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TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 621X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 0,000/-, drawn on Punjab National Bank, Bagipul in his favour. The complainant presented the cheque before his banker, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement of "funds insufficient". The complainant issued a legal notice on 22.01.2014, which was deemed to be served on 27.01.2014. The accused failed to make the payment; hence, the complaint was filed to take action against the accused as per law. 3.Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4.The complainant examined himself (CW1) to prove his case. 5.The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he used to purchase articles from the complainant. He denied that he had purchased the articles worth Rs.80,000/- from the complainant. He stated that he had issued two blank cheques to the complainant on 26.2.2013 at his request as a security. He admitted that the cheque was dishonoured. He stated that he had made the payment of the entire amount to the complainant, an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ile deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed: "25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened, and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... te of T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639: 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494] has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus: (SCC p. 643, para 9) '9. ... We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeals against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view, and even if by any stretch of the imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.'" 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P. [Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294: (2022) 2 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... atisfies the court that he had sufficient cause in not making the complaint within the time prescribed. On a reading of the proviso, which was inserted by Act No. 55/02, it becomes abundantly clear that a time-barred complaint could also be entertained if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause. Admittedly, in the case on hand, there is a delay of 3 days in filing the complaint. The learned Magistrate, before taking cognisance and recording the sworn statement, has straight away condoned the delay in filing the complaint. Incidentally, that exercise is done without notice to the petitioners. Undoubtedly, a right has accrued in favour of the petitioners when there is a delay in lodging the complaint. The provisions of Section 142(b) of the Act will have to be read in tandem with Section 142(a), which starts with a non-obstante clause that 'no court shall take cognisance of any offence punishable under Sec. 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque'. Clause (b) specifies that such complaint shall be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... de affecting him, and then he must be given an opportunity to correct or contradict them.' Another classic example is the statement of Willes, J. in a case which, in essentials, was the same as Cooper. v. Wands Worth Board of Works: 'In condemning a man to have his house pulled down, a judicial act is as much implied as in fining him five, and as the local board is the only Tribunal that can make such an order, its act must be a judicial act, and the party to be affected should have a notice given to him ........ In the present case, there is nothing in the Act of Parliament to limit the natural inference as to the nature of the Act.' 10. Taking into consideration the fact that the delay of 3 days was condoned without notice to the petitioners, I am of the view that the proceedings commencing from taking cognisance and issuing process to the petitioners requires to be set aside as it is opposed to principles of natural justice." 16. A similar view was taken in Manish Maseih v. Babulal, 2016 SCC OnLine MP 11941: (2017) 2 MP LJ 618: 2017 ACD 785, wherein it was observed at page 621: "7. Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act would deal with bad cheques. Section 142, Negot ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt without deciding the condonation application. His said act is certainly contrary to the principles of natural justice and provisions to sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of section 142, Negotiable Instruments Act. The aforesaid view of mine is fortified by a decision rendered by the Karnataka High Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar Jhunjhunwala v. Eastern Roadways Pvt. Ltd., 2007 Cr. LJ. 482. In that case, the complaint under section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, was filed with a condonation application seeking condonation of delay of only three days. The learned JMFC allowed the condonation application without hearing the accused. It is held that it was mandatory for the learned JMFC to provide an opportunity for the accused to argue on the merits of the condonation application. Thereupon, the Karnataka High Court quashed the proceedings against the accused and directed the trial Court to decide the condonation application, affording an opportunity to the accused to oppose the same." (Emphasis supplied) 17.Therefore, there can be no implied condonation of the delay. 18.It was not disputed in the memorandum of appeal that the complaint was barred by limitation, and it was require ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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