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TMI Blog1993 (2) TMI 98X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion to retire voluntarily from March 31, 1990, even if his outstanding claims with it were not settled by that date. But, the Government did not grant permission to the respondent to voluntarily retire from its service with effect from March 31, 1990, as had been sought by him. Instead, the Governor of U. P., purporting to exercise his powers under F. R. 56 of the Financial Hand Book, volume 11, Part II-IV, as amended up-to-date (to be referred to as " F. R. 56 issued an order dated 6th January, 1990, compulsorily retiring the respondent from the Government service with effect from 6th January, 1990, and giving him the benefit of three months' wages at the last drawn rates. No doubt, that order of compulsory retirement of the respondent was challenged by him in a writ petition, Writ Petition No. 1980 of 1990 filed before the High Court of judicature at Allahabad. But, a Division Bench of that court, refused to entertain that writ petition and dismissed it by its order dated March 29, 1990, which read: " Learned counsel for the State has produced the record and has also filed counter-affidavit to which rejoinder affidavit has been filed. However, after looking into the record we ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich he had been compulsorily retired was liable to be rejected in limine when his first writ petition by which he had impugned the self-same order, had been dismissed by Division Bench of the same Court for having sought to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court without availing of the alternate remedy before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. Secondly, he urged that the view of the learned single judge of the High Court that the respondent's issuance of a notice to the Government seeking permission for his voluntary retirement from a future date made the Government lose its power to compulsorily retire him in the meantime, was untenable. Thirdly, he urged that the view of the learned single judge of the High Court that departmental disciplinary enquiry pending against the respondent inhibited the Government from compulsorily retiring him under F.R. 56, was again untenable. The respondent who appeared in person could not meet the grounds on which the order under appeal was assailed. Nor could his written submissions be regarded as helpful in meeting those grounds. The first ground urged in support of the appeal, if it merits our acceptance that', that ground by itself w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r article 226 of the Constitution is a legal position which is too well-settled. A Constitution Bench of this court in Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes [1964] 6 SCR 655, 661 and 662 ; AIR 1964 SC 1419, 1423, when it had occasion to deal with the question as to how the discretionary jurisdiction of a High Court under article 226 of the Constitution was required to be exercised respecting a petition filed thereunder by a person coming before it bypassing a statutory alternate remedy available to him for obtaining redressal of his grievance ventilated in the petition, has given expression to the said well-settled legal position, speaking through Shah J., as he then was, thus : " The jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the article. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary, it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations ... Where, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Tribunal shall consist of a judicial Member and an Administrative Member. Sub-section (3) thereof requires that the judicial Member shall be a serving judge of the High Court or a person qualified to be appointed as a High Court judge while the Administrative Member shall be a person who holds or has held the post of, or any post equivalent to, Commissioner of a Division. Section 4 of the Act, which provides for reference of claims to the Tribunal for their adjudication reads : " 4. Reference of claims to Tribunal. -If any person who is or has been a public servant claims that in any matter relating to employment as such public servant his employer or any officer or authority subordinate to the employer has dealt with him in a manner which is not in conformity with any contract, Or (a) in the case of a Government servant, with the provisions of article 16 or article 311 of the Constitution or with any rules or law having force under article 309 or article 313 of the Constitution ; (b) in the case of a servant of a local authority or a statutory corporation, with article 16 of the Constitution or with any rules or regulations having force under any Act or Legislation constitutin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iries being not bound by the technical rules of procedure under the Civil Procedure Code and the technical rules of evidence under the Evidence Act, it could avail of its vast powers of enquiry to redress grievances of public servants concerning matters of their employment adequately and efficaciously. The fact that section 4 of the Act declares that the decision of the Tribunal is final subject to the provisions of articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution itself shows the nature of high judicial sanctity attached by statute to such decision. The respondent had filed in the High Court of judicature of Allahabad, his first writ petition, Writ Petition No. 1980 of 1990 challenging the validity of the order of the State Government by which he had been compulsorily retired from Government service and claimed several reliefs against the State Government. We have to find whether the U. P. Public Services Tribunal if had been approached by the respondent here, could not have, if warranted, invalidated the order challenged in the writ petition and given the reliefs sought for therein. If we have regard to the high status of the members constituting the Tribunal, expertise possessed by su ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion filed by such person, and sought to derive support therefor from the decisions of this court in (i) Daryao v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1457, 1466 ; (ii) B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1986 SC 210,227; and (iii)L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, Bareilly [1970] 78 ITR 26, 31 ; AIR 1971 SC 33, 36. It is true that the decisions to which the learned single judge has referred have ruled that the dismissal of a writ petition in limine on the alternate remedy being available to a petitioner, does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution or the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution to entertain a subsequent writ petition of the same party in relation to the same subjectmatter. But, what has escaped the notice of the learned single judge is that they do not lay down that when the discretion of the High Court to refuse to entertain the first writ petition on the ground of non-exhaustion by him of a statutory remedy had been rightly and properly exercised, the same could be ignored by the same High Court when the party whose writ petition was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of a statutory remedy file ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tice and procedure governing such matters permitted the learned single judge to bypass the order of the Division Bench on the excuse that the High Court has jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a second writ petition since the earlier writ petition of the same person had been dismissed on the ground of non-availing of alternate . remedy and not on merits. When a judge of single judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. The second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the learned single judge has no jurisdiction to entertain same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition would render the order of the same court dismissing the earlier writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power. Besides, i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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