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TMI Blog2021 (3) TMI 1448X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at Annexures-C & D respectively to the writ petition. The petitioner sought for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act had lapsed as per Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the '2013 Act' for the sake of brevity) in respect of the following lands: Sl. No. Village Sy. No . Extent 1 Hosakerehalli 71/2 7A 6G 2 Pantharpalya 30 1A 23G 3 Pantharpalya 26 1A 08G 4 Pantharpalya 27 1A 02G 5 Pantharpalya 28 20 guntas 6 Pantharpalya 29 33 guntas 7 Pantharpalya 31 08 guntas 8 Pantharpalya 32 26 guntas 9 Pantharpalya 33 2A 1G 10 Pantharpalya 34 1A 31G 11 Pantharpalya 35 1A 08G 12 Pantharpalya 36 1A 10 G 13 Pantharpalya 45 2A 16G 3. According to the appellant/petitioner, the lands were acquired by late Patel Chikkahanumaiah under the respective inams abolition proceedings. Later, the lands were settled amongst the family members of the said Patel Chikkahanumaiah as per family settlement dated 26.12.1974. The aforesaid lands came to the share of the appellant herein, being one of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e with law and that the acquisition may be quashed insofar as the aforesaid extent of lands are concerned. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that there are certain additional documents which have to be considered in this appeal. If the same are considered, the impugned judgment would have to be then set aside. 9. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4 as well as learned counsel appearing for the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board ('KIADB' for short) submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition for two main reasons: firstly, that the appellant herein suppressed the fact that he had earlier approached this Court in W.P. Nos. 43358-59/2003 assailing the very same acquisition process. Those writ petitions were partly allowed by order dated 18.12.2003, inasmuch as, 40% of the acquisition was quashed, whereas 60% of the acquisition was sustained against the appellant herein. The appellant as well as respondent No. 4 had preferred their respective appeals. W.A. No. 1558/2005 was filed by the appellant herein and that the said appeal was allowed on 29.06.2005, following the judgment and o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dated 08.04.2003, 05.07.2003 produced and marked as ANNEXURE-C and D respectively in so far as the Petitioner's lands are concerned. iii) Declare that the Proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act 1996 in so far as the Petitioner's lands are concerned are lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. iv) Issue any appropriate writ, order or directions as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the circumstances of the case, in the ends of justice and equity." 13. On perusal of the same, it would clearly indicate that in the writ petition, petitioner had sought a two-fold prayer: one, seeking quashing of the acquisition notifications and the second, seeking a declaration that the acquisition of the lands in question had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 14. As far as first prayer is concerned, the filing of the writ petition seeking relief of quashing of acquisition notifications cannot be reconsidered and the writ petition has been rightly dismissed on the principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata. In this regard, it would be useful to n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ismissed on the ground of res judicata. Even if the learned counsel for the appellant now contends that the appellant had certain other documents to be produced, we think that the same cannot be permitted to be furnished as the principles of constructive res judicata would also apply. 18. The relevant judgments on this appeal of the matter are as under: (a) The decision of the Apex Court in M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka, [2011 (3) SCC 408], (M. Nagabhushana) in respect of acquisition for the very same project under consideration on the principles of constructive res judicata and principles of analogous to the same can also be usefully cited as follows: "In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions." (b) The Apex Court, in Shankar Co-op Housing Society ltd., vs. M. Prabhakar & Others, [2011 AIR SCW 3033], (M. Prabhakar) held that a second writ petition on the same cause of action cannot be filed and an issue which had attained finality cannot be entertained. In the said ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at the previous litigation was the public interest litigation, not by way of a private grievance, which was bonafide which is common and is agitated in common with others. (e) In fact, in Manipur Vasant Kini vs. Union of India & Others, [1998 (3) KLJ 121], (Manipur Vasant Kini), a Division Bench of this Court has held that principle of res judicata applies even to public interest litigation initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even though such proceedings are not governed by the Code of civil procedure. A decision given on merits in respect of a public right claimed by the petitioners in common with others, would bind not only the petitioners, but also all other persons interested in such right and would operate as res judicata barring subsequent petition in respect of same matters. (f) Nagaraj (Dead) by LRs And Others vs. B.R. Vasudeva Murthy And Others, [2010 (3) SCC 353], (Nagaraj (Dead) by LRs) is also a case pertaining to the constructive res judicata. The Apex Court held that if a ground of attack had not been taken in any earlier proceedings, the same cannot be raised in a subsequent proceeding because of the principle of constructive res judicata un ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lapsed. In that regard, it is not necessary for us to dwell into the matter afresh, inasmuch as the Hon'ble Supreme Court has already decided the issue in the case of Anasuya Bai. That judgment has been followed by this Court in the case of the D. Sharanappa and Others vs. State of Karnataka, Department of Commerce and Industries, represented by its Secretary and Others, [ILR 2018 KAR 3250], (D. Sharanappa) (Judgment authored by one of us, Nagarathna. J.), wherein it has been categorically held that Section 24(2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition proceeding initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. 22. Before considering this point, it would be relevant to extract Section 24(2) of 2013 Act. Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as under: "24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894- (a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ealed. 12. To Section 24(1)(b) an important exception is carved out by Section 24(2). The necessary ingredients of Section 24(2) are as follows: (a) Section 24(2) begins with a non-obstante clause keeping sub-section (1) out of harm's way; (b) For it to apply, land acquisition proceedings should have been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act: (c) Also, an award under Section 11 should have been made 5 years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act; (d) Physical possession of the land, if not taken, or compensation, if not paid, are fatal to the land acquisition proceeding that had been initiated under the Land Acquisition Act: (e) The fatality is pronounced by stating that the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall, in this game of snakes and ladders, start all over again." (underlining by us) 25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai while setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court has held as under: "28. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ayment of compensation within a period of five years.' 29. This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally erroneous. In the first instance, the matter is not properly appreciated by ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 28 above. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11-A of the old LA Act is not rightly understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this Court in M. Nagabhushana case which is referred by it in the aforesaid discussion itself. This judgment categorically holds that once the proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 11-A of the old LA Act would not be applicable. Such an opinion of the Court is based on the following rationale: (M. Nagabhushana case, SCC pp. 420-22, paras 29-36) "29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquire ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rent purposes. Insofar as the KIAD Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is clear that the same was enacted to achieve the following purposes: 'It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for industrial development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of industries.' 34. The KIAD Act is of course a self-contained code. The said Act is primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. Recently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra held that Section 11-A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966. 35. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to acquisition of land under KIAD Act is excluded. 27. Moreover, the scheme and object of KIAD Act is different from LA Act, 1894. The KIAD Act has been enacted by Karnataka Legislature to make special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid. Under Section 3(1), the State Government may, by notification, declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for the purposes of this Act along with the limits of the area to which it relates. Section 4 of the Act deals with alteration of industrial area by exclusion of any area from an industrial area or including additional area as may be specified by issuance of a notification. Chapter III of the Act deals with establishment and constitution of the board. While the functions and powers of the Board are delineated in Chapter IV, Chapter V deals with finance, accounts and audit. Chapter VI deals with application of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Oc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ssary. (8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired." 28. Section 29 deals with payment of compensation, which is extracted as under: "29. Compensation: (1) Where any land is acquired by the State Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. (3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid. (4) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respecti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... initiated under the LA Act, 1894. The said Section-does not incorporate the words "or proceedings initiated under any other enactment". Therefore, the expression "land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894" are significant and must be given its natural and plain meaning and the said expression cannot be given an expansive interpretation by adding words to the provision, in the absence of the provision itself giving rise to any such implication. In this regard, the rules of interpretation of a statute would become relevant and reliance could be placed on guiding principles of interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for, the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of an act or rule, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a provision of a statute, or rule must be first understood in the natural, ordinary or popular sense. Phras ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rovisions of LA Act, 1894. 35. Further, Section 24 creates a new right in favour of land owners in as much as they are entitled to relief under certain circumstances as stipulated in Section 24 of the Act. One such relief is under subsection (2) of Section 24 of the Act, dealing with lapse of acquisition by a fiction. It is a deeming provision, provided the stipulations therein are complied with or the conditions mentioned therein exist. One overbearing condition is that the acquisition must have been initiated under the provisions of LA Act, 1894. Thus, if acquisition is initiated under any other Central or State enactment, Section 24 does not apply. 36. The reasons as to why Parliament has incorporated Section 24 in the 2013 Act are evident and not far to see. The said section creates a new right in favour of land owners whose lands have been acquired under the provisions of LA Act, 1894, which has been repealed and substituted by 2013 Act. The 2013 Act is not a substitution for other Central enactments pertaining to acquisition of land or for that matter any other State enactment. Therefore, Section 24 uses the expression that the acquisition must have been initiated under the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not.- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." However, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply only when a saving clause as per subsection 2 of Section 14 is not expressly provided under 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which is in the nature of a saving clause has created new rights in favour of land ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or BDA Act or Karnataka Urban Development Act, 1987 (KUDA Act). In fact, the Parliament itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. This is evident from Section 105 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under: "105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule. (2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule. (3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s distinct and different from the other Central enactments enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments. 45. In the circumstances, it is concluded and held that Section 24 does not take within its scope nor does it apply to, acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of any other enactment particularly, State enactment, such as, KIAD Act, BDA Act or KUDA Act. The said Section is restricted to only those acquisitions which have been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 only. Subject to compliance of the conditions mentioned under sub-section (2) of Section 24, the land owner would be entitled to the deeming provision regarding lapse of acquisition and not otherwise. 46. We also wish to refer to Mrs. Premakala Prabhakara Reddy and another vs. State of Karnataka and others, [2019 (3) AKR 657], wherein one of us (Nagarathna J.) has held in paragraph Nos. 43 and 44 as under: "43. Therefore, the acquisition in these writ petitions having been initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act, it cannot be held that the said acquisition has been initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the dictum of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... (3), but, reliance was placed on H.N. Shivanna to grant relief to the petitioners therein. But in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Development Authority, which arose from the judgment of this Court in Ashwathanarayana, it could be observed that H.N. Shivanna is no longer good law. Therefore, the petitioners herein cannot be granted relief on the basis of the dictum of the Division Bench in H.N. Shivanna and reliance placed on the said judgment by learned counsel for the petitioners is of no assistance to them. This is because the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Nagabhushana and Anasuya Bai rendered under the provisions of the KIAD Act hold the field. Similarly, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Offshore Holdings (P) Limited and Bangalore Development Authority which are rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act, 1976 are binding on this Court. 48. With reference to the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in H.N. Shivanna and others vs. State of Karnataka, Department of Industries and Commerce, Bengaluru and another [2013 KCCR 2793 DB], having regard to the observations of the Hon& ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the acquisitions initiated under the Act of 1894 and which are not completed by taking possession nor compensation has been paid in spite of lapse of 5 years and proceedings are kept pending due to lethargy of the officials. The drastic consequences follow by the provisions contained in Section 24(2) in such cases. x x x 172. A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession has been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013." (underlining by us) 50. In the circumstances, we find that the learned Single Judge was right in holding that the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, is not applicable to an acquisition proceeding initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal. 51. The appeal is hence dismissed. However, we refrain from imposing costs on the appellant. In view of the dismiss ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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