TMI Blog2014 (2) TMI 1431X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... denied him an opportunity to work during the said period. The petitioner - in the light of the submissions of the 2nd respondent Corporation that already 50% of the wages have been paid - shall be entitled to the remaining 50% of the wages for the put off duty period with effect from 03.05.2002 to 27.03.2003. Accordingly, the 2nd respondent Corporation is hereby directed to pay the said differential amount of 50% for the put off duty period, as early as possible, at any rate, not beyond two months' time from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Petition allowed. - HON'BLE JUDGES DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. For the Appellant : P. Raghavender Reddy For the Respondents : Government Pleader, Standing Counsel JUDGMENT DAMA SESHADRI NAIDU, J. 1. The petitioner, a casual driver, working in the 2nd respondent Corporation (A.P.S.R.T.C.), was removed from service on 27.03.2003 on an allegation of certain misconduct on his part. Initially, before taking the eventual step of removing the petitioner from service or disengaging him as he was only a casual employee, the Corporation 'put him off duty' for a certain period. In that context, the petitioner filed the present wri ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d some unreported; some by learned Single Judges and some by learned Division Benches. Since all the series of judicial pronouncements of the learned Single Judges got subsumed into those of learned Division Benches, I will examine those judgments of the Division Benches, especially for the reasons mentioned below. 5. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation, in tune with the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the Corporation, has submitted that the petitioner was only a daily wage employee, and that even before the Labour Court, he has made a specific claim for full wages for the period of put off duty, but it was expressly denied. He has further contended that it is a well established principle that a daily wage earner would be paid only for the days he was in service and not otherwise. As a matter of alternative submission, the learned Standing Counsel has also stated that put off duty can be likened to suspension of the regular employees pending disciplinary proceedings. On that count too, at best, the petitioner is entitled to have subsistence allowance, as if he were a suspended regular employee. The learned Standing Counsel has al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y, the management is liable to pay full salary to the workman who had been prevented from discharging his duties without any valid suspension order having been passed vis- -vis the said workman. It can be seen that this order does not directly deal with the concept of 'put off duty'. 12. Even in W.P. No. 14816 of 1991, a learned single Judge directed the management to pay full wages to the workman for the period he was prevented from attending the duty pending enquiry, in the absence of any effective order of suspension. In the first place, the copy of the said order dated 29.11.1991 passed on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is absolutely illegible. From whatever I could make out of the order, it can be seen that this order does not deal with the concept of the put off duty either. 13. In the Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Musheerabad v. Addl. Labour Court, Hyderabad and Others 2012 (1) ALD 368 (DB), a learned single Judge of this Court has held as follows: The reason which occasioned the employees to go before the Labour Court with their applications under Section 33-C(2) was to seek adjudication of the propriety of putting them off duty on allegations of cash and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d I see there is no illegality in the order passed by the Labour Court-II, Hyderabad. Accordingly, the writ petition is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed. 15. In Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C., Pargi Bus Depot v. Labour Court-III, Hyderabad and Another 2000 (6) ALT 708 : 2001-LLJ-381 this Court has once again held that the workman is entitled to full wages for the put off period. Thus, in all those three decisions, it is positively affirmed that 'put off duty' is no from of suspension. 16. In an unreported Judgment dated 18.01.2001 in W.A. No. 1751 of 2000, a learned Division Bench of this Court has dealt with the aspect of put off duty. It was held that an employee can only be suspended in terms of the rules pending departmental proceedings and during the course of that suspension, he would be entitled to subsistence allowance. If it falls short of suspension and if the workman is kept away from duty in the name of put off duty, the workman shall be entitled to full wages. Accordingly, modifying the orders of the learned single Judge, the learned Division Bench has directed the Corporation to pay full wages to the workman for the period he had been put o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ad the writ petitioner not been amenable to the conduct Rules then how could he be charged under those rules. Since these rules do not provide for any 'put off duty' but provide for suspension during the pendency of enquiry therefore, we agree with the earlier Bench judgment that 'put off duty' should be construed as 'on suspension'. While such casual labours are being proceeded against for misconduct in terms of A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees Conduct Regulations the appellants cannot chose to apply certain regulations and refuse to apply certain regulations. Therefore, this appeal has no merits. However, the learned counsel for the appellants submits that since the writ petitioner was not being paid any particular scale of pay and he was only paid as and when required therefore it would be difficult to ascertain as to on what rates the allowance during suspension would be payable to him. We leave it to the appellants to make rules in that behalf, but till rules are framed the employees on 'put off duty' who have been proceeded against A.P.S.R.T.C. Employees (Conduct) Regulation, 1963 shall be paid at least one-half of the basic of the scale which is availab ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... further, I may observe that in Deena v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1155 : (1983) 4 SCC 645 : LNIND 1983 SC 265, the Supreme Court has observed thus: Any case, even a locus classicus, is an authority for what it decides. It is permissible to extend the ratio of a decision to cases involving identical situations, factual and legal, but care must be taken to see that this is not done mechanically, that is, without a close examination of the rationale of the decision cited as a precedent. 25. A Larger Bench of Five Judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another AIR 2003 MP 81 (FB), examined in depth the issue of precedential value of conflicting judgments of coequal Benches. In fact, the initial reference to Larger Bench was occasioned in the light of an earlier Full Bench judgment of the same High Court in State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh AIR 2001 MP 268, in which the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held: 48. Further where there is a direct conflict between the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its co-equal benches, the High Court has to follow the judgment, which appears to it to state the la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the latter Bench of equal strength, in which case the later decision is binding. Decision of a Larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches. Therefore, the decision of earlier Division Bench, unless distinguished by latter Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts, Similarly, in presence of Division Bench decisions and Larger Bench decisions, the decisions of Larger Bench are binding on the High Courts and the subordinate Courts. No decision of Apex Court has been brought to our notice which holds that in case of conflict between the two decisions by equal number of Judges, the later decision is binding in all circumstances, or the High Courts and subordinate Courts can follow any decision which is found correct and accurate to the case under consideration. High Courts and Subordinate Courts should lack competence to interpret decisions of Apex Court since that would not only defeat what is envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also militate hierarchical supremacy of Courts. The common thread which runs through various decisions of Apex Court seems to be that great value has to be attached to precedent which has taken the shape o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g decisions also had been referred to, if any available on the point by the Court while rendering such Judgments. These principles at any rate cannot be said to be exhaustive, but only just illustrative. (emphasis supplied) 29. In Ushodaya Enterprises Limited, Visakhapatnam v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, A.P., Hyderabad 1998 (3) ALT 96 (F.B.), a Full Bench of this Court has held as follows: 22. Without making inroads into the settled principles governing the binding force of a decision of the Supreme Court either by virtue of its presidential value or the mandate of Article 141, we can safely evolve the principle that in a case of conflict arising from the decisions of co-equal benches of the Supreme Court, the High Court is free to disregard the decision which is based on an obvious mistake of fact or the one which purports to follow the ratio of an earlier decision though such ratio is found to be non-existent. The High Court can legitimately decline to follow such decision and follow the earlier decision which is backed by reasoning-whether it is acceptable to the High Court or not, and which is free from any such apparent flaw. We are unable to persuade ourselves to subsc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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