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TMI Blog2022 (1) TMI 1442X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... terfere with the order dated 09.07.2016, passed by the respondent authority. I.A.No.1575 of 2021 3. Admittedly, the instant intra-court appeal has been preferred after inordinate delay of 687 days, as per the office report. However, in the instant application, the prayer has been sought for to condone the delay of 699 days. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, at the outset, has submitted that the reference of delay of 699 days, in place of 687 days, as pointed out by SR dated 26.02.2021, is due to inadvertence and therefore, the instant interlocutory application may be construed to consider for condoning the delay of 687 days on the basis of the ground stipulated therein. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has further submitted that the matter may be heard on merit also for consideration of condoning the delay. 5. But a serious objection to such submission has been made by Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent CCL by making submission that when the appeal is barred by limitation of 687 days and as such, before entering into the merit, the consideration may be given to the delay condonation application. 6. This Court, afte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g the delay, is fit to be dismissed. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the reason assigned in the interlocutory application which has been field for condoning the delay of 687 days in filing the appeal. 11. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that "Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the appellant." In the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, wherein, it has been held at paragraphs 9 and 10 as under:- "9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act enjoins a court to dismiss any suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made, after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the I Schedule irrespective of the fact whether the opponent had set up the plea of limitation or not. It is the duty of the court not to proceed with the application if it is made beyond the period of limitation prescribed. The court had no choice and if in construing the necessary provisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation application, the Court of Law is required to c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature." Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." 13. This Court, on the basis of the proposition laid down, as referred hereinabove, has considered the grounds as referred in the interlocutory application for condonation of delay of 687 days and in order to test the grounds shown in delay condonation application, paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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