land might be held. What we are now concerned with is Clause (d) of that definition dealing with 'inams' which runs :-- "3. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context--....... . . . (2) 'Estate' means--. .......... .......... (d) any inam village of which the grant has been made, confirmed or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the grant, the village has been partitioned' among the grantees or the successors in title of the grantee or grantees". This sub-section is followed by 3 Explanations of which only the first is relevant for the purposes of the present appeal and that runs: "Explanation (1)--Where a grant as inam is expressed to be of a named village, the area which forms the subject-matter of the grant shall be deemed to be an estate notwithstanding that it did not include certain lands in the village of that name which have already been granted on service or other tenure or been reserved for communal purpose." The contention urged by the appellant in the Courts below and before us was that the Shrotriem did not fall within this defin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... elds comprised in the grant' specifies both the dry lands and the Poramboke whose extents are given in Columns 4 and 5. The total extent of the lands in the village comprised of dry lands and poramboke which in English measure are of the extent respectively of 585.62 and 101.35 making a total of 686.92 acres. Having regard to the heading of Column 3, this entire extent of 686.92 acres must be taken to be the subject of grant. We shall now set out the details of the Poramboke of 32-7-0 in local measure (corresponding to 101.35) acres on which reliance is placed by learned Counsel for the appellant both for his submission that it was not the entire village that was granted but only certain lands in the village, as also that there was a reservation of certain lands by the grantor. At the bottom of Column 4 the particulars of the Poramboke are given and this is made up of the extents stated of the village site, ponds, vagus, paths and tsavudu (i.e., saline land unfit for cultivation) making a total of 32-7-0 in local measure (101.35 in acres). In this connection reliance is also placed on the entry in column No. 13 where there is a reference to two minor inams covered by separate t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... learned Counsel: 1. Was the grant one of a named village? 13a. The remarks of the Deputy Collector extracted earlier tend strongly in favour of the view that the grant was of a named village oil Thakkellapadu. Learned Counsel drew our attention to the heading in the Register of Inams in the village (Ex. A2) and pointed out that it purported to be a Register of Inams in the village, but obviously no assistance can be derived from the use of the preposition "in" as it is a well-known form of heading which is equally used even where an entire village is the subject of the grant (Vide e. g. the observations in District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Md., AIR1953SC446 ). 2. Were the entirety of the lands in the village granted, and if not, the nature of the reservation? 14. Closely related to the first point dealt with, and possibly merely another aspect of the same question is whether the entire land of the Village was not the subject of inam under the original grant. We have already pointed out that in Column 3 of Ex. A2 both the dry as well as the Poramboke of a total extent of 686.97 acres--as set out in Columns 4 and 5--is shown as the extent of the inam. That the entirety ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Estates Land Act. 4. Reservation of lands in the village for other than communal purposes: 16. Learned Counsel contended that of the categories of land which were listed under the head "Poramboke" under Column 4 were not merely the extent of the village site, ponds, vagus, and paths which were put to communal use but also 'tsavadu' or saline land unfit for cultivation of the extent of over 50 acres, and that since this land was reserved, the case was not covered by the last part of the first explanation to Section 3(2)(d) of the Estates Land Act. What we have stated already, viz. that the entirety of the poramboke of 101.35 acres was the subject of grant, along with the dry land of the extent of 585.62 acres would be sufficient to dispose of this contention. Apart however from the entry in Column 3 read with Columns 4 and 5 on which we have based our conclusion, we might point out that it is unthinkable that the grantor while granting the dry lands in the village, reserved for himself for his enjoyment or for a grant on a future occasion the saline land wholly unfit for cultivation. We consider therefore that there is no substance in this last contention ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o members whereas the appellate Tribunal constituted by the Abolition Act was one consisting of 3 members. 20. Notwithstanding that the learned trial Judge upheld the second contention he proceeded also to deal with the question on the merits, and so doing decided against the plaintiff affirming the conclusion reached by the Settlement Officer in the enquiry under Section 9 of the Abolition Act. 21. When the matter was taken up on appeal to the High Court the learned Judges arrived at the same conclusion as the trial Judge on the 2nd point viz., the validity of the dismissal of the appeal by the Tribunal. They, however, held that the result of the dismissal being invalid was that the appeal should be considered as still pending before the Tribunal, not having been properly disposed of. Besides, they held that on a construction of the provisions of the Abolition Act the jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether or not the shrotriem was an 'inam estate' was exclusively that of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal on appeal and that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to determine it. On this finding they dismissed the appeal. 22. It was submitted to us on be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ontroversy is consistent with them. Section 2 contains the definition of the expressions used in the Act and of these we need refer only to the definition of 'estate'--the main term used in the Act--to indicate the tenure or holding that is being 'abolished' and converted into 'Ryotwari'. 'Estate' is defined to mean "a zamindari or an under-tenure or an inam estate'. In this case we are not concerned with the first two types of land holding but with the last, with 'inam estates' and that term is defined in Section 2(7) of the Abolition Act as meaning "an estate within the meaning of Section 3, Clause (2) (d), of the Estates Land Act, but does not include an inam village which became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936". Section 5 provides for the appointment and functions of Settlement Officers and Section 8 for the constitution of Tribunals. Section 9 which is the important provision in the present context has a heading which reads: 'Determination of inam estate.' Section 9 provides : "9. (1) As soon as may be after the passing of the Act, the Settlement Officer may suo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... estate" The other provisions of the Act are not very material. 24. No doubt, having regard to the terms of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code we start with a presumption against the ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, but this presumption could be over-borne, and what is relied on by the respondents in this connection is the combined effect of the several provisions in Section 9. In the first place, Sub-section (1) authorises the Settlement Officer to "enquire and determine" whether any "inam village" is an "inam estate." Sub-sections (2) and (3) prescribe the procedure to be followed in this enquiry and determination which includes the giving of an opportunity to every one interested in the result of the enquiry for participating in it by leading evidence in support of his contention. It does not stop there but by Sub-section (4)(a) provides for an appeal from the decision of the Settlement Officer to a Tribunal. In this connection the nature of the Tribunal set up to hear the appeals is also not without significance. Section 8 (2) enacts: "8. (2) Each Tribunal shall consist of three members; one of them (who shall be i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of their not being appealed against within the time prescribed, attained finality. This apart, if the submission of the appellant were correct; it would mean that when a Settlement Officer rendered his decision on the matter set out in Section 9(1), the aggrieved party had a right either to appeal to the Tribunal within the time prescribed or challenge it by a suit in Civil Court within the period of limitation which might be applicable to such suits under the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. If this were so, as there might conceivably be more than one party having a similar interest and raising a similar contention who might all feel aggrieved by the decision of a Settlement Officer, it would mean that one party might file a suit, while another resorted to the Tribunal by way of appeal. This result would be sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of accepting the construction for which the appellant contends. The very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the question on which the applicability of the Act depends, is Sufficient in most cases for inferring that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same matter is b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nvisaged by Lord Thankerton or referred to by Gajendragadkar, J. is raised in the appeal before us and it is therefore unnecessary for us to examine, in the present appeal either, the precise limits of this exception. 27. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. Lord Esher formulated the point thus in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax (1888) 21 QBD 313 "When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o this appeal, makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer. 28. Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under Section 9 question the character of the property as not failing within the description of an "inam village", he has of necessity to decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied, he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by Section 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of Section 9(1) the property in question being an "inam village" is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former, he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore, is (subject to the result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, but no further. The correctness of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... led the appellant challenged the proceedings before the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal and the dismissal of his appeal by the latter on two grounds: (1) that even if the original grant of the shrotriem comprised the entire village, still the same was not an "inam estate" within the Abolition Act, because the same was not an "estate" prior to the amendment effected in 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908. In the definition, as it then stood.--as already seen--a grant was brought within the terms of the definition of an estate only where the grant was of the land revenue or of the melvaram alone "to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof." It was this definition that was altered by an amendment effected in 1936. It was submitted by the appellant that the grant in the present case was of the entire interest in the land and not of the melvaram alone and that such an inam, even though it be of an entire village, was not brought within the provisions of the Abolition Act. (2) The decision of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal was impugned as incompetent for the reason that whereas Section 8 provided for a tribunal consisting of three members ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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