TMI Blog1971 (2) TMI 41X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Company. That business was wound up in that year and he had the stock-in-trade of that business transferred to his business carried on in the name of Wallton Watch Company. 3. On March 19, 1963, the Rummaging staff under the appellant raided the respondent's business premises and seized 218 watches, all of foreign make, 87 of these watches, however, were released on the respondent then and there producing vouchers relating to them. Later on, 21 more watches were released on September 18,1963 and February 27, 1964 on more vouchers having been produced. The case of the Customs authorities, however, was that he was not able to produce documentary evidence in respect of the rest of the watches, and therefore, their release was not possible. 4. On March 6, 1964, the appellant served on the respondent a notice under Section 124(a) to show cause why the rest of the said watches should not be confiscated and personal penalty should not be imposed upon him. Watches imported without licence or on which proper import duty has not been paid are undoubtedly liable to confiscation under Section 111(d). 5. Section 110, which finds its place in Chapter XIII dealing with searches, seizure an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uld be granted, and the watches should, as provided by Section 110(2), be restored to him. He also got no opportunity to plead before the Collector that the right to have the watches restored to him having already accrued to him on January 19, 1964, it could not be defeated by an order of extension passed after the first extended period had already lapsed. 8. Aggrieved by the two orders of extension passed in the manner aforesaid, the respondent moved the High Court of Calcutta under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the proviso to Section 110(2) envisaged only one extension, and that, therefore, the second extension was invalid. The learned Single Judge, who heard the writ petition, rejected this contention holding that the proviso empowered the Collector to grant as many extensions as the completion of the inquiry and the issuance of the notice under Section 124(a) required but in no case exceeding six months at a time. The second contention urged by the respondent was that the period of the first extension having expired on January 19, 1964 and no further extension having been granted by that date, he became entitled to restoration of the said watches and the se ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efeated by an order passed one month after the lapse of the first extended period. It also held that the words "sufficient cause being shown" used in the proviso meant that the Collector had to decide an application for extension judicially, the reason being that the Collector could not fairly and justly determine that a sufficient cause was shown without hearing the pros and cons of the question, and therefore, he had no jurisdiction to grant extension without giving to the respondent an opportunity of being heard. In this connection the Division Bench observed : "As long as the period of issuing notice has not expired, it might be one thing. But quite a different set of circumstances arise when the period has expired and the right to the return of the goods is vested in the person from whose possession the goods are seized. If you are to take away the right you can only do that for a "sufficient cause". How can the officer concerned decide as to whether a "sufficient cause" has been shown, so as to divest a vested right, unless he hears the parties affected. Even after the supplementary affidavits were filed in this case, it is extremely doubtful whether a sufficient cause has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riod and a notice under Section 124(a) is, therefore, not given, the person from whom the goods are seized becomes entitled to their restoration. However, on the supposition that in some cases such an investigation may not be completed owing to some difficulties, the legislature gave under the proviso power to the Collector an officer superior in rank and also an appellate authority under Section 128, to extend the time on two conditions, namely, (1) it does not exceed one year, and (2) on sufficient cause being shown. The policy of the legislature, therefore, clearly was that in view of the extraordinary power of seizure, the enquiry should ordinarily be completed within six months but since it might not be possible to do so in some cases, it gave power of extension of the Collector. The legislature was thus careful to entrust the power of extension to a superior officer who also has the power to hear inquiries under the Act involving penal consequences and also appeals. Cases where extension would have to be asked for and granted are thus envisaged as exceptions to the general rule of six months laid down in sub-section (2). The second limitation to the power is that such extensi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ona fide exercise of power and within the provisions of the Act which confers such power, the order undoubtedly is immune from interference by a Court of law, and therefore, the adequacy of the cause shown may not be a ground for such interference. But there can be no doubt at the same time that the inquiry to be held by the Collector has to be on facts, i.e., materials placed before him. There is, therefore, no question in such cases of the subjective satisfaction of the Collector, for, what he is asked to do by the proviso is to determine that the cause shown before him warrants an extension of time. 14. In Lakhanpal's case, AIR 1967 S.C. 1507, this Court noticed a similar difference of language used in Rules 30(1)(b) and 30A(9) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 which dealt with two different types of powers. Though it was a case dealing with preventive detention, what is important is that the decision primarily depended on the difference in language used in the two rules and the difference it made in the character of the two powers. A similar expression, though not exactly the same, also came to be construed by the House of Lords in De Verteuil v. Knaggs, 1918 AC 557, a case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tions was thin and gradually evaporating, and that the functions performed by those doing judicial function and administrative function, where the rights of citizens are affected to their prejudice, had the same object, namely, to do justice and deciding the question fairly and justly. In the former case, there would be express rules of procedure, but the object of these rules is only to enable or facilitate to decide fairly and justly. The Court also pointed out that in recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change and noted with approval the decision in Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board; Ex parte Lain, (1967) 2 QB 864, where it was held that certiorari would be available not only where the impugned order infringes immediately enforceable rights but also where it is a step as a result of which legally enforceable right may be affected. If the power of preparing a selection list without the power to appoint, as in Kraipak's case, (1969) 2 SCC 262 and power to transfer indentured labour from one to another employer, as in (1918) AC 557, are held, in the context of their respective provisions, to be quasi-judicial powers, there is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tinguished the decision of the Division Bench under this appeal (reported in AIR 1968 Cal. 28) on the ground that the question involved in that decision as whether an opportunity of being heard had to be given in respect only of an extension when the right to restoration of the goods in question has already accrued to the party from whom they were seized, and therefore, the decision did not apply to the case before him when such a right had not vested in the petitioner. With respect to the learned Judge, the distinction was not correct, firstly, because the first order of extension was only assumed to be correct as the Division Bench concentrated its attention on the second order of extension which also involved the question of the right to restoration of the goods having already vested, and secondly, because the Division Bench set aside extension order on the ground that the power of extension was quasi-judicial or at any rate one which required a judicial approach. The latter ground applied to both the orders, and therefore, if the second order of extension was bad, the first was for the same reason necessarily bad. The order of extension in both the cases would deprive the perso ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... requires determination on facts and not on mere suspicion and a sufficient cause being made out by the applicant-officer, and secondly, because a civil right of a citizen to the restoration of the goods on expiry of the period, whether initial or extended, is affected. 17. The other decision, which takes a contrary view, is of the High Court of Mysore in Ganeshmul Channilal v. Collector of Central Excise, AIR 1968 Mys. 89. The grounds on which the learned Judges there took that view were (1) that the power was administrative, and (2) that if notice were to be necessary, the authority which applies for extension would have to make a disclosure about the investigation, which disclosure would be detrimental to the investigation itself. For the reason already given we cannot agree with the first ground. As for the second ground, we do not see any reason for the apprehension. So far as the initial period of six months is concerned, there is no question of disclosure of the investigation. The legislature itself contemplated that ordinarily such an investigation would be completed within that period. The question of disclosure would arise only in cases where for bona fide reasons somet ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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