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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 191 Records
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1950 (12) TMI 37 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... say that the goods were lost by explosion damage within the meaning of section 14, it seems to me, they would be bringing themselves under the bar of section 18 (2). The respondents cannot therefore claim that the loss of the goods was explosion damage within the meaning of the Ordinance so as to bring the case within section 14 and at the same time contend that the loss was not "due tO or did not in any way arise out of the explosion" in order to avoid the bar under section 18. Both section 14 and section 18 have in view the physical cause for the loss or damage to property for which compensation is claimed and not the cause of action in relation to the person against whom relief is sought. The respondents cannot, in my opinion, be allowed to take up inconsistent positions in order to bring themselves within the one and to get out of the other. I would therefore allow the appeal and dismiss the counter-claim. DAS J. agreed with the Chief Justice. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 35 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... shed that the General clauses Act does not apply to temporary Acts. That is why a provision had to be made in this Act providing for the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The effect of Section 9 is nothing more than that. That being so, I cannot accept Mr. Chaudhuris contentions on this point. But on the view which I have taken as to the effect of Section 4 (1) of the Act and having come to the conclusion that the Income-tax Officer has acted beyond his powers, I shall give relief to the petitioner in this case. The result is that the rule will be made absolute and the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are hereby prohibited and restrained from taking any steps in furtherance of the notices mentioned in the petition or from giving effect to the said notices or from proceeding thereunder. The applicant is entitled to the costs of this application. The costs will be as of a motion but each days hearing would be allowed separately as of a motion. Application allowed.
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1950 (12) TMI 34 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the petitioner, in my opinion, may well claim to have discharged the onus of showing that this company and its shareholders have been singled out for discriminating treatment by showing that the Act, on the face of it, has adopted a basis of classification which, by its very nature, cannot be exclusively applicable to this company and its shareholders but which may be equally applicable to other companies and their shareholders and has penalised this particular company and its shareholders, leaving out other companies and their shareholders who may be equally guilty of the alleged vice of mismanagement and neglect of the type referred to in the preambles. In my opinion the legislation in question infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner and offends against article 14 of our Constitution. 94. The result, therefore, is that this petition ought to succeed and the petitioner should have an order in terms of prayer (3) of the petition with costs. 95. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 33 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... it for effective administration of justice which was made its special responsibility. Any argument as to deliberate encroachment that might have been founded on the Proviso to section 3 of the Act which enabled the Provincial Government to give to the City Court even Admiralty jurisdiction which was a matter in List I has been set at rest by the amendment of the Proviso by Bombay Act XXVI of 1950. The impugned Bombay Act may, in my judgment, be well supported as a law made by the Provincial Legislature under entry 2 read with entry 1 in List II and I hold accordingly. I, therefore, concur in the order that this appeal be allowed. 101. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to discuss the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the Bombay City Civil Court Act may be supported as a piece of legislation made, by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay under entry 4 read with entry 15 in Part I of List III and I express no opinion on that point. 102. Appeal allowed.
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1950 (12) TMI 32 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rsquo;s fees to this particular work the whole of the payments to the directors must be regarded as an expense of the company which is assessed and therefore the whole can be deducted from the gross income for the purpose of arriving at the amount of tax. The amount of the expenses which can be deducted cannot be made to depend upon how much of their work is attributed to the income which is made assessable under the Indian Income-tax Act. Their work must be regarded as a whole. They worked and were paid as directors of the company and in assessing the company the payment must be regarded as a legitimate expense of the company for earning the income upon which they are assessed. In our view the taxing authorities should have allowed the whole of the remuneration payable to the directors and should not have disallowed a proportion attributable to earning the income in Gwalior. In the result therefore I would answer the question submitted in the negative. Banerjee, J.-I agree.
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1950 (12) TMI 31 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e as drawn up. Secondly, the power of the High Court to allow an amendment under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code is clearly one under which the plea of the bar of limitation may be ignored. There are decisions of very high authority taking that view. The contention therefore that by allowing the amendment the High Court took away the present appellants' valuable right to plead the bar of limitation cannot be accepted. It was a matter of discretion for the High Court and the materials put before us indicate no reason to hold that the discretion was exercised so as to violate any recognised principles of law or that by granting leave to amend any gross injustice has been done. As pointed out by the High Court, the payment of court-fees is a matter primarily between the Government and the present respondents and that was the whole fight in respect of this contention. In our opinion therefore the preliminary objection fails. 6. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.
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1950 (12) TMI 30 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rrespective of the question of fraud. In our opinion, therefore, the contention that because of the fraud established in the present case under section 48(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, the appellant gets a fresh starting point of limitation under article 182 of the Limitation Act is unacceptable. The appellant relied on the general principle of juris prudence that fraud stops or suspends the running of time and that it should be applied in his favour, apart from section 18 of the Limitation Act. Rules of equity have no application. where there are definite statutory provisions specifying the grounds on the basis of which alone the stoppage or suspension of running of time can arise. While the courts necessarily are astute in checkmating or fighting fraud, it should be equally borne in mind that statutes of limitation are statutes of repose. For the reasons given above we concur in the conclusion reached by the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... also. Further it cannot be assumed that the parties contemplated any such contingency as when the plaintiffs filed the suit they must have filed it only on the basis that that Court had jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the suit. If the contention put forward on behalf of the appellants is accepted, the Court will be introducing new words in the power of attorney and also confer a new power on him. When the plaintiffs expressly authorised Narayanaswami Naidu to conduct a suit in a particular Court. I cannot hold that they intended to empower Narayanaswami Naidu to conduct that suit in any other Court. I am therefore constrained to hold, on a fair construction of the express words used in the power of attorney, that Narayanaswami Naidu has no power, under the power of attorney, to institute and conduct the suit in the Subordinate Judge's Court of Chittoor. In my view the conclusion arrived at by the Subordinate Judge is correct. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1950 (12) TMI 28 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... f means, the measure of damages could only be a problematic conjecture. Indeed, it may have been precisely for this very consideration that the defendant had unconditionally agreed to obtain the consent of the lessor and to assign his interest in the lease. That the plaintiff was a respectable and responsible person cannot, on the evidence before the Court, be denied or disputed and, indeed, learned counsel for the appellant did not so contend. We find ourselves in agreement with the High Court that in the circumstances and on the evidence on record the lessor had unreasonably withheld his consent so as to enable the defendant to assign the lease without such consent. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that both the trial Court and the appeal Court exercised their discretion properly and no ground has been made out for our interfering with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The appellant to pay the costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 27 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s of judgments against which special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court can be asked for under article 136. It is obvious that such judgments are not covered under article 135 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion this Court has therefore no jurisdiction to entertain these petitions for special leave to appeal against such judgments of the High Court of Hyderabad under Article 136 of the Constitution. Cases like those of the petitioners are thus not covered by articles 134, 135 or 136 and therefore the Supreme Court in the present state of the legislation is unable to render any assistance to them. An omission to provide for such relief in the Constitution cannot be remedied by the Supreme Court and assumption of jurisdiction which is not warranted by the clear words of articles 134, 135 or 136 will be tantamount to making legislation by the Supreme Court which it is never its function to do. The petitions, under the circumstances, are rejected. Petitions dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 26 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed under Section 10(2)(vii) which is as follows - "any expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure of personal expenses of the assessee) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation". It is difficult to see how the boarding and lodging expenses of a partner can be said to be "wholly and exclusively" for the purpose of such business. It is true that a partner going outstation in the interest of the business of the firm might have to spend more on his boarding, but he would have to spend something even if he remains at the head-quarters. Such expenditure has to be incurred to preserve life, and it is difficult to see how it can be said that the money was spent wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. Our answer to this question is, therefore, in the negative. In the result, the revenue is entitle to its costs which we assess at ₹ 200. Reference answered accordingly.
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1950 (12) TMI 25 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... rganised by it for effective administration of justice which was made its special responsibility. Any argument as to deliberate encroachment that might have been rounded on the Proviso to section 3 of the Act which enabled the Provincial Government to give to the City Court even Admiralty jurisdiction which was a matter in List I has been set at rest by the amendment of the Proviso by Bombay Act XXVI of 1950. The impugned Bombay Act may, in my judgment, be well supported as a law made by the Provincial Legislature under entry 2 read with entry 1 in List II and I hold accordingly. I, therefore, concur in the order that this appeal be allowed. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to discuss the contention of the learned Attorney-General that the Bombay City Civil Court Act may be supported as a piece of legislation made by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay under entry 4 read with entry 15 in Part I of List III and I express no opinion on that point. Appeal allowed.
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1950 (12) TMI 24 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been that the Assistant Commissioner, an officer subordinate to the Deputy Commissioner, has felt his hands bound, and failed to give effect to his own independent view in the matter. Another result apprehended by the party will be that the Deputy Commissioner after having once expressed himself, would be slow to change his view. All this rendered the appeal nugatory and a revision application to the Deputy Commissioner perhaps useless. We are of opinion that the Sales Tax Officers ought to exercise their independent judgment in cases they decide and not consult the higher officers in this way so as to render the provisions as regards appeal and one revision nugatory and superfluous. We hope that this case affords a solitary instance of consultation. 10.. For reasons given in para 4 above, however, we have to reject this application on the preliminary point of jurisdiction. ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL. The application is rejected. No orders as regards costs. Application rejected.
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1950 (12) TMI 23 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as it were, the word judgment and to give to it a meaning which in this country is an esoteric meaning, the origin and scope of which I did not myself appreciate until I con- sulted Seton on Judgments and Orders, I must decline to do so on the ground that the Constitution was not the result of a revolution but the outcome of an orderly progress towards Self-Government, that the Supreme Court is the heir of the Federal Court and of the Judicial Committee, that in the Acts of the British Parliament constituting each of these great Tribunals and defining their jurisdiction the word judgment was used as part of a comprehensive phrase which, in my opinion, admits of no such construction and that that comprehensive phrase has been adopted by the makers of the Indian Constitution. I would myself grant leave to appeal. But as each of my learned brothers is of a contrary opinion, the application must be disposed of in the manner just stated by Sarjoo Prosad, J. Application dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 22 - MYSORE HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e has not resorted to any of the remedies provided nor is the invalidity of the tax tested either in appeal or revision. Consequently the assessment has become final. Section 13 provides for the recovery of tax assessed under the Mysore Act and Section 22 prohibits the civil Courts from questioning by appeal or application by way of revision the assessment made or an order passed by the assessing authority. If the provisions contained in the Act or the rules made thereunder, and the method and the manner in which the orders are made, are precluded from the cognisance by civil Courts which evidently constitute proper forum to test the legality or otherwise of the orders a fortiori it follows that in prosecutions which are merely meant to penalise the default and enforce the payment of the tax assessed, the validity of the tax assessed cannot be questioned by criminal Courts. In this view, the conviction must be upheld. This petition fails and is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1950 (12) TMI 21 - VINDHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... changes location. So, it is fallacious to argue that the customs duty levied in the Vindhya Pradesh on 25th January, 1950, is identical with the sales tax referred to in the President s C.O. No. 7. In the result, since no sales tax was actually levied on articles exported from the Vindhya Pradesh on 25th January, 1950, imposition of the sales tax on articles exported from the Vindhya Pradesh territory is illegal. I, therefore, order that the second party cannot legally levy any sales tax on articles purchased within Vindhya Pradesh and exported for consumption outside, and I direct them not to levy the same. The second party, however, is entitled to take all administrative precautions to stop evasion under false description of the destination of the goods sold or purchased. As this involves a substantial question of law in the interpretation of Article 226 of the Constitution and C.O. No. 7 of the President leave is given for appeal to the Supreme Court. Ordered accordingly.
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1950 (12) TMI 20 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sed agents to initial all the books of account of the company and they also will allow the respondents to inspect and take copies of such books of account, during reasonable hours. Such inspections and taking of copies must be completed by 3rd January, 1951. The liquidators have also given undertaking not to distribute any of the assets amongst the creditors without a fort- night s notice to the respondents. Liberty is also given to the respond- ents to inspect and take copies of the books of account of the company periodically every month upon three days notice to the attorney of the petitioner. Such inspection may be made and copies may be taken by the attorneys or the duly authorised agents of the respondents but the inspec- tion and the copies must be completed in course of one day. The sum of Rs. 4,141-9-6 to be paid to Mr. N.C. Mitra, attorney for the State of West Bengal, will be held by him free from all lien subject to further orders of the Court. Order accordingly.
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1950 (12) TMI 19 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Winding up - Power to apply to court to have questions determined or powers exercised ... ... ... ... ..... eir attorneys or their duly authorised agents to initial all the books of account of the company and they also will allow the respondents to inspect and take copies of such books of account, during reasonable hours. Such inspections and taking of copies must be completed by 3rd January, 1951. The liquidators have also given undertaking not to distribute any of the assets amongst the creditors without a fortnight s notice to the respondents. Liberty is also given to the respondents to inspect and take copies of the books of account of the company periodically every month upon three days notice to the attorney of the petitioner. Such inspection may be made and copies may be taken by the attorneys or the duly authorised agents of the respondents but the inspection and the copies must be completed in course of one day. The sum of Rs. 4,141-9-6 to be paid to Mr. N.C. Mitra, attorney for the West Bengal, will be held by him free from all lien subject to further orders of the Court.
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1950 (12) TMI 18 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Winding up – Power to summon persons suspected of having property of company, etc., Overriding preferential payments and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent, directors, etc.
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1950 (12) TMI 17 - SUPREME COURT
Whether one individual shareholder can, under the circumstances of the case and particularly when one of the respondents is the company which opposes the petition, challenge the validity of the Act on the ground that it is a piece of discriminatory legislation, creates inequality before the law and violates the principle of equal protection of the laws under article 14 of the Constitution of India?
Whether in fact the petitioner has shown that the Act runs contrary to article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- Agreeing with the line of reasoning and the conclusion of Mr. Justice Mukherjea as regards the second point relating to the invalidity of the Act on the ground that it infringes article 14 of the Constitution and have nothing more to add. The attack on the legislation on the ground of the denial of equal protection of law cannot succeed.Appeal dismissed.
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