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TMI Blog2022 (7) TMI 1114X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of November, 2012, the accused took a friendly loan of Rs.15,00,000/- from the complainant and agreed to repay the loan within five months. It was alleged that the accused No.2 is the Director of accused No.1 and was responsible and In-charge of business/the day to day affairs of the accused No.1 at the time of issuance of the cheque. On 20.05.2013, the complainant approached the accused No.2 and demanded the money back. On this, the accused No.2 issued cheque bearing No.461676 dated 20.05.2013 amounting to Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lacs only) of UCO Bank, Branch G.T. Road, Jalandhar City to the complainant to discharge his liability. The complainant presented the above said cheque in his Banker i.e. Union Bank of India, Branch Dhariwal for encashment The said cheque was sent by the Banker of the complainant to the Banker of the accused and the same was dishonoured and returned back vide memo dated 17.08.2013 with remarks "Funds Insufficient". 3. After considering the preliminary evidence led by the complainant, the Court found sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused under Section 138 of the NI Act and both the accused were summoned on 10.04.2014. The accused pleadi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nant. The complainant opted to lead defence but did not lead any defence evidence and closed the same. 6. Counsel for the complainant argued that the accused had availed a friendly loan of the amount of Rs.15,00,000/- in the month of November 2012 and he did not pay back the above said friendly loan and issued cheque bearing No. 461676 (EX.C-1) in the sum of Rs.15,000,00/-. The complainant presented the cheque for encashment, but it was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds and was returned vide memo (Ex.C-2). The complainant served legal notice (Ex.C-3) upon the accused calling upon him to make the payment SHO within 15 days. But he failed to make the payment, so accused had committed an offence under section 138 of Act and he is liable to be convicted. 7. The defence counsel argued that the complainant had failed to prove that the cheque (Ex.C-1) was issued by the accused in favour of the complainant to discharge his legal liability. In fact the accused never raised any friendly loan from the complainant nor issued the cheque (Ex.C-1) in favour of the complainant. The complainant had family and business dealings with Gurpartap Singh Wadala, the MLA of Nakodar constituenc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Further no attempt had been made to stop payments on the cheque by issuing any communication to the bank. He submits that the accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did not claim that the complainant did not have the financial capacity to advance the loan to him and documents (Mark-1 to Mark-8) would show that he had the requisite financial capacity to be able to provide financial assistance to the accused. 11. With respect to the contention of the complainant that a presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque existed in view of the provisions of the Act, it would be necessary to first examine the relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, reads as under:- "118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:- (a) of consideration -that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;" Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, reads as under:- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d furthermore although provided for the mode and manner of rebuttal of such presumption as regards the right to mines and minerals said to be vested in the Government vis- a-vis the absence thereof in relation to the lands presumed to be retained by the landowners but the same would not mean that the words "shall presume" would be conclusive. The meaning of the expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" have been explained in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, 1872, from a perusal whereof it would be evident that whenever it is directed that the court shall presume a fact it shall regard such fact as proved unless disproved. In terms of the said provision, thus, the expression "shall presume" cannot be held to be synonymous with "conclusive proof". 31.In terms of Section 4 of the Evidence Act whenever it is provided by the Act that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. The words 'proved' and 'disproved' have been defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act (the interpretation clause) to mean: - "Proved- A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt". 34.This Court, therefore, clearly opined that it is not necessary for the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by way of direct evidence. 35. The standard of proof evidently is pre-ponderance of probabilities. Inference of pre-ponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials on records but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. *** *** *** 42. A presumption is a legal or factual assumption drawn from the existence of certain facts. 43. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, at page 3697, the term 'presumption& ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable possibility of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists". Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the "prudent man"." 46.The court, however, in the fact situation obtaining therein, was not required to go into the question as to whether an accused can discharge the onus placed on him even from the materials ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n presumptions to be raised. This Section lays down some special rules of evidence relating to presumptions. The reason for these presumptions is that, negotiable instrument passes from hand to hand on endorsement and it would make trading very difficult and negotiability of the instrument impossible, unless certain presumptions are made. The presumption, therefore, is a matter of principle to facilitate negotiability as well as trade. Section 118 of the Act provides presumptions to be raised until the contrary is proved (i) as to consideration, (ii) as to date of instrument, (iii) as to time of acceptance, (iv) as to time of transfer, (v) as to order of indorsements, (vi) as to appropriate stamp and (vii) as to holder being a holder in due course. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. Presumptions are devices by use of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Indian Evi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. 11. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. The accused in a trial ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... accepted by the court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue. 12. The defence of the appellant was that he had agreed to purchase woolen carpets from the respondent and had issued the cheques by way of advance and that the respondent did not supply the carpets. It is the specific case of the respondent that he had sold woolen carpets to the appellant on 6.8.1994 and in discharge of the said liability the appellant had issued two cheques, which were ultimately dishonoured. In support of his case the respondent produced the carbon copy of the bill. A perusal of the bill makes it evident that there is no endorsement made by the respondent accepting the correctness of the contents of the bill. The bill is neither signed by the appellant. On the contrary, the appellant examined one official from the Sales Tax Department, who positively asserted before the Court that the respondent had filed sales tax return for the Assessment Year 1994-95 indicating that no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Act can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on account of 'stop payment' instructions sent by the accused to his bank in respect of a post-dated cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds in the account. This position was clarified by this Court in Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza, 2003(2) RCR (Criminal) 131 : 2004(1) Apex Criminal 55 : (2003) 3 SCC 232, wherein it was held : "Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business transactions. These provisions were intended to discourage people from not honouring their commitments by way of payment through cheques. The court should lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely. The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommod ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ended to the said section provides for compliance with legal requirements before a complaint petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139 of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued for discharge of any debt or other liability. 31. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on the basis that for proving the defence the accused is required to step into the witness box and unless he does so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct. 32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Bratindranath Banerjee, 2001(3) RCR (Criminal) 460 : (2001) 6 SCC 16, it was held (Ruma Pal, J. at Paras. 22- 23): "22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court 'shall presume' the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn, , it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of the presumption has been established. It introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused (). Such a presumption is a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which describes provisions by which the court may presume a certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable probability of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. 23. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... consideration was improbably or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of proving the non-existence of the consideration can be either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by showing the non-existence of the consideration, the plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour. The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in vie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ose that no consideration and debt existed. Further, specific defence in this regard may not have to be led by the accused but he can rely on the cross-examination of the complainant and his witnesses to rebut the said presumption. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. 14. In the present case, the complainant has been unable to establish his financial capacity to advance such a huge loan to the respondent/accused. In fact, he has categorically admitted that he did not possess any documents to establish the alleged transaction. This becomes even more glaring because the appellant is an educated person being an advocate. Further, the complainant has not been able to establish a close friendly relationship with the accused; he did not know the name of the wife of the accused, the details of his other family members or the residential address of the accused. It does not stand to reason that a person would advance a loan of Rs.15 lakhs to a virtually unknown person whose residential address is also not to his knowledge. Interestingly, he has not mentioned any specific date of the issuance of the friendly loan either in the examin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of innocence in favour of an accused person and cannot lose sight of the fact that the said presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial Court and so, the fact that the accused person is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt will always be present in the mind of the High Court when it deals with the merits of the case. As an appellate Court the High Court is generally slow in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, particularly when the said finding is based on an appreciation of oral evidence because the trial Court has the advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses who have given evidence. Thus, though the powers of the High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those which it has in dealing with an appeal against conviction, in-dealing with the former class of appeals, its approach is governed by the overriding consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence. Sometimes, the width- of the power is emphasized, while on other occasions, the necessity to adopt a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals is emphasised, and the emphasis is expressed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 and Harbans Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 439; and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse. Therefore, the question which we have to ask ourselves in the present appeals is whether on the material produced by the prosecution, the High Court was justified in reaching the conclusion that the prosecution case against the appellants had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the contrary view taken by the trial Court was erroneous. In answering this question, we would, no doubt, consider the salient and broad features of the evidence in order to appreciate the grievance made by the appellants against the conclusions of the High Court. But under Article 136 we would ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the High Court particularly where the said findings are based on appreciation of oral evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "C. Antony Versus K.G. Raghavan Nair, 2002(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 750, hel ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court, or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision. (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of acquittal. (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. (4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal were culled out: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... v. State of Bihar (2003 (11) SCC 519), State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003 (11) SCC 271), State of Punjab v. Phola Singh (2003 (11) SCC 58), Suchand Pal v. Phani Pal (2003 (11) SCC 527) and Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. (2004 (11) SCC 410). [Emphasis supplied] The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the matter of Nagbhushan V. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 222, as under: "5.2 Before considering the appeal on merits, the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal is required to be considered. 5.2.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189, this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. 1973 In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:- 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the mo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ent under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference." (emphasis supplied) 5.2.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under: "20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is"against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable.Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)" . 8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babula Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... es were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10). "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.PC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the wellestablished rule that the presumption of innocen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible. [Emphasis supplied] This Court "Rekha Versus State of Haryana & another, 2019(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 294", held as under:- "13.While granting the leave applied for, this Court is to bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the Fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person is presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but re-inforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. When two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." [Emphasis supplied] 17. The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court are to the effect that while an Appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acqu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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