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TMI Blog2014 (2) TMI 1431X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the Corporation issued a charge sheet on 22.05.2002, apart from putting the petitioner off duty on the said date. Not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the petitioner in response to the charge sheet, the Corporation issued orders of disengagement through proceedings dated 26.12.2002, based on the enquiry report dated 14.12.2002. 2. Later on 12.03.2003, the respondent Corporation issued further proceedings cancelling or recalling the order of disengagement dated 26.12.2002 on the ground that it had been erroneously given and further issued a show cause notice for the deletion of the petitioner's name from the approved list. Once again, when the petitioner submitted his explanation to the said show cause notice on 25.03.2003, the respondent Corporation, apparently not being satisfied with the explanation, proceeded further and issued the final orders of disengagement on 27.03.2003. 3. Contending that till there was a disengagement of the petitioner, there existed an employer and employee relationship between the Corporation and the petitioner, i.e., essentially for the period from 03.05.2002 to 27.03.2003, when the petitioner had been under the put off duty, the pet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... period, and as such, no further amount need be paid to the petitioner under whatever circumstances. Accordingly, the learned Standing Counsel has urged this Court to dismiss the writ petition. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent-Corporation, apart from perusing the record. 8. The facts indeed are not in dispute. The controversy runs in a very narrow compass. The petitioner had been a casual driver on daily wage basis and he was later disengaged on the ground of proven misconduct, to wit, having caused an accident, which was held to be due to his rash and negligent driving. It is further not in dispute that the petitioner was kept under put off duty from 22.05.2002 to 26.12.2002 before he was eventually disengaged with effect from 27.03.2003. 9. The issue is whether, in the absence of any specific provision in the Regulations, 1963 of the Corporation specifying put off duty as an interim measure pending departmental proceedings, the workman is entitled to payment of full wages or whether the said put off duty can be treated as suspension pending enquiry as in the case of the regular workman of the Corporation. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ishment nor an intermediate measure in aid of any punishment prescribed under the Service Regulations. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent-workmen may at best be considered to have been suspended from service for the period in question, in which case, they will be entitled to claim only subsistence allowance. He may be begging the question. They could be suspended only if they were employees. They could be offered subsistence allowance only if, by a valid order passed in exercise of powers contained in Regulation 18 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Regulations the petitioner-employer had suspended them from service. No order of suspension having been validly issued, it is not open for the petitioner to contend that the entitlement of the workmen was only for subsistence allowance. Admittedly, the respondent-workmen were in the employment and the employer-employee relationship continued till it was terminated by the orders of removal. The order of the Labour Court awarding wages due to the workmen for the period during which they were forcibly prevented from rendering service to the Corporation during subsistence of employer-employee relationship, there ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the put off duty. 18. In A.P.S.R.T.C., Mushirabad, Hyderabad and Another v. Harikrishna and Another 2012 (1) ALD 368 (DB) : 2012-III-LLJ-866 another learned Division Bench of this Court has placed reliance on the judgment of a learned Single Judge in A.P.S.R.T.C. rep. by its Managing Director and Another v. M. Ramulu, Ex-Casual Driver and Another (supra) and has held that the workman is entitled to full wages during the put off period. 19. In all those decisions this Court, per either a learned Single Judge or per a learned Division Bench, has taken the view that put off duty has not been enumerated in the Regulations of the Corporation and it cannot be likened to suspension. Thus, it is nothing but preventing the workman from discharging his duty without any lawful order of suspension. Accordingly, it is concluded that the affected workman shall be paid full wages for the said period of put off duty. 20. But in the interregnum, another Division Bench of this Court in Regional Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Nellore and Another v. Sk. Gulam Rasool 2003 (2) ALT 376 (D.B.) : 2003-III-LLJ-368 has, however, held as follows: His complaint is that after this charge sheet was served on him he ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... been brought to the notice of the learned Division Bench. Accordingly, treating the put off duty as a mode of suspension, their Lordships have held that the workman could be entitled only to subsistence allowance or at least one half of the basic of the scale, which is available for the post, as a measure of subsistence allowance during the put off period. 22. There is a direct conflict of judicial opinion involving co-equal Benches. One set of rulings followed the line of reasoning as has been enunciated and Another decision, though singular, of a co-equal Division Bench in Regional Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Nellore and Another v. Sk. Gulam Rasool (supra) took a different line, that there is a seeming conflict of judicial opinion. 23. One prevalent school of judicial thought is that in a series of judgments of co-equal benches, in the face of cleavage or conflict of judicial opinion, the latest judgment should prevail. This school of thought, I am afraid, is fallacious. In fact, the said issue, though, has not been decided by any definitive pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, guidance is available in the form of Full Bench ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 27. 26. Having doubted the above proposition, a large Bench (Five Judge Bench) of the same High Court in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another (supra), after surveying the entire case law as has been obtaining by that time, has held as follows: 8. Having considered the matter with broader dimensions, we find that various High Courts have given different opinion on the question involved. Some hold that in case of conflict between two judgments on a point of law, later decision should be followed; while others say that the Court should follow the decision which is correct and accurate whether it is earlier or later. There are High Courts which hold that decision of earlier Bench is binding because of the theory of binding precedent and Article 141 of the Constitution of India. There are also decisions which hold that single Judge differing from another single Judge decision should refer the case to Larger Bench, otherwise he is bound by it. Decisions which are rendered without considering the decisions expressing contrary view have no value as a precedent. But in our considered opinion, the position may be stated thus-- with regard ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .P. v. Balveer Singh (supra) which holds that if there is conflict of views between the two co-equal Benches of the Apex Court, the High Court has to follow the judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately and in conformity with the scheme of the Act, in our considered opinion, for reasons recorded in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, does not lay down the correct law as to application of precedent and is, therefore, over ruled on this point. (emphasis supplied) 27. In my considered opinion, the position would be this: When the subsequent co-equal bench renders the judgment in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement of co-equal bench, the judgment of the previous bench will have binding effect. On the other hand, if the latter bench refers to the earlier one and distinguishes it, to that extent of distinction, the latter one binds. 28. A learned Division Bench of this Court in S.K. Mahaboob Ali, Ex-C.R.P.F. Constable, Nandyal v. Director General of Police, Central Reserve Police Force, New Delhi and Others 2005 (1) ALT 412 (D.B.), has held: 9. This is a very delicate area where the Courts are expected to be more careful and cautiou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Supreme Court nor the higher wisdom of the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. We are preferring one decision to the other - both rendered by Division Benches, for obvious reasons so as to avoid an incongruity leading to travesty of justice. (emphasis supplied) 30. The learned Full Bench of this Court, in the said judgment, has held that the previous judgment of a co-equal bench would be binding even in the face of subsequent contrary judgment, once the previous judgment has dealt with the issue more appropriately and with reference to all previous precedents obtaining on that point. 31. Thus, having been guided by the precedents that have been referred to above without fear of contradiction, I hold that judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in Regional Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Nellore and Another v. Sk. Gulam Rasool (supra) cannot said to be correct law in the light of the previous, as well as subsequent, judgments of Co-equal Benches. 32. Thus, it is to be held that the put off duty cannot be equated with suspension and in the absence of any statutory support from the Regulations, 1963, it shall be treated as absence of the workman induced by co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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