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2021 (4) TMI 681

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..... t passed in terms of section 158 BC read with section 143(3)/254 of the Act was passed out of time, invalid, passed without Jurisdiction and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 3. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the findings recorded in para 2.5 of the impugned order in rejecting the contentions with regard to the provisions governing the limitation prescribed for completing the block assessment were wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law and ought to have appreciated that the misconstruction of the related provisions discussed in the said para 2.5 would justify the stand of the appellant in substantiating the limitation prescribed in section 158BE of the Act while vitiating the related findings recorded by him. 4. The DCIT failed to appreciate that in any event the impugned order in giving effect to the order of the jurisdictional Bench or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated 4.10.2000 was not passed in accordance with law/not in accordance with the purpose for which the entire matter was remanded back to his file and ought to have appreciated that any order passed in violation of the principles of legitimate .....

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..... k period under consideration and consequently erred in recasting the cash flow forming part of each of the assessment years comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 11. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the computation of the assessable income for the assessment year 1987- 88 comprised in the block period under consideration in para 7 of the impugned order on various facets was wrong. erroneous, unjustified incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 12. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the computation of the assessable income for the assessment year 1988-89 comprised in the block period under consideration in para 8 of the impugned order on various facets was wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 13. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the computation of the assessable income for the assessment year 1989- 90 comprised in the block period under consideration in para 9 of the impugned order on various facets was wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 14. The DCIT failed to apprec .....

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..... ed at the time of marriage as against the claim of receiving such gifts aggregating to Rs. 5,10,000/- on the application of section 68 of the Act without assigning proper reasons and justification. 21. The DCIT erred in bringing to tax Rs. 26,25,000/- as the presumed investment in purchase of five tippers in recording wrong and erroneous findings from para 13.4 to para 13.7 of the impugned order in computing the undisclosed income for the assessment year 1993-94 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 22, The DCIT erred in making the disallowance of Rs. 1,68750/- being the rental charges paid for hiring the tippers in consequence to the addition made in presuming the appellants ownership of the tippers resulting in separate addition in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1993-94 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 23. The DCIT erred in bringing to tax Rs. 12000/- appearing in the name of Sri K.Muthuswamy in the books of T.C.V.Packers as unexplained cash credit on the application of section 68 of the Act in para 13.9 of the i .....

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..... ustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 30. The DCIT erred in adding back Rs. 2,41,82,880/- being the amount presumed to be spent for acquiring PR status at Singapore in para 15.2 to para 15.9 of the impugned order as unexplained investment on the application of section 69 of the Act in the computation of undisclosed income relating to the assessment year 1995-96 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 31. The DCIT failed to appreciate that in the absence of seized materials, the addition made in this regard on presumption of facts was completely unjustified and ought to have appreciated that the definition of undisclosed income incorporated in Chapter XIVB of the Act was completely overlooked and brushed aside. 32. The DCIT erred in adding back Rs. 24,00,000/- as unexplained expenditure u/s 69C of the Act pertaining to the presumed expenses incurred for engaging the Advocate/Investment Consultant at Singapore in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1995-96 comprised in the block period under consideration at para 16.3 of the impugned order without assigni .....

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..... bstantiate the presumption of facts of investment in UK by repeating the first block assessment order, the assessment of presumed investment on various facets should be reckoned as bad to law. 40. The DCIT failed to appreciate that having noticed the fact of stay of trial of the proceedings initiated by the ED, the addition made for the presumed investment on various grounds was were wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 41. The DCIT failed to appreciate that the order of Enforcement Directorate had not reached finality and ought to have appreciated that the findings in the said order on various facets were wrong, erroneous, unjustified, incorrect, invalid and not sustainable both on facts and in law. 42. The DCIT erred in estimating the income at 8% of the said investment on presumptions and assumptions at para 21 of the impugned order and consequently erred in adding back Rs. 1,82,85,040/- in the computation of undisclosed income for the assessment year 1995-96 comprised in the block period under consideration without assigning proper reasons and justification. 43. The DCIT erred in adding back Rs. 1,86,500/- on th .....

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..... able both on facts and in law. 49. The DCIT railed to appreciate that there was no proper opportunity given before passing the impugned order and any order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is nullity in law. 50. The Appellant craves leave to file additional grounds/arguments at the time of hearing." 3. Brief facts of the case are that the assessee is an individual engaged in the business of contract work for earth moving. He was proprietor of TVC Packers, partner of M/s. Vivek Finance and management Services and also director of M/s. TVC Engineering Pvt.Ltd. & M/s. Emerald Promoters Pvt.Ltd. The Enforcement Directorate, Chennai has launched investigation against the assessee for alleged violation of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. He was also detained under COFEPOSA Act for one year from 07.02.1996. The Enforcement Directorate has conducted search in the premises of the assessee and its associates in connection with alleged violation of FERA and seized certain books of account and documents. Simultaneously, the Enforcement Directorate has caused certain inquiries at abroad and particularly in U.K and Singapore with certain banks and certain persons ass .....

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..... der dated 30.07.1997 before the ITAT. The ITAT vide its order dated 04.10.2010 in IT(SS)A No.163/Mds/1997 has set aside the assessment and directed the Assessing Officer to redo the assessment, after taking into consideration all the relevant materials connected to the proceedings and strictly following principles of natural justice and further, giving reasonable and sufficient opportunity to the assessee. Pursuant to the order of the Tribunal, the Assessing Officer had initiated proceedings to complete set aside assessment proceedings. During the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee vide its letters of even dated had requested the Assessing Officer to furnish copies of documents requisitioned from Enforcement Directorate including statements recorded from him and his associates for which the Assessing Officer has provided copies of statement recorded from the assessee and his associates by the Enforcement Directorate and also certain documents collected from Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore. Thereafter, on 04.03.2002 the assessee has filed a Writ Petition before the Hon'ble Madras High Court in W.P No.7623 of 2002and challenged block assessment proceeding .....

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..... has also rejected another contention of the assessee regarding limitation in light of provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act on the ground that sub-section (2A) to section 153 enables the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment at any time before expiry oftwo years from the end of financial year in which the order passed u/s.146 or 250, 254 /263 /264, as the case may be received by CIT/CCIT. Since, the order passed by the Tribunal on 04.10.2010 was received by O/o. CIT on 10.11.2000, the Assessing Officer shall have time limit upto 31.03.2003 to complete the assessment. Further, since the assessee has challenged the proceedings before the Hon'ble High Court and got stay for proceedings, as per Explanation (ii) period of operation of stay shall be excluded from limitation and if such period is excluded, the Assessing Officer is still having time upto 06.01.2020 to pass assessment order and hence, the order passed u/s 143(3), r.w.s. 254 on 31/12/2019 is well within the time prescribed under section 153(2A) of the Act. Therefore, he opined that no merit in the arguments taken by the learned AR for the assessee that proceedings are barred by limitation. The Assessing Officer ha .....

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..... was served: Provided that where the notice under section 148 was served on or before the 31st day of March, 1987, such assessment, reassessment or recomputation may be made at any time up to the 31st day of March, 1990. (2A,) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1)and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971, and any subsequent assessment year an order of fresh assessment under section 146 or in pursuance of an order under section 250, section 254, section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 146 cancelling the assessment is passed by the [Assessing) Officer or the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the [Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner) (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, [subject to the provisions of subsection (2A),] be compl .....

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..... me, in compliance to the direction of the Hon'ble High Court and not of the Hon'ble ITAT. The order passed under the jurisdiction of writ is not covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153. If the provisions of sub-section (2A) is analysed carefully then it makes clear that it covers order passed u/s.146 by A.O. or 250/254/263/264 orders by CIT/CCIT and it does not cover order passed by a Court order under the writ jurisdiction. The Hon'ble High Court has dismissed the writ of the assessee vide order dated 14.12.2018, which was received in the office of the PCIT on 13.02.2019.As discussed in the earlier para one year out of 2 year is completed the balance one year period is still left commencing from February 2019 and ending by February 2020. Therefore the assessment in the normal course needs to be completed by February 2020 and hence it is not time barred even presuming that section (2A) is applicable to the facts of the case as claimed by the assessee. Analysis of provision of sub-section (3) This subsection covers any finding or direction or an order passed by any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under the Act apart from various other ord .....

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..... (2A), sub-section (3) underwent a simultaneous change. It was expressly made "subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A)." This meant that Section 153(3) would thereafter apply only to such cases where Section 153(2A) did not apply. In other words, in all instances of an AO having to pass a fresh assessment order upon remand where Section 153(2A) would apply, the AO would be bound to follow the time limit imposed by sub-section (2A). Where the AO was only giving effect to an appellate order, then Section 153 (3) (ii) of the Act would apply" Hence as per the elaborations above, Since the block assessment order is being passed by complying the directions of Hon'ble High court of Madras under writ, dated 14.12.2018, I am of the view that the block assessment proceedings are not time barred as per Section153(3) of the Income Tax Act." Being aggrieved by the assessment order, the assessee is in appeal before us. 7. The preliminary issue raised by the assessee vide ground no.2 to 4 is with regard to validity of assessment order passed u/s.158BC, r.w.s. 143(3), r.w.s 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 dated 31.12.2019 in light of provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act. The learned A .....

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..... ssing Officer on a mistaken of law has considered the pre-amended time limit available as per section 153(2A) by grossly overlooking amendment brought in by the Finance Act, 2000, restricting time limit to one year from the end of financial year in which order is received by CIT. If one year period of limitation is considered, as per amended provisions of section153 (2A), then the order passed by the Assessing Officer on 31.12.2019 is clearly barred by limitation and liable to be quashed. 8. The ld. AR further referring to dates and events submitted that in this case, the order of the ITAT was passed on 04.10.2000 and which was received by the O/o. PCIT on 10.11.2000. Since, the order of the Tribunal was received on or after 1-4-2000, amended provisions of section 153(2A) prescribing restricted time limit would get attracted to the facts of the case, and hence, the AO should have completed assessment on or before 31.03.2002 and not on or before 31.03.2003, as assumed by the Assessing Officer. Because of the intervening order of the Hon'ble High Court in writ and disposal of said writ on 14.12.2018 ( communicated to PCIT on 13.02.2019), the Assessing Officer would get clear 60 days .....

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..... , supporting the order of the Assessing Officer submitted that there is no merit in the arguments of the learned A.R for the assessee that assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer is barred by limitation, because the Assessing Officer has passed order within time limit as provided u/s.153(3) of the Act, where it is clearly envisaged that if an order is passed in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in the said order under section 250/254/263 or 264 or in an order of any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act, provisions of sub-section (1),(1A),(1B) and (2) shall not apply and hence, there is no time limit as prescribed for completion of assessment. In this case, the Assessing Officer has completed assessment in pursuant to the direction of the Hon'ble Madras High Court vide order dated 14.12.2018, which was received in the Office of PCIT on 13.02.2019. The order passed under writ jurisdiction is not covered by sub-section (2A) of section 153 of the Act. If provisions of sub-section (2A) is analyzed carefully, then it makes clear that it covers orders passed by the Assessing Officer u/s .146 or orde .....

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..... , 1988, or any earlier assessment year, is filed under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 139, whichever is later: Provided that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable is the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2004 but before the 1st day of April, 2010, the provisions of clause (a) shall have effect as if for the words "two years", the words "twenty-one months" had been substituted: Provided further that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable is the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2005 but before the 1st day of April, 2009 and during the course of the proceeding for the assessment of total income, a reference under subsection (1) of section 92CA- (i) was made before the 1st day of June, 2007 but an order under sub-section (3) of that section has not been made before such date; or (ii) is made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, the provisions of clause (a) shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso, have effect as if for the words "two years", the words 'thirty-three months" had been substituted: Provided also that in case th .....

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..... 1st day of April, 2010 and during the course of the proceeding for the assessment or reassessment or recomputation of total income, a reference under sub-section (1) of section 92CA is made, the provisions of this sub-section shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the second proviso, have effect as if for the words "one year", the words "two years" had been substituted. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (1A), (1B) and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971, and any subsequent assessment year, an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 250 or section 254 or Section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of one year from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner: Provided that where the order .....

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..... twithstanding anything contained in the second proviso, have effect as if for the words "one year", the words "two years" had been substituted. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1), (1A), (lB) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and re-computations which may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2A), be completed at any time- (i)[***] (ii) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 250,254, 260,262,263, or 264 or in an order of any court in a proceeding otherwise than by way of appeal or reference under this Act; (iii) where, in the case of a firm, an assessment is made on a partner of the firm in consequence of an assessment made on the firm under section 147. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, subsection (2) of section 153A and sub-section (1) of section 153B, the order of assessment or reassessment, relating to any assessment year, which stands revived under sub-section (2) of section 153A, shall be made within one year from th .....

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..... er under sub-section (1) of section 245D is received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under sub-section (2) of that section, or (vi) the period commencing from the date on which an application is made before the Authority for Advance Rulings under sub-section (1) of section 2450 and ending with the date on which the order rejecting the application is received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under sub-section (3) of section 245R, or (vii) the period commencing from the date on which an application is made before the Authority for Advance Rulings under sub-section (1) of section 245Q and ending with the date on which the advance ruling pronounced by it is received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner under sub-section (7) of section 245R, or (viii) the period commencing from the date on which a reference or first of the references - for exchange of information is made by an authority competent under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A and ending with the date on which the information requested is last received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or a period of one year, whichever is less, or (ix) the period comme .....

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..... mmencing on or after the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words "twenty-one months", the words "twelve months" had been substituted.] (2) No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 was served: 46[Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April, 2019, the provisions of this subsection shall have effect, as if for the words "nine months", the words "twelve months" had been substituted.] (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment, may be made at any time before the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Commis .....

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..... be, order in revision is passed by Commissioner. In the above circumstances, assessment may be completed within above mentioned time limit, even if, time limit specified under sub-section(1) & (2) of Section 153 for completion of assessment or reassessment has been expired. The amendment brought out by the Finance Act, 2000, has reduced general time limit prescribed under section 153(2A) to one year and such amendment has been made effective from 01.06.2001. Simultaneously, a proviso has been inserted to make it clear the purpose of amendment of sub-section (2A), as per which, where the order u/s.250 or 254 is received by the Commissioner /Chief Commissioner or as the case may be, or the order u/s.263 or 264 is passed by Commissioner or CCIT on or after 01.04.1999, but before 01.4.2000, such an order of fresh assessment may be made at any time upto 31.03.2002. A plain reading of sub-section 153(2A) along with proviso thereunder, it is very clear that revised time limit of one year is made applicable for those orders which were received by Commissioner /Chief Commissioner on or after 01.4.2000. The meaning thereby is that any orders passed by appellate commissioner or appellate trib .....

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..... der ought to have been completed on or before 14.04.2019. But, in this case the Assessing Officer has passed assessment order on 31.12.2019 and therefore, in our considered view the assessment order is clearly barred by limitation as per amended provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act. 14. The learned DR for the Revenue, although vehemently opposed applicability of amended provisions of section 153(2A) of the Act to the present case on the sole ground that said amendment has been given effect from 01.06.2001 onwards, but fact remains that provisions of section 153(2A) prescribed limitation period for passing effect giving orders while starting point though falls before the effective date of the amended provisions prescribing restricted time limit, the completion of pending effect giving orders in view of the transitional provisions by virtue of simultaneous insertion of the proviso should fall in new regime thereby giving harmonious interpretation of the combined reading of the amended subsection and the proviso inserted simultaneously, it is very clear that the proviso takes care of orders received from 01.04.1999 to 31.03.2000 which are pending for passing effect giving orders .....

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..... Officer has discussed the issue in light of decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Nokia Enterprises vs. DCIT(supra) and held that present order is being passed in compliance to the direction of the High Court and as such, the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 153 is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. If such provision is applied, then there is no question of assessment getting time barred. 16. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the reasons given by the Assessing Officer to consider time limit prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 153 of the Act and find that the Assessing Officer has made fundamental mistake in applying sub section (3) of section 153, because the present assessment is completed in pursuant to the order of Appellate Tribunal in setting aside the assessment order . We further noted that Tribunal has set aside the order passed by Assessing Officer for de novo consideration in accordance with material available on record and after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the assessee. We further noted that Tribunal has considered fundamental issue raised by the assessee in light of principles of natural justice an .....

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..... pellate Tribunal dated 04.10.2000 passed in first round and not at instance of Madras High Court decision in permitting the Assessing Officer to continue proceeding initiated in consequent to the order of Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, reliance placed by the Assessing Officer on the provisions of section 153 (3) of the Act is completely misplaced and misdirected. Because, under the existing provisions of section 153(3), such fresh assessments are not subjected to any time limit, because said sub-section, in particular, did not require order passed therein to be issued within any particular time limit for simple reason that it would get attracted to a finding or direction contained in the appellate order. Since, the decision of the Hon'ble Madras High Court has only permitted to pass effect giving order in pursuant to the order of Tribunal referred hereinabove, and thus, question of application of sub-section (3) to section 153 is totally incorrect. We, further ourselves unable to agree with the contention of the Assessing Officer that when the order of assessment is completed in pursuant to the order of High Court in writ jurisdiction, the provisions of section 153 is come into op .....

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..... to give an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The meaning thereby is that assessment is being set aside for de novo assessment and thus, there is no question of application of provisions of section 153(3)(ii) of the Act. 18. Coming back to case laws relied upon by the learned A.R for the assessee. In this regard, the learned AR relied upon direct decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Bhan Textile Pvt.Ltd. (2008) 300 ITR 176(Del), wherein the Hon'ble High Court under identical circumstances held that where the Assessing Officer was directed by Commissioner (Appeals) to pass fresh order u/s.144, meaning thereby that assessment order was set aside or cancelled and there was no independent finding or direction which the Assessing Officer was required to comply with, it was limitation u/s. 153(2A) which was applicable and not limitation u/s.153(3)(ii) of the Act. The Hon'ble High Court, while confirming order of the Tribunal quashed impugned order passed by the Assessing Officer by holding that the provisions of section 153(3) has no application, where order of the Assessing Officer has been set aside by the Appellate Tribunal or Appellate Commissioner. In th .....

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..... on of the Revenue that the amended provision of Section 153(2A) would be applicable in respect of the cases where the appellate or revisionary order is received or passed after 1st June, 2001, there was no necessity of proviso to Section 153(2A) and the said proviso would become redundant. It cannot be presumed that the legislature would provide a proviso which is redundant. That in the CBDT's Circular No.14 of 2001 paragraph 68.3, it has been clearly provided "The period of two years provided for making such assessments or reassessments is more than necessary considering that the scope of such assessment or reassessment is generally limited to a few specific issues. With a view to bringing about an early finalization of such proceedings, the Act has amended sub-sections (2) and (2A) of section 153 to reduce the timelimit for making such orders of assessment, reassessment or recomputation to one year." Thus, the legislature has taken a conscious decision to reduce the period of two years for making reassessment of set aside matters to one year. They have also consciously provided that the old provisions of two years would be applicable where such order of set aside was passed o .....

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..... Officer may pass order under section 144 taking the explanation into account. Therefore, this matter is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer. Thus, ground No.2 of the appeal is treated as allowed." 47. When the matter was taken up by the Assessing Officer, he issued a notice under Section 143(2) of the Act on 24th February, 2003. The assessee claimed the notice to be barred by limitation in view of provisions of Section 153(2A). Since the assessee did not cooperate with the Assessing Officer, he completed the assessment once again as 30 ITA-300/Del/2001 & 5 others originally framed. On appeal, learned CIT(A) upheld the assessment order. The assessee preferred an appeal to the ITAT which held the assessment to be barred by limitation under Section 153(2A). Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court upheld the order of the ITAT. 48. We find that the precise dispute before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court was whether in respect of such an order of set aside, Section 153(2A) was applicable or Section 153(3)(iii) was applicable and Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court held that Section 153(2A) was applicable. However, the facts are identical. That in the said case also .....

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..... h Court in writ and stay of proceedings on 08.03.2002 and subsequent disposal of said Writ Petition on 14.12.2018 (communicated to O/o.PCIT on 13.02.2019), the period covered under operation of stay shall be excluded while computing period of limitation, as per Explanation 1(ii) to section 153 of the Act and if such period is excluded, then the Assessing Officer will get 60 days clear time for completion of assessment, in view of explanation referred to in section 153 of the Act, because balance time available as on date of interim order passed by High Court was 23 days, which is less than 60 days. Since the order of Hon'ble High Court in Writ Petition was received in the Office of PCIT on 13.02.2019 and the Assessing Officer has sixty days clear time to pass order giving effect order and if such 60 days is considered for limitation period, then the Assessing Officer ought to have passed assessment order on 14.04.2019. In this case, the impugned order was passed on 31.12.2019. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the assessment order passed u/s. 158BC r.w.s 143(3) / 254 dated 31.12.2019 is barred by limitation and liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the assessment order is .....

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