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TMI Blog1985 (3) TMI 60X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have shed all the norms of justice and fair play. Even so, the High Court is not much to be blamed because in the process of following precedents or decisions of doubtful validity of some courts, it tried to follow suit. It may be stated that even the old classic Hindu law jurists and celebrated sages conceded certain substantial rights to women, one of which was what is called-saudayika or stridhan, with which we are concerned here. This now brings us to a brief discussion of the nature, character and concomitants of stridhan. In the instant case, we are mainly concerned with that part of stridhan which is the absolute property of a married woman during coverture. Sir Gooroodas Banerjee in 'Hindu Law of Marriage and Stridhana' while describing the nature of stridhan quoted Katyayana thus : (p. 341) "Neither the husband, nor the son, nor the father, nor the brother , has power to use or to alienate the legal property of a woman. And if any of them shall consume such property against her own consent, he shall be compelled to pay its value with interest to her, and shall also pay fine to the king ...... Whatever she has put amicably into the hands of her husband afflicted by dis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e also been spelt out by Mulla's Hindu Law, at page 168 (s. 113), which gives a complete list of the stridhan property of a woman both before and during coverture, which may be extracted thus : " 113. Manu enumerates six kinds of stridhana : 1.Gifts made before the nuptial fire , explained by Katyayana to mean gifts made at the time of marriage before the fire which is the witness of the nuptial (adhyagni). 2. Gifts made at the bridal procession, that is, says Katyayana while the bride is being led from the residence of her parents to that of her husband (adhyavahanika). 3. Gifts made in token of love, that is, says Katyayana those made through affection by her father-in-law and mother-in-law (pritidatta), and those made at the time of her making obeisance at the feet of elders (padavandanika). 4. Gifts made by father. 5. Gifts made by the mother. 6. Gifts made by a brother. " It is, therefore, manifest that the position of stridhan of a Hindu married woman's property during coverture is absolutely clear and unambiguous; she is the absolute owner of such property and can deal with it in any manner she likes-she may spend the whole of it or give it away at her own pl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... themselves and wrongful loss to the complainant... The accused refused to give the entrusted articles of dowry, which were the stridhan of the complainant. On February 10, 1981, when the accused Nos. to 5 came to Ludhiana to attend the proceedings under section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, filed by the complainant in the court of Shri S. S. Tiwana, they were pursuaded by the parents of the complainant to send the articles entrusted to them at the time of marriage but they gave flat refusal to its notice which was served upon the accused No. 1 which was dated December 17, 1980, but to no effect. The accused have thus dishonestly used and converted the articles aforementioned to their own use, who are still in possession of the same in violation of the directions given by the parents of the complainant. The parents of the complainant directed the accused at the time of marriage to give the articles to the complainant for her use, in the presence of the aforesaid persons, but the accused have not done the needful on the demand and have thus committed criminal breach of trust punishable under section 406, IPC." A perusal of the allegations made in the complaint undoubtedly makes out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... han property of a woman was completely abolished. For instance, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surinder Mohan v. Kiran Saini [1977] Chandigarh Law Reporter 212, held thus: " In the light of the aforesaid observations, can it be said that the bringing of articles by the respondent to her parents-in-law's house at the time of marriage falls within the expression 'entrustment'? The answer is in the negative." We are of the opinion that this view of the High Court is not legally sustainable because neither of the two Acts, referred to above, go to the extent of providing that the claim of a woman on the basis of stridhan is completely abolished. All that the two sections, mentioned above, provide is that if the husband refuses to return the stridhan property of his wife, it will be open to the wife to recover the same by a properly constituted suit. The sections nowhere provide that the concept of stridhan is abolished or that a remedy under the criminal law for breach of trust is taken away. In a later decision in Bhai Sher Jang Singh v. Smt. Virinder Kaur [1979] Crl LJ 493, it was very rightly pointed out by the same High Court that s. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act merely pr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ove terminology, the statute expressly recognises that property which is exclusively owned by the wife is not within the ambit of section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act ...... Equally no other provision in the Hindu Marriage Act could be pointed out which erodes the concept of Stridhan or in any way incapacitates the Hindu wife to hold property as an exclusive owner. " The sheet-anchor of the arguments of the counsel for the respondents which is based on the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Vinod Kumar's case, AIR 1982 P & H 372 [FB], is that the moment woman after marriage enters her matrimonial home, her stridhan property becomes a joint property of both the spouses and the question of application of s. 406, I.P.C., is completely eliminated. It is true that to a great extent this part of the argument of the learned counsel is supported by the aforesaid decision but, in our opinion, the decision, so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, is wholly unsustainable. We would first extract the exact ratio held by the High Court in Vinod Kumar's case (AIR 1982 P & H 372, 394) : " To conclude, it necessarily follows from the aforesaid discussion that the very conc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... husband at the very behest. We are surprised how could the High Court permit the husband to cast his covetous eyes on the absolute and personal property of his wife merely because it is kept in his custody, thereby reducing the custody to a legal farce. On the other hand, it seems to us that even if the personal property of the wife is jointly kept, it would be deemed to be expressly or impliedly kept in the custody of the husband and if he dishonestly misappropriates or refuses to return the same, he is certainly guilty of criminal breach of trust, and there can be no escape from this legal consequence. The observations of the High Court at other places regarding the inapplicability of s. 406 do not appeal to us and are in fact not in consonance with the spirit and trend of the criminal law. There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly co-extensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Varadarajan J., is that after entering the matrimonial home, the custody of the stridhan entrusted by the wife to her husband becomes sort of a partnership firm and, in this view of the matter, the question of criminal breach of trust does not arise. In our opinion, it is neither appropriate nor apposite to import the concept of partnership into the relationship of husband and wife for the simple reason that the concept of partnership is entirely different from that of the husband's keeping the stridhan in his custody. Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (hereinafter referred to as the " Partnership Act ") defines " partnership thus : " ' Partnership' is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually 'partners' and collectively 'a firm' and the name under which their business is carried on is called the 'firm name' The essential ingredients of a partnership are (1) that there should be an actual or physical overt act on the part of two persons to embark on a business adventure, (2) that if any busin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inion, it cannot be said that a bare act of keeping stridhan property in the custody of the husband constitutes a partnership and, therefore, a criminal case under s. 406, IPC, is not maintainable. It is not necessary for us to multiply cases on this point on which there does not appear to be any controversy. We have already pointed out that the stridhan of a woman is her absolute property and the husband has no interest in the same and the entrustment to him is just like something which the wife keeps in bank and can withdraw any amount whenever she likes without any hitch or hindrance and the husband cannot use the stridhan for his personal purposes unless he obtains the tacit consent of his wife. When the essential conditions of a partnership do not exist, the mere act or factum of entrustment of stridhan would not constitute any co-ownership or legal partnership as defined under s. 4 of the Partnership Act. To sum up, the position seems to be that a pure and simple entrustment of stridhan without creating any rights in the husband excepting putting the articles in his possession does not entitle him to use the same to the detriment of his wife without her consent. The husband ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n of the Indian Penal Code. A more tragic consequence of the view taken by the High Court is that even if there is a break in the matrimonial alliance and the wife wants her husband to return her exclusive property and he refuses to return, even then the provisions of s. 406, IPC, would not apply. It is an extreme travesty of justice for a court to say that whenever a married woman demands her stridhan property from her husband, she should be driven to the dilatory process of a civil court and her husband would be debarred from being prosecuted by a criminal court. By a strange and ingenious process of holding that such an act of a husband does not attract the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, as the property being joint, there is no question of the husband being a trustee or holding the same in a fiduciary capacity. Such a view, in our opinion, is not only contradictory but-what the High Court has said before regarding the applicability of s. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the nature of stridhan as referred to above-is also neither in consonance with logic and reason nor with the express provisions of the Indian Penal Code and seems to us to be inspired by a spirit of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e theory or philosophy of matrimonial home propounded by it stands directly contradicted by its own observations referred to above. In paragraph 49 of the judgment, the High Court clearly finds that the mere use by the relations of the husband would not have the effect of passing the possession of the property to the HUF and in this connection observes thus: " Equally, the common use and enjoyment of certain articles of dowry and traditional presents, by the other members of a joint family with the leave and licence of a Hindu wife, cannot have the effect of extending the jointness of control and custody of the couple to undefined and unreasonable limits. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that the mere user or enjoyment of the dowry by other members of the household, would have the effect of passing the possession and control thereof jointly to the Hindu undivided family as such." Thus, these observations run counter and are totally inconsistent and irreconcilable with the view taken by the High Court in paragraph 41, where it has observed thus: " In the light of the above, it would be farcical to assume that despite the factum of a marriage and a common matrimonia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r close relations of the husband. No such gullible presumption of entrustment or passing of the dominion of property can be raised in such a situation to come within the mischief of criminality for breach of trust. Entrustment or dominion over the property has to be unequivocally alleged and conclusively established by proof later." The High Court had itself rightly spelt out the legal propositions that the pure and traditional presents given to a bride in a Hindu wedding may be divided into three categories, viz., (a) property intended for exclusive use of the bride, e.g., her personal jewellery, wearing apparel, etc., (b) articles of dowry which may be for common use and enjoyment in the matrimonial home, and (c) articles given as presents to the husband or the parent-in-law and other members of his family. With regard to category (a) above, the High Court observed thus (p. 385): "Similarly as regards the first category of articles meant for the exclusive use of the bride, she would retain her pristine ownership therein irrespective of her entry and presence in the matrimonial home or that of her parents-in-law." The High Court thus accepts the well-established rule o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n, are clearly established. That the view of the High Court is absolutely wrong would be clear from a number of authorities, some of which we would like to discuss here. In Chelloor Mankkal Narayan Itiravi Nambudiri v. State of Travancore Cochin, AIR 1953 SC 478, this court made the following observations (p. 484): " As laid down in s. 385, Cochin Penal Code (corresponding to s. 405, Indian Penal Code) to constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, it is essential that the prosecution must prove first of all that the accused was entrusted with some property or with any dominion or power over it ...... It follows almost axiomatically from this definition that the ownership or beneficial interest in the property in respect of which criminal breach of trust is alleged to have been committed, must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. " In Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [1956] SCR 483 ; AIR 1956 SC 575, Sinha J. (as he then was) observed thus (p. 582 of AIR): " For an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, the first essential ingredient to be proved is that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this court in Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1433, where the following observations were made (p. 1435) "In order to establish 'entrustment of dominion' over property to an accused person, the mere existence of that person's dominion over property is not enough . It must be further shown that his dominion was the result of entrustment. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Harris C.J., the prosecution must establish that dominion over the assets or a particular asset of the partnership was by a special agreement between the parties, entrusted to the accused person." In the case of State of Gujarat v. Jaswantlal Nathalal [1968] 2 SCR 408 AIR 1968 SC 700, Hegde J., speaking for the court, observed thus (p. 701): " The expression 'entrustment' carries with it the implication that the person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further, the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. " In Sushil Kumar Gupta v. Joy Shankar Bhattacharjee, AIR 1971 SC 1543, this court observed thus ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h Court, out of three categories laid down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Vinod Kumar's case, accepted only the third category, viz., articles which constitute the individual property of the person for whose use it was given, and held that the rest of the property following under categories (a) and (b) would be property exclusively meant for the use of the bride and once it was brought to the family home, the possession would be joint unless by an express written agreement, there was an entrustment of the property of the bride to other members of the family. The Allahabad High Court thus also accepts the concept of the property being a joint property in the matrimonial home. By and large this decision toes the line of the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Vinod Kumar's case, AIR 1982 P & H 372 [FB]. Furthermore, the High Court has greatly erred in holding that the property could only be claimed by filing a properly constituted civil suit or in accordance with the provisions of the Dowry Prohibition Act or the Hindu Marriage Act, as the case may be. This proposition, in our opinion, is wholly incorrect as conceded even by the Punjab and Haryana High Court i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... prudent person can ever reach conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused ; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by a legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. " The same principles would apply mutatis mutandis to a criminal complaint. We now come to the question as to whether or not a clear allegation of entrustment and misappropriation of properties was made by the appellant in her complaint and, if so, was the High Court justified in quashing the complaint at that stage. It is well-settled by a long course of decisions of this court that for the purpose of exercising its power under s. 482, Cr. PC, to quash a FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e denied the right to prove her case at the trial by pre-empting it at the very behest by the order passed by the High Court. We, therefore, overrule the decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Vinod Kumar's case, AIR 1982 P & H 372 [FB] and of the Allahabad High Court and other cases following Vinod Kumar's case. By way of post-script we might add that we are indeed amazed to find that so deeply drowned and inherently engrossed are some of the High Courts in the concept of matrimonial home qua the stridhan property of married woman that they simply refuse to believe that such properties are meant for the exclusive use of the wife and could also be legally entrusted to the husband or his relations. Thus, if the husband or his relations misappropriate the same and refuse to hand it over to the wife and convert them to their own use and even though these facts are clearly alleged in a complaint for an offence under s. 405/406, IPC, some courts take the view that the complaint is not maintainable. Thus, even when clear and specific allegations are made in the complaint that such properties were entrusted to the husband, they refuse to believe these hard facts and brush t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion for the marriage. Accordingly, dowry articles mentioned in the list appended to the complaint, worth Rs. 60,000, in the form of golden articles, clothes and other valuables were given and entrusted to the respondents and four others mentioned in the complaint at Ludhiana at the time of " doli " on February 5, 1972, in the presence of Kapur Chand Jain and six others. The six respondents in the complaint started teasing, harassing and beating the appellant and they kept her without even food to extract more money from her parents. They turned out the appellant with her children in the beginning of 1977. After a great deal of persuasion and intervention by Panchayatdars, respondent No. 1 came to Ludhiana and took the appellant to his house after giving an undertaking in writing on June 21, 1977, not to misbehave with and maltreat the appellant and her children. But after some time all the respondents in the complaint started maltreating the appellant and misbehaving with her. The articles mentioned in the list were never given by the respondents in the complaint to the appellant for her use but were retained by them illegally and with the dishonest intention of causing wrongful g ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st the very concept of entrustment of his or her property by one spouse to the other. In this view, he allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings arising out of the appellant's complaint, observing that the allegations in the appellant's complaint are similar to the one in Vinod Kumar's case, AIR 1982 P & H 372 [FB], and that this case is fully covered by the ratio in that decision. The appellant has, therefore, come to this court in appeal by special leave, impleading the petitioners before the High Court, who are only two out of the six respondents in the complaint, as respondents in this appeal. In a petition under s. 482, Cr PC, for quashing a criminal complaint, the allegations made in the complaint have to be taken to be correct in order to find out whether they constitute the various ingredients of the offence alleged. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [1976] Supp. SCR 123; AIR 1976 SC 1947, illustrations have been given of cases in which it may be safely held that an order of a Magistrate issuing process against an accused can be quashed or set aside. They are (p. 1948 of AIR 1976): "(1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... valuables were given and entrusted to the husband and the other five respondents in the complaint, at the time of the " doli " at Ludhiana on February 5, 1972, in the presence of Kapur Chand Jain and six other persons. For the purpose of the petition under s. 482, Cr PC, those articles must be prima facie considered to be dowry or stridhana of the appellant-wife. In Velji Raghavji Patel v. State of Maharashtra [1965] 2 SCR 429; AIR 1965 SC 1433, it is observed (p. 1435 of AIR): " Upon the plain reading of s. 405, IPC, it is obvious that before person can be said to have committed criminal breach of trust, it must be established that he was either entrusted with or entrusted with dominion over property which he is said to have converted to his own use or disposed of in violation of any direction of law, etc. Every partner has dominion over property by reason of the fact that he is a partner. This is a kind of dominion which every owner of property has over his property. But it is not dominion of this kind which satisfies the requirements of s. 405. In order to establish 'entrustment of dominion' over property to an accused person the mere existence of that person's dominion over ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ust. The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created." The most important ingredient of an offence under s. 406, which is alleged by the wife against her husband, his three brothers, father and brother-in-law in her complaint in the present case is the entrustment of the dowry articles to the respondents in the complaint and their dishonest conversion thereof to their own use. There is no doubt an allegation in the complaint that these articles were given and entrusted to the respondents in the complaint at Ludhiana at the time of " doli " on February 5, 1972. Apart from the husband, the other respondents in the complaint, as already stated, are his father, three brothers and brother-in-law. The articles were given for the use of the wife. If so, could there be entrustment of the articles to such a number of diverse persons ? In the background of what usually happens in Hindu marriages, namely, placing of the articles presented to the bride in the presence of the eld ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce investigation or the consequent criminal trial. 25. Now, apart from the principle, the most ancient texts of Hindu law have always been categoric that dowry, as commonly understood, was stridhana and thus in the exclusive ownership of the bride. 26. Now once it is so held that articles of dowry and traditional presents given at the wedding are owned by the bride individually in her own right, then one fails to see how by the mere fact of her bringing the same into her husband's or parents-in-law's household, would forthwith divest her of the ownership thereof. Separate and individual right to property of the wife therein cannot vanish into thin air the moment the threshold of the matrimonial home is crossed. To say that at that point of time she would cease to own such property altogether and the title therein would pass to her husband or in any case she would lose half of her right therein and become merely a joint owner of the same, with the family of her husband, does not appear to me as even remotely unwarranted either by the statute, principles or logic. No such marriage hazard against the wife can be implied in law. Once she owns property exclusively, she would continu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n jurisprudence that the concept of the marital home lies at the very centre of the idea of marriage in all civilised societies. Perhaps from primeval times when human beings lived sheltered in subterranean caves to the modern day when many live perched in flats in high rise apartments within the megapolis, the husband and the wife have always hankered for a place which may be their very own and which they may call home. The innumerable mutual obligations and rights which stem from the living together of man and wife are undoubtedly beyond any precise definition and stand epitomized by the concept of the matrimonial home.' In the light of the above, it would be farcical to assume that despite the factum of a marriage and a common matrimonial home, the two spouses would stand in a kind of a formal relationship where each is entrusted with or has been passed dominion over the exclusive property of the other. Rather it appears to me that the conjugal relationship and the existence of a matrimonial home automatically obviates any such hyper-technicalities of an entrustment or dominion over property. It seems inapt to conceive the relationship as a day-to-day entrustment of the proper ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction 405 is in the following terms : Rs. 405. Criminal Breach of trust.-Whoever being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits criminal breach of trust.' It is well-settled that from a legal contract, or violation of directions of law, the entrustment of property or dominion over property are the pre-requisites for the applicability of the aforesaid provision. Once it is held as above that property within the matrimonial home is in the joint possession and custody (despite rights of the individual ownership therein), then these very pre-requisites of entrustment or dominion over property cannot be easily satisfied betwixt the spouses inter se. It is indeed well settled that the very concept of the jointness of possession and custody would rule out the entrustment or dominion o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the special provisions of the same and subsequent legislation. In India, however, in the absence of any statutory change, the legal position would continue to be the same. This came up for pointed consideration before a Full Bench of five judges in Bhuban Mohan Das v. Surendra Mohan Das, AIR 1951 Cal 69. The relief sought therein of quashing the proceedings under s. 406, Indian Penal Code, betwixt partners, was granted whilst holding that a charge under s. 406, Indian Penal Code, cannot be framed against a person who, according to the complainant, is a partner with him and is accused of the offence in respect of property belonging to them as partners. P. B. Mukharji J., in his concurring judgment, observed as under (para. 46): `The question here is of much broader application and of a more fundamental nature. Its fundamental nature is this that the very conception of partnership precludes possibility of entrustment or dominion of the partnership property by one partner as against the other and, therefore, precludes any possible operation of the claim under s. 46, Indian Penal Code, of criminal breach of trust by one partner against the other in respect of the partnership property ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f 0. 32-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 47. In view of the above, it would be equally untenable to hold that either the desertion or the expulsion of one of the spouses from the matrimonial home would result in entrusting dominion over the property belonging to the other so as to bring the case within the ambit of this pre-requisite under s. 405, Indian Penal Code. The joint custody and possession once established would thereafter exclude either express entrustment or the passing of dominion over the property. It was rightly argued that if an irate husband or wife walks out from the matrimonial home in huff, this cannot constitute an entrustment or dominion over the property to the other. Consequently, unless a special written agreement to the contrary can be established, the strongest presumption arises that during the existence and immediately after the crumbling of the matrimonial home, there was in essence, a joint possession and custody of the property of the spouses therein, including dowry and traditional presents, which would preclude the essentials of entrustment or dominion over the property which form the cornerstone of criminality under s. 405, Indian Penal Code. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lacking in a charge of criminal breach of trust of property by one spouse against the other. Inevitably, therefore, the purported allegations of breach of trust betwixt husband and wife so long as the conjugal relationship lasts and the matrimonial home subsists, cannot constitute an offence under section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, subject to any special written agreement. Equally, as against the close relations of the husband, no facile presumption of entrustment and dominion over the dowry can be raised prima facie and this inevitably has to be by a subsequent conscious act of volition which must be specifically alleged and conclusively established by proof. Lastly, because of the definition in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the offences under the said Act cannot come within the ambit of s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code as these cannot stand together on the same set of facts. 57. Hence the answer (to the question) posed at the very outset is rendered in the affirmative. The bonds of matrimony, therefore, bar the spectre of the criminal breach of trust qua the property of the spouses at the very threshold of the matrimonial home. It cannot enter its hallowed precinct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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