TMI Blog1972 (4) TMI 109X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as the Act). She claimed compensation of ₹ 70,000/- and ₹ 5,000/- for expenses, pain and suffering. The Tribunal awarded a sum of ₹ 25,000/-. In support of her case, the father of the boy and one Doraiswami Iyengar, a retired teacher of the school, were examined as witnesses, while on the other side the bus driver, the conductor and the Joint Regional Transport Officer were examined. P.W. 2, the teacher, has given evidence that he was standing opposite to the State Bank of India at about 4 p.m. on 18-10-1967, that school children were coming out of the school, that the bus was going fast from south to north towards the bus stand and the boy was run over by the bus. There is no effective cross-examination and nothing is suggested to him that the accident happened in any other manner that the boy was run over on account of the boy's negligence and no theory is suggested to this witness to make out that the driver of the bus was not negligent and that the accident occurred on account of the negligence of the boy suddenly running across the bus or at the rear side of the bus. In the counter of the bus owner it was stated that the accident occurred because the boy ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... enly darted across the road and got involved in the accident. This evidence is given especially when the criminal prosecution was pending against the driver at that time. We have not the slightest hesitation in accepting the finding of the Tribunal that the death was due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus by the driver without taking any care or caution in the matter. 2. On the question of the quantum of compensation, the learned counsel for both sides invited our attention to several decisions. Learned Counsel addressed arguments based upon a comparative statement as revealed in the several decisions cited with reference to the victim's age at the time of his death, the age of the claimant, if the victim had been in employment, what salary or remuneration he was earning, the prospect in the increase of his emoluments if he had led a normal life up to the end of his career the contributions likely to be made to the claimant out of the victim's earnings, the affluence and the wealth of the claimant and the damages awarded in the individual cases. A study of the decisions reveals how wide is the variation between the judgments of various courts in assessing under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... several elements which enter into the computation. The precedents while enunciating that the Court has ample latitude in the matter have at the same time laid down certain technical rules in the form of guide-lines which to some extent detract from the amplitude of the discretion of the court. It is in this environment that the new set of provisions were introduced into the Motor Vehicles Act constituting a self-contained machinery. The new provisions do not either impliedly or expressly incorporate the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act but deliberately leave the jurisdiction, powers and discretion of the court unfettered by imposing the only condition that the tribunal should enquire into the claim and determine the amount of compensation which should be 'just'. Our attention was drawn to certain decisions arising out of the claims under the Motor Vehicles Act as amended in 1956 revealing a divergence of view on the question whether the newly introduced provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act are self contained and constitute an exhaustive machinery or whether the ultimate liability should be determined only in accordance with the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Devi Sohaney v. Govt. of Madhya Pradesh, AIR1971MP113 , a different view was taken to the effect that the tribunal has to award such compensation as may be 'just' and that the tribunal need not strictly follow the decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act. The attention of the Bench was not drawn to the earlier decision. The Bench observed that the expression 'just' in Section 110-B is wide in ambit than the words used in Sections 1-A and 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act and that the tribunal has to only consider what appears to it to be just compensation and it need not strictly follow and apply the basis of the assessment of compensation indicated in the various decisions under the Fatal Accidents Act, Indian or English, though they may be merely of general guidance. The Bench also observed that the decisions in India and England arising under the Fatal Accidents Act may be applicable only in so far as 'they promote interests of justice' under the facts and circumstances of each particular case to help the Tribunal to award compensation which is just. 5. We may at this stage refer to the Bench decision of this court consisting of Anantanarayanan, C. J. and R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eral law of Torts and in the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act has developed considerably for over a century and for over three or four decades motor accidents fatal or otherwise, have increased beyond all proportion. The classical statement of the House of Lords in Rose v. Ford, 1937 AC 826 in the Benham's case, 1941 AC 157 in the oft-quoted case Davies v. Powell Duffreyn Associated Collieries Ltd., 1942 ACJ 601 will show the many imponderables and difficult problems which the courts have solved in assessing the compensation in each case. Winfield on Tort, 8th Edition, at page 627, in the paragraph under the caption 'Criticism of the existing law' has observed that the law is still not entirely satisfactory and that the Court must discharge a solemn duty (go through the solemn farce of putting a value on such an incalculable thing). It is because of this reason that the Indian Legislature did not want to incorporate the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act into the Motor Vehicles Act and defined the powers and jurisdiction of the tribunal in a wide and comprehensive term and that what the tribunal decides must be a just compen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e its colour from the main purpose and object of the enactment, Further, as observed by Rajamannar, C. J., in V. G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 147, Even ideas of what is just differ from age to age. What may seem to be just to one man in one age may appear to another man in another age totally differently . It is enough to hold that the word ' just' in Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act has been used in a very wide and comprehensive sense. 6. We are therefore of the view that there is no warrant for literally importing the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act into Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act so as to read both the provisions as part and parcel of one provision. By this we should not be understood as saying that the Tribunal can adopt any method which is arbitrary and capricious or in disregard of well-established principles. The decisions rendered under the general law of Torts and under the Fatal Accidents Act will undoubtedly be relevant and constitute broad guidelines, but they would not be binding upon the Tribunal in the sense that the method of approach should be the same and identical as in the cases arising under the Fatal Accidents A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e only limitation is, the court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in the realm of speculation or fancy or mere sentiment or emotion. The amount fixed ultimately depends upon an objective estimate of what kind of future on earth the victim might have enjoyed, the loss of benefit to the parents on the dependents; in the nature of things, no guidelines in the abstract can be laid down. 9. As regards the measure of liability in the case of motor accidents, the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Gobald Motor Service v. Velusami, [1962]1 SCR 929 and C. K. S. Iyer v. T. K. Nair, [1970]2 SCR 688 have (after a discussion of all the leading decisions in England) laid down the main principles. Both the decisions did not have to consider the measure of liability under Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. We may now take it as settled law that under the Fatal Accidents Act the liability under Section 1 and Section 2 are distinct, different and independent. Under Section 1, damages are recoverable for the benefit of persons mentioned therein as loss sustained by them, while under Section 2, damages are awarded for the recoupment of the pecuniary loss to the esta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary inference can I think be drawn from circumstances other than and different from them.' The Supreme Court summed up the law in these terms at pages 380 and 381:-- The law on the point arising for decision can be summed up thus: Compulsory damages under Section 1-A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under Section 2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ircumstances tending to show whether the victim would have a predominantly happy life or a life of misery or a life of despondence or an insipid life. Even though it depends upon very many uncertain factors, the Tribunal has to take an overall picture and form its estimate though, to some extent, it must be based upon speculation. (2) The pecuniary loss sustained by the persons entitled to claim compensation as a result of the accident. In determining the pecuniary loss, say, the age of the boy at the time of his death, the age of the parents and the prospects of the boy contributing his earnings to the parents will have to be taken note of. In the case of a father and an only son, it is difficult to formulate a uniform rule that, because the father himself is carrying on business with affluence, there will not be any contribution by the deceased if he had not met with the accident. It cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious to visualise that both the father and the son would have together pooled up their resources and income and augmented their wealth. The pecuniary loss will have to be evaluated with reference to several considerations and the pecuniary loss to the family wi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for loss of the amenities of life like the loss of opportunity to marry, earn a livelihood and to enjoy life. The fact that the father of the infant was an executive earning .1250 per year was also taken into account. Lord Parker C. J. who tried the action and awarded .11,000 as damages, observed as follows, at page 679: The infant plaintiff is, I think, entitled to something for what he has lost, whether he knows he has lost it or not, albeit that the amount may well be less than in the case of a person who has enjoyed life and amenities and knows that he has lost them. The trouble, however, is to put that into money. There are so many imponderables, especially in the case of such a young child. As far as loss of earnings is concerned, the considerations involved again cannot easily be put into pounds, shillings and pence. Here against, there are imponderables. What education would the parents have been able to give the child? If not, how far would the child succeed? What trade or profession would he take up and what would he have earned? There is no conceivable clue to that. The only guide, if it be any guide at all--and I do not think it is--is that his father is working i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and my brethren all think otherwise. I can give no adequate reason to support a higher figure or to show that on figure is righter than the other. There is no norm by which one can say that this figure is right and the other wrong. To say in Shelley's words, 'I cannot argue I can only feel' may be permitted in a jury-man but it is rarely a sound foundation for a judgment. Here, the Lord Chief Justice has impeccably balanced all the relevant matters with sympathy and anxious consideration and arrived at a conclusion. One certainly cannot say that it was wholly erroneous. I would therefore somewhat regretfully agree with my brethren's view that the appeal must be dismissed. With respect, these observations apply to the instant case 'which is unique' and we ourselves cannot give any cogent reasons for saying that some other figure would be more right than the figure awarded by the Tribunal. It is unnecessary to discuss the matter further; the appellate Court would be slow to interfere with the verdict of the Tribunal, as it is inevitable that in assessing the damages, elements of estimate and to some extent, conjecture and a balancing of chances and change ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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