TMI Blog2022 (7) TMI 1114X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ination-in-chief or in the body of the complaint. He has further been discrepant about when the cheque had been issued to him i.e. either at the time he had advanced the loan or 05 months thereafter, when he had sought the return of the said amount. A perusal of the cheque would also reveal that the signatures of the accused have been affixed with green ink while the particulars of the cheque have been filled with blank ink. This fact also remained unexplained by the accused. With respect to the involvement of Gurpartap Singh Wadal, it may be pertinent to mention here that the complainant himself had very close friendly relations with the said person, though he has tried to explain during his cross-examination that the relationship with the accused developed through the above-said Gurpartap Singh Wadala. Strangely, this fact too has not been mentioned in the complaint. The accused-respondent has been able to rebut the presumption of there being a legally enforceable debt - thus, the respondent accused has been able to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued in the discharge of a legally enforceable debt and the view taken by the Trial Court while acquitting the accu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .04.2014. The accused pleading not guilty to the notice of accusation under Section 138 of Act and claimed trial. 4. In after notice evidence, the preliminary evidence of the complainant was considered as envisaged in the case of Indian Bank Association and others Versus Union of India and others 2014(2) RCR (Cri.) 598 which is the evidence of Gurbakhsh Singh as CW-1, who tendered into evidence his duly sworn affidavit (Ex.CW-1/A), the original cheque bearing No.461676 dated 20.05.2013 (Ex.C-1), original memo dated 17.08.2013 (Ex.C-2), copy of legal notice dated 09.09.2013 (Ex.C-3) and postal receipt (Ex.C-4) and closed the same. Thereafter, in additional evidence, the complainant tendered into evidence the copy of sale deed dated 12.12.2012 (Mark-1), copy of sale deed dated 12.12.2012 (Mark-2), copy of sale deed dated 07.02.2013 (Mark-3), copy of sale deed dated 07.02.2013 (Mark-4), copy of sale deed dated 01.03.2013 (Mark-5), copy of sale deed dated 01.03.2013 (Mark-6), agreement to sell dated 05.11.2012 (Mark-7) and copy of agreement to sell dated 05.11.2012 (Mark-8) and closed the after notice evidence. 5. After closure of the complainant's evidence, the incriminating ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dala, the MLA of Nakodar constituency and the cheque (Ex.C1) was given to the above said person as security. The complainant had misused the cheque after receiving the same from Gurpartap Singh Wadala. Further the complainant had failed to prove that he had friendly relations with the accused. The complainant had failed to establish his financial capacity to loan such a huge amount of Rs.15 lakhs. The security cheque, which was given to Gurpartap Singh Wadala, had been misused against the accused. Therefore, the accused sought acquittal. 8. After hearing the counsel for the complainant and the accused, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the accused had been able to rebut the presumption of the cheque having been issued for the discharge of a legally enforceable debt. Firstly, on account of the fact that the complainant had failed to establish his financial capacity to advance such a huge amount. Secondly, the complainant was unable to establish his close relationship with the accused so as to be able to advance a loan to the accused. Thirdly, the complainant did not specify as to on which specific date the friendly loan had been advanced, despite the fact that he was an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Negotiable Instruments Act, reads as under:- 139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in section 138, for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. 12. The Hon ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of statutory presumptions and rebuttal thereof in a number of judgments some of which have been discussed hereinbelow:- In K.N. Beena Versus Maniyappan, 2001(4) R.C.R (Criminal) 545 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: 6. In our view the impugned Judgment cannot be sustained at all. The Judgment erroneously proceeds on the basis that the burden of proving consideration for a dishonoured cheque is on the complainant. It appears that the learned Judge had lost sight of Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Under Section 118, unless the contrary was proved, it is to be presumed that the Negotiable Instrument (including a cheque) had been made or drawn for consideration. Under Section 139 the Court has to presume, unless the contrary was proved, that the holder of the cheque r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Disproved- A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. 32.Applying the said definitions of 'proved' or 'disproved' to principle behind Section 118(a) of the Act, the Court shall presume a negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration does not exist. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 43. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, at page 3697, the term 'presumption' has been defined as under: A presumption is an inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known arising from its connection with another which is known. A presumption is a conclusion drawn from the proof of facts or circumstances and stands as establishing facts until overcome by contrary proof. A presumption is a probable consequence drawn from facts (either certain, or proved by direct testimony) as to the truth of a fact alleged but of which there is no direct proof. It follows, therefore that a presumption of any fact is an inference of that fact from others that are known . (per ABBOTT, C.J., R. v. Burdett, 4 B. Ald, 161). The word 'Presumption' inherently imports an act of reasoning- a conclusion of the judgment; and it is applied to denote such facts or moral phenomena, as from experience we known to be invariably, or commonly, connected with some other related facts. (Wills on Circumstantial Evidence). A presumption is a probable inference which common sense draws from circumstances usually occurring in such cases ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... taining therein, was not required to go into the question as to whether an accused can discharge the onus placed on him even from the materials brought on records by the complainant himself. Evidently in law he is entitled to do so. 47. In Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'Souza and Another [(2003) 3 SCC 232], upon which reliance was placed by the learned counsel, this Court held that the presumption arising under Section 139 of the Act can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who want to rebut the presumption. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether closure of accounts or stoppage of payment is sufficient defence to escape from the penal liability under Section 138 of the Act. The answer to the question was rendered in the negative. Such a question does not arise in the instant case. 48. In Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1316], Subba Rao, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, held that while considering the question as to whether burden of proof in terms of Section 118 had been discharged or not, relevant evidence cannot be permitted to be withheld. If ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of which the courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on an issue notwithstanding that there is no evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the Indian Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one or the other class of the three classes mentioned in the Act, namely, (1) may presume (rebuttable), (2) shall presume (rebuttable) and (3) conclusive presumptions (irrebuttable). The term 'presumption' is used to designate an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence a fact, conveniently called the presumed fact drawn by a judicial tribunal, by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, either judicially noticed or admitted or established by legal evidence to the satisfaction of the tribunal. Presumption literally means taking as true without examination or proof . Section 4 of the Evidence Act inter-alia defines the words 'may presume' and 'shall presume as follows: - (a) 'may presume' - Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it. (b) 'shall presume' - Whenever ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d one official from the Sales Tax Department, who positively asserted before the Court that the respondent had filed sales tax return for the Assessment Year 1994-95 indicating that no sale of woolen carpets had taken place during the said Assessment Year and, therefore, sales tax was not paid. The said witness also produced the affidavit sworn by the respondent indicating that during the year 1994-95 there was no sale of woolen carpets by the respondent. Though the complainant was given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, nothing could be elicited during his cross-examination so as to create doubt about his assertion that no transaction of sale of woolen carpets was effected by the respondent during the year 1994-95. Once the testimony of the official of the Sales Tax Department is accepted, it becomes evident that no transaction of sale of woolen carpets had taken place between the respondent and the appellant, as alleged by the respondent. When sale of woolen carpets had not taken place, there was no existing debt in discharge of which, the appellant was expected to issue cheques to the respondent. Thus the accused has discharged the onus of proving that th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a post-dated cheque is to provide some accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of Section 138. A contrary view would render Section 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts which in other words can be said to be taking advantage of one's own wrong. ... 10. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant-accused that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable deb ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f placed upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials already brought on record. An accused has a constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution in a criminal case is different. ... ..... ...... ...... ...... 34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of the accused is 'preponderance of probabilities'. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he relies. (emphasis supplied) Specifically in relation to the nature of the presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act, it was observed; 45. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable probability of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. 23. In other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of law exists, the discretion is left with the Court to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the prudent man. (emphasis supplied) 12. The respondent-claimant has also referred to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... istence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff. To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring on record such facts and circumstances upon consideration of which the court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist. Interestingly, the very same extract has also been approvingly cited in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra). 13. With regard to the facts in the present case, we can also refer to the following observations in M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. v. Medchl Chemicals Pharma (P) Ltd., 2002(1) RCR (Criminal) 318 : (2002) 1 SCC 234 (Para. 19) : ... The authority shows that even when the cheque is dishonoured by reason of stop payment instruction, by virtue of Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of 'preponderance of probabilities'. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own. (Emphasis supplied) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basalingappa Versus Mudibasappa, 2019(2) R.C.R (Criminal) 863 , held as under:- 23. We having noticed the ratio laid down by this Court in above cases on Sections 118(a) and 139, we now summarise the principles enumerated by this Court in following manner:- (i) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... al address of the accused. It does not stand to reason that a person would advance a loan of Rs.15 lakhs to a virtually unknown person whose residential address is also not to his knowledge. Interestingly, he has not mentioned any specific date of the issuance of the friendly loan either in the examination-in-chief or in the body of the complaint. He has further been discrepant about when the cheque had been issued to him i.e. either at the time he had advanced the loan or 05 months thereafter, when he had sought the return of the said amount. A perusal of the cheque would also reveal that the signatures of the accused have been affixed with green ink while the particulars of the cheque have been filled with blank ink. This fact also remained unexplained by the accused. With respect to the involvement of Gurpartap Singh Wadal, it may be pertinent to mention here that the complainant himself had very close friendly relations with the said person, though he has tried to explain during his cross-examination that the relationship with the accused developed through the above-said Gurpartap Singh Wadala. Strangely, this fact too has not been mentioned in the complaint. All these facto ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eals, its approach is governed by the overriding consideration flowing from the presumption of innocence. Sometimes, the width- of the power is emphasized, while on other occasions, the necessity to adopt a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals is emphasised, and the emphasis is expressed in different words or phrases used from time to time. But the true legal position is that however circumspect and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This position has been clarified by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. The, King Emperor, (1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 398: AIR 1934 PC 227 and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 151. (17) In some of the earlier decisions of this Court, however, in emphasizing the importance of adopting a cautious approach in dealing with appeals against acquittals, it was observed that the presumption of innocence is reinforced by the order of acquittal and so, the findings of the trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gh Court. But under Article 136 we would ordinarily be reluctant to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the High Court particularly where the said findings are based on appreciation of oral evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in C. Antony Versus K.G. Raghavan Nair, 2002(4) R.C.R. (Criminal) 750, held as under:- 6.This Court in a number of cases has held that though the appellate court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded, still while exercising such an appellate power in a case of acquittal, the appellate court, should not only consider every matter on record having a bearing on the question of fact and the reasons given by the courts below in support of its order of acquittal, it must express its reasons in the judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal is not justified. In those line of cases this Court has also held that the appellate court must also bear in mind the fact that the trial court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the presumption of innocence is not weakened by the order of acquittal, and in such cases if two reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal. (6) If, in any case, the application under subsection (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under subsection (1) or under sub-section (2). 6. Whereas Sections 379-380 cover special cases of appeals, other sections lay down procedure to be followed by appellate courts. 7. It may be stated that more or less similar provisions were found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the old Code ) which came up for consideration before various High Courts, Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. [Emphasis supplied] The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lunaram Versus Bhupat Singh others, 2010(5) R.C.R. (Criminal) 530, held as under:- 6. There is no embargo on the appellate court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. General ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1973 In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:- 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... noring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is against the weight of evidence , or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber Plastics v. CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P.(2009) 10 SCC 636). (emphasis supplied) 5.2.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 5.3 In the case of V ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babula Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well- considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.PC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the wellestablished rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of his innocence is certainly not weakened but re-inforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. When two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. [Emphasis supplied] 17. The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court are to the effect that while an Appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded, it is equally true that there is a double presumption in favour of the innocence of the accused, firstly on account of the presumption of innocence available to an accused and secondly on account of the fact that the competent Court has acquitted the accused and therefore, if two reasonable conclusions were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court. However, where the judgment appealed against is totally perverse and the findings have been arriv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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