TMI Blog2021 (6) TMI 1171X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... decree of a civil court and executable as such. There is nothing in this scheme of things for treating an award passed by a Lok Adalat as a deemed decree of that court which made the reference to the Lok Adalat or for which the Lok Adalat was organised. There is nothing to suggest that if the award is in a compensation dispute in a land acquisition matter, any third party should thereby be entitled to apply for re-determination of its compensation under Section 28A of the LA Act. As a matter of principle, it is not possible to say that that eventuality (i.e. entitlement of a third party to apply for re-determination of its own compensation after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat) inevitably follows as a corollary or consequence from such award. The award of Lok Adalat having to be treated as an award of the reference court under Part III, does not follow as an inevitable sequitur, to come to such consequence the legal fiction contained in Section 21 of the LSA Act will have to be actually extended to import two other fictions, namely, that the award of Lok Adalat should be deemed (i) a decree of the court which has referred the matter to the Lok Adalat , and (ii) a decree pass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Pushapalata Diwan, AGP JUDGMENT S.C. GUPTE, J. 1. This petition challenges an order passed by Sub-Divisional Officer, Solapur on an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and seeks directions for conducting a fresh inquiry under that Section. The petition raises a substantial question of law, namely, whether an award passed by a Lok-Adalat can be considered an award of the court under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act for the purposes of Section 28A of that Act. 2. The Petitioners' land along with several other lands was acquired by the State for a storage lake. An award dated 26 February 2010 was made under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( LA Act ) in respect of the acquired lands. Compensation was paid to landholders including the Petitioners herein after duly issuing notices under Section 12(2) of the LA Act. Sometime later, a Land Acquisition Reference (LAR No. 18 of 2011) was filed before the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Solapur by one of the landholders, one Sangappa Irappa Dabare. The LAR was taken before a Lok Adalat. By a compromise entered into on 13 December 2014, an award was made by the Lok Adalat for payment of enha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ces Authority Act, 1987, can be considered 'an award of the court' made under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of Section 28A of that Act so as to enable persons interested in any other land covered by the same notification under Section 4 of that Act to apply for re-determination of the amount of compensation? 5. Section 28A is as follows: 28A Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court.-(1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, thepersons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was whether time should run from the date of the award of the reference Court or from the date of the order of the High Court (as the appellate court). The Supreme Court held that as prescribed by the plain language of Section 28A, three months' period of limitation was to be reckoned from the date of the award by the court disposing of the reference under Section 18 and not the appellate court dealing with an appeal against the award of the reference court. (The question as to whether each successive award would give rise to a cause of action for filing of an application under section 28A, was left open by the Supreme Court.) This position was once again affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai vs. State of Gujarat. 7. It cannot, accordingly, be gainsaid that as a prerequisite for an application of Section 28A, the award must be by a 'court'. The expression 'court' is defined in Section 3(d) of the LA Act as follows: (d) the expression Court means a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed (as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within any specified local li ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... view, Mr. Advocate is right. It has been a settled position of law that when a statute creates a legal fiction, it must not be extended beyond the purpose for which it has been created or beyond the language of the statute by which it has been so created. The Supreme Court noted this principle in the case of State of WB. vs. Sadan K. Bormal (2004) 6 SCC 59 in the following words: 25. So far as interpretation of a provision creating a legal fiction is concerned, it is trite that the Court must ascertain the purpose for which the fiction is created and having done so must assume all those facts and consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to the fiction. In construing a fiction it must not be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created or beyond the language of the Section by which it is created. It cannot be extended by importing another fiction. These principles are well settled and it is not necessary for us to refer to the authorities on this subject. The principle has been succinctly stated by Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling Co. Ltd. V. Finsbury Borough Council, (1951) 2ALL ER 587, when he observed: (All ER p. 599 B-D) If you are ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed. As required by Section 20 of the LSA Act, a case may be referred to a Lok Adalat for settlement under clause (i) above (a) if the parties agree or one of the parties makes an application to the court for so referring the case and if the court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances of settlement in the case; or (b) if the court is satisfied that the matter is appropriate to be referred. As for the matters referred to in clause (ii) of Section 19(5), the authority or committee organising the Lok Adalat may itself refer a matter to the Lok Adalat on receipt of an application in that behalf from any of the parties. The Lok Adalat may then proceed to dispose of the case or matter by a compromise or settlement between the parties. Section 21 of the LSA Act provides as follows: 21. Award of Lok Adalat.-- (1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870. (2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ard is in a compensation dispute in a land acquisition matter, any third party should thereby be entitled to apply for re-determination of its compensation under Section 28A of the LA Act. As a matter of principle, it is not possible to say that that eventuality (i.e. entitlement of a third party to apply for re-determination of its own compensation after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat) inevitably follows as a corollary or consequence from such award. 15. Section 28A was initiated in the LA Act by the Law Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The statement of objects and reasons of the Amended Act puts the object of the section thus: (ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil court under section 18 of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent landowners and that this causes considerable inequality in the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any of them ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d to be in line with the scheme of the LSA Act. The Supreme Court in the case of K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon vs. CD. Shaji (2012) 2 SCC 51 held that even if a matter is referred to Lok Adalat by a criminal court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, by virtue of the deeming provision of Section 21 of the LSA Act, the award of Lok Adalat has to be treated as a decree capable of being executed by a civil court and not an order of the criminal court referring the matter to Lok Adalat. If that is so, there is nothing to follow inferentially from an award of Lok Adalat in a land acquisition reference brought before it, made on a compromise between the parties to that reference, that it is an award of that court (i.e. the reference court which sent the matter to the Lok Adalat or for which the Lok Adalat was organised) under Part III of the LA Act. It is simply a deemed decree of a civil court and is executable as such as between the parties. It is only this consequence that is in consonance with the purpose of the LSA Act andthere is no consequence from the standpoint of Section 28A of the LA Act, following as an inevitable corollary. Whilst using the authority of K.N ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urpose of the legal fiction of Section 21 of the LSA Act and the ratio of the Supreme Court in Sadan K. Bormal (supra). 21. The judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Komaramjeri Pedamunuswamy (supra), cited by Mr. Tajane, appearing for the Petitioner, is distinguishable on facts. There, it was the Reference Court which had passed an award based on a compromise arrived at between the parties before a Lok Adalat. The application for re-determination of compensation made under Section 28A of the LA Act was, thus, on the basis of an award made by the Reference Court under Part III of the LA Act; there was no question of extending the deeming provision of Section 21 of the LSA Act to an award of a Lok Adalat. 22. The case of Rambhau Mahadeorao Tembhurkar (supra) cited by Mr. Tajane is on an altogether different point. It holds, on a principle of equality before law, that it was impermissible to accord different treatments to owners of similar lands based on two different acquisition statutes (namely, the LA Act and the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, in that case). Relying inter alia on the statement of law in Girnar Traders (3) vs. State of Maharashtra (2011) 3 SCC 1, the Di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
