TMI Blog1980 (7) TMI 277X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty from handing over possession of these flats to respondents Nos. 2 to 10. The Board of Nominees also stayed the implementation of the resolution which was challenged before it. 2. On 27th May 1978, a Commissioner was appointed by the Board of Nominees to report on the state of construction of the flats in question. 3. The Commissioner, after inspecting the site, reported that the society had not handed over possession of the flats in question to respondents Nos. 2 to 10 and, that respondents Nos. 2 to 10 bad not taken their possession. The flats under construction were not complete and were, therefore, not habitable. Respondent No. 9 signed the Commissioner's report. 4. The petitioner alleges that respondents Nos. 2 to 10 thereafter took possession of the flats in violation of the ad-interim injunction issued by the board of Nominees, completed the construction and occupied them. Therefore, the petitioner filed in this court miscellaneous civil application No. 105 of 1979 for taking, action against the respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. How ever, it appears that that petition was withdrawn because the ad-interim in junction which the Board of Nominees had iss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... itted willful breach of the ad-interim injunction issued by the Board of Nominees. He has not done so. It is the duty of the person who institutes an action to satisfy the court that it is within time. When we say so, we are assuming that the information supplied by the petitioner by filing the present petition amounted to the institution of an action against the respondents. When the petitioner was faced with this situation an attempt was made to argue that the petitioner had instituted earlier miscellaneous Civil Application No. 105 of 1979 in this Court and that the present proceedings were a continuation thereof. There cannot be a more untenable argument than one, which Mr. Ravel has raised on behalf of the petitioner. The earlier petition stood terminated finally when it was withdrawn by the petitioner. Thereafter, the Board of Nominee heard both the parties in the matter of ad-interim injunction issued by it earlier and made an order vacating it. Intervention of these two events totally disconnect the earlier proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act from the present proceedings. 7. It has also been argued by Mr. Raval in that behalf that once contempt is committed, unless ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... S. 29 are satisfied. He has further argued that if the terms of sub-see. (2) of S. 29 are satisfied, then, S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the present proceedings and this court has jurisdiction to condone delay. The argument which Mr. Raval has raised has over-simplified the problem which we are required to answer. It cannot be gainsaid -that in relation to Limitation Act, 1963, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is a special law. The schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any limitation for initiating proceedings under the Contempt o Courts Act, 1971. S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 fills up the lacuna and prescribes a period of limitation. He has further argued that no provision of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 expressly excludes the application of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963. This argument which Mr. Raval has raised cannot be controverter and yet, we are unable to accede to the argument which he has raised. It is not mere express exclusion of Ss. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which repels the applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings initiated under the Contempt of Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt's of itself. It appears to us that whereas in the case of a criminal contempt, the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General has been given a statutory right to make a motion to the court for taking action against the contemner, no such statutory right has been conferred upon any one in respect of the civil contempt. However, in the case of a civil contempt, ordinarily a person who is aggrieved by such act of contempt brings it to the notice of the court. Such a person, in our opinion, is nothing more than a relator. He cannot be elevated to the status of a petitioner or an applicant who has a right to institute an action and seek decision of the court- in his favour. Therefore, the word 'Application' used in subsection (2) of S. 29 does not have any reference to the information which a person supplies to the court in regard to an act of civil contempt. He may call it an application or petition. He may call hims ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the court in such proceedings, the question of condoning delay does not arise. Delay can be condoned in a case where a person who has a right to institute action has approached the court after the expiry of the period of limitation. S. 20 does not contemplate such situation. When the Court initiates contempt proceedings on its own motion, the question of condoning delay does not arise. To illustrate, if the court initiates proceedings after the expiry of the one-year from the date on which the alleged contempt was committed, who has to pray for condoning delay? Who has to bring on record the circumstances under which delay was caused in initiating the proceedings or in other words, does the court condone delay caused by it in initiating proceedings against the alleged contemner under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971? To say that the, court can condone its own delay is something which is beyond our comprehension so far as Section 20 is concerned. If the court has to condone its own delay, after trotting out reasons, the court shall be the prosecutor and the Judge ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ding, an application for condoning delay. It is not necessary for us to examine this question because since S. 9 of the Limitation Act is not available to the contempt proceedings, the question whether delay should be condoned before an action has been admitted to hearing or after it has been admitted to hearing, does not arise. 16. The view, which we take, leads us to the conclusion that the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 is a complete Code. As held by the Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mlshra [1974]3SCR31 - What the court has to see is whether the scheme of the special law and the nature of the remedy provided there, in are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete Code. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the special Act. 17. In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a complete- code and excludes provisions of Ss. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Bearing in mind this decision of the Supreme Court, we will examin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the court and the alleged contemner. No one has a statutory or common law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to move the court and draw its attention to the contempt alleged to- have been committed and it will then be for the court, if it so thinks fit, to take action to vindicate its authority and - commit the alleged contemner for contempt. It is for the court in the exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. Even if the court is prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed, the court may yet choose to ignore it and decline to take action. There is no right in any one to compel the court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima facie case appears to have been made out. The same position obtains even after a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the court on a motion made to it for the purpose. The court may in the exercise of its discretion accept an unconditional apology from the alleged contemner and drop the proceeding for contempt or even after the Alleged contemner is found guilt ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes Jurisdiction to punish for contempt the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in S. 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the court. Where the court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it-refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 22. The next decision is in Gulab Singh v. Ramji Das AIR1975All366 . In that case, the petitioner had brought to the notice of the Court the alleged acts of contempt within a period of one month, but the court did not pass any order before the expiry of period of one year. It was, therefore, argued on behalf of the petitioner in that case that the petitioner should not be allowed to suffer for the mistake of the court. He had done what was necessary for him to do and thereafter the enti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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