9911796707
TMI Blog2025 (1) TMI 944X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... peal, the above Interim Application is also filed seeking a condonation of delay. Though in the Interim Application, the period of delay is not mentioned, on the basis of the lists of dates and events tendered to this Court on 9th December 2024, the delay mentioned is 132 days. 3. As recorded in our order dated 9th December, 2024, we had noted that the issue involved in the present case is whether the Court has the power to condone the delay beyond the total period of 120 days [sixty days being the prescribed period and a further period of sixty days being the grace period] as stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002, read with its proviso. In order to decide the aforesaid issue, it would be apposite to refer to certain admitted facts which are relevant for the present purposes. 4. The present Applicant/Appellant is working as the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Surat, Sub-Zonal Office, Surat. The Joint Director of the Directorate of Enforcement, Ahmedabad Zonal office, Ahmedabad, had filed Original Complaint No. 805 of 2017 [under Section 5 (5) of the PMLA, 2002] in respect of Provisional Attachment Order No.4 of 2017 dated 17th July 2017. This provisional atta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... July 2018. As per Section 42, the Appeal had to be filed within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the said order. Since the Appeal was filed after 65 days from the date of the communication of the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, an application for condonation of delay was also filed before the Gujarat High Court, and which was allowed. Thereafter, once the Appeal was withdrawn from the Gujarat High Court and filed in this Court, there has been further delay of about 132 days in filing the above Appeal. 10. In these facts, and considering the provisions of Section 42, we inquired from the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant as to how we would have the power to condone the delay beyond the maximum period of 120 days as stipulated in Section 42 of the PMLA, 2002. In answer to this query, the learned Counsel submitted that the provisions of Section 42 do not preclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In this regard the learned Counsel submitted that Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 clearly stipulates that where any special or local law prescribes inter-alia for any appeal, a period of limitation different from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erson aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal to him on any question of law or fact arising out of such order: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means- (i) the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the aggrieved party ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; and (ii) where the Central Government is the aggrieved party, the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the respondent, or in a case where there are more than one respondent, any of the respondents, ordinarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain." (emphasis supplied) 12. As can be seen from the aforesaid provision, any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ey are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being extend." (emphasis supplied) 14. Section 29 (2) basically stipulates that where any special or local law, for any suit, appeal or application, prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963, then, for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed [for any suit, appeal or application] by any such special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special law or local law. After perusing the provisions of Section 42, we are clearly of the view that when the said Section is read as a whole, the inescapable conclusion is that S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ld render the said words otiose and would be against all principles of interpretation. 15. We must note that we have taken this precise view in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Anusaya Sitaram Devrukhkar and Others [Interim Application No.13254 of 2024 in First Appeal (ST) No.24058 of 2024 decided on 7th January 2025]. In this decision, what this Court considered were the provisions of Section 74 (1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 [for Short "the 2013 Act"]. Section 74 of the 2013 Act also stipulated that the Requiring Body, or any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Reference Authority under Section 69 of the 2013 Act, may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of the Award. The proviso to Section 74 (1) stipulated that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the initial period of sixty days, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. For the sake of convenience, Section 74 (1) the 2013 Act and its proviso are reproduced hereunder:- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal. (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any Court from any judgment, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail. (5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days." (emphasis supplied) 18. Whilst construing this provision, the Division Bench of this Court held that the word "shall" appearing in the proviso to Section 21 (5) should be read as "may" and hence would be directory in nature. We fail to understand ho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
