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Showing 1 to 20 of 21 Records
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1950 (10) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... m Bali Singh. Of course, as already mentioned, he did not mention that Ram Bali Singh stabbed him at the instigation of these persons. It follows, therefore, that the statement of Nanhku Singh on account of the omission of the names of Harbansh Singh and Param Sukh Lal as instigators throws doubt on the veracity of the witnesses with respect to his mentioning them as instigators on the spot or on the statements of eye-witnesses that they had seen these two persons instigating Ram Bali Singh. 29. I would, therefore, give the benefit of doubt to Harbanah Singh and Param Sukh Lal. 30. By the Court.--We maintain the conviction and sentence of Ram Bali Singh, dismiss his appeal, accept the reference and direct that the sentence of death be carried out according to law. We allow the appeal of Harbansh Singh and Param Sukh Lal, set aside their conviction and sentence and acquit them. They shall be set at liberty unless they are required to remain in custody under some other warrant.
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1950 (10) TMI 25 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... ppeals also lie to a Division Bench from a 'judgment' of a learned single Judge. It is now well settled that 'judgment' means not an expression of opinion on a point that was argued before a single Judge but an order which finally deter, mines the rights of the parties so far as the single Judge is concerned. Under Section 170, Companies Act, the Court had the power to dismiss the application, to grant the same or to adjourn the hearing conditionally or unconditionally. Here, the learned Judge considered it proper to adjourn the case to a future date and to postpone the passing of a final order to that date. In Chauli v. Meghoo ILR (1945) ALL 798 a Full Bench of this Court has held that after return of the findings on issues remitted to the lower Court the Court is not bound by the judgment remitting the issues and can re-decide the whole case. 2. The appeal is misconceived. It does not lie. We allow the preliminary objection and dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1950 (10) TMI 24 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA
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... ... ..... only concerned with the disbursement of the income over determinate objects of the trust in defined shares or otherwise. Therefore, in my opinion, this contention is without any merit & is not sustainable in view of the true interpretation of the document. 5. For the above reasons, the reference should be answered in the negative, & the income from the Schedule C properties should be taxed not at the maximum rate under the first proviso to Section 41, but on the same basis as the income from Schedule B properties as directed by the Tribunal already. The assessee, in the circumstances of this case, will not be entitled to any costs of the hearing of this application. Shearer, J. 6. I agree to the order proposed to be passed by my learned brother, but desire to say that I am inclined to doubt the correctness of the decision in Joytishwari Kalimata v. Commissioner of Income Tax B. & O., & think that when a suitable occasion arises, it may have to be reconsidered.
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1950 (10) TMI 23 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eal, set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below and remand the case to the trial Court to frame the necessary issue and determine whether (a) the amount claimed by the mortgagee was not really due on the footing of the mortgage; and (b) the amount was claimed in good faith. 20. The Court shall proceed to dispose of the suit in the light of its findings on these points. The parties will bear their own costs of this appeal. Agarwala, J. 21. I agree. Chandiramani, J. 22. I agree. 23. By the Court. -- The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the case is remanded to the trial Court to frame the necessary issue and determine whether (a) the amount claimed by the mortgagee was not really due on the footing of the mortgage; and (b) the amount was claimed in good faith. 24. The Court shall proceed to dispose of the suit in the light of its findings on these points. The parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1950 (10) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e order of acquittal. But having set it aside, we might either have remanded the case to the trial Ct. for a fresh trial or we might ourselves have asked for fresh evidence, to be recorded & certified to us. But as we hold that we have no power of altering or reviewing our earlier judgment, it is not open to us to make that order. 20. Under these circumstances, we do not think that we can review or alter the order which we have passed on 18-9-1950, & that order must therefore stand. 21. An appln. has been made by Mr. Kolah on behalf of the accused that we should certify that this is a fit case for appeal to the S. C. We think that the question whether this Ct. has power to review or alter its judgment after the judgment has once been recorded & a writ in terms of that order has been issued, is an important point of law, & we think that this is a fib case in which a certificate might be issued for an appeal to the S. C. 22. We accordingly grant the certificate.
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1950 (10) TMI 21 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent. Consequently, my answer to the question referred to the Full Bench is as follows An oral transfer of immovable property worth more than ₹ 100 cannot be made by a Muslim husband to his wife by way of gift in lieu of dower-debt which also exceeds ₹ 100. Such a transaction is neither a gift nor a combination of gifts which can be made orally; it is a sale which can be effected by means of a registered instrument only. Agarwala, J. 47. I agree. Harish Chandra, J. 48. I agree. 49. By the Court- -- The question referred to the Full Bench is answered as follows An oral transfer of immovable property worth more than ₹ 100 cannot be validly made by a Muslim husband to his wife by way of gift in lieu of dower-debt which also exceeds ₹ 100. Such a transaction is neither a gift nor a combination of gifts which can be made orally; it is a sale which can be effected by means of a registered instrument only. 50. Let the papers be laid before the Bench concerned.
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1950 (10) TMI 20 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... revisions filed under the U. P. Tenancy Act in the revenue Courts, and does not apply to suits filed in a civil Court. The case before my brother being a case which had been instituted in the civil Court, the matter was argued and had to be decided upon the general principles of law apart from Section 31. My brother held, and if I may say so with great respect, correctly that since the law was not retrospective in operation so as to affect suits filed in the civil Court, decrees passed by the Courts below could not be upset because during the pendency of the appeal the law had been amended. There is nothing in the observations made by my brother that can be said to advance the appellant's case in the present appeal. 23. My answer to the first question referred to us is "yes" if the suit is pending on the date when the Amending Act 1947 came into force, and my answer to the second question is "yes". Kidwai, J. 24. I agree. Chandiramani, J. 25. I agree.
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1950 (10) TMI 19 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d therefore had no jurisdiction. Whatever be the meaning which could be attached this paragraph which is certainly worded very unusual manner, there can be no doubt that the case to show the appln. is within time was on the decree-holder and it was for him to show by having given proper particular that the appln. was within time. I am, there fore, of the opinion that when the appln. for execution was filed on 20-12-1946 in the Ct. of the learned Senior Subordinate judge as it is now contended by the decree-holder's Advocate, it was barred by time and should not have been proceeded with. 15. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the objections of the judgment-debtors should have been allowed by the learned Judge and he was in error in overruling them. 16. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is allowed, but considering the circumstances of the case I would leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Ct. as well as in the Ct. of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Simla.
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1950 (10) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... possession. This case, therefore, does not carry the matter any further. 10. The short answer to Sir Jamshedji's contention is that mere possession of materials is not information. Information must be a knowledge or a mental awareness of the facts which are revealed by the materials, and if it is established - as it has been established in this case - that there was no awareness on the part of the Income Tax Officer of the various facts embodied in Mr. Dastur's report. Then when the mind of the subsequent officer became aware with regard to those facts he came in possession of those facts which led to the discovery contemplated by Section 34 or Section 15. In our opinion, therefore, the assessment was validly made under Section 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act. 11. The result is that we must answer the question submitted to us as follows - Question (1) in the negative. Question (2) in the affirmative. 12. Assessee to pay the costs. 13. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (10) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . In our view, the argument fails. Liberty of a person is a much wider thing than freedom of expression & what was sought to be curtailed in this case was the liberty of the detenu as distinguished from his freedom of expression. Moreover, this ground alleges that the detenu was exhorting the public to start an open & violent revolt to overthrow Govt. That, at any rate, is a valid ground for detention of a person under the Preventive Detention Act. Accordingly we do not see much force in the last contention of Mr. Sule also. In our view, grounds NOS. 2 & 3 of the grounds stated by the detaining authority are good & valid grounds. 25. Although para. 12 of the detaining authority's affidavit is too general & vague, in my view, we are satisfied from the consideration of the grounds as they were given that the detaining authority bad applied his mind properly to the question of the detention of this detenu. Accordingly the appln. fails & is dismissed.
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1950 (10) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by reason of a decision of this Court given on identical grounds and which decision was arrived at after elaborate arguments were presented to the Court. My brothers Dixit and Shah JJ. were under this handicap that when the application came before them the matter was not fully argued and they very rightly, judging by materials presented to them at that moment, came to a conclusion which was contrary to the conclusion taken by a Division Bench subsequently. Although we have held that we are not entitled to review the decision of Dixit and Shah JJ. or to permit the applicant to present this application to any other Judge of this High Court, we feel certain that Government will not take its stand on any technical ground, but will review this case, and if it is satisfied that the case falls within the four corners of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench subsequently, it will not hesitate to set the detenus free. 9. Leave to Mr. Sule under Article 132 of the Constitution.
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1950 (10) TMI 15 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
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... ... ..... he sites thereof and the land immediately appurtenant thereto and necessary for their enjoyment belonging to a J.D. other than an agriculturist and occupied by him.... Under this definition if that is the main residential house, then that building with all other buildings attached to it would be a residential house for the purposes of the exemption. In this case there is evidence to show that the whole building is being used for the purposes of residence and even if there is a shop on the ground floor it cannot be said that that alone will convert it into something different from a residential house. I, therefore, hold that the property in dispute is a residential house within Section 60, Code of Civil Procedure and the learned executing Court has rightly come to the conclusion that it cannot be attached or sold in executing of the decree. I dismiss this appeal and affirm the order of the learned Judge of the executing Court. The Respondent will have his costs in this Court.
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1950 (10) TMI 14 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... was no interdependence or interconnection between the two businesses so that they could be considered to be one business. It is difficult to say in the circumstances that there was no evidence before the Tribunal which would entitle it to come to the findings at which it arrived. On the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal, therefore, the answer to the first question must be in the negative and the sum of ₹ 55,380 cannot be allowed as a deduction under Section 10(2)(vii) in computing the income from the glass business. We do not see how the second question arises. There is no fact mentioned in the 'Statement of the Case' on which the second question has been framed, nor is there anything in the order of the Appellate Tribunal which can give rise to this question. In our view the second question, therefore, does not arise and does not call for an answer. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (10) TMI 13 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... demand is required to be issued only when the assessment has been enhanced or the refund order has been modified to the detriment of the assessee. Where the order is in favour of the assessee, all that can be said is that a part of the demand had been cancelled or rescinded allowing the rest to stand. In such a case no question of a fresh notice of demand under Section 29 becomes necessary. That is our answer to the second question framed by the Tribunal. The assessee had, therefore, no fresh right of appeal from the date of the receipt of the notice of the order dated 30th August, 1946. In view of our answer to question No. (2) of the assessee's appeal filed on the 26th August, 1946, was clearly time-barred and, as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refused to condone the delay, it is not necessary to answer the third and fourth questions which do not therefore arise. The department is entitled to its costs which we fix at ₹ 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (10) TMI 12 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the assessment of Ghanashyam Das has been completed and that he had been assessed for this sum as a part of his profits. If that be so, it is open to the assessee to approach the Income-tax department for a refund. We are sure that the department will not try to have double assessment on the selfsame item of money. This cannot be treated for assessment purposes as profits of the debtor as well as of the creditor. Under the circumstance, Mr. Mohanty's remedy is somewhere else than in this Court. In case the Income-tax department does not perform their duty, his remedy in this Court would then be opened. Under the circumstance, we dismiss these S.J. Cases. As all these cases have been heard analogously, there will be one consolidated hearing fee for the learned Standing Counsel for the department. We assess it at two gold mohurs. We are impressed with the fact that the assessee has some yet unredressed grievance at any rate. NARASIMHAM, J.--I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1950 (10) TMI 11 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... re must be some material to support that finding, but where the finding amounts to this that a party has failed to prove its case, we fail to see why it should be necessary to have positive material to support that finding in every case. If a party on whom the burden of proof lies produces evidence which is considered to be unsatisfactory and is, therefore, disbelieved, the mere fact that there is no evidence to the contrary does not compel the Tribunal to record a finding in favour of the party on whom the burden lies. Our answer to the first question, therefore, is that the Tribunal was justified in its view that the assets of the cloth business and the money-lending business had not passed out of the Hindu undivided family. Coming to the next question, if the partnership is held to be a sham transaction, no question can arise of the registration of the partnership deed. The Department is entitled to its costs which we assess at ₹ 300. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (10) TMI 10 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... worth instead of money--this proposition is true; it is a totally different thing to say that the receipt of money's worth is necessarily a receipt of income." In the judgment of Mackinnon, L.J., it was pointed out that "a debtor may pay his debt by giving the promise of a third party to pay; indeed the best form of payment in the world, Bank of England notes, if subjected to the unusual treatment of being read, will be found to be promises by a third party to pay. But I am satisfied that there can never be payment of his debt by a debtor by giving his own promise to pay at a future date." We are, therefore, of the opinion that the receipt of the U. P. Government Bonds issued under Section 30 of the Encumbered Estates Act in lieu of interest due was receipt of income during the year of account and was assessable to income-tax. The Commissioner is entitled to his costs which we assess at a figure of ₹ 400 in each case. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (10) TMI 9 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... section (4). In this case the assessee also applied for relief under the second part of Section 25(4) and in our opinion it is clear that an application had to be made with regard to that relief, and as no application was made within the period of limitation laid down in Section 25(5), it is not open to the assessee to make any such application after the period of limitation or to get any relief after the period of limitation. Sir Jamshedji has very fairly conceded that the Tribunal's view with regard to the second relief claimed by him is right and he cannot contest that position. The result, therefore, is that we must answer the first part of question (1) as follows That the income of the assessee is exempt from the 17th October, 1944, till the 18th October, 1944, and Section 25(5) does not apply to this relief under Section 25(4). With regard to question (2), the answer is in the affirmative to both the parts. Assessee to pay the costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (10) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and therefore invoked rule 14(2) which could have absolutely no application to the case. Mr. Nambiar for the plaintiffs states that the order of assessment and the collection based on a power alleged to have been conferred on the Commercial Tax Officer in rule 14(2) could even be called absurd and that he must be held to have acted absurdly. There is no doubt much to be said in favour of this argument since on an ordinary understanding of the Act and the rules and the relevant provisions relating to the assessment of escaped turnover it could not be said that the Commercial Tax Officer acted as a man of ordinary intelligence would after a reading of the rules governing this particular case. I am therefore of opinion that in any event the order of assessment and its collection could not be said to have been made according to the law for the time being in force. In the result, there will be a decree as prayed for and for costs against the defendant. Decree for the plaintiffs.
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1950 (10) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... even contradicted the language (1) 1950 2 M.L.J. 449 2 S.T.C. 1. (3) (1889) 14 App. Cas. 493 at p. 503. (2) 1935 A.C. 398 at 417. of the Legislature when on a full view of the Act, considering its scheme and its machinery and the manifest purpose of it, they have thought that a particular case or class of cases was not intended to fall within the taxing clause relied upon by the Crown. A notable instance is the case of Colquhoun v. Brooks(1), decided nearly thirty years ago, and always followed. I entirely agree that if the natural meaning could lead to strangely anomalous results, then the Court could cut down or even contradict the language. But in this case I am not satisfied how giving the natural meaning to the words would lead to strangely anomalous results. I am not prepared therefore to read the section with the words without reasonable cause. No other point is raised in this case and the petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. (1) (1889) 14 App. Cas. 493 at 503.
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