TMI Blog1973 (9) TMI 112X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the entire petition, has been referred, it is unnecessary to consider the case on facts. However, with a view to understand the question that has been referred, we will briefly set out the facts giving rise to this petition. 3. Since prior to 1958, one Aher was a tenant of the open plot of land in dispute at the rent of ₹ 12/- per month. He put up a flour mill. On February 14, 1958, by a deed of assignment, he had assigned his tenancy rights together with the running business of the flour mill to the petitioners. The Petitioners fell in arrears for more than six months, and, therefore, by notice dated January 27, 1965, the landlord called upon them to vacate the premises on the ground of non-payment of rent for over six months. By a reply the petitioners challenged the quantum of rent as well as the period from which they were liable. Nothing, however, was paid by them towards the arrears of rent, and, therefore, the respondent-landlord filed the instant suit on August 25, 1965, for recovery of possession of the suit premises as also for arrears of rent. The petitioners filed their written-statement contending inter alia that the rent demanded was excessive and requested ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Vithoba, AIR1971Bom396 (FB). It was under these circumstances that Wagle, J. has referred this matter to a Division Bench. 5. There are other two Special Civil Applications viz. Nos. 89 of 1968 and 693 of 1969 which have been ordered to be placed for hearing with this Special Civil Application No. 2353 of 1968, as the question referred to by Wagle, J, is also involved in those two petitions. 6. With a view to facilitate the understanding of the rival points of view, it would be necessary to consider the scheme of the Rent Act of 1947 with a particular reference to the rights of the landlord to evict the tenant. The preamble shows that one of the objects in enacting the law is to control rents of premises and eviction of tenants. With the object of preventing the landlords from charging excessive rent, provisions have been made for fixation of stand are rent in relation to the premises. Section 5(10) defines standard rent . According to this definition contained in Section 5(10)(a), the standard-rent that may have been fixed by the Court and the Controller respectively under the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939, or the Bombay Rents, Hotel Rates and Lodging House Rates (Contr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the case, without any fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, and there has been no structural alterations or change in the amenities or in respect of any other factors which are relevant to the fixation of the standard rent, or change in such increases thereafter in the premises . would, therefore, appear that a new application for fixation of standard rent or permitted increases is not permissible except in certain special circumstances such as the fixation was made as a result of fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, or any structural alterations or change in amenities or change in such increase after the original fixation of standard rent and permitted increases by the Court. Section 11A is thus nothing but an extension of the principle of res judicata to fixation of the standard rent and permitted increases. Subject to the provisions of Section 11A. Section 11(1) enumerates the cases where the Court has the power to fix the amount of standard rent of any premises. Section 11(2) relates to the powers of the Court to fix the amount of permitted increases in cases of the dispute between the landlord and the tenant. It would be clear from the provisions of Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... andard rent and permitted increases has been served on the tenant. Section 12(3)(a) gives a right to the landlord to obtain possession from the tenant provided the conditions laid down in that subsection are satisfied. If all or anyone of the conditions laid down in Section 12(3)(a) do not exist, or are not satisfied, a further protection from eviction is given to the tenant by Section 12(3)(b), provided he pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due on the first day of the hearing of the suit, or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. The grounds other than the ground of non-payment of rent, which entitle the landlord to recover possession of the premises, are contained in Sections 13 and 13A, and if the landlord satisfies anyone of the grounds enumerated in the said sections, he gets a right to recover possession of the premises. 9. Section 14, 15 and 15A give protection to certain sub-tenants and licenses. We may observe that the original Section 14 and 15 dealt with the rights of sub-tenants only. By the Maharashtra Amendment Act 17 of 1973, the said sections were amended so ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich are to be deposited in Court by the tenant and make an order directing the tenant to deposit such amount in Court or at the option of the tenant make an order to pay to the landlord such amount thereof as the Court may specify, pending the final decision of the application. A copy of the order shall be served upon the landlord . Out of any amount deposited in Court the Court may make an order for payment of such reasonable such to the landlord towards payment of rent or increases due to him as it thinks fit. If the tenant fails to deposit such amount or, as the case may be to pay such amount thereof to the landlord his application shall be dismissed. (4) Where at any stage of a suit for recovery of rent, whether with or with out a claim for possession of the premises, the Court is satisfied that the tenant is withholding the rent on the ground that the rent is excessive and standard rent should be fixed, the Court shall and in any other case if it appears to the Court that it is just and proper to make such an order the Court may make an order directing the tenant to deposit in Court forthwith such amount of the rent as the Court considers to be reasonably due to the landlo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tinues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. (4). Pending the disposal of any such suit, the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit. Explanation I. In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the Court under sub-section (3) of section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court. Explanation II. - For the purposes of sub-section (2), reference to 'standard rent' and to 'permitted increase' shall include reference to 'interim standard rent' and 'interim permitted increase' specified under sub-section (3) or (4) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dispute and as in that case the dispute was not bona fide, the landlord was entitled to possession of the premises. This contention was not decided by the Division Bench on the Group that the question Bench on the ground that the questions raised by the landlord were questions of fact and were not considered by the Appellate Court. The Court, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Court and remanded the case for a fresh decision after considering the issues raised on behalf of the landlord. If the Division Bench was of the opinion that a mere raising of a dispute, whether bona fide or otherwise, in a written statement by the tenant was sufficient to give protection to the landlord, and the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) were not applicable it was not necessary to remand the matter for fresh decision. It would, therefore, appear that the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that it was of the view that the word dispute in Section 12(3)(a) implies a bona fide dispute . 17. In Civil Revn. Appn. No. 1569 of 1964 (Bom.) Smt. Mohini M. Jaya v. Mrs. Pauline Correa) decided on 17.4.1968 by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Palekar and Nathwani, JJ. a similar vie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the tenant was not bona fide. It appears from the judgment of the Division Bench that the aforesaid decisions of Tarkunde, J. in Civil Revn. Appln. No. 1822 of 1957 , D/- 12-11-1959 (Bom.) and that of Tambe, Acting C. J. and Abhyankar J. in (Spl. C.A. No. 459 of 1965 decided on 14/15-12-1965 (Bom.)) were relied on by the tenant in support of his contention that the dispute about the standard rent could be raised for the first time in the written statement and if the dispute is bona fide and genuine, the tenant was entitled to protection. However, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dhansukhlal Chhaganlal v. Dalichand Virchand, [1968]3SCR346 , the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the said two decisions of Tarkunde, J, and Tambe, Ag. C. J. and Abhyankar, , were no longer good law. The Division Bench was of the view that the tenant can claim protection from the tenant can claim protection from eviction only it before the expiry of one month after notice referred to in section 12(2), he makes an application under Section 11(3) and not otherwise, However, this decision was based on both the grounds viz., that the dispute was not bona fide and the tenant failed to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l Civil Appln. No. 781 of 1968 Dattu Subhana v. Gajanan Vithoba decided on 5.8.1968 (Bom), by which judgment, he referred the matter to a Division Bench, which in its turn, made a reference to the Full Bench for deciding the question whether in a proceeding to which Section 12(3)(a) of the Act would otherwise apply, the tenant-defendant can prove that a dispute k about standard rent exists without following the procedure laid down in Explanation I to Section 12? and whether he can also take a defence that Section 12(3)(a) does not apply and Section 12(3)(b) applies?' This reference was decided by the Full Bench in AIR1971Bom396 (FB)., It appears from the referring judgment of Bal, J. that he was unable to agree with the view expressed No. 512 of 1966 decided on 2.4.1968 = ILR (1970) Bom 1335 that the decisions of Tarkunde J., in C. R. A. No. 1822 of 1957 (Bom.) and of Tambe, Ag. C. J. and 1965 (Bom) were no longer good law. Bal, J. was of view that if the dispute about the standard of rent and/or permitted increases, though raised for the first time in the written statement, is bona fide and the tenant satisfies the other requirements of Section 12(3)(b), the protection of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irst time in his written statement, it is necessary that such a dispute about the standard rent or permitted increases for the first time in his written statement, it is necessary that such a dispute must be bona fide to enable him to claim the protection under Section 12(3)(b) of the Act, Mr. Diwan, the learned counsel for the tenant, however, contends that these decisions have no binding force as precedents, and this Division Bench is entitled to take a contrary view. Mr. Diwan's objections to the decided cases being considered as having binding cases are these. Firstly, according to him, these judgments are per incuriam as they were rendered ignoring the plain statutory provision of Section 12(3)(a) which only uses the word 'dispute' and not the words bona fide dispute'. Secondly, these judgments are sub silentio in the sense that the particular point of law involved in the decision was not perceived by the court or present to its mind while deciding these cases and also because the point in issue was not fully argued. Thirdly, the observations were made on an assumed position of law, and some of the observations, in the cases were obiter, as it was not necessar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consider itself entitled not to follow an earlier decision of its own. Such cases would obviously be of the rarest occurrence and must be dealt with in accordance with their special facts ... On a careful examination of the whole matter we have come to the clear conclusion that this court is bound to follow previous decisions of its own as well as those of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. The only exceptions to this rule (two of them apparent only) are those already mentioned which for convenience we here summarise: (1) The court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow. (2) The court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot in its opinion, stand with a decision of the House of Lords. (3) The court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if it is satisfied that the decision was given per incuriam. 29. The counsel contends that all the decisions of this court referred to above, which in effect, take the view, that the dispute referred to in Section 12(3)(a) must be a bona fide or a genuine dispute, are not binding on this court as preced ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... name of the liquidator of the company. The only point argued was on the question of the priority of the claimant's debt, and, on this argument being heard, the Court of Appeal granted the order. No consideration was given to the question whether a garnishee order could properly be made on an account standing in the name of the liquidator. When therefore, this very point was argued in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal, Lancaster Motor Co. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 - the court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene, M. R., said that he could not help thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of substance might be decided. He went on to say that the point had to be decided by the earlier court before it could make the order which it did; never the less, since it was decided without argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of authority, it was not binding and would not be followed . 31. On going through the decisions (taking the view that the dispute must be bona fide ) rendered by both the single Judges as well as D ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vil Revn. Appln. No. 1569 of 1964, decided on 17-4-1968 (Bom.), again it would appear that the question of law raised before us was not considered by the Bench, nor were any arguments advanced. Here too, the Division Bench proceeded on the assumption that the word dispute in Section 12(3)(a) must mean a bona fide dispute and not merely a 'dispute . 35. Mr. Kotwal submits that the observations and the view taken in the various decisions relied on by him has been consistently expressed over number of years, and even if technically, they cannot be considered as binding precedents on the Division Benches, they are entitled to weight. He says that it is not likely that this view would not be consistently taken without due consideration to the language of the section and the meaning to be given to the word dispute in Section 12(3)(a). Since we fee that Mr. Diwan is right in his submission that those judgments cannot be considered as binding precedents, we are inclines to decide the point referred to us afresh on the basis of arguments advanced before us. 36. Before we proceed to the actual consideration of the point of law referred to us, it is necessary to dispose of one ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi . It would be clear from the above quoted passage that it is the enunciation of the reason or principle or the process of reasoning on which a question before a Court has been decided can be said to be binding as a precedent. A mere logical decoction or corollary on the ratio of a decision cannot be binding as a precedent; for, generally, the exposition of law in the judgment must be qualified by the particular facts of the case. The ratio of the case must mean a decision on issue which is a live issue between the parties, and the law should result from being applied to live issues raised between actual parties and argued on both sides. We must not forget that very often general words and expressions are used invariably, but the same is always controlled by the facts of that particular case. It would, therefore, be necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the ratio decided of a decision and the logical corollary which may seem to follow from it. In the Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, [1956 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... m rent pending fixation of the standard rent, and the interim rent was accordingly fixed by the court. The trial court, in view of the contention taken up in the written statement, raised an issue about the standard rent. Ultimately, the trial court held that the standard rent of the premises was ₹ 26 p. m. In view of the deposit of the arrears of rent and costs of suit, the trial court dismissed the landlord's suit for possession. The landlord's allegation about waste and nuisance was rejected by the trial court. The appeal filed by the landlord relating to the recovery of possession was dismissed. This was again challenged by the landlord by a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. When the matter came up k for hearing before Bal, J., he found that there was a conflict of decisions of the Division Benches of this Court on the question as to whether a tenant was entitled to raise a dispute about standard rent for the first time by way of written statement. Bal J. took the view that if the dispute about standard rent and/or permitted increases though raised for the first time in the written statement is bona fide and the tenant satisfies the other requir ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to be so because the Full Bench was to called upon to consider the question as to whether the dispute must be a bona fide dispute and not any dispute. The two questions, viz., whether the dispute could be raised for the first time in the written statement and whether such a dispute should necessarily be a bona fide dispute are different. The Full Bench was concerned only with the first one. If the Full Bench had in its mind the question of bona fide , it would certainly have referred to that question and expressed their view one way or the other. The absence of any such consideration of the question by the Full Bench in the case shows that they did not apply their mind to this aspect. It is significant to note that none of the counsel appearing before the Full Bench seem to have thrashed out this point. Mr. Diwan, however, lays stress on the following observations of the Full Bench at page 385 of the Report 73 Bom LR 371: Secondly, it is at once clear upon the terminology of the Explanation that it can never apply to a case under sub-section (3) (a) because the whole basis of the applicability of the explanation is the existence of a dispute as to the creases whereas the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lanation I of S. 12, Mr. Diwan contends that the Full Bench by necessary implication has come to the conclusion that it is immaterial whether the 'dispute' under Section 12(3)(a) is bona fide or not. According to him, the ratio of the Full Bench expressed in the above referred to passages is that the nature of the dispute in Section 12(3)(a) cannot be different from the one contemplated in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11. If the bona fides or otherwise of the tenant in making an application under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11 are irrelevant, they would be equally irrelevant in the case of a dispute referred to in sub-section (3) (a). We are unable to accept these submissions of Mr. Diwan. It is true that the word 'dispute in relation to standard rent and permitted increases occurs in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 11 and sub-section (3) (a) and Explanation I to Section 12. It is true that in a broad sense, all the four cases contemplate of raising a dispute by the tenant, and such a dispute necessarily relates to the standard rent and/or permitted increases. It appears to us that it is only in a broad context and for the limited purpose of deciding ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the rate of ₹ 26 per month when the contractual rent agreed upon was ₹ 28 per month. Such a case cannot fall under Section 12(3)(a) . These observations tend to indicate that even the Full Bench assumed for the purposes of the reference before them that the dispute raised by the tenant was bona fide . Taking into consideration all the aspects of the matter, we are unable to accept Mr. Diwan's contention that the ratio decidendi of the Full bench decision binds us to the conclusion that the word dispute in Section 12(3)(a) means any dispute, whether bona fide or otherwise. It would not be proper to deduce such a ratio by taking into consideration a few observations out of a long and elaborate judgment of the Full Bench. The observations relied on by Mr. Diwan may at best from a basis for a logical argument in support of his contention that the word dispute must not be given a restricted meaning. But the logical corollary that may seem to follow from such observations cannot be said to be the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Full Bench which will be a binding precedent. More over, we do not think that the Full Bench ever considered the question about t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not found there unless strong and compelling reasons are found within the four corners of the Act itself. he further submits that the only possible way of construing the word dispute in Section 12(3)(a) is merely to find out whether there is a dispute or there is no dispute : and there is no justification whatsoever to add the word bona fide in the sub-section which is not there. He further submits that there is intrinsic evidence in the Act itself that whenever the Legislature intended to bring in the concept of bona fides, it has used the word in other section of the Act. According to him, dispute means that somebody alleges one way and the other party may allege in the other way. The question of the allegation being bona fide or not is irrelevant. He says that Section 12(3)(a) is a special case and provides for an exception, and as such, it must be strictly construed and its area should nt be unduly enlarged. The word dispute in Section 11(1)(e), 11(2), Explanation 'I' to Section 12, and in Section 12(3)(a) must be attributed the same meaning; if Section 11(1)(e), 11(2) and Explanation 'I' do not contemplate that the dispute raised should be bona fide ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a proper construction of a statuary provision in which the words occur. often enough, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject-matter of the statute and the object which it is intended to achieve. The words should be construed in the light of their context rather than what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from their context ..... (See Sheikh Gulfan v. Sant Kumar, [1965]3SCR364 ). It is also well settled that the intention of the Legislature has clearly to be gathered from the actual words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal grammatical meaning. But when there is doubt about their meaning, the words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view ......... (See State of U. P. v. C. Tobit, 1958CriLJ809 - the Head note). Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible for more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects or consequences which would result from it, for they often point out the real meaning of the words. These are certain objects which the legislature is presum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account to ascertain the intention of the legislature such as the history of the Act, the reason which led to its being passed the mischief which had to be cured as well as the cure as also the other provision of the statute.........(See S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen, [1963]49ITR1(SC) . 45. Having regard to the rules of construction referred to above, the intention of the Legislature assumes paramount importance. For this purpose, the statute has to be construed as a whole. We have already noted above the broad features of the scheme of the Rent Act. The preamble of the Act indicates that the intention is to control rents and evictions. The object appears to be not to put a complete ban on evictions of tenants, but only to control eviction. By enacting the various provisions of the Rent Act, the Legislature has in effect modified the general law as contained in Section 106 and the subsequent provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and imposed certain condition under which alone the tenants can be evicted from the premises occupied by them. The provisions regarding eviction are contained primarily in Section 12 and 13 of the Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the tenant. It would appears from the provisions of sub-section (1) that the Legislature intended to give protection to a bona fide tenant who actually wanted to pay or was ready and willing to pay. These provisions of sub-section (2) and Explanation I have been enacted with a view to give a further chance to honest tenants to make payment by clearing off the arrears or resorting to the machinery provided by Explanation I. Failure of the tenant to pay in spite of the notice by the landlord under sub-section (2) results in the curtailment of the protection given to him, subject, however to his taking advantage of the machinery provided. If he avails of the Explanation I, he continues to be protected as by legal fiction, he is deemed to be ready and willing to pay. Section 12(3)(a) deals with cases to which Section 12(1) does not apply and a vested right is created in a landlord on fulfillment of the four conditions mentioned therein. The four conditions are, - (1) that the rent is payable monthly; (2) that there is no dispute regarding the amount of the standard rent or permitted increases; (3) that such rent or increases should be in arrears for a period of six months; and (4) that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ow assume that the landlord has been able to establish the three conditions laid down in sub-section (3) (a), viz., (i) the rent is payable monthly; (ii) the rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months; and (iii) the tenant neglects to make the payment until expiration of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), The bone of contention between the parties relates to the fourth condition, viz., that there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases. In view of the judgment of the Full Bench in AIR1971Bom396 FB), there can be no dispute that the tenant is entitled to raise a contention about the standard rent and permitted in creases for the first item in his written statement. 46. The crucial point for consideration is whether the dispute contemplated by Section 12(3)(a) should necessarily be a bona fide dispute. Can it be said to be the intention of the Legislature to give protection to a tenant who just raises the contention about the standard rent or permitted increases in the written statement, although the plea may be frivolous, baseless or mala fide? The learned counsel for the tenant naturally submits that we sh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vested right of the landlord is only to raise a plea about the standard rent in his written statement. It would be unreasonable to hold that such was the intention contemplated by the Legislature. The scheme of Section 12 would show that the protection is extended to honest tenants. We find that there are other indications as well to support the view that we are inclined to take. 48. Section 11-A precludes a Court from entertaining a plea of standard rent or permitted increases being excessive if the same are already fixed on merits by the Court except on proof of fraud or collusion or an error of the facts, and there has been no structural alterations or change in circumstances. Now, it is difficult to hold that even if a tenant is barred from raising a plea about standard rent or permitted in creases in the written statement and take the case out of the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) . If a literal meaning is given to the word 'dispute in Section 12(3)(a), in such a case absurd results would follow; for, although he is precluded by the judgment of the Court and barred from raising a plea under Section 11-A, he would be free to merely raise such a plea howsoever dishonest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ngness in favour of the tenant has been introduced giving protection to him where he has a dispute about standard rent and permitted increases. The very fact that the tenant resorts to the machinery provided by Explanation I read with Section II within the prescribed period would prima facie show that he was ready and willing to pay rent but had a genuine reason for withholding payment . The Legislature has deliberately created a case of conclusive evidence of readiness and willingness to pay to give protection to the tenant. There can be no dispute that the protection is further extended to honest tenant who had a genuine dispute about standard rent and permitted increases, about standard rent and permitted increases, but who for some reason could not take the advantage of the machinery provided by Explanation I, and such a tenant six allowed to raise the dispute for the first time in his written statement under Section 12(3)(a) Can it be said that the Legislature intended to extend this protection to dishonest tenants who have no genuine and bona fide dispute about standard rent or permitted increases but still raise such a dispute for the first time in the written statement? The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... umstances mentioned in the section. The word may has been substituted by the word shall by Maharastra Act 14 of 1963; but this change has not made any change in the legal position. Even when the word may found place in Section 12(3)(a), it was construed to mean shall . It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to confer a vested right in the landlord a dn also made it mandatory on the Court to pass a decree for eviction. On fulfilment of the four conditions. On fulfilment of the four conditions load down in Section 12(3)(a), the Court is bound to pass a decree, and no option is left to the Court. It may further be noted that even with regard the tender in Court of the standard rent and permitted increase,s the original provisions of Section 12(3) were liberal, for the tender could be made at the hearing of the suit. This was interpreted to mean that the tent could deposit the amount at any time till the disposal of the suit, and evening appeal, for the appeal is considered to be a continuation of the suit. However, Section 12(3)(b), on the other hand, makes the provision less liberal by providing that the tenant must pay or tender in Court the standard rent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the intention of the Legislature to give a restricted meaning to the word dispute but giving an enlarged or plain or grammatical meaning to the word dispute would lead to absurd results, and it is also likely to render the provisions of Section 12(3)(a) incorporated by amendments by the Legislature infructuous and nugatory. 53. Mr. Diwan, however, submits that there was no reason why the Legislature should not have made its intention clear by using the word bona fide in Section 12(3)(a). In this connection, he has drawn our attention to the provisions of sub-clauses (g),(h) and (hh) of sub-s. (1) of Section 13 of the Act, where the legislature has used the word bona fide . The said provisions of Section 13 relate to the requirements of the landlord for certain purposes. In that context, the Legislature has used the word bona fide in Section 13. Section 30 deals with the powers of the Court to award compensation to the defendant or the opponent by the plaintiff or applicant in any suit, proceeding or application , if the same is not instituted or made bona fide, or is false, frivolous or vexatious. If appears that these powers are similar to those under Section 35-A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... act, Explanation I specifically refers to the making of an application by the tenant under Section 11(3). As stated earlier, the very fact that the tenant has made an application for fixation of standard rent within one month from the date of the receipt of the notice under Section 12(2) and continues to pay or tender the amount specified in the order made by the court is a conclusive evidence of his readiness and willingness to pay. If a tenant takes the advantage of Explanation I, it is irrelevant for the Court to consider whether the dispute raised by the tenant is bona fide or not, and, therefore, the Legislature cannot have intended that the word dispute in Explanation I should be given a restricted meaning. It would, therefore, appear that the word dispute in Explanation I should be given a restricted meaning. it would, therefore, appear that the word 'dispute in Section 11(1)(e), 11(2) and Explanation I has to be given its plain and grammatical meaning. It is true that in a broad sense, the dispute raised by the tenant by an application under Sections 11(1)(e), 11(2) or Explanation I, as well as the dispute raised by the tenant in his written statement under Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on to the general rule laid down in Section 12(1) and the rule of interpretation requires that such, a provision must be strictly construed; and if two reasonable and possible construction are available then the one which does not expand the ambit of the sub-section should be selected. Once we come to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to use the word dispute as a bona fide dispute, this argument too can have no force. To us, it appears that the only reasonable and proper construction of the word dispute in Section 12(3)(a) would to be construe the sand as a bona fide dispute . and not any dispute. 57. It is further urged on behalf of the tenant that the expression bona fide is vague and uncertain and incapable of application by a Court of law in a rational manner to the facts of a given case, as the word has neither been defined in the Act nro are there any guidelines in the Act nor are there any guidelines in the provisions of the Act on the basis of the which the Court would be able to decide whether the dispute raised by a tenant is bona fide or otherwise. We are unable to see any force in this contention. In our opinion, the question as to whether the d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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